Rico v. Montoya

1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 5 not include the filing date. 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 7 SALVADOR RICO, 8 Worker-Appellant, 9 v. NO. 31,127 10 JAMES R. MONTOYA, d/b/a THE ROCK 11 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and NEW 12 MEXICO MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, 13 Employer/Insurer-Appellees. 14 APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 15 Victor S. Lopez, Judge 16 Rose Bryan, P.C. 17 Rose Bryan 18 Albuquerque, NM 19 for Appellant 20 Yenson, Lynn, Allen & Wosick, P.C. 21 Phyllis Savage Lynn 22 April D. White 23 Albuquerque, NM 24 for Appellees 25 MEMORANDUM OPINION 26 VANZI, Judge. 1 Worker appeals from an order sustaining Employer/Insurer’s objection to 2 Worker’s notice of change of health care provider (HCP). We issued a notice of 3 proposed summary disposition, proposing to reverse. Employer/Insurer has filed a 4 memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded. We 5 therefore reverse. 6 Worker’s entitlement to change his HCP turns upon the effect of a letter which 7 Employer/Insurer sent to him approximately two weeks after he was injured. In that 8 letter, Employer/Insurer wrote to “confirm” that it had not chosen the initial HCP but 9 rather had “allowed” Worker to make the initial selection. [MIO 2] Insofar as he had 10 already received treatment from Dr. Sanchez, the letter specifically identified Dr. 11 Sanchez as Worker’s “chosen” HCP. [MIO 2] 12 As a matter of law, it was incumbent upon Employer/Insurer to advise Worker, 13 in writing and within a reasonable period of time, of its decision either to select the 14 initial HCP itself or to allow Worker to make the initial selection. NMSA 1978, § 52- 15 1-49(B) (1990); 11.4.4.11(C)(2)(b) NMAC (2003); Howell v. Marto Elec., 2006- 16 NMCA-154, ¶¶ 15, 18, 140 N.M. 737, 148 P.3d 823 (recognizing that the employer 17 is “required to communicate their initial decisions with respect to which party will 18 choose the initial HCP to their workers in writing” and observing that this 19 communication must occur “within a reasonable period of time”). Employer/Insurer 2 1 contends that its letter fulfilled this requirement by indicating that it had decided to 2 allow Worker to make the initial selection. [MIO 5-6] 3 In Cribbs v. Coastal Chemical, No. 29,896, slip op. at 1 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 4 30, 2010), we addressed a letter that was analogous in all material respects. As in this 5 case, the employer/insurer wrote the worker a “confirmatory” letter in which it took 6 the position that the worker had already selected the initial HCP by seeing a physician. 7 Id. at 2. We concluded that this did not comply with the employer/insurer’s duty to 8 advise the worker of his right to choose. Id. More specifically, we held that an 9 employer/insurer “cannot provide notice in writing that a worker has the right to 10 choose an initial HCP and identify who that choice is in the same document without 11 defeating the concept of choice and the requirement of notice as contemplated by the 12 Legislature in Section 52-1-49(B) and articulated in 11.4.4.11(C)(2)(b) NMAC.” 13 Cribbs, No. 29896, slip op. at 3. 14 The letter at issue in this case is deficient in precisely the same respects. As in 15 Cribbs, Employer/Insurer took the position that Worker had already made a selection 16 and specifically identified the doctor. “[W]e decline to interpret a letter that states that 17 a worker has already made a selection as written notice that a worker may make a 18 selection.” Id. at 2. 3 1 In its memorandum in opposition, Employer/Insurer attempts to distinguish 2 Cribbs on its facts. [MIO 7] The letter at issue in this case contains some additional 3 language, including Employer/Insurer’s assertion that it had already “allowed” 4 Worker to choose the initial HCP, as well as a suggestion that Worker contact 5 Employer/Insurer or an ombudsman if he disagreed with Employer/Insurer’s position. 6 [MIO 2, 7] However, the inclusion of this language does nothing to satisfy the 7 essential statutory and regulatory requirement, that Employer/Insurer inform Worker 8 of his right to make a prospective choice. It is this critical shortcoming which renders 9 the similarities between the letters, rather than their differences, controlling. 10 Employer/Insurer also argues that Cribbs should be distinguished on grounds 11 that we lack information about the nature and extent of the treatment that Worker 12 received from Dr. Sanchez. [MIO 7-8] However, this has no bearing on 13 Employer/Insurer’s obligation to provide reasonably prompt and legally adequate 14 notice of its decision with respect to the initial selection of HCP. As we held and 15 Howell and reiterated in Cribbs, an employer/insurer may not avoid its responsibility 16 in this regard by remaining silent for a period and subsequently relying on the 17 worker’s predictable act of obtaining care on his or her own to establish that the 18 worker made the initial HCP selection. Howell, 2006-NMCA-154, ¶ 30; Cribbs, No. 19 29,896, slip op. at 2. In light of Employer/Insurer’s failure to provide the requisite 4 1 notice in this case, the nature and extent of care that Worker received from Dr. 2 Sanchez is immaterial. 3 Finally, Employer/Insurer urges the Court to “disregard” Cribbs, arguing that 4 it represents an unwarranted expansion of the statutory obligation to provide notice. 5 [MIO 8] However, we do not share Employer/Insurer’s view, and we decline the 6 invitation to abrogate our prior decision. 7 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in our notice of proposed 8 summary disposition, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 9 this opinion. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 __________________________________ 12 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 13 WE CONCUR: 14 _________________________________ 15 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 16 _________________________________ 17 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 5