IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35549
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2009 Opinion No. 63
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: September 4, 2009
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
CHRISTOPHER P. MARTIN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Valley County. Hon. Thomas F. Neville, District Judge. Hon. Henry R. Boomer,
III, Magistrate.
Memorandum decision and order of the district court on intermediate appeal from
the magistrate division affirming denial of motion to suppress evidence, affirmed.
Hallin Law, PLLC; Jonathon D. Hallin, McCall, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
______________________________________________
GUTIERREZ, Judge
Christopher P. Martin appeals from the district court‟s memorandum decision and order
on intermediate appeal affirming the magistrate‟s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A vehicle being driven by Martin was stopped by Trooper Mike Sherbondy after the
officer noticed the front license plate was hanging at a thirty-degree angle with one bolt missing.
The officer subsequently discovered that Martin was driving without privileges and arrested him.
Martin was charged with driving without privileges, his third such offense within five years, in
contravention of Idaho Code § 18-8001(5).
Martin thereafter filed a motion to suppress, claiming that Trooper Sherbondy lacked
reasonable and articulable suspicion to conclude that he was operating the vehicle contrary to
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Idaho traffic laws and also that I.C. § 49-428, governing the display of license plates, was
unconstitutionally vague as it applied to him. After a hearing where Martin stipulated to the fact
that the license plate was secured by one bolt and was hanging at a thirty-degree angle, the
magistrate denied Martin‟s motion. Martin then entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Acting in its appellate capacity, the district
court affirmed the magistrate‟s order denying Martin‟s suppression motion. Martin appeals the
decision of the district court.
II.
ANALYSIS
Martin advances two contentions in arguing that the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate‟s denial of his motion to suppress: that the officer did not have the requisite suspicion
to stop him and that I.C. § 49-428 is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to him.
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we review
the decision of the district court directly. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217
(Ct. App. 2008). We examine the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate‟s findings of fact and whether the magistrate‟s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate‟s decision, we
affirm the district court‟s decision as a matter of procedure. Id.
A. Vagueness
Martin contends that I.C. § 49-428 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because,
he asserts, the statute failed to provide him adequate notice that the manner in which his license
plate was affixed was prohibited and therefore, allowed Trooper Sherbondy to “arbitrarily and
discriminatorily” enforce the requirement of the statute against him. Where the constitutionality
of a statute is challenged, we review the lower court‟s determination de novo. State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 430, 179 P.3d
1084, 1086 (Ct. App. 2007). The party attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must
overcome a strong presumption of validity. Id. Appellate courts are obligated to seek an
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute
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defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does
not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711-12, 69 P.3d at 131-32. It
is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are
not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Korsen, 138 Idaho at
711, 69 P.3d at 131. Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required at the peril
of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711-12,
69 P.3d at 131-32. Due process requires that all “be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids” and that “men of common intelligence” not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998) (citing Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the
statute. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at
132; State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001).
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a
defendant‟s conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. To succeed on an “as applied”
vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the defendant‟s
conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant‟s conduct was proscribed or failed to
provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether
to arrest him. Id.
In relevant part, I.C. § 49-428 provides that:
(2) Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle
to which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not less
than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the plate,
be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from
foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible . . . .
Martin argues that section 49-428 is unconstitutionally vague because the words
“securely fastened” permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by not defining how a
person of ordinary intelligence is to comply with the strictures of the rule. Specifically, he
argues that the statute fails to define how a license plate is to be “securely fastened to the
vehicle,” because the Idaho Legislature could have intended two interpretations of preventing the
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plate from either: (1) swinging parallel to the ground, or (2) swinging perpendicular to the
ground. He further argues that “securely fastened” does not require that a license plate be
fastened with two bolts and that if the legislature had intended that all license plates be securely
fastened with two or more bolts, “it could have easily said as much.” And since it did not, he
surmises, the statute allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
In denying Martin‟s claim that the statute was void for vagueness, the district court
stated:
This Court does not find the language in section 49-428 to be
unconstitutionally vague; rather, this Court finds the language clear and
unambiguous. Not only does section 49-428 require a license plate to be
“securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate from
swinging,” but it also requires the plate to “be in a place and position to be clearly
visible,” and be “maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be
clearly legible.” Idaho Code Ann § 49-428(2). The language of section 49-428
clearly conveys the legislative purpose that all license plates shall be securely
fastened, clearly visible, and clearly legible. Regardless of whether a plate is
positioned to allow swinging parallel in a forward and backward motion or
perpendicular to the lane of traffic, where only one corner of the plate is fastened,
if the license plate is in any position to be swinging, it is clearly not “securely
fastened to the vehicle . . . to prevent the plate from swinging.”
This does not mean that in order to be in violation of Idaho Code Section
49-428, a license plate must be swinging. Rather, the language clearly
contemplates that if a license plate is securely fastened, it would not be able to
swing. Appellant also attempts to argue that his license plate was securely
fastened by one bolt and had the legislature intended to require license plates be
secured with two bolts, it could have designated as such. However, the Idaho
Legislature did not have to articulate specifically that license plates which are
adequately secured with two bolts would prevent a license plate from swinging
because such a fact is quite obvious in nature and design. It is general knowledge
that Idaho license plates are equipped with two holes, which may be secured with
two bolts. Therefore, the language in section 49-428 which require license plates
to be “securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate
from swinging,” is clear and unambiguous. Thus, this Court cannot find that
Idaho Code Section 49-428 is unconstitutionally vague.
When called upon to interpret a statute, we begin with an examination of its literal words.
State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare ex rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730
(1995); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 628, 38 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Ct. App. 2001); State v.
Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). The statutory language is to be
given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Lisby, 126 Idaho at 779, 890 P.2d at 730. A
statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one provision from another. State v.
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Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 440, 64 P.3d 697, 699 (Ct. App. 2003). In attempting to discern and
implement the intent of the legislature, a court may seek edification from the statute‟s legislative
history and contemporaneous context at enactment. Id. However, if the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, a court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory
construction. Id.
In this case, we agree with the district court that the language of the statute defines
criminal conduct with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and that it is worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. The plain and obvious meaning of the statute‟s requirement that a
plate be “securely fastened to the vehicle . . . to prevent the plate from swinging,” clearly
provides notice to a driver that fastening a license plate on a vehicle in a fashion that will not
prevent it from swinging is a violation of I.C. § 49-428. That the statute does not distinguish
between swinging of license plates parallel or perpendicular to the ground does not render the
statute unconstitutionally vague--the clear language of the rule requires that the plate be securely
fastened to prevent swinging of any manner. As the district court pointed out, “regardless of
whether a plate is positioned to allow swinging parallel in a forward and backward motion or
perpendicular to the road, where only one corner of the plate is fastened, if the license plate is in
any position to be swinging, it is clearly not „securely fastened to the vehicle . . . to prevent the
plate from swinging.‟” The statute clearly sets forth the conduct prohibited and therefore is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Martin.
B. Stop
Martin also argues that the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to
conclude that his license plate was displayed in contravention of I.C. § 49-428, and therefore the
officer‟s stop of his vehicle was not justified and his motion to suppress should have been
granted. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court‟s findings of fact which are supported
by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
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127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits government agents
from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. When a private vehicle is stopped by the
police, all of its occupants are “seized” and may seek suppression of evidence if the seizure did
not comply with Fourth Amendment standards. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007);
State v. Nevarez et. al., ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho
235, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994). Normally, to pass constitutional muster, a detention to
investigate possible criminal activity must be based upon reasonable suspicion, derived from
specific articulable facts, and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts, that the
person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26
(1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,
983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264, 47 P.3d 763, 767
(Ct. App. 2001). The quantity and quality of information necessary to create reasonable
suspicion for such a “Terry stop” is less than that necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210, but must be
more than a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
When a defendant challenges the validity of a vehicle stop, the burden is on the state to
prove that the stop was justified. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); State v. Sevy, 129
Idaho 613, 614-15, 930 P.2d 1358, 1359-60 (Ct. App. 1997). The reasonableness of a stop is
determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of
the stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520,
526, 826 P.2d 481, 487 (Ct. App. 1991).
Here, the magistrate concluded that the officer‟s testimony that he observed the license
plate hanging at a thirty-degree angle gave the officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the
license plate was not securely fastened and had been able to swing down. On appeal, the district
court affirmed, stating:
In the present case, the Court must determine whether the traffic stop was
supported by a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that the Defendant‟s vehicle
was being driven contrary to Idaho Code Section 49-428. According to the
findings of fact by the Magistrate Judge, Trooper Sherbondy observed that the
Defendant‟s license plate appeared to have only one bolt and to be hanging at a
thirty (30) degree angle. Defendant‟s license plate was only fastened with one
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bolt and at one time swung in a motion perpendicular to the lane of traffic rather
than parallel to it.
. . . Idaho Code Section 49-428 requires that license plates be “securely
fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging.”
Idaho Code Ann. § 49-428(2). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge‟s
findings that Trooper Sherbondy had reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Defendant‟s license plate, being secured by only one bolt and hanging at an angle,
appeared not to be securely fastened and that it might have been swinging in
violation of Idaho Code Section 49-428. If a license plate is not securely fastened
in such a manner to be clearly visible or legible, that is also a violation of Idaho
Code Section 49-428. Regardless of whether a license plate is moving or is
hanging at an angle, such license plate may be difficult to read.
Additionally, the position of Defendant‟s license plate in an angled
manner [sic] was enough to catch Trooper Sherbondy‟s attention while on patrol.
If most license plates are securely fastened with two bolts in a manner which
prevents the license plate from swinging, a license plate attached with only one
bolt and tilted in a downward position understandably draws attention as being
out of the ordinary. Therefore, this Court finds that Trooper Sherbondy had
reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop believing the
Defendant to be operating his vehicle in a manner contrary to Idaho Code Section
49-428.
On appeal, Martin contends that the state never set forth a “factual basis for which
Trooper Sherbondy could have reasonably believed” that Martin was operating his vehicle in
contravention of the statute. He concedes that his front license plate was only secured by one
bolt, but argues that there was no evidence presented to support a reasonable conclusion that it
was not prevented from swinging or that it was less than twelve inches off the ground. His
argument is unavailing. Common sense dictates that where a license plate is secured by only one
bolt and hanging at an angle, it is reasonable for an observer to suspect that it has not been
fastened securely enough to prevent swinging and, indeed, has swung down to its current
position. Thus, in this case, we conclude that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion
that Martin‟s license plate was displayed in contravention of I.C. § 49-428 such that his stop of
the vehicle was justified.1
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As the state points out, Martin‟s reliance on State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d 1279
(Ct. App. 2007) is misplaced. There, this Court concluded that law enforcement officers could
not stop a vehicle being operated without a license plate, but with a temporary registration permit
visible, in order to investigate the temporary permit‟s validity unless the invalidity of the permit
was “obvious and discernable by the officer prior to stopping the vehicle.” Id. at 348, 160 P.3d
at 1283. The reasoning in Salois is not applicable to this case, because there was an “obvious
and discernable” violation of I.C. § 49-428 that was readily apparent to Officer Sherbondy prior
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III.
CONCLUSION
Idaho Code § 49-428 is not unconstitutionally void as applied to Martin, nor did the
officer effectuating the stop lack reasonable, articulable suspicion that Martin had violated the
statute‟s requirement that a license plate be securely fastened to prevent swinging. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court‟s decision upholding the magistrate‟s denial of Martin‟s motion to
suppress.
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge PERRY CONCUR.
to the stop--namely that the license plate was dangling at a thirty-degree angle and was not
securely fastened in a manner to prevent it from doing so.
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