State v. Melton

April 17 2012

DA 11-0376

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2012 MT 84

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RICHARD EDWARD MELTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC-10-088
Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

Robin A. Meguire, meguirelaw.com, Great Falls, Montana

For Appellee:

Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, Tammy A. Hinderman,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

John Parker, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: March 14, 2012

Decided: April 17, 2012

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Richard Edward Melton pleaded guilty in the Eighth

Judicial District Court, Cascade County, of failing to comply with the Sexual or Violent

Offender Registration Act. As contemplated in the plea agreement, the District Court

committed Melton to the Department of Corrections for two years, all suspended.

¶2 As Condition 14 of his suspended sentence, the District Court prohibited Melton

from having contact with any individual under the age of 18, except for Melton’s own

children, “unless accompanied by an approved and appropriately trained, responsible

adult who is aware of [Melton’s] sexual conviction and approved by the probation and

parole officer and sexual offender treatment provider.” Furthermore, as Condition 15, the

District Court prohibited Melton from frequenting places where children congregate or

are reasonably expected to be present—including, but not limited to, schools, parks,

playgrounds, malls, movies, fairs, parades, swimming pools, carnivals, arcades, parties,

family functions, and holiday festivities—unless accompanied by an approved and

appropriately trained, responsible adult who is aware of Melton’s sexual conviction and

approved by the probation and parole officer and sexual offender treatment provider.

Melton also must “obtain permission from his Probation Officer prior to going to any of

the above places.”

¶3 Melton objected to Condition 15 to the extent it prohibits him from accompanying

his own children to places and functions where there will be other children, unless he is

accompanied by a trained chaperone and given prior approval by his probation officer.

Melton contends that this condition is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation or the

2
protection of the public. He asserts that the condition was “indiscriminately imposed”

and “unnecessarily burdens [his] constitutionally protected relationship with his children

and his right to freedom of travel.” For the reasons which follow, we disagree with

Melton’s contentions and affirm the District Court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶4 In 1999, Melton was charged in Washington with rape of a child in the third

degree. He was 20 years old at the time, and the victim was the 15-year-old daughter of a

friend with whom Melton was residing. The victim told the investigating officer that the

sexual intercourse was consensual. Nevertheless, Melton admitted to the officer that he

“knew better.”

¶5 Melton was released from custody pending trial. When he failed to appear for one

of his court hearings, he was charged with bail jumping. Ultimately, Melton was

convicted of both offenses. On the bail jumping offense, the Washington court sentenced

him to 8 months of confinement followed by 12 months of community custody. For the

rape, the court sentenced him to 16 months of confinement followed by 36 months of

community custody. The sentences were to run concurrently. Melton was required to

register as a sexual offender. In addition, he was to enter and complete sexual deviancy

treatment during the probationary period.

¶6 Melton began, but did not complete, the sexual deviancy treatment. His last date

of attendance was in October 2002. He moved to Lincoln, Montana, in 2003 or 2004

where he worked for about two years before moving to the Great Falls area. He failed,

however, to notify law enforcement in Montana or Washington of his various changes in

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residence. In May 2004, the Washington court issued a fugitive warrant due to Melton’s

failure to verify his address (a felony). Around this same time, Melton married a woman,

Lacey, whom he had known for several years. Lacey had a young son (born in 2000)

from a previous relationship. Melton adopted Lacey’s son. In addition, Melton and

Lacey had two other children: a daughter born in 2004 and a son born in 2007.

¶7 A petition was filed in the Washington court to revoke Melton’s probation on the

rape conviction. When Melton failed to appear, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.

This warrant stated that Melton was extraditable from Oregon and Idaho. In March 2010,

the Cascade County Sheriff’s Office discovered that Melton was living in Belt

(approximately 20 miles east of Great Falls) without having notified the Sheriff’s Office

of his residence as required by Montana’s Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act

(SVORA). See Title 46, chapter 23, part 5, MCA. The Sheriff’s Office also determined

that Melton had an active warrant from Washington. A deputy notified Washington

authorities of Melton’s location, and the Washington court in turn issued an amended

bench warrant which provided that Melton was also extraditable from Montana. The

Cascade County Sheriff’s Office received the amended warrant on August 10, 2010, at

which time it was served on Melton. The sentencing transcript in the present case reflects

that Melton was to be returned to Washington upon the conclusion of the proceedings

relating to his instant offense in Montana.

¶8 In this regard, the State of Montana charged Melton on March 12, 2010, with one

count of failure of a sexual offender to provide notice of change of residence, a felony, in

violation of §§ 46-23-505 and -507, MCA (2009). Melton and the State reached a

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nonbinding plea agreement in which the State agreed to recommend a two-year

commitment to the Department of Corrections, with all time suspended. Melton entered

his guilty plea on August 4, 2010, admitting that “I moved to Belt, and I didn’t notify the

sheriff’s office when I moved.”

¶9 Prior to sentencing, a probation and parole officer, Susan F. Carroll, prepared a

presentence investigation report. In her evaluation and recommendation, Carroll noted

that “by his failing to complete the probationary term of his [Washington] sentence and

failing to register with the proper authorities, [Melton] is working toward a lengthy

criminal history.” Carroll stated that she had

concerns whether the Defendant has the ability to successfully complete
supervision in a community setting. As one of the most important
conditions of his prior sentence was the completion of Sexual Deviancy
Treatment, which he failed to accomplish last attending on October 29,
2002. In addition, Mr. Melton failed to return to the State of Washington to
appear on a warrant which initially was not extraditable in Montana. Now
Mr. Melton must face the penalty for not abiding by the laws in two (2)
states. Of further consequence is the emotional and financial burden he has
placed on his family. The outcome for the Defendant’s wife is being a
single mother of three (3) children.

¶10 Upon defense counsel’s motion, Dr. Michael Scolatti completed a psychological

and psychosexual evaluation of Melton. The evaluation revealed various attributes, some

weighing in Melton’s favor and others weighing against him. On the positive side,

Melton did not demonstrate any sexual interest in prepubescent children and did not

exhibit any major psychopathology. His history did not reflect “a chronic, compulsive

pattern of sexual abuse involving many victims over many years,” he had not exhibited

“a pattern of predatory, stranger oriented behavior,” and his offenses did not include

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“solicitation of others to engage in the acts, such as other children or adults.” Melton

appeared to understand the inappropriateness of his sexual behavior and showed empathy

for the victim and concern for her welfare.

¶11 At the same time, however, Melton was defensive during the evaluation and prone

to minimize or disregard his problems, even common shortcomings to which most people

will admit. The testing revealed that Melton is very concerned about how he is perceived

by others and wants to be viewed as exemplary. He tends to use denial and repression as

a coping mechanism and was reluctant to admit to dysfunction or problems across many

areas. He has poor insight and does not like to analyze himself or others. In general, he

attempts to avoid or deny “unacceptable” feelings, impulses, and problems. As a result,

Dr. Scolatti noted:

Given this apparent tendency to repress undesirable characteristics, the
interpretive hypotheses in this report should be reviewed with caution.
Although there is no evidence to suggest an effort to intentionally distort
the profile, the results may under-represent the extent and degree of any
significant findings in certain areas due to Mr. Melton’s tendency to avoid
negative or unpleasant aspects of himself.

¶12 Dr. Scollati found that Melton’s level of motivation for treatment was substantially

lower than is typical of individuals being seen in treatment settings. Melton’s responses

indicated that he is satisfied with himself as he is, is not experiencing marked distress,

and sees little need for changes in his behavior. Thus, Dr. Scolatti noted that engaging

Melton in the therapeutic endeavor “is likely to represent a formidable problem.”

¶13 As to recidivism, the risk-assessment tools used by Dr. Scolatti placed Melton in

the “moderate” category. Nevertheless, Dr. Scollati designated Melton a Level 1 (low)

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risk to reoffend. See § 46-23-509(2), MCA. He also recommended, though, that Melton

be required to complete “at least” a Phase I component of an outpatient sexual offender

treatment program. Dr. Scolatti noted that Melton could safely and effectively be treated

in a community-based setting without the security of incarceration.

¶14 Lastly, Dr. Scollati concluded that Melton could reside with his wife and children,

but recommended that Melton be prohibited from having any unsupervised contact with

any female children under the age of 18. In this regard, objective measures indicated that

Melton’s sexual interests include adult females and adolescent females (ages 14 to 17);

and while an interest in adolescent females “should not be construed as deviant, or an

indication the person ‘prefers’ adolescent females,” it presented a concern here in light of

Melton’s prior offense and the personality traits discussed above. Moreover, Melton’s

self-reported ratings of various images (depicting children, teens, and adults) indicated

that he had “minimized his subjective sexual interest in comparison to his objectively

measured sexual interest, especially in regards to adolescent females.”

¶15 At sentencing, held April 28, 2011, Melton raised an objection to Condition 15.

While not objecting to the general prohibition on his frequenting places where children

congregate (unless accompanied by a trained chaperone), he proposed that an exception

be included under which he would be allowed to go to such places, without a chaperone,

“if he’s with his own children.” The District Court judge, however, observed that “I

don’t want to place other children at risk.” The judge stated that he was “not going to

allow [Melton] to go to any place where children congregate unless chaperoned by

somebody who is trained.”

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 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 We review restrictions or conditions on a criminal sentence for both legality and

abuse of discretion. State v. Hafner, 2010 MT 233, ¶ 13, 358 Mont. 137, 243 P.3d 435;

State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164.

DISCUSSION

¶17 A court does not have the power to impose a sentence unless authorized by a

specific grant of statutory authority. State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, ¶ 23, 342 Mont. 499,

182 P.3d 66. A sentencing judge is specifically authorized to impose on a suspended

sentence various restrictions or conditions that the judge considers necessary to obtain the

objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society. Section

46-18-202(1), MCA (2009).1 These include restrictions on the offender’s freedom of

association and freedom of movement, plus “any other limitation reasonably related to

the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society.” Section

46-18-202(1)(c), (d), (f), MCA.

¶18 A sentencing judge’s discretion under § 46-18-202(1), MCA, is “broad,” and our

review is correspondingly “deferential.” State v. Zimmerman, 2010 MT 44, ¶ 17, 355

Mont. 286, 228 P.3d 1109. As a general rule, we will affirm a restriction or condition

imposed pursuant to this statutory authority so long as the restriction or condition has

some correlation or connection—i.e., nexus—to the underlying offense or to the offender

1
Melton was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, committing the underlying
SVORA offense in February 2010. Thus, the 2009 MCA applies here. State v. Tracy,
2005 MT 128, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 220, 113 P.3d 297 (the law in effect at the time an offense
is committed controls as to the possible sentence).

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himself or herself. Ashby, ¶¶ 13-15; Zimmerman, ¶ 17. At the same time, however, we

have explained that a sentencing judge’s discretion “is not without limit” and that

deferential review does not mean “no review at all.” Zimmerman, ¶ 17 (internal

quotation marks omitted). If the restriction or condition at issue is “overly broad or

unduly punitive,” or if the required nexus is “absent or exceedingly tenuous,” we will

reverse. Zimmerman, ¶ 17; see also e.g. State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47, ¶ 28, 309

Mont. 1, 43 P.3d 318 (concluding that the banishment condition was unnecessarily broad

and severe); State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85, ¶¶ 24-25, 320 Mont. 490, 87 P.3d 1017

(concluding that the 40-year driving prohibition was unreasonable in terms of its

harshness and duration); cf. United States v. Doe, 79 F.3d 1309, 1319 (2d Cir. 1996)

(“While a sentencing court has broad discretion in fixing conditions of probation, and we

therefore review a sentence of probation under an abuse-of-discretion standard, we

carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions, such as one requiring the defendant to

give up a lawful livelihood.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Davis,

452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Where a condition of supervised release would

impose sweeping restrictions on important constitutional rights, we review the condition

more closely.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Nexus

¶19 As a preliminary matter, the State contends that Melton’s 2010 SVORA offense is

“derivative of” his 1999 rape offense. The State’s “offense nexus” analysis, therefore,

includes some discussion of the 1999 rape. In response, Melton points out that he

pleaded guilty and was sentenced in this case for a registration offense, not a sexual

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exploitation offense. See United States v. Curry, 627 F.3d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 2010)

(“Curry was convicted in the instant case of a registration offense, not a sexual

exploitation offense.”), vacated on other grounds, Curry v. United States, ___ U.S. ___,

132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). Melton further argues that it was improper to impose a

restriction or condition on his sentence for the instant offense (failing to provide notice of

change of residence) based on a separate offense which occurred 12 years earlier, which

involved different conduct (sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl when Melton was

20 years old), and which Melton has not repeated. In this regard, he cites several federal

cases for the proposition that sex-offender conditions cannot be justified by stale sexual

offenses. In United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit

reasoned that “[s]upervised release conditions predicated upon twenty-year-old incidents,

without more, do not promote the goals of public protection and deterrence. The fact that

T.M. has lived the last twenty years without committing a sex offense suggests that he no

longer needs to be deterred or shielded from the public.” 330 F.3d at 1240 (citations

omitted). Similarly, in United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2001), the Eighth

Circuit reversed the “special conditions of sex offenders” imposed on Scott because,

while Scott had been convicted of a sexual offense in 1986, there was no evidence that he

had a propensity to commit any future sexual offenses or that he had repeated the

behavior in any way since the 1986 conviction. 270 F.3d at 636. The court reasoned that

“the special conditions seem unlikely to serve the goals of deterrence or public safety,

since the behavior on which the special conditions are based, though highly

reprehensible, has ceased.” Scott, 270 F.3d at 636.

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¶20 While the State suggests that a nexus to the “original offense” (rather than to the

SVORA offense for which the defendant is being sentenced) is sufficient, we decline to

adopt this as a categorical rule. This Court has indicated that a passing, isolated, or stale

instance of behavior or conduct is insufficient to support a restrictive probation condition

imposed in the name of offender rehabilitation. Ashby, ¶ 15; see also e.g. State v. Stiles,

2008 MT 390, ¶ 16, 347 Mont. 95, 197 P.3d 966; State v. Jones, 2008 MT 440, ¶¶ 22-23,

347 Mont. 512, 199 P.3d 216. An “exceedingly tenuous” nexus is likewise insufficient.

Zimmerman, ¶ 17. In some instances, the “original offense” underlying the registration

requirement may have relevance. Cf. T.M., 330 F.3d at 1240-41 (“[M]ore recent relevant

events may revive old offenses and justify the imposition of supervised release conditions

related to sex offender status.”). In other cases, however, the “original offense” may be

too isolated or stale to serve as justification for imposing the challenged condition. Each

case must turn on its specific facts.

¶21 Here, on the facts presented, we conclude that Melton’s 1999 rape conviction is

relevant to the analysis and supports the challenged condition. As a result of that

conviction, the Washington court required Melton to undergo sexual deviancy treatment

during the probationary period of his sentence. Melton failed, however, to complete the

treatment and absconded from the jurisdiction. It does not appear that he has ever

addressed his underlying issues which led him to engage in the unlawful sexual behavior

in 1999. Furthermore, Dr. Scolatti’s findings, which Melton does not refute, indicate that

Melton is prone to minimize or disregard his problems, is reluctant to admit to

dysfunction, uses denial and repression as a coping mechanism, does not like to analyze

11
himself or others, and has poor insight. Melton’s motivation for treatment is substantially

below average, and he sees little need for changes in his behavior. Although Dr. Scolatti

recommended that Melton be designated a Level 1 (low) risk to reoffend, which the

District Court adopted, Melton’s tendency to repress undesirable characteristics and to

avoid unpleasant aspects of himself caused Dr. Scolatti to express concern that the results

of the psychological and psychosexual testing “may under-represent the extent and

degree of any significant findings in certain areas.” Melton’s self-reported ratings of

various images of children, teens, and adults indicated that he had “minimized his

subjective sexual interest in comparison to his objectively measured sexual interest,

especially in regards to adolescent females.” Based on the evaluation, Dr. Scollati

recommended that Melton be prohibited from having any unsupervised contact with any

female children under the age of 18.

¶22 Irrespective of the parties’ disagreement about whether an “offense nexus” exists

here, we have no difficulty concluding that there is an “offender nexus” and that “the

history or pattern of conduct to be restricted [by the challenged condition] is recent, and

significant or chronic.” Ashby, ¶ 15. At present, Melton remains untreated for the sexual

misconduct underlying his 1999 offense. Moreover, his denial and repression, his low

motivation for treatment, and his tendency to avoid facing the consequences of his

actions (as evidenced by his bail-jumping offense, his failure to complete sexual deviancy

treatment, and his years of noncompliance with the sexual offender registration

requirements) led Dr. Scolatti to conclude that engaging Melton in the therapeutic

endeavor “is likely to represent a formidable problem.” Given these circumstances, the

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District Court had ample justification for placing a limitation on Melton’s contact with

children (other than his own) during his probationary period.

Breadth and Severity

¶23 Melton does not challenge Condition 14, which prohibits him from having contact

with any individual under the age of 18 (other than his own children) unless accompanied

by a trained and responsible adult. Melton also does not challenge Condition 15’s

general prohibition on his frequenting places where children typically congregate (unless

accompanied by a chaperone). What Melton challenges is the absence of an exception in

Condition 15 allowing him to accompany his own children, without a chaperone, to

places where other children are reasonably expected to be present, such as schools, parks,

playgrounds, malls, movies, fairs, parades, swimming pools, carnivals, arcades, parties,

family functions, and holiday festivities. Melton suggests that the absence of such an

exception unnecessarily burdens his “constitutionally protected relationship with his

children” and his “right to freedom of travel.”2 Citing Muhammad, Melton complains

that Condition 15 significantly impacts his right to family relations and is more restrictive

than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose.

2
Melton concedes that he did not raise a free-standing constitutional challenge to
Condition 15 in the District Court. (He raised the lack of a “nexus” as the basis for his
objection to the condition.) Melton explains that he cites his constitutional rights as
additional support, on appeal, for his preserved claim that Condition 15 is unreasonable.
In this regard, Melton relies on the authority of State v. Roundstone, 2011 MT 227, ¶ 21
n. 6, 362 Mont. 74, 261 P.3d 1009, where this Court held that the State’s appellate
arguments fell “within the scope of its theory” before the district court. We noted that
parties may “ ‘bolster their preserved issues with additional legal authority or . . . make
further arguments within the scope of the legal theory articulated to the trial court.’ ”
Roundstone, ¶ 21 n. 6 (quoting State v. Montgomery, 2010 MT 193, ¶ 12, 357 Mont. 348,
239 P.3d 929).

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¶24 In Muhammad, the sentencing court banished the defendant from Cascade County

as a condition of his probation and required him to reside in Lewis and Clark County. In

concluding that this restriction was unduly severe and punitive to the point of being

unrelated to rehabilitation, and broader than necessary to protect the victim, we observed

that Muhammad was residing in Cascade County at the time of the sentencing hearing,

that he had family in Cascade County, that he had no family in Lewis and Clark County,

and that he had been precluded from petitioning the district court to temporarily lift the

restriction. Muhammad, ¶ 28. Notably, we further observed that the district court had

imposed several “less restrictive” means to rehabilitate Muhammad and to protect the

victim and society, including that he “have no contact with females under the age of 18”

and “not frequent places where children congregate.” Muhammad, ¶ 28. Thus, while

Melton argues that Condition 15 is “even broader” in effect than the condition challenged

in Muhammad, this is incorrect. Unlike Muhammad, who was categorically prohibited

from having contact with females under the age of 18 and from frequenting places where

children congregate, Melton is still permitted to engage in these activities—so long as he

is accompanied by a trained and responsible adult and obtains permission from his

probation officer. This Court has affirmed similar restrictions where the specific facts of

the case justified their imposition. See e.g. State v. Rowe, 2009 MT 225, ¶¶ 26-30, 351

Mont. 334, 217 P.3d 471 (affirming a condition that prohibited Rowe from having

contact with any person under the age of 15, unless accompanied by an approved adult);

State v. Brinson, 2009 MT 200, ¶ 18, 351 Mont. 136, 210 P.3d 164 (affirming a condition

14
that required any contact between Brinson and his underage daughter to be supervised

until such time as a counselor made a different recommendation).

¶25 Here, we are not persuaded that Condition 15 is unreasonable, unduly punitive, or

overbroad. The condition’s purpose is to preclude Melton from having unsupervised

contact with children other than his own—a restriction which Melton has not objected to

and which is justified, in any event, for the reasons discussed above. In order to

accomplish this purpose, it is necessary to prohibit Melton from frequenting places where

children congregate, unless accompanied by a trained and responsible adult. The fact that

Melton’s children are with him does not vitiate the need for a chaperone. As the State

points out, the likelihood of Melton’s having unsupervised contact with children in places

like parks and playgrounds would actually increase if he were accompanied only by his

own children, who would be likely to interact with other children themselves. The

sentencing judge stated that he did not want to place other children at risk. Given

Melton’s demonstrated failure over the preceding ten years to face the legal consequences

of the 1999 rape and to complete treatment for that offense, as well as his ongoing

resistance to therapy, the District Court was clearly justified in this concern.

¶26 We reached the same conclusion in State v. Malloy, 2004 MT 377, 325 Mont. 86,

103 P.3d 1064, which involved similar facts. There, Malloy (a registered sex offender)

was convicted of failing to report his change of residence. He was given a partially

suspended sentenced that included certain conditions prohibiting from coming into

contact with persons under the age of 18. In affirming this restriction, we observed that

Malloy had been convicted of two prior sexual offenses and had failed to complete two

15
different sexual offender programs. In fact, he had never completed sexual offender

treatment, either while incarcerated or under supervision of probation and parole. We

reasoned that “Malloy’s history demonstrates his inability to conform his conduct to the

demands of this State’s sexual offender laws. As such, Malloy exhibits behavior which

places society in danger because of his recidivism.” Malloy, ¶ 14. We noted that the

probation conditions had been included in Malloy’s suspended sentence “so that he must

avoid situations which could reasonably be expected to lead to further offenses, given his

history as a sexual offender.” Malloy, ¶ 14. This reasoning in Malloy is also persuasive

here with respect to Melton’s history of absconding and failing to complete treatment.

¶27 As a final matter, we note that Melton, unlike the defendant in Muhammad, has

not been precluded from petitioning the District Court to lift or modify Condition 15’s

restriction. In this regard, the State posits that once Melton has answered for his crimes

in Washington and has successfully completed sexual offender treatment, his treatment

provider may conclude that Melton no longer requires supervision when around young

girls, in which case Melton may petition the court to modify or remove the condition.

Similarly, in considering an identical restriction in State v. Johnson, 2011 MT 286, 362

Mont. 473, 265 P.3d 638, this Court observed that “the conditions challenged here appear

to be quite restrictive of Johnson’s movements. There is good reason for the imposition

of restrictions, but if these prove to be unduly burdensome in practice, Johnson and/or his

probation officer may seek relief from the District Court.” Johnson, ¶¶ 18, 20.

¶28 In conclusion, the requirement that Melton, as a condition of his two-year

suspended sentence, be accompanied by a trained and responsible adult when going to

16
any places where children typically congregate, and obtain permission from his probation

officer before doing so, is reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the

protection of society, § 46-18-202(1), MCA, and is not overbroad or unduly punitive.

¶29 Affirmed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

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