USCA11 Case: 22-12537 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 12/21/2022 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12537
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
GEORGE W. ALLEN, JR.,
Petitioner,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
U.S. Tax Court
Agency No. 11238-20
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12537
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
George Allen, Jr., proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the
Tax Court’s dismissal of his petition to challenge a notice of defi-
ciency, under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a), for lack of jurisdiction. The
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) moves for
summary affirmance of the Tax Court’s dismissal of Allen’s peti-
tion and contends the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over Allen’s
appeal because his petition was postmarked on July 16, 2020, which
was one day after the filing deadline. The Commissioner contends
timely filing was a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a petition
to challenge the notice of deficiency in the Tax Court.
Allen responds and asserts the Commissioner is not entitled
to summary affirmance because the Supreme Court’s decision in
Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 142 S. Ct. 1493
(2022), undermines our precedent, which previously held that
timely filing of a petition to challenge the notice of deficiency is a
prerequisite for the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.
After the IRS mails a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer, the
“taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermina-
tion of the deficiency,” within 90 days. 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). Fur-
thermore, the statute provides the “Tax Court shall have no juris-
diction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund un-
der this subsection unless a timely petition for a redetermination of
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22-12537 Opinion of the Court 3
the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the defi-
ciency that is the subject of such petition.” Id. The “timely filing
of such a petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a suit in the tax
court.” Pugsley v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 749 F.2d 691, 692
(11th Cir. 1985).
The postmark stamped date on the envelope of a petition
shall be the date of delivery of such a document for purposes of a
filing deadline. 26 U.S.C. § 7502(a). If the envelope has a timely
postmark, the document is considered timely filed even if it is re-
ceived after the last date prescribed for filing the document.
26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(a). If the postmark does not bear a date on
or before the last date set for filing the document, it is considered
not to be timely filed regardless of when the document was depos-
ited in the mail. Id. § 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(A). “Accordingly, the
sender . . . assumes the risk that the postmark will bear a date on
or before the last date, or the last day of the period, prescribed for
filing the document,” although he may use registered or certified
mail to avoid such risk. Id.
Summary disposition is appropriate because the Commis-
sioner’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law. See Groen-
dyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 1
(explaining summary disposition is appropriate where “the
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12537
position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so
that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the
case”). The Tax Court did not clearly err when it found that Allen’s
petition was untimely filed when it was postmarked on July 16,
2020, which was one day after the filing deadline for his petition to
challenge the notice of deficiency. See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a); I.R.S.
Notice 2020-23 (Apr. 9, 2020) (providing relief to affected taxpayers
and granting them until July 15, 2020, “to perform all [s]pecified
[t]ime [s]ensitive [a]ctions, that [were] due to be performed on or
after April 1, 2020, and before July 15, 2020,” including “the time
for filing all petitions with the Tax Court”); Highpoint Tower
Tech. Inc. v. Comm’r, 931 F.3d 1050, 1056 (11th Cir. 2019) (review-
ing the Tax Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual find-
ings for clear error). The Commissioner mailed Allen’s notice of
deficiency on March 2, 2020, which informed him he had until June
1, 2020, to file a petition with the Tax Court. 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a).
However, after the President declared the COVID-19 pandemic as
a federal disaster, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a notice on
April 9, 2020, which extended Allen’s deadline from June 1, 2020,
to July 15, 2020, to file his petition with the Tax Court. I.R.S. No-
tice 2020-23 (Apr. 9, 2020).
With a filing deadline of July 15, 2020, Allen’s petition, post-
marked on July 16, 2020, was untimely, and under our case law, the
timely filing of a deficiency petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite
for a case in the Tax Court. Pugsley, 749 F.2d at 692; see also
26 U.S.C. § 7502(a); 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7502-1(a) and (c)(1)(iii)(A).
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22-12537 Opinion of the Court 5
Contrary to Allen’s argument, Boechler 2 did not overrule our prec-
edent in Pugsley, and we are bound by prior panel precedent to
apply the law holding the timely filing of a petition to challenge the
notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a suit in the
Tax Court. See Pugsley, 749 F.2d at 692; Smith v. GTE Corp., 236
F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Under the well-established
prior panel precedent rule of this Circuit, the holding of the first
panel to address an issue is the law of this Circuit, thereby binding
all subsequent panels unless and until the first panel’s holding is
overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.”);
Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 344 F.3d
1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (“While an intervening decision of the
Supreme Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our
court, the Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.”);
2 In Boechler, the IRS notified the taxpayer of a discrepancy in its tax filings,
and when the taxpayer failed to respond, the IRS assessed an “intentional dis-
regard” penalty. 142 S. Ct. at 1496. After the Independent Office of Appeals
sustained the IRS’s levy, Boechler had 30 days to file a petition in the Tax
Court, which he missed by 1 day. Id. at 1497. The Tax Court dismissed
Boechler’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court explained
that a procedural requirement is only jurisdictional if Congress “clearly states”
that it is. Id. The Court looked at I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1), which stated that a “per-
son may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax
Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have juris-
diction with respect to such matter).” Id. Finding the text of § 6330(d)(1) did
not “clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading,” the Supreme Court held
“§ 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due
process determination is an ordinary, nonjurisdictional deadline subject to eq-
uitable tolling.” Id. at 1498, 1501.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12537
Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228, 1230
(11th Cir. 2007) (noting “[o]bedience to a Supreme Court decision
is one thing, extrapolating from its implications a holding on an is-
sue that was not before that Court in order to upend settled circuit
law is another thing” and holding the Supreme Court’s determina-
tion the time requirement set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 33 was not jurisdictional did not impact our precedent hold-
ing the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 are
jurisdictional). Additionally, although Allen contends he has proof
he was in line at the post office on July 15, 2020, and was given
assurances his petition would be postmarked on that date, by fail-
ing to send his petition by registered or certified mail, he assumed
the risk the petition would not be postmarked on the day he asserts
he deposited it in the mail. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(A).
Because Allen failed to timely file his petition, the Tax Court
did not err when it determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear his
case. See Highpoint Tower Tech., Inc., 931 F.3d at 1056. There-
fore, the Commissioner’s position is clearly correct as a matter of
law, and he is entitled to summary affirmance of the Tax Court’s
dismissal of Allen’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Groendyke
Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. Therefore, we GRANT the govern-
ment’s motion for summary affirmance.