#24868-rev & rem-JKM
2009 SD 66
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
BRILEY PIPER, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS WEBER, Warden,
South Dakota State Penitentiary, Respondent and Appellee.
* * * *
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
HONORABLE JOHN W. BASTIAN
Judge
* * * *
STEVE MILLER
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
STEVEN R. BINGER of
Binger Law Office Attorneys for petitioner
Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellant.
LAWRENCE E. LONG
Attorney General
GARY CAMPBELL
Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for respondent
Pierre, South Dakota and appellee.
* * * *
ARGUED ON APRIL 28, 2009
OPINION FILED 07/29/09
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MEIERHENRY, Justice
[¶1.] Briley Piper appeals the circuit court’s denial of his writ of habeas
corpus. He contends that he did not validly waive his right to have a jury determine
whether to impose the death penalty and that his appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal.
BACKGROUND
[¶2.] The facts of this case are available in their entirety in this Court’s
opinion affirming Piper’s conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. State v.
Piper, 2006 SD 1, 709 NW2d 783. The following facts relate to the issues raised in
Piper’s request for habeas corpus relief. Piper, Elijah Page, and Darrell Hoadley
kidnapped and murdered Chester Allen Poage on or about March 12 and 13, 2000,
for the purpose of stealing from Poage’s family home in Spearfish, South Dakota.
Piper was charged with first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony
murder, kidnapping, first degree robbery, first degree burglary and grand theft.
[¶3.] Piper first pleaded not guilty. He later appeared before the judge to
change his plea to guilty to the charges of first degree felony murder, kidnapping,
and the remainder of the charges. The State was not aware of Piper’s intent to
change his plea but contemporaneously informed the judge that it still intended to
seek the death penalty. The judge then had a discussion on the record with counsel
concerning the death penalty phase of the proceedings. The judge indicated that he
was unsure whether the death penalty determination would be made by the court or
by a jury when a defendant pleads guilty to first degree murder. Defense counsel
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for Piper offered their interpretation of the statutes. They believed the statutes
required the judge rather than a jury to decide if death should be imposed.
[¶4.] Following the short discussion with counsel concerning the proper
procedure, the judge advised Piper that he had the “right to a jury trial here in
Lawrence County by a jury of 12 fair and impartial jurors.” The judge further
explained that the jury would have to determine whether the penalty should be a
life or death sentence and that the verdict would have to be unanimous. Piper
indicated that he did not understand the unanimity requirement. In response, the
judge explained that by waiving jury sentencing, Piper traded “12 lay people for one
judge to make that call.” The judge emphasized that by pleading guilty, Piper was
waiving his right to have a jury make the death penalty determination. The judge
then accepted Piper’s guilty plea and set a date for the sentencing hearing. After a
three-day hearing, the judge sentenced Piper to death.
[¶5.] Piper’s co-defendant, Page, was also sentenced to death by the same
judge. The other co-defendant, Hoadley, maintained his not guilty plea and
proceeded to jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict but did not impose the
death penalty. Because of the discrepancy in sentences of the co-defendants, Piper
challenged the proportionality of his death sentence to this Court. The case was
remanded for the judge to conduct an intra-case proportionality review. The judge
conducted the proportionality review and affirmed his earlier decision to impose the
death penalty. Piper appealed his death sentence, and the majority of this Court
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affirmed. * Subsequently, Piper filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in
circuit court. The habeas court denied the application. Piper now appeals the
denial of habeas relief and raises two issues: (1) whether his waiver of his right to
have a jury determine the death penalty was constitutionally valid, and (2) whether
his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in his direct appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶6.] The United States Supreme Court has said that: “[T]he penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison
term differs from one of only a year or two.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US
280, 305, 96 SCt 2978, 2991, 49 LEd2d 944 (1976). “[T]he qualitative difference of
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.” California v. Ramos, 463 US 992,
998-99, 103 SCt 3446, 3452, 77 LEd2d 1171 (1983) (citations omitted); see also
Piper, 2006 SD 1, ¶75, 709 NW2d at 811 (citations omitted); State v. Page, 2006 SD
2, ¶98, 709 NW2d 739, 771 (citations omitted). This Court has embraced the
Supreme Court’s recognition that “‘death is a different kind of punishment from any
other which may be imposed in this country’ and that ‘[t]he penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.’” Page, 2006
* Piper originally appealed in 2002. This Court requested additional briefing
after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 US 584,
122 SCt 2428, 153 LEd2d 556 (2002). Piper’s appeal was argued in March of
2004 and decided in January of 2006.
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SD 2, ¶98, 709 NW2d at 771 (quoting Lankford v. Idaho, 500 US 110, 125, 125 n21,
111 SCt 1723 n21, 114 LE2d 173 (1991)).
[¶7.] Habeas corpus proceedings are reviewed under a narrow standard of
review. Steichen v. Weber, 2009 SD 4, ¶4, 760 NW2d 381, 386 (citing Erickson v.
Weber, 2008 SD 30, ¶17, 748 NW2d 739, 744).
Habeas corpus can be used only to review (1) whether the court
has jurisdiction of the crime and the person of the defendant; (2)
whether the sentence was authorized by law; and (3) in certain
cases whether an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of
basic constitutional rights. Habeas corpus is not a remedy to
correct irregular procedures, rather, habeas corpus reaches only
jurisdictional error. For purposes of habeas corpus,
constitutional violations in a criminal case deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction. Further, we may not upset the habeas
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Id. (quoting Erickson, 2008 SD 30, ¶17, 748 NW2d at 744). “Habeas corpus review
does not substitute for direct review.” Id. The applicant for habeas corpus must
satisfy the initial burden to prove the need for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
ANALYSIS
[¶8.] Piper’s habeas argument is directed at invalid waiver of his right to a
jury in the death penalty phase and ineffective assistance of counsel. Piper
contends that he was misled by the judge’s advice that a jury would have to choose a
sentence unanimously. Since we decide this case on the issue of whether Piper
validly waived his right to a jury on the death penalty phase, we do not reach his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
[¶9.] SDCL 23A-27A governs the capital sentencing procedure in South
Dakota. See SDCL 23A-27A-6; SDCL 23A-27A-2. The statutes provide that if a
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jury does not unanimously decide to sentence the defendant to death, a life sentence
is automatically imposed. SDCL 23A-27A-4; SDCL 23A-27A-5. In pertinent part,
SDCL 23A-27A-4 provides: “If an aggravating circumstance is found and a
recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
If a sentence of death is not recommended by the jury, the court shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment.” SDCL 23A-27A-4 (emphasis added). Our reading
of the statute is that the jury has to unanimously agree to impose the death
penalty. If the jury cannot agree to a death sentence, an automatic life sentence is
imposed. Consequently, if one juror votes against imposing death, the defendant
will receive a life sentence.
[¶10.] South Dakota modeled its capital sentencing scheme after the Georgia
death penalty statutes, which the United States Supreme Court determined to be
constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia. See Rhines v. Weber, 2000 SD 19, ¶49, 608
NW2d 303, 314; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153, 96 SCt 2909, 49 LEd2d 859
(1976). The Georgia Supreme Court, applying similar statutes, said:
We interpret [the statutes] to mean . . . in a murder case, after
conviction, where only two sentences can be imposed, life
imprisonment or death, if the convicting jury is unable to agree
on which of those two sentences to impose, the trial judge must
impose the lesser, life imprisonment.”
Miller v. State, 229 SE2d 376, 377 (Ga 1976); see also Zant v. Stephens, 456 US 410,
420, 102 SCt 1856, 1860, 72 LEd2d 222 (1982) (jury must unanimously recommend
the death penalty).
[¶11.] Piper contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
right to have a jury make the death penalty determination. Piper specifically points
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to the judge’s failure to clarify that a jury would have to unanimously sentence him
to death, and that if one juror voted against the death penalty, he would receive a
life sentence. The verbatim record of the judge’s explanation supports Piper’s claim.
[¶12.] The judge first advised:
Judge: With respect to Count IA, which is a Class A felony,
you not only have a jury trial right as to the charge itself as to
the issue of guilt or innocence, but you have the right to a jury to
determine whether or not the State has proved one or more
aggravating circumstances and then for that jury to decide
whether the penalty should be life or death. The verdict of the
jury would have to be unanimous. And even if the jury found
that one or more aggravating circumstances existed, I think it is
still within their province to sentence you to life imprisonment.
Is that your understanding, [Defense Counsel]?
Piper’s counsel: Correct.
Judge: [Counsel for the State]?
State’s counsel: Yes.
Judge: Do you understand that, Mr. Piper?
Piper: I didn’t understand the last part.
(Emphasis added). After Piper expressed that he did not understand jury
sentencing, the judge advised:
Judge: Okay. As I understand it, based upon the statutes
and the cases so far decided by the Supreme Court of this state
concerning the death penalty, that the state of the law is that if
you were convicted of either Count I, premeditated murder, or
Count IA, felony murder, which is the charge that you intend to
plead guilty to today, then we would have a sentencing hearing.
You are proposing that I hold the sentencing hearing
rather than the jury hold the sentencing hearing. What you
need to understand is that if you have a jury instead of a judge,
all 12 jurors must agree on the penalty; and even if the jury
found that the State had proved one or more aggravating
circumstances - -
Piper’s counsel: Those are circumstances with which the jury
would be justified in giving you the death penalty if they saw
necessary. Aggravating circumstances is simply something - -
The jury must find that it exists in order to impose the sentence
of death. If they don’t find that that exists, they can’t. And if
they do find that it exists, they don’t have to, but they can.
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Judge: Do you understand that, Mr. Piper?
Piper: Yes.
Judge: Is there anything you want me to explain in more
detail about that?
Piper: No.
Judge: If I do the sentencing instead of the jury, I still
have the same situation. I must find one or more aggravating
circumstances to be proved by the evidence, and even if I found
those to be proved by the evidence, I could sentence you to life
imprisonment rather than to death by lethal injection. Do you
understand that?
Piper: Yes.
Judge: What is significant about what you’re doing here
today is that if you waive your right to have the jury do the
sentencing, you are trading 12 lay people for one judge to make
that call. Do you understand that?
Piper: Yes.
(Emphasis added). The judge did not clarify further.
[¶13.] The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant waives
several constitutional rights when entering a guilty plea.
First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the
States by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial
by jury. Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. [A court]
cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights
from a silent record.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 243, 89 SCt 1709, 1712, 23 LEd2d 274 (1969)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Apple, 2008 SD 120,
¶11, 759 NW2d 283, 287 (citing Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 SD 122, 126-27, 178
NW2d 198, 200 (1970) (applying the Boykin rights to South Dakota)). Further, the
Supreme Court has considered the right to a jury trial for both parts of bifurcated
proceedings, such as death penalty proceedings. The Supreme Court recently noted
that “[t]his Court has repeatedly held that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact
that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury,
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not a judge, and established by a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Cunningham v. California, 549 US 270, 281, 127 SCt 856, 863-64,
166 LEd2d 856 (2007).
[¶14.] Since the 1979 reenactment of the South Dakota death penalty
statutes, five defendants have been sentenced to death in South Dakota. See Page,
2006 SD 2, 709 NW2d 739; Piper, 2006 SD 1, 709 NW2d 783; State v. Anderson,
2003 SD 65, 664 NW2d 48; State v. Moeller, 2000 SD 122, 616 NW2d 424; State v.
Rhines, 1996 SD 55, 548 NW2d 415. Of the five, only Piper and Page pleaded guilty
and were sentenced by the trial court. Thus, Piper’s case was the first time this
Court addressed whether South Dakota’s statutory scheme allowed a jury to
determine the death penalty following a guilty plea or whether the statute
unconstitutionally required the judge to determine the death penalty.
[¶15.] On direct appeal, Piper argued that the South Dakota death penalty
statutes were unconstitutional. Piper, 2006 SD 1, ¶47, 709 NW2d at 803. Piper
argued that the statutes did not allow for jury sentencing if the defendant pleaded
guilty. Id. In Ring v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court determined that
“a capital sentencing scheme would be unconstitutional if it prevented a defendant
who pleaded guilty from having alleged aggravating circumstances found by a jury.”
Id. ¶48,709 NW2d at 803 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 US 584, 609, 122 SCt 2428,
2443, 153 LEd2d 556 (2002)). The majority of this Court determined that the South
Dakota statutes were not unconstitutional because even though the death penalty
statute “does not authorize jury sentencing in capital cases following a guilty plea,
other statutes provide that right.” Id. ¶56, 709 NW2d at 806. Although the opinion
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stated that Piper waived his right to a jury trial, the issue of whether Piper
constitutionally waived his right to have a jury decide the death penalty was not
raised on appeal. It had not been raised because Piper’s main challenge was that
the statute unconstitutionally did not allow for a jury on the death penalty phase.
On habeas, Piper claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising
the voluntariness issue on appeal. Thus, the question, as now framed, of whether
Piper’s waiver was knowing and voluntary is squarely before us for the first time.
[¶16.] We have said that “‘the trial court must be able to determine from its
own record that the accused has made a free and intelligent waiver of his
constitutional rights before a guilty plea is accepted.’” Apple, 2008 SD 120, ¶10, 759
NW2d at 287 (quoting State v. Sutton, 317 NW2d 414, 416 (SD 1982)). “A judge has
the duty to make sure that a defendant understands the consequences of entering a
guilty plea and the rights the defendant is waiving.” Id. ¶21, 759 NW2d at 290.
This Court considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a
guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Id. ¶14, 759 NW2d at 288. Piper’s waiver of
his right to have a jury decide the death penalty stage is also considered under the
totality of the circumstances.
[¶17.] Central to the totality of the circumstances analysis is the judge’s lack
of a clear explanation regarding juror unanimity in the death penalty phase. The
judge did not explain to Piper that if the jury did not unanimously decide to impose
death, then a life sentence would be imposed. The judge only explained that “all 12
jurors must agree on the penalty.” Although Piper’s attorneys testified in Piper’s
habeas hearing that they had fully explained the unanimity requirement, their
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explanation alone in this case is not sufficient to find a voluntary waiver. This is
especially true in light of the fact that Piper’s attorneys advised him that the
statute did not allow for a jury trial on the penalty phase after a guilty plea to first
degree murder. During Piper’s change of plea hearing, defense counsel said: “I’m
seizing upon . . . the plain language of that statute: ‘In nonjury cases the judge shall
. . . ,’ so it’s our position that upon the acceptance of the plea, we will come before
you for a sentence of life or death.” Consequently, when Piper entered his guilty
plea, he was doing so under counsels’ advice that by entering his guilty plea, he was
not entitled to a jury on the sentencing phase. The judge’s explanation did not
clearly dispel that misunderstanding. Nor did the judge’s explanation point out
that if Piper chose to let the jury decide whether to impose the death penalty, one
juror could spare him from death.
[¶18.] Other courts have held that the failure to fully advise a defendant of
the requirement of jury unanimity warrants reversal. See Harris v. State, 455 A2d
979, 984 (Md 1983), State v. Martinez, 43 P3d 1042, 1048-49 (NM 2002);
Commonwealth v. O’Donnell, 740 A2d 198, 213 (Pa 1999). The Maryland Court of
Appeals determined that “[i]t is one thing to be told that the jury would have to be
unanimous before imposing death or life imprisonment, but quite another to not
being made aware that if, after a reasonable time, the jury is unable to agree, the
court shall dismiss the jury and impose a life sentence.” Harris, 455 A2d at 984.
Because of the court’s failure to advise the defendant, the court remanded for a new
sentencing proceeding. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
defendant’s waiver of jury sentencing cannot be knowing and intelligent unless the
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defendant is aware of the unanimity requirement. Martinez, 43 P3d at 1048-49.
The court determined that the unanimity feature of “jury sentencing is an especially
crucial piece of information for a defendant who faces a potential sentence of death,”
and that this error constituted fundamental error. Id. at 1049. The court remanded
for a new sentencing proceeding. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also
determined that “[g]iven the unique role a sentencing jury plays in the penalty
phase of a capital case, it also seems appropriate for any colloquy preceding a trial
court’s acceptance of a capital defendant’s waiver to a penalty-phase jury to inform
the defendant of the requirement under Pennsylvania law that a penalty-phase jury
render a unanimous verdict.” O’Donnell, 740 A2d at 213 (internal citation omitted).
[¶19.] The fact that one juror has the potential to save a defendant’s life
cannot be underplayed. The defendant’s plea cannot be considered knowing and
voluntary without a clear explanation and understanding of this concept. The
judge’s explanation fell short of the required clarity in this case. The judge
explained as follows: “[t]he verdict of the jury would have to be unanimous. And
even if the jury found that one or more aggravating circumstances existed, I think it
is still within their province to sentence you to life imprisonment.” Even if Piper’s
lawyers had explained the unanimity requirement to him before he entered his
plea, the judge’s explanation, at least, would have been confusing and, at most, in
direct contradiction. Consequently, without an adequate explanation by the judge
that one juror could, in effect, choose life, Piper’s waiver of a jury trial on the death
penalty cannot be considered knowing or voluntary. Furthermore, the finality of a
death sentence requires that we accord higher scrutiny to capital sentencing
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determinations. Ramos, 463 US at 998-99, 103 SCt at 3452 (citation omitted). For
this reason, in a death penalty plea, more so than in other pleas, the trial court has
the duty to ensure “that the defendant truly understands the charges, the penalties,
and the consequences of a guilty plea.” Apple, 2008 SD 120, ¶21, 759 NW2d at 291.
[¶20.] Piper argues that the remedy for an unconstitutional waiver of his
right to jury trial is to invalidate his death sentence and impose a life sentence.
Piper cites to SDCL 23A-27A-14 to support this argument. SDCL 23A-27A-14
provides that:
In the event the death penalty for a Class A felony is held to be
unconstitutional by the South Dakota Supreme Court or the
United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over
a person previously sentenced to death for a Class A felony shall
have such person brought before the court, and the court shall
sentence such person to life imprisonment.
SDCL 23A-27A-14. We are not, however, holding that the death penalty is
unconstitutional. Rather we determine that Piper’s waiver of his right to jury trial
was unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
[¶21.] We hold that Piper did not validly waive his right to have a jury
determine the death penalty. We, therefore, vacate Piper’s death sentence and
remand for a new sentencing proceeding that affords Piper the right to have a jury
decide whether the death penalty should be imposed. See Quist v. Leapley, 486
NW2d 265, 268-69 (SD 1992) (invalid plea reversed and remanded); see also Apple,
2008 SD 120, ¶¶22-23, 759 NW2d at 291 (reversed to allow defendant to withdraw
guilty plea because plea was not intelligent and voluntary,); State v. Goodwin, 2004
SD 75, ¶18, 681 NW2d 847, 854 (invalid guilty plea reversed to allow the defendant
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to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial). Because we reverse based on the
unanimity requirement, we do not reach Piper’s other issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
[¶22.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and
SEVERSON, Justices, concur.
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