Com. v. Chestnut, W.

J-S33037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM M. CHESTNUT :
:
Appellant : No. 2396 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005280-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM M. CHESTNUT :
:
Appellant : No. 2397 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005281-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM M. CHESTNUT :
:
Appellant : No. 2398 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002447-2018

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
J-S33037-22

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 20, 2023

William M. Chestnut (“Chestnut”) appeals from the orders granting

partial sentencing relief but otherwise denying his timely first Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”) petitions in the above-captioned cases.1 We affirm.

We summarize the factual and procedural history of this appeal from the

record. On September 11, 2018, Chestnut appeared before the trial court

with counsel (“plea counsel”), and following a colloquy, the court offered him

the alternatives of proceeding to a “bifurcated” trial or entering guilty pleas in

these three cases.2 After signing additional written colloquies and undergoing

a second in-court colloquy, Chestnut entered open guilty pleas to numerous

offenses committed against his paramour, Nicolette Reeves (“Reeves”).

Specifically, at 5280 and 5281 of 2017, Chestnut admitted to the following:

In April 2017, he called Reeves while she was working and threatened to beat

her up because a check had bounced. See N.T., 9/11/18, at 28. Fearing for

her safety, Reeves called her mother. See id. Reeves’s mother picked up

Reeves and Reeves’s child, and she took them to her own house. See id. at

28-29. Chestnut arrived at the home, snuck through an unlocked window,

and assaulted and strangled Reeves. See id. at 29. Chestnut told her, “You’re
____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. As discussed below, the PCRA court
granted PCRA relief from one of the sentences imposed at 5280 of 2017.

2 Chestnut, while represented by the Philadelphia Defender’s Association, had
previously entered guilty pleas at Nos. 5280-2017 and 5281-2017. Chestnut
withdrew his pleas after retaining plea counsel. Plea counsel thereafter
represented Chestnut in preparation for trial, and then during his guilty pleas,
sentencing, and the reconsideration of Chestnut’s sentence.

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lucky I didn’t beat you to death.” Id. Reeves’s sister was in the home at the

time and called the police. Based on these facts, Chestnut pleaded guilty, at

No. 5280-2017, to aggravated assault, terroristic threats, recklessly

endangering another person, and strangulation, graded as a second-degree

felony. Chestnut also pleaded guilty at No. 5281-2017 to burglary and

criminal trespass.

At No. 2447-2018, Chestnut admitted that, in February 2018, he

choked Reeves at their home, and between February and March 2018, he sent

Reeves threatening text messages and “made comments to obstruct and

impede and interfere with her participating with the [c]riminal [j]ustice

[s]ytem.” Id. at 30-31. At the time of these incidents, Reeves had a

protection from abuse order (“PFA”) against Chestnut. See id. Based on

these facts, Chestnut pleaded guilty at No. 2447-2018 to strangulation,

graded as a first-degree felony, intimidation of a witness, terroristic threats,

recklessly endangering another person, harassment, and contempt of a court

order.3

The trial court initially sentenced Chestnut to an aggregate term of

sixteen to forty-seven years of imprisonment and a consecutive probationary

term of ten years for all three cases, but granted reconsideration, in part. The

trial court resentenced Chestnut to an aggregate term of eleven to thirty-two
____________________________________________

3 At the time of his pleas, Chestnut was awaiting sentencing for a fourth
matter, listed at No. 6778-2017. The facts regarding that matter were not
included in the certified records in these appeals.

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years of imprisonment followed by ten years of probation. The original and

reconsidered sentences included sentences of five to fifteen years of

imprisonment each for the second-degree felony count of strangulation listed

at No. 5280-2017 and the first-degree felony count of strangulation at No.

2447-2018. Chestnut took direct appeals, and his newly appointed direct

appeal counsel filed an Anders4 brief and a petition to withdraw. On October

22, 2020, this Court affirmed the judgments of sentences and granted direct

appeal counsel leave to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 241

A.3d 453, 2020 WL 6194413 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum).

Chestnut did not seek allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

Chestnut timely filed pro se PCRA petitions in all three cases, and the

PCRA court appointed present counsel. Present counsel filed amended PCRA

petitions asserting that plea counsel was ineffective, Chestnut’s pleas had

been coerced, and direct appeal counsel was ineffective per se. Chestnut’s

amended petition further alleged that direct appeal counsel had overlooked a

meritorious challenge to the legality of the sentence. The Commonwealth filed

a response conceding that partial relief was due because the fifteen-year

maximum sentence for strangulation at No. 5280-2017 exceeded the lawful

maximum sentence for a second-degree felony. The Commonwealth asserted

all remaining issues were meritless.

____________________________________________

4 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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J-S33037-22

The PCRA court granted partial relief and on October 25, 2021, entered

an amended sentencing order at No. 5280-2017 correcting the sentence for

strangulation to five to ten years of imprisonment.5 The PCRA court did not

issue Pa.R.A.P. 907 notices, but entered orders at Nos. 5281-2017 and 2447-

2018 dismissing Chestnut’s PCRA petitions on October 25, 2021. However,

the PCRA court did not enter an order disposing of the remaining PCRA claim

at No. 5280-2017. Chestnut nevertheless filed separate notices of appeal on

November 17, 2021, in all three cases. Subsequently, the PCRA court issued

corrective docketing orders indicating that it had held a video hearing to

address Chestnut’s petition on October 25, 2021,6 and on that same day,

granted partial sentencing relief and denied all remaining PCRA issues. See

Orders Directing Corrective Docketing, 2/4/22.7 Chestnut and the PCRA court
____________________________________________

5 The corrected sentence did not alter the overall sentencing scheme for the
three cases.

6 Chestnut has not referred to the October 25, 2021 proceedings nor ensured
that a transcript of those proceedings were included in the certified records.

7 The corrective docketing orders of February 4, 2022, were docketed as “case
correspondence.” We note that the record at 5280 of 2017 still does not
contain an entry for an order denying relief on that date. Adding to the
procedural confusion in these cases, the dockets in all three of these cases
indicate that the PCRA court apparently entered orders denying Chestnut’s
remaining requests for PCRA relief on December 20, 2021. Although no such
orders exist in the records at 5280 and 5281 of 2017, Chestnut filed additional
notices of appeal from the December 20, 2021 orders. This Court docketed
those appeals at 288 to 291 EDA 2022, but dismissed the appeal at 288 EDA
2022 as duplicative of 289 EDA 2022. Subsequently, this Court dismissed the
appeals at 289 to 291 EDA for failure to file docketing statements.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This Court consolidated these appeals sua

sponte.

Chestnut raises the following issues, which we have reordered for our

review:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
that [plea] counsel was ineffective for providing misleading
information regarding the maximum permissible sentence,
failing to file and litigate pre‐trial motions, and failing to
interview and subpoena witnesses.

2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
that [Chestnut’s] guilty plea was unlawfully induced based on
[plea] counsel’s ineffectiveness, thus rendering the plea
unknowing and unintelligent, and the plea colloquy defective.

3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
violations of [Chestnut’s] constitutional rights under the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, including an
involuntary and unknowing guilty plea, as well as his Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation.

4. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
that [direct appeal] counsel was ineffective for filing an Anders
brief despite [Chestnut’s] valid claims, failing to file the
____________________________________________

Having reviewed the records and the corrective docketing orders, we will
regard as done that which should have been done on October 25, 2021,
namely, the entry and docketing of an order that granted in part and dismissed
in part PCRA relief at 5280 of 2017. Cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, 122
A.3d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 2015) (declining to quash an appeal based on
docket notations that an order had been served). As a final note, the PCRA
court’s corrective docketing orders of February 4, 2022, appear to contain
apparent misstatements: the corrective docketing orders indicate that the
PCRA court granted sentencing relief at No. 2447-2018; however as noted
above, the records indicate that the PCRA court entered an amended
sentencing order at No. 5280-2017, not at No. 2447-2018.

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requisite [Pa.R.A.P.] 2119(f) statement, and failing to raise the
illegal sentence claim.

Chestnut’s Brief at 8 (reordered).

This Court’s standard for reviewing the dismissal of PCRA relief is well-

settled:

Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party in the PCRA Court. We are bound by any
credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s
legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

In his first three issues, Chestnut raises related claims that his pleas

were unknowing and involuntary and that plea counsel was ineffective. To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must

demonstrate:

(1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no
reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and
(3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
error. To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not
chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
the course actually pursued. Regarding the prejudice prong, a
petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be
effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness[,]
the petitioner must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this
presumption.

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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth

v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).

Moreover,

[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

A guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant

understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. See

Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013). We

presume that a defendant was aware of what he was doing when entering a

plea, and he bears the burden of proving involuntariness. See id. A

defendant who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in

open court while under oath and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing

the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy. See

Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Chestnut argues that neither the trial court nor plea counsel advised him

of the total sentence he was facing for all three cases. See Chestnut’s Brief

at 16-17. He contends that he believed that the total maximum sentence for

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all three cases would have been thirty-seven years and had he known he was

facing a possible total maximum sentence of 104 years, he would have insisted

on going to trial. See id. at 17-18, 22. He also asserts that plea counsel was

ineffective for failing to file or litigate pre-trial motions, provide him with

discovery materials, and interview and call witnesses. See id. at 16-17.

Chestnut adds that plea counsel prevented him from retrieving and presenting

text messages from the complainant that would have proved his innocence.8

See id. at 22-23.

The PCRA court considered and rejected Chestnut’s arguments noting

that the trial court had properly informed him of his combined possible

sentencing exposure for all three cases. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/22,

at 6. The PCRA court further concluded that Chestnut failed to offer any

factual or legal support for his claims that plea counsel was ineffective. See

id. at 7.

Our review reveals that the record supports the PCRA court’s

conclusions. The trial court had informed Chestnut that “if convicted of all

three cases, the maximum possible sentence that [he was facing was] . . . 49

____________________________________________

8 Additionally, Chestnut asserts that the sentencing in a fourth case at 6778
of 2017, would have been consolidated into the proceedings in the three cases
sub judice. However, he fails to develop any argument how this alleged belief
affected the entry of his pleas. Therefore, we will not consider this
unsupported assertion. See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93
(Pa. Super. 2007) (refusing to consider an undeveloped claim).

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years to 103 year[s’] state time incarceration” during its initial colloquy.9 See

N.T., 9/11/18, at 13. Therefore, his claim that his plea was involuntary or

unknowing because he believed his maximum sentencing exposure was only

thirty-seven years lacks arguable merit.

Furthermore, Chestnut’s claims that plea counsel failed to file or litigate

pre-trial motions, provide him with discovery materials, obtain text messages,

or interview witnesses are too boilerplate. Chestnut, in his amended PCRA

petition or his brief in these appeals, has not identified any specific pretrial

claim, available information, or witnesses plea counsel should have pursued

in preparation for trial. Therefore, we conclude the PCRA court properly

dismissed these bare assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel. See

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 783 A.2d 328, 333 (Pa. Super. 2001) (noting

that the ineffective assistance of counsel will not be found in a vacuum and

reminding an appellant that it is his burden to show a factual predicate to

____________________________________________

9 We acknowledge the discrepancy in the trial court and the PCRA court’s
reference to a 103-year total possible maximum sentence and Chestnut’s
assertion of a 104-year possible maximum sentence. However, any difference
between a 104- versus a 103-year maximum sentence is immaterial because
the trial court had clearly apprised Chestnut of a total sentencing exposure of
over one hundred years for the three cases and the trial court at no point
sentenced Chestnut beyond a total maximum sentence of imprisonment of
forty-seven years. Thus, Chestnut cannot claim prejudice arising from the
difference in his and the courts’ calculations of the total possible maximum
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 656 A.2d 463, 466 (Pa. 1995)
(noting that a defendant must be advised that sentences can be run
consecutively and no prejudice occurs when the trial court’s sentence does not
exceed the defendant’s expectations of imprisonment).

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support his allegation of counsel’s ineffectiveness).10 Accordingly, Chestnut’s

first three issues seeking relief from his guilty pleas and alleging plea counsel’s

ineffectiveness lack merit.

Chestnut, in his fourth issue, asserts that direct appeal counsel’s

ineffective assistance resulted in a complete deprivation of his appellate rights

and warrant a finding of ineffectiveness per se. Under narrow circumstances,

including an actual or constructive denial of counsel, a PCRA petitioner may

assert a claim of ineffectiveness per se. See Commonwealth v. Rosado,

150 A.3d 425, 429 (Pa. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d

1216, 1221 (Pa. 2009) (holding that a claim of per se ineffective assistance

of counsel, if established, presumes prejudice without requiring the petitioner

to demonstrate actual prejudice). Errors by counsel that completely foreclose

appellate review constitute ineffectiveness per se. See Rosado, 150 A.3d at

433. However, counsel is not ineffective per se where his actions or inactions

____________________________________________

10 We add that records also contradict Chestnut’s claims. The transcript of
Chestnut’s pleas indicate that plea counsel had informed the trial court that
two defense witnesses were outside of the country at the time of the hearing
and that there were crucial text messages that could not be recovered from a
broken phone. See N.T., 9/11/18, at 3-4. The trial court had offered Chestnut
the opportunity to have a bifurcated jury trial at which Chestnut could have
presented evidence at a later date. See id. at 6, 15. Chestnut, however,
elected to plead guilty after being advised that he was waiving his rights to
file pre-trial motions and his trial rights. See id. at 18-24; see also Written
Plea Colloquy Forms, 9/11/18, at 2 (advising Chestnut that his pleas would
result in giving up his rights to call defense witnesses). Under these
circumstances, we also find no basis to conclude that Chestnut’s plea was
involuntary or that plea counsel’s failure to prepare for trial induced Chestnut
pleas.

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only narrow the ambit of an appeal. See Reed, 971 A.2d at 1226 (concluding

that “the filing of an appellate brief, deficient in some aspect or another, does

not constitute a complete failure to function as a client's advocate” to establish

a claim of ineffectiveness per se); see also Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923

A.2d 1119, 1128-29 (Pa. 2007) (holding that where counsel’s failure to file

post-sentence motions did not foreclose appellate review of appellant's entire

claim, counsel was not ineffective per se).

Chestnut argues that by filing an Anders brief, direct appeal counsel

failed to raise a meritorious illegal sentencing claim and further failed to

preserve discretionary aspect of sentencing claims by including a Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f) statement. See Chestnut’s Brief at 19-20. Chestnut equates direct

appeal counsel’s performance to the filing of a brief that effectively stripped

him of his right to a direct appeal. See id. at 20.

The PCRA court concluded that Chestnut’s issue failed because he did

not establish a discretionary aspect of sentencing claim of arguable merit and

Chestnut was not prejudiced by the absence of a Rule 2119(f) statement. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/22, at 9. Moreover, the PCRA court found that

direct appeal counsel’s failure to challenge the legality of the sentence could

not result in prejudice because the court granted partial PCRA relief and

corrected the illegal sentence. See id.

Our review reveals that contrary to Chestnut’s assertions, direct appeal

counsel’s filing of an Anders brief and the omission of a Rule 2119(f)

statement did not result in the complete foreclosure of this Court’s review.

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Rather, this Court previously reviewed the merits of at least some of the issues

raised in the direct appeal, including a discretionary challenge to the sentences

imposed at 5280 of 2017. See Chestnut, 2020 WL 6194413, at *4-*5.

Further, although Chestnut had waived a challenge to the validity of his pleas

by failing to object in the trial court, this Court conducted an extensive

alternative analysis to affirm on merits. See id. at *6; accord Reed, 971

A.2d at 1220 (noting that when an appellate court finds an issue waived but

also explains why the claim would lack merit, the merits analysis will constitute

the law of the case). We acknowledge that direct appeal counsel and this

Court did not address the legality of the sentence imposed for strangulation

at No. 5280-2017. However, this oversight did not foreclose appellate review

but narrowed the ambit of direct review, and as noted by the PCRA court, the

illegal sentence issue has been remedied as part of these PCRA proceedings.

Thus, we conclude that Chestnut failed to establish a claim that direct appeal

counsel was ineffective per se.11

Lastly, given the possible confusion at which case the PCRA court

granted sentencing relief,12 we consider sua sponte the legality of the

____________________________________________

11 Furthermore, Chestnut’s generic assertions that direct appeal counsel was
ineffective with respect to his discretionary aspect and legality of sentence
claims do not establish any of the three prongs for assessing trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness outside the framework of a claim of ineffectiveness per se.

12As noted above, the corrective docketing orders indicated that the PCRA
court had granted partial sentencing relief at No. 2447-2018, although the
PCRA court had only entered an amended sentencing order at No. 5280-2017.

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sentences for respective counts of strangulation at Nos. 5280-2017 and 2447-

2018.13 See Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182, 192 (Pa. 2018)

(noting that an illegal sentence claim is subject to review pursuant to a timely

PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. 2016)

(noting that legality of sentence claims are not subject to the traditional waiver

doctrine). A claim that the trial court improperly graded an offense for

sentencing purposes implicates the legality of a sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Nellom, 234 A.3d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting

that an improper grading of an offense on facts not proven beyond a

reasonable doubt implicated the constitutional principles set forth in Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and thus constituted a challenge to the

legality of a sentence), appeal denied, 252 A.3d 593 (Pa. 2021). Our review

of the legality of a sentence is de novo and plenary. See Commonwealth v.

Pope, 216 A.3d 299, 303 (Pa. Super. 2019).

As noted previously, the Commonwealth charged Chestnut with

strangulation graded as a second-degree felony at No. 5280-2017 and with

strangulation graded as a first-degree felony at No. 2447-2018. See

Information, No. 5280-2017, 6/29/17, Count 5,; Information, No. 2447-2018,

4/5/18, Count 1. Section 2718 of the Crimes Codes generally grades

strangulation as a second-degree misdemeanor. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2718(d)(1). However, if the offense is committed against a family or
____________________________________________

13 Although Chestnut repeatedly referred to the imposition of an illegal
sentence, he did not develop a specific claim as to any of his sentences.

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household member as defined in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102, strangulation

constitutes a second-degree felony, which carries a maximum term of

imprisonment of ten years. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(d)(2)(i); see also 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(2). If the offense is committed when the defendant is

subject to an active PFA that covers the victim, strangulation constitutes a

first-degree felony, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty

years. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(d)(3)(i); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1).

Our review confirms that the PCRA court properly concluded that its

sentence of five to fifteen years of imprisonment for the strangulation count

at No. 5280-2017 was illegal because that count was graded as a second-

degree felony and that sentence exceeded the lawful maximum of ten years.

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(2). However, the PCRA court has since imposed a

new sentence of five to ten years of imprisonment on that count, thus, the

illegal sentence has been corrected.

As to the strangulation count at No. 2447-2018, our review reveals that

Chestnut’s guilty plea included specific admissions that he committed the

crime of strangulation against Reeves while he was the subject to an active

PFA order obtained by Reeves. See N.T., 9/11/18, at 30-31. Therefore, he

pleaded knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to all facts necessary to grade

that offense as a first-degree felony, and the sentence of five to fifteen years

of imprisonment on that count fell within the proper maximum sentence of

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twenty years.14 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1103(1), 2718(d)(3)(i); see generally

Nellom, 234 A.3d at 704. Accordingly, we discern no legality of sentence

issues concerning the strangulation count at No. 2447-2018, and we regard

any references to sentencing relief being granted at No. 2447-2018, as

opposed to No. 5280-2017, as typographical mistakes.

In sum, having reviewed the record, the PCRA court’s opinion,

Chestnut’s arguments, and the applicable law, we conclude that the PCRA

court properly denied Chestnut’s claims that his prior counsel were ineffective

and his pleas were invalid.

Orders affirmed.

Judge King joins this memorandum.

Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.

____________________________________________

14 We observe that the information filed at No. 2447-2018 listed the count of
strangulation as a felony-one offense, but the recital erroneously included
language regarding for second-degree felony offense, namely, that Chestnut
had strangled a family or household member. See Information, No. 2447-
2018, 4/5/18, Count 1. This discrepancy does not affect our analysis because
Chestnut had clear and repeated notice that the strangulation count at No.
2447-2018 would be graded as a first-degree felony, and he specifically
pleaded to the fact necessary to sustain that grading of the offense, that is,
that he was subject to a PFA when he strangled Reeves in February 2018.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/20/2023

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