April 24 2012
DA 11-0489
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2012 MT 91
ANNE NANG LOI,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
TODD C. FEELEY,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DR 09-11C
Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Suzanne C. Marshall; Marshall Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
R. Stan Peeler; Peeler Law Office, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 28, 2012
Decided: April 24, 2012
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Todd Feeley (Todd) and Anne Nang Loi (Anne) were married in 1993. Prior to
their marriage, Anne inherited or was gifted an amount between $200,000 and $240,000
from the sale of her family’s frozen shrimp business in France. Anne filed for dissolution
of the parties’ marriage in January 2009. At trial, Anne alleged that approximately
$180,000 of the parties’ $198,000 down payment on the marital home came from her
inherited funds. The District Court found that there was no evidence other than the
testimony of Anne and her mother to establish that $180,000 of the inherited money had
been applied to the down payment. Instead, the court found that Anne was entitled to an
additional $79,982.50 in equity from the marital home because this amount could be
traced to the down payment. Anne appeals.
¶2 We rephrase the issue for review:
¶3 Whether the District Court erred in its application of the law in determining the
distribution of the marital property, including any property inherited by Anne prior to
marriage.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 Anne and Todd were married on July 31, 1993, in San Jose, California. Todd had
just completed his doctoral studies at the time of the marriage. The couple moved to
Switzerland the same year and resided there for the next three years. In 1996, they
returned to the United States so that Todd could begin work as an assistant research
professor at Montana State University (MSU).
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¶5 Anne’s father had passed away in 1984, and her mother continued to run the
family’s frozen shrimp business until 1989. That year, she sold the business and divided
the profits equally among her six children. A bank account with the United Bank of
Switzerland (UBS account) was established in Anne’s name, containing between
$200,000 and $240,000.
¶6 The couple had two children, who at the time of trial were 15 and 11 years old. In
1998, they bought a house on Hitching Post Road in Bozeman for $277,000, making a
$198,000 down payment. At the time of trial, the agreed upon value of the home was
$385,000. Todd is now an associate professor at MSU, and Anne works there as a
systems administrator.
¶7 On January 12, 2009, Anne was arrested for partner-family member assault and a
temporary order of protection was issued against her upon Todd’s petition. Anne filed a
petition for dissolution the next day. In the time between the filing of the petition for
dissolution and trial, the parties were mired in numerous disputes regarding visitation
with the children and various expenditures and debts accrued by Anne after separation.
¶8 Hearings on the petition for dissolution were held over four days in August 2010.
Anne contended that she had applied $180,000 of her inherited funds to the parties’ down
payment on the marital residence. The down payment had been dispersed from the
parties’ joint bank account at First Interstate Bank. She and her mother, Tu, testified that
Tu had transferred $180,000 out of Anne’s UBS account into a separate account when the
couple decided to purchase a home. Todd testified that these funds had been disbursed
from the comingled marital amount, but said there was no way to determine the sources
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of the funds in the account. Both parties agreed that these accounts did indeed contain
inherited funds that had been comingled with marital earnings. However, the only record
of such a transaction was that of a May 12, 1998, transfer of $79,982.50 from the UBS
account to the First Interstate Bank account.
¶9 The District Court entered its order on April 25, 2011, dissolving the parties’
marriage, distributing the marital estate, and establishing a final parenting plan and
support order for the children. In calculating the amount of the equalization payment to
be made by Todd, who was to keep the marital home, the District Court found that Anne
was only entitled to an additional $79,982.50 equity credit in the value of the marital
home because that was the amount traceable to her inherited property.
¶10 Anne promptly filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment of the District Court,
contending that it had failed to award her an additional $140,000 worth of inherited
property. The District Court denied this motion, finding that Anne had failed to prove at
trial that the entire down payment had been made with her inherited funds, and that she
had also failed to show that she had spent an additional $40,000 of this money on a
marital vehicle. Anne now appeals from the orders of the District Court.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 We review a district court’s division of marital property to determine whether the
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and the conclusions of law are correct. In re
Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 6, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39. Absent clearly
erroneous findings, we will affirm a district court’s division of property unless we
identify an abuse of discretion. Funk, ¶ 14. The court’s decision with respect to pre-
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acquired property and assets acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent must be based
on substantial evidence. Funk, ¶ 19.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Whether the District Court erred in its application of the law in determining the
distribution of the marital property, including any property inherited by Anne prior to
marriage.
¶13 Anne argues that the District Court erred when it failed to award her an additional
$100,000 when distributing the marital estate because it did not recognize that her
inheritance was the source of $180,000 of the down payment made on the marital home.
Todd argues that Anne can only trace $79,982.50 of her inheritance to the down payment,
and that the only evidence of greater contributions consists of self-serving testimony that
is contradicted by other evidence in the case. Citing In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, the
District Court found that where the contribution of an inheritance is not traceable and
both parties contributed to any increased value of a marital asset, it is inequitable to
award the value of the asset solely to the acquiring spouse upon dissolution. 2002 MT
309, ¶ 37, 313 Mont. 74, 60 P.3d 441, overruled in part, Funk, ¶ 25. Accordingly, the
court credited Anne with contributing $79,982.50 of her separate, inherited property
toward the down payment on the marital home because this amount was traceable to her.
¶14 Section 40-4-202, MCA, vests the district court with broad discretion to apportion
the marital estate in a manner equitable to each party under the circumstances, providing
in relevant part:
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(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage . . . the court, without
regard to marital misconduct, shall . . . finally equitably apportion between
the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both, however and
whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in the name of the
husband or wife or both. In making apportionment, the court shall consider
the duration of the marriage and prior marriage of either party; the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
custodial provisions; whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition
to maintenance; and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital
assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution or
dissipation of value of the respective estates and the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit. In dividing property acquired
prior to the marriage; property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; the
increased value of property acquired prior to marriage; and property
acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation, the court shall
consider those contributions of the other spouse to the marriage, including:
(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker;
(b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the
maintenance of this property; and
(c) whether or not the property division serves as an alternative to
maintenance arrangements.
¶15 Anne cites to Stoneman v. Drollinger in arguing that pursuant to § 40-4-202,
MCA, Todd is only entitled to an equitable share of the appreciated or preserved value of
the property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent which is attributable to his
efforts. 2000 MT 274, ¶ 18, 302 Mont. 107, 14 P.3d 12, overruled in part, Funk, ¶ 25.
She alleges that Todd’s salaries between 1996 and 1998 could not have possibly allowed
the couple to make a $198,000 down payment on the marital home if she hadn’t
contributed much more than what was credited to her by the District Court. In Funk,
however, we overturned our holdings in Stoneman and multiple other cases regarding
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property acquired prior to the marriage or acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.
These overruled cases stood for the proposition that the non-acquiring spouse was limited
to an equitable share of the appreciated value of such property attributable to that
spouse’s efforts. See Funk, ¶ 25 at n. 3.
¶16 Neither party cites to Funk; however, our opinion in that case controls the
disposition in this appeal. In that case we determined that the overarching premise of §
40-4-202, MCA, is to “finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and
assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired and whether the title
thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both.” Funk, ¶ 16. Thus, instead of
focusing our inquiry on those portions of the statute that specifically address the division
of pre-acquired assets or property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, the
appropriate analysis is “whether the district court adequately considered all of the
relevant facts of the particular case; whether it considered the statutory factors; and then
whether it equitably distributed all property and assets accordingly.” Funk, ¶ 15.
¶17 The record in this case establishes that the District Court considered both parties’
conflicting testimony as to the sources of the down payment on the marital home. The
court found that Anne could only conclusively trace $79,982.50 of her inherited property
to the down payment, and it awarded her this much. As noted above, all decisions made
with respect to this category of property must be based on substantial evidence. Funk, ¶
19. We find no indication in the record that the District Court misperceived the weight of
the evidence in this case.
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¶18 The District Court also considered the over 15-year length of the parties’ marriage,
the ages and health of the parties, their education and employment, and the contributions
each party made to the marital assets as required by § 40-4-202(1), MCA. We have
stated that in findings and conclusions relative to inherited property, a court must also
refer to the factors in § 40-4-202(1)(a)-(c), MCA. Funk, ¶ 24 (citing In re Marriage of
Collett, 190 Mont. 500, 504, 621 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981)). However, Todd conceded that
the $79,982.50 was due to Anne. The court determined that aside from the
aforementioned credit, the relevant facts and statutory considerations called for an equal
division of the marital estate.
¶19 Despite relying in part upon case law that has subsequently been overturned, the
District Court weighed and properly considered the relevant facts and statutory factors,
and arrived at an equitable division of the parties’ property and assets.
CONCLUSION
¶20 Anne has failed to show the District Court’s equitable distribution of the marital
estate lacked credible support in the evidence or otherwise constituted an abuse of
discretion. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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