Filed 1/9/23 Conservatorship of L.A. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Conservatorship of the Person of L.A. H049457
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 1-06-MH-036042)
MARY ANN WARREN, as Public Guardian, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION,
etc., DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Petitioner and Respondent, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
v.
L.A.,
Objector and Appellant.
BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 16, 2022, be modified as follows:
On page 2, the first full paragraph shall now read:
“L.A. suffers from schizophrenia, a mental illness characterized by disorganized thinking,
hallucinations, delusions, unusual behavior, isolation, and withdrawal from social interaction.
She has been institutionalized for much of her adult life and has lived in a variety of care
facilities, including board and care homes, institutes for mentally disordered people, and acute
psychiatric hospitals. L.A. has been hospitalized in locked facilities for acute exacerbation of her
symptoms many times over the course of her lifetime.”
There is no change in the judgment. The petition for rehearing is denied .
___________________________________
Wilson, J.
______________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
______________________________________
Danner, J.
Warren, as Public Guardian v. L.A.
H049457
Filed 12/16/22 Conservatorship of L.A. CA6 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Conservatorship of the Person of L.A. H049457
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 1-06-MH-036042)
MARY ANN WARREN, as Public
Guardian, etc.,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
L.A.,
Objector and Appellant.
A jury determined L.A. to be “gravely disabled” within the meaning of the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.),1 resulting in
the appointment of respondent Public Guardian for the County of Santa Clara (public
guardian) as L.A.’s conservator. L.A. contends substantial evidence did not support the
jury’s finding of grave disability.
While her appeal was pending, L.A.’s conservatorship expired. Having
considered the parties’ supplemental briefing on whether the appeal is moot, we dismiss
the appeal.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
L.A. suffers from schizophrenia, a mental illness characterized by disorganized
thinking, hallucinations, delusions, unusual behavior, isolation, and withdrawal from
social interaction. She has been institutionalized for much of her adult life and has lived
in a variety of care facilities, including board and care homes, institutes for mentally
disordered people, and acute psychiatric hospitals. She has also been placed under
conservatorships before, following determinations that she was gravely disabled. L.A.
has been hospitalized in locked facilities for acute exacerbation of her symptoms many
times over the course of her lifetime.
In January 2021, L.A. presented herself to the Good Samaritan Hospital Mission
Oaks (Mission Oaks) emergency room. Mission Oaks is a locked acute psychiatric
hospital with 24-hour-a-day nursing care. While at Mission Oaks, L.A. received
psychiatric treatment, including prescription and administration of medication. She
remained at Mission Oaks at the time she was evaluated for the conservatorship
proceeding challenged in this appeal.
On February 11, 2021, the public guardian filed a petition for appointment of
temporary conservator of the person for a gravely disabled person, pursuant to the LPS
Act. The same day, the court issued an order appointing the public guardian as
temporary conservator of the person of L.A., pending final determination of the petition.
L.A. elected to proceed with a jury trial pursuant to section 5350, subdivision
(d)(1). At trial, the public guardian argued that “[L.A.] is gravely disabled due to a
mental illness and therefore requires a mental health conservatorship for her own safety
and well-being.” The public guardian also requested that the court impose restrictions on
L.A. precluding her from having a driver’s license, possessing a firearm, entering into
contracts, refusing or consenting to treatment related to her grave disability, and refusing
or consenting to routine medical treatment unrelated to her grave disability.
2
L.A. denied that she is gravely disabled, although she acknowledged that she
suffers from schizophrenia.
A jury was selected and trial was held on August 2, 2021. The public guardian put
on Dr. Gregory Salerno as its expert witness in the field of psychology and the issue of
grave disability, to testify regarding L.A.’s mental state and her ability to provide for her
basic personal needs. L.A. did not testify at the trial.
On August 3, 2021, the jury unanimously determined that L.A. was “presently
gravely disabled due to mental disorder.” The trial court then determined that: (1) L.A.
shall not have the privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle; (2) L.A.
shall not have the right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to her being
gravely disabled; (3) L.A. shall not have the right to refuse or consent to routine medical
treatment unrelated to remedying or preventing the recurrence of her being gravely
disabled; (4) L.A. shall not have the right to enter into contracts; and (5) L.A. is
disqualified from possessing a firearm.
Judgment was entered on August 4, 2021, and the letters of conservatorship were
signed on August 5, 2021. L.A. timely appealed.
While the appeal was pending, L.A.’s conservatorship expired by its own terms on
August 3, 2022.2 We requested supplemental briefing regarding whether the appeal was
moot.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable law
“The LPS Act authorizes short-term involuntary detentions (see Welf. & Inst.
Code, §§ 5150, 5250) and one-year conservatorships for those who are gravely disabled
due to a mental health disorder or chronic alcoholism (see id., § 5350).”
“An LPS conservatorship automatically expires after one year (§ 5361).”
2
(Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2.)
3
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095 (Eric B.).) In this context,
“gravely disabled” means “[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health
disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or
shelter.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48,
54.)
“When a treatment professional determines a person is gravely disabled and
unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may
petition to establish a conservatorship.” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1095, citing
§ 5352; Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 708-709 (K.P.).) “If the matter
proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely disabled, the court appoints a
conservator (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350), imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed (id., § 5357),
and determines an appropriate treatment placement (id., § 5358).” (Eric B., supra, at
pp. 1095-1096, citing K.P., supra, at pp. 709-710.) “A conservatorship terminates after
one year but may be extended for additional one-year terms upon petition.” (Eric B.,
supra, at p. 1096, citing § 5361.)
B. The appeal is moot
The conservatorship challenged here has ended, thus depriving us of the ability to
provide L.A. with effectual relief and rendering the appeal moot. (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 705, fn. 3; Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574 [cases are moot if reviewing court cannot grant effective
relief].)3 As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[t]his problem frequently
arises because a conservatorship’s duration is short, compared to the appellate process.”
3 The public guardian represents that he has been reappointed as conservator for
L.A. with new letters expiring on August 3, 2023 and requests that we take judicial notice
of the new letters of conservatorship. We deny the request as it is not necessary to our
analysis. (Appel v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 329, 342, fn. 6.) The
expiration of the challenged conservatorship renders this appeal moot and the new
conservatorship is not at issue here.
4
(K.P., supra, at p. 705, fn. 3, citing Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131,
142, fn. 2.)
Although the appeal is technically moot, we nevertheless have discretion to
overlook the expiration of the conservatorship and decide the appeal on the merits. (See
Conservatorship of George H., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 161, fn. 2.) “Even if a
conservatorship terminates prior to appellate review, the appeal is not moot if it raises
issues that are capable of repetition yet avoiding review. [Citation.] In addition, the
continuing stigma of wrongful commitment, which continues even after the commitment
has ceased, is grounds for entertaining an appeal.” (Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 123, 133 (Carol K.).) It may also be proper to resolve a moot case on
the merits where it is a matter of general public interest likely to reappear in the future.
(Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 647, fn. 1.)
We do not find these factors present here, though. On appeal, L.A. argues
substantial evidence did not support the jury’s determination that she is gravely disabled
or Dr. Salerno’s opinion that L.A. could not provide food, clothing and shelter for herself.
In other words, she only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those
specific determinations which are unique to her case and the challenged conservatorship.
By contrast, she does not raise legal issues that could apply to other cases or present any
questions of general public interest likely to reappear in the future.
In K.P., the California Supreme Court exercised its discretion to consider the
merits of the appeal despite it being moot. (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 705, fn. 3.)
However, in that case, the appellant had claimed that “a finding of unwillingness or
inability to accept voluntary treatment is required for a conservatorship to be
established,” which was strictly a legal question. (Id. at p. 706.) We are not confronted
with any such legal issues here.
In supplemental briefing, L.A. relies on Carol K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 123, in
which the court elected to address the merits of the appeal despite the conservatorship
5
already having expired. The court stated that, “[e]ven if a conservatorship terminates
prior to appellate review, the appeal is not moot if it raises issues that are capable of
repetition yet avoiding review. [Citation.] In addition, the continuing stigma of wrongful
commitment, which continues even after the commitment has ceased, is ground s for
entertaining an appeal.” (Id. at p. 133.)
We do not view the specific evidentiary issues raised in this appeal as capable of
repetition yet evading review; on the contrary, there is no suggestion that the evidentiary
arguments L.A. raises here are recurring problems. Moreover, the facts in Carol K. do
not appear analogous to this case; nor has L.A. argued that they are. The mere fact that
the court in Carol K. elected to exercise its discretion to consider the merits of an
otherwise moot appeal does not compel the same result here.
We recognize that, as the California Supreme Court explained in K.P., “[t]his
problem frequently arises because a conservatorship’s duration is short, compared to the
appellate process.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 705, fn. 3.) However, it does not follow
that a reviewing court must address the merits in every such instance; instead, the matter
is left to the discretion of the reviewing court. 4 (Conservatorship of John L., supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 142, fn. 2.)
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
4 We also note that an appellant subject to an LPS conservatorship could seek
peremptory relief by writ petition (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 655) or
seek calendar preference and expedited review on appeal. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules Court,
rule 8.240.)
6
___________________________________
Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
______________________________________
Danner, J.
Warren, as Public Guardian v. L.A.
H049457