RENDERED: DECEMBER 22, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0754-MR
DILLON BALDWIN,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF WILLIAM BALDWIN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-00524
JOHN ROOT, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS LAUREL COUNTY
SHERIFF; LAUREL COUNTY
OFFICE OF SHERIFF; AND
UNKNOWN LAUREL COUNTY
DEPUTY SHERIFF, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS/HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS LAUREL COUNTY
DEPUTY SHERIFF APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND K. THOMPSON,
JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: The Appellant alleges that the trial court erroneously
denied a directed verdict and then incorrectly instructed the jury concerning the
propriety of the use of an interstate cut-through by a law enforcement officer when
driving a vehicle without lights and sirens activated. Having reviewed the record,
the briefs of the parties and the law, we affirm the ruling on directed verdict, but
reverse and remand on the instructional issue.
FACTS
On January 3, 2017, William Baldwin (Baldwin) was driving north on
Interstate 75 in Laurel County. Baldwin was in the left lane of the expressway
when he noticed a marked Laurel County Sheriff’s Office vehicle rapidly
approaching from his rear. The sheriff’s vehicle was in the “slow” or right lane.
Baldwin feared that the deputy, despite not having emergency lights
activated, was going to pull him over as he was admittedly driving at a speed
above the posted limit. Instead, the officer’s vehicle passed him, still in the right
lane, and then signaled a left turn. The vehicle changed lanes and after entering the
left lane in front of Baldwin, applied its brakes and entered a cut-through in the
median to execute a U-turn to proceed in the southbound lanes of I-75. Baldwin
applied his brakes as he was afraid if he did not, he would run into the rear of the
vehicle as it turned into the cut-through. Baldwin’s SUV began to slide on the
pavement, which was wet from a light drizzle. The SUV left the road, hit a wall,
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and started flipping over multiple times, landing in the emergency lane of
northbound I-75.
Firefighters and EMS responded to the scene and Baldwin was
transported to the local hospital and was later transported to a larger hospital.
Surgery was performed on his right shoulder, and he eventually recovered, though
he had lingering pain in the joint.
In June of 2018, Baldwin filed a civil complaint against the Sheriff of
Laurel County, both individually and as sheriff, as well as the unknown driver of
the law enforcement vehicle who he claimed caused the accident on January 3,
2017. Baldwin alleged negligence by the operator of the sheriff’s vehicle and
negligent training and supervision by the sheriff. His complaint was soon amended
to substitute claims for common law negligence and statutory negligence and to
name additional law enforcement agencies, apparently because Baldwin was not
positive about the identity of the markings on the sheriff’s vehicle which he
claimed caused his accident.
After a trial, Baldwin moved for directed verdict on liability, which
was denied. Additionally, both parties submitted proposed jury instructions to the
court. Baldwin’s tendered instructions requested that the jury be instructed that
law enforcement officers are not to “drive over or across any dividing line on the
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interstate without his vehicle’s lights and sirens activated.”1 The trial court refused
to instruct the jury as Baldwin requested, reasoning that it was not the act of the
sheriff’s vehicle turning into the cut-through which caused the accident. The trial
court stated that if any act of the officer had contributed to the accident, it was the
braking, not the turning, making an instruction pursuant to KRS 177.300
unnecessary. Because the lights and sirens were not activated by the officer, the
court instructed the jury that the driver of the sheriff’s vehicle owed an ordinary
duty of care, as any other driver on the road.
The jury found in favor of the Laurel County Sheriff and against
Baldwin. Baldwin2 now appeals and alleges that the trial court erred in its
instructions to the jury, specifically in not instructing the jury concerning the
deputy’s use of the cut-through, and that the trial court should have directed a
verdict in favor of Baldwin on liability. We affirm the ruling on the directed
verdict but agree with Baldwin concerning the instructions. We therefore reverse
and remand for a new trial.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 177.300.
2
William Baldwin passed away while this appeal was pending before this Court. His son and
administrator of his estate, Dillon, filed a motion to be substituted, which was granted.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Determinations concerning motions for a directed verdict are
reviewed by the appellate court for a determination of whether “if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt [or
liability], only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict[.]” Mountain
Water Dist. v. Smith, 314 S.W.3d 312, 314 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Commonwealth
v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)).
Allegations of error involving jury instructions are reviewed by an
appellate court either for an abuse of discretion or de novo, depending on the
nature of the objection.
Our review of alleged errors in jury instructions differs,
depending upon the type of error alleged. When the error
arises from giving an unwarranted instruction or failing to
give a warranted instruction, we review the decision for
abuse of discretion. Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198,
203 (Ky. 2015). However, when the error hinges on
“whether the text of the instruction accurately presented
the applicable legal theory,” we review the “content of a
jury instruction” de novo. Id. at 204.
Commonwealth v. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364, 366-67 (Ky. 2018).
ANALYSIS
Baldwin alleges that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and
erred in denying him a directed verdict on liability. We will first review the
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determination concerning the motion for directed verdict before considering the
argument concerning the instructions given to the jury.
a. Directed Verdict
Baldwin argues that the actions of the deputy driver were singularly
responsible for the accident and, therefore, directed verdict on liability should have
been granted in his favor. We disagree. Under the evidence as a whole, it was not
clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Baldwin liable for the accident, and so it
was appropriate for the trial court to deny the motion.
Baldwin cites City of Louisville v. Maresz, 835 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. App.
1992). In that case, which involves somewhat similar facts, the officer applied his
brakes and slowed down in the left lane of Interstate 64 in Louisville in preparation
of pulling into a cut-through to execute a U-turn so he could respond to a call.
Before the turn could be executed, the citizen hit the rear of the police vehicle. It is
that fact – that the cars collided – which causes Maresz to be inapplicable to the
present case. Though the Court in Maresz held that the citizen would have been
entitled to a directed verdict on liability of the officer, it did so based upon the facts
of the case. The officer in Maresz applied his brakes in the left lane, and in doing
so caused the citizen to run into the rear of his vehicle.
In the present case, there was no evidence of any contact between the
police vehicle and Baldwin’s vehicle. The evidence provides that it could just as
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well have been Baldwin’s actions which caused the accident as opposed to any
actions of the law enforcement officer. Because it was not clearly unreasonable for
the jury to find that it was not any action of the officer which caused Baldwin to
lose control of his vehicle in the present case, the trial court’s determination to
deny a directed verdict to him was not “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993
S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
b. Jury Instructions
Baldwin alleges that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury
concerning the impropriety of deputy’s actions in using the cut-through to execute
a U-turn. The appellee argues that the argument raised now on appeal was not
preserved by an objection to the trial court. First, we will consider whether the
objection was properly preserved.
CR3 51 is clear that one may not later argue error in jury instructions
unless the party first objects to the instruction given or denied to the trial court, so
that the trial court might have the opportunity to consider the argument.
(3) No party may assign as error the giving or the failure
to give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately
presented his position by an offered instruction or by
motion, or unless he makes objection before the court
3
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
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instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which
he objects and the ground or grounds of his objection.
Id.
The standard of review on appeal concerning instructions turns on the
character of the objection lodged. If a party requests a particular instruction, as
here, and is denied, that determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. If,
however, a party objects to the content of an instruction as given the jury, the
review is de novo.
Baldwin argued to the trial court that the jury should be instructed
concerning KRS 177.300, which declares it to be unlawful to make a U-turn or a
left turn except where allowed.4 The trial court judge refused the instruction,
explaining that he believed it was not the act of the deputy’s vehicle making the
left or U-turn which had caused the accident. Rather, the court itself believed it
was the actions of the deputy’s vehicle before the left or U-turn was made which
4
It is unlawful for any person (1) to drive a vehicle over, upon, or across any curb,
central dividing section or other separation or dividing line on limited access
facilities; (2) to make a left turn or a semicircular or U-turn except through an
opening provided for that purpose in the dividing curb section, separation or line;
(3) to drive any vehicle except in the proper lane provided for that purpose and in
the proper direction and to the right of the central dividing curb, separation
section, or line; (4) to drive any vehicle into the limited access facility from a
local service road except through an opening provided for that purpose in the
dividing curb, or dividing section or dividing line which separates such service
road from the limited access facility proper.
KRS 177.300.
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led to the accident. Thus, the court determined the instruction concerning the U-
turn was irrelevant and unnecessary.
We find that the tendering of the desired instruction, and argument at
the bench of why Baldwin desired said instruction to be included in the instructions
tendered to the jury, to be sufficient to preserve Baldwin’s position. The trial court
was clearly aware of Baldwin’s argument concerning the instruction on KRS
177.300. Whether the objections lodged by Baldwin regarding the failure to
include the requested instruction, and the tendering of the requested instruction,
would be sufficient to undertake a de novo review of the instructions that were
tendered to the jury is not necessary for us to determine. The objection to the
instructions by Baldwin was only to the failure to include the requested instruction
regarding the unlawful U-turn. Thus, we will not undertake a de novo review of
the remaining instructions given the jury as we find no such review is necessary.
However, we will review the trial court’s denial of the instruction for
an abuse of discretion.
When the alleged error is that a trial court either gave an
instruction that was not supported by the evidence or
failed to give an instruction that was required by the
evidence, the correct standard of review is abuse of
discretion. Id. at 203. This is because the
decision to give or to decline to give a particular
jury instruction inherently requires complete
familiarity with the factual and evidentiary
subtleties of the case that are best understood by
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the judge overseeing the trial from the bench in the
courtroom. Because such decisions are necessarily
based upon the evidence presented at the trial, the
trial judge’s superior view of that evidence
warrants a measure of deference from appellate
courts that is reflected in the abuse of discretion
standard.
Id.
Kentucky Guardianship Administrators, LLC v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc.,
635 S.W.3d 14, 35 (Ky. 2021) (citing Sargent, 467 S.W.3d at 203).
The trial court determined, after hearing all the evidence, that the U-
turn itself was not the cause of the accident, and so it determined it would not be
proper to instruct about a matter which was not relevant. Rather, the trial court
instructed the jury on the duty of ordinary care on the part of the deputy, as he had
not activated his emergency lights and sirens and was therefore to exercise the
level of care required of any driver on the road.
We find the trial court abused its discretion in not giving the
instruction requested because, in doing so, the trial court invaded the province of
the jury in determining the cause of the accident. The jury could have determined
that it was the actions before the U-turn, or not, which caused the accident. The
jury could have determined, or not, that it was the actions of the deputy during the
execution of the U-turn which caused the accident. Thus, the jury should have
been instructed on the propriety of the turn in accordance with the instruction
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requested by Baldwin.
It is axiomatic that a trial court must instruct the jury upon every
theory reasonably supported by the evidence.
The trial court must instruct the jury upon every theory
reasonably supported by the evidence. “Each party to an
action is entitled to an instruction upon his theory of the
case if there is evidence to sustain it.” McAlpin v. Davis
Const., Inc., 332 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky. App. 2011)
(quoting Farrington Motors, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.
of N.Y., 303 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Ky. 1957)).
Sargent, 467 S.W.3d at 203.
While it may be true that instructions should be fundamental or “bare
bones” in civil matters, they must still be complete.
It is well-settled that Kentucky follows the bare bones
approach to jury instructions in all civil cases. Olfice,
Inc. v. Wilkey, 173 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Ky. 2005). See also
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814, 824
(Ky. 1992). However, fundamental to that approach is
that all of the bones must be presented to the jury.
Correct instructions are absolutely essential to an
accurate jury verdict. The function of instructions is to
tell the jury what it must believe from the evidence in
order to resolve each dispositive factual issue in favor of
the party who has the burden of proof on that issue. See
Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070, 95 S. Ct. 657, 42 L. Ed. 2d
666 (1974). In light of the importance of correct jury
instructions, erroneous instructions are presumed
prejudicial. McKinney v. Heisel, 947 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky.
1997). If it cannot be affirmatively shown that no
prejudice resulted from the erroneous instruction,
reversal is required. Id.
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Insight Kentucky Partners II, L.P. v. Preferred Automotive Services, Inc., 514
S.W.3d 537, 549 (Ky. App. 2016).
We must review questions concerning instructions reviewing the
evidence with an eye favoring the party who requested the instruction. “When
ruling on whether it was error not to give a jury instruction, appellate courts must
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party requesting the
instruction.” Exantus v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 871, 888 (Ky. 2020) (citing
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. 2005) (citing Ruehl v.
Houchin, 387 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Ky. 1965))).
It is the province of the jury to determine the ultimate cause of the
accident, not the trial court. “The immediate cause, the last link in the chain of
causation, is the important one, and it is within the province of the jury to
determine whether this link has existence.” Ashton v. Roop, 244 S.W.2d 727, 731
(Ky. 1951). By failing to instruct the jury concerning the propriety of the deputy’s
actions in utilizing the cut-through, we find the trial court impeded the jury from
considering that it was the U-turn which caused the accident. Such invaded the
province of the jury, was prejudicial and was an abuse of discretion. “The issue of
causation is ordinarily one for a jury to determine.” Jones by and through Jones v.
IC Bus, LLC, 626 S.W.3d 661, 683 (Ky. App. 2020). Reversal is required.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied Baldwin’s motion for a directed
verdict on the question of liability as it was not unreasonable for the jury to
determine that it was Baldwin’s reactions to the movement of the deputy’s vehicle
which led to the accident. The trial court did err, we hold, in not instructing the
jury concerning the propriety of using the cut-through to execute a U-turn. The
failure to so instruct invaded the province of the jury to be the finder of fact and
determiner of causation. We remand for a new trial with the jury being instructed
in accordance with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
David Noble Casey C. Stansbury
Adrian Mendiondo Curtis M. Graham
Lexington, Kentucky J. Austin Anderson
Lexington, Kentucky
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