UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-30961
Summary Calendar
IRENE M. BEASLEY,
SSN XXX-XX-XXXX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(92-CV-1480)
March 29, 1996
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND
Irene M. Beasley filed an application for Social Security
disability benefits on May 7, 1990, alleging disability since May
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
15, 1987. The state agency and the Social Security Administration
denied her claim. Beasley requested and received a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ issued a decision
denying benefits on July 22, 1991. The ALJ found that Beasley was
not disabled within the meaning of the Act prior to June 30, 1989,
the date her Title II insured status expired. Beasley requested
review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council on the grounds
that the ALJ did not consider evidence that her insured status
continued after June 30, 1989. The Appeals Council denied
Beasley's request for review, stating that it had considered the
evidence in question and that the evidence was not sufficient to
rebut the presumption established by the earnings record that she
had not received wages after 1984.
Beasley filed a complaint in the district court, alleging that
the ALJ's finding that her insured status ended on June 30, 1989,
was contrary to the law and the evidence in that the ALJ ignored
credible evidence that she had continued to work until the spring
of 1987. Beasley and the Secretary filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. Beasley argued that the ALJ had improperly failed to
evaluate and give credence to her evidence that she had continued
to work through 1987 and had thus extended her insured status. The
Secretary argued that the Appeals Council had considered the
evidence and found it insufficient. The magistrate judge
recommended that Beasley's motion be denied and that her complaint
be dismissed with prejudice, holding that substantial evidence
2
supported the ALJ's finding that her insured status expired on June
30, 1989. Beasley filed objections, pointing out that the ALJ had
failed to even consider her evidence of employment. The district
court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, denied
Beasley's motion, and dismissed her complaint.
The evidence in question consists of three affidavits by
Beasley, her daughter, and her husband, in which they asserted that
Beasley worked for a Mrs. Paula Kirk as a cook/maid from 1985 until
the spring of 1987 for $25 a day, three days a week at first, and
then two days a week towards the end. Beasley's daughter asserted
that she would sometimes accompany Beasley and also work for Mrs.
Kirk. Beasley's husband asserted that he would frequently drive
Beasley to work at Mrs. Kirk's.
Beasley testified regarding her employment in the years of
1985 through 1987 at the hearing before the ALJ. She testified
that she worked for Mrs. Kirk (Curt in the transcript), and a
lawyer named Madsen (Matterson in the transcript). These employers
were listed in Beasley’s original application for benefits. She
testified that Social Security was supposed to have been withheld
from her pay. The ALJ, noting the issue of the expiration of
Beasley's insured status on June 30, 1989, according to the
Secretary's records of her wages, held open the record for 30 days
to take additional evidence of Beasley's employment. The record
was reopened on July 22, 1991, for admission of the affidavits.
3
OPINION
Beasley argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate and give
credence to the evidence that she continued to work through 1987,
thus extending her insured status, rendering the decision invalid
and unsupported by substantial evidence.
This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited
to two issues: 1) did the Commissioner apply the proper legal
standards, and 2) is the Commissioner's decision supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Anthony v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). If the Commissioner's
findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive
and must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). Substantial evidence is that which is
relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It must be more than a scintilla, but it
need not be a preponderance. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. "This
Court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo.
Rather, conflicts in the evidence are for the Secretary to
resolve." Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295 (citations omitted).
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, an applicant
must be "insured for disability insurance benefits." 42 U.S.C. §§
423(a)(1)(A) & (c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130; Demandre v. Califano,
591 F.2d 1088, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952 (1979).
A claimant is eligible for benefits only if the onset of disability
4
began on or before the date the claimant was last insured. Ivy v.
Sullivan, 898 F.2d 1045, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990). The claimant bears
the burden of establishing a disabling condition before the
expiration of his insured status. Id.
According to the Secretary's records of Beasley's wages, the
date that Beasley was last insured was June 30, 1989. The
Secretary’s records showed no wages after 1984.
The Social Security Act specifically addresses the evidentiary
weight given to the Secretary's record. The absence of entries of
wages in the records serves as evidence that no wages were paid.
42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.803(a); Breeden v.
Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir. 1974). The records are
open to revision for a period of three years, three months, and
fifteen days, after which period the absence of an entry is
presumptive evidence that no wages were paid. 42 U.S.C. §§
405(c)(1)(B) & (c)(4)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.803(c)(2); Breeden, 493
F.2d at 1005. This presumption is not conclusive and may be
rebutted upon the production of contrary evidence by the claimant.
However, the absence of a wage entry is still an evidentiary
factor, which may be considered as proof that the claimant did not
receive wages for that year, and must be weighed against the
claimant's evidence that he did receive wages, applying the usual
tests of credibility. Kephart v. Richardson, 505 F.2d 1085, 1089
5
(3d Cir. 1974); Duenas v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 719, 722-23 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1430 (1995).
Beasley is correct that the ALJ's decision does not mention
either her testimony at the hearing, or the affidavits submitted
after the hearing regarding the issue of her alleged employment
from 1985 to 1987. The decision does not contain any determination
regarding the credibility of Beasley's claims of continued
employment. The Appeals Council suggested that Beasley's "self-
serving statements" were not credible evidence.1 However, such
testimony cannot be disregarded, and neither the statute nor the
regulations require independent corroboration by the types of
objective evidence suggested by the Secretary, such as tax returns.
Kephart, 505 F.2d at 1089 (Claimant's "testimony is evidence which
cannot be disregarded, whether corroborated or not."). The ALJ was
not required to believe Beasley's evidence; however, he was
required to consider it and explain why he found it not credible,
if that is in fact what he did. See Singer v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d
176, 178 (9th Cir. 1975)(ALJ required to consider claimant's
evidence of employment).
The Secretary argues that Beasley's evidence was not as
substantial as the evidence produced by claimants in other cases
1
Beasley also correctly points out that the Appeals
Council erroneously implied that a presumption of no wages existed
for 1987. Beasley filed her application for benefits before the
time limitation expired for 1987, which the Secretary acknowledges.
6
which were reversed and remanded. However, that argument begs that
question. If the ALJ had considered Beasley's evidence and
believed it, it would be sufficient. As Beasley correctly noted in
her objections, the magistrate judge misconstrued the ALJ's finding
that there was "no evidence of work activity since the claimant's
alleged onset date." That finding pertained to the date of onset
of disability. Beasley obviously does not dispute that she did not
work past her onset date in May of 1987. She does dispute the
absence of wage entries in the Secretary's records for wages she
contends she earned from 1985 through May of 1987. The administra-
tive record is devoid of a factual finding by the ALJ regarding the
credibility of Beasley's claimed employment from 1985 to 1987, or
any evaluation by the ALJ of the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of
the evidence she presented.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to remand it to the Secretary for
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Nothing herein should be construed to express any opinion as to the
credibility or weight of Beasley's evidence.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
7