State v. Baker

[Cite as State v. Baker, 2023-Ohio-241.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-21-1258

Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202002036

v.

Angela Baker DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: January 27, 2023

*****

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Thomas P. Kurt, for appellant.

*****
I. Introduction

OSOWIK, J.

{¶ 1} Following a jury trial, the defendant-appellant, Angela Baker, was convicted

on two counts of ethnic intimidation and two counts of aggravated menacing by the

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Baker was accused of directing racial epithets

and threatening to “kill” two teenaged boys with her car during an altercation in a Meijer
parking lot. On appeal, Baker argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to

dismiss on selective prosecution grounds and further erred in failing to provide a self-

defense instruction to the jury. As set forth below, we affirm.

II. Background

{¶ 2} The incident in this case occurred in the parking lot of a Meijer Store in

Oregon, Ohio, around 5 p.m. on July 7, 2020. Baker was living out of her car at the time

and specifically in the Meijer lot. Baker’s blue Dodge Charger was parked in an empty

section, near a light post. While seated inside her car, two teenaged boys, and brothers,

D.V., aged 15, and A.H. aged 17 (“the victims”), walked by Baker’s car. The victims

traversed the lot, from a nearby hotel to Meijer for some “snacks.” Baker is Caucasian;

the victims are African-American.

{¶ 3} The record in this case includes footage from D.V.’s cell phone that captured

part of the altercation as well as three “body cam” videos, taken by the two arresting

officers from the Oregon Police Department. The officers interviewed Baker, the

victims, and an eyewitness. A description of the video evidence is set forth below.

{¶ 4} By all accounts, the incident began when Baker “flipped off” the victims,

with her middle finger, as they walked by her car. In the first police video, when asked

why she made that gesture, Baker said that she was “tired of these fucking [N-words]

harassing me. Always walking past my car and all this bullshit and harassing me. So, I

flip them off and then [A.H.] starts coming towards me * * * running his mouth.”

2.
 {¶ 5} Footage from D.V.’s cell phone captured what happened next. As the cell

phone video begins, D.V. can be heard yelling, “this bitch is racist as fuck,” and A.H. is

seen walking toward the car. Baker is heard, muttering something that includes the word

“die,” and the victims demand to know “how we going to die” and “what we going to die

for” and “it’s because I’m black, isn’t it * * * yeah, it’s because I’m black, huh?” After

that exchange, Baker begins to maneuver her car slowly, in reverse, away from the

victims and slowly enunciates “worthless [inaudible] nigger.” To this, the victims

unleash a torrent of their own profanity-laced insults, telling Baker to “step out of the

car” so they can “beat [her] ass,” and calling her a “honkey” and a “stupid-cracker bitch”

and a “racist.” The final images from D.V.’s cell phone are mostly of the pavement, but

the sound of squealing tires can be heard, along with D.V. yelling “watch out; watch out;

watch out.”

{¶ 6} During A.H.’s interview, he told police that, after he and his brother walked

by Baker’s car on their way to the store, she honked at them. In response, A.H. and D.V.

“looked back” in the direction of the car, and Baker said, “Y’all about to die, niggers.”

A.H. admits that he began walking back toward the car, and demanded to know “what are

we doing [wrong]?” and to know what her “problem” was. A.H. told police that he

“didn’t even know” Baker, and he admitted that he was “mad.” According to A.H.,

Baker then began “chasing” him in her car and “driving around [in circles], trying to hit

[him] with the car.” D.V. was interviewed next. He told police that he and his brother

sought refuge in the grocery cart corral area to prevent Baker from hitting them.

3.
Although Baker did not hit either victim, “she kept following” them and was still “trying

to hit” them.

{¶ 7} Next, the police interviewed eyewitness and store employee, C.R., who was

“on break” and watched the altercation from inside his car that was parked nearby. The

eyewitness could see, but not hear what was said between the parties, because his car

windows were up. According to him, the victims were “teasing” Baker, when she

“gunned” her car at them. He told police that, “[Baker] was trying to hit them for sure.”

And, when the victims “got closer to her,” then she “really tr[ied] to hit them.” The

eyewitness told police that Baker “could have left the parking lot” but instead she “tried

[to hit them] multiple times.”

{¶ 8} During a second conversation between the police and Baker, Baker repeated

that she gave the victims the middle finger because she “was sick and tired of their shit,

of [N-words] taunting me everywhere I fucking go, even walking past me when I’m

sitting here parking.” Baker told police that, after making that gesture, the victims began

yelling “c’mon, c’mon” and “taking off their shirts” and “walking at me * * * so I start

charging my car at them.” (Emphasis added.) When A.H., i.e. the “one in the black

shirt,” got a grocery cart and started “walking” toward Baker again, with the cart, she

“charged at them again * * * but * * * swerved” out of the way and did not hit them.

After this description of the incident, police arrested Baker on two counts of aggravated

menacing.

4.
 {¶ 9} After her arrest, the police talked to Baker one last time, specifically to ask

why she had “approached” the victims. Baker explained that she was “fucking fed up of

getting taunted by these stupid [N-words].” Baker added that she had “had enough” and

was “sick of” being taunted “everywhere I go.” Baker claimed that police had not

“listen[ed]” to her previous complaints, and she decided to “fight back.” The police

pressed Baker on this point, asking if she had been harassed and taunted by the victims,

in particular, or “all black people.” Baker responded, “I don’t remember if they [i.e. the

victims] were here before. * * * I don’t even know these fuckers.”

{¶ 10} On August 31, 2020, Baker was indicted on two counts of ethnic

intimidation, in violation of R.C. 2927.12(A) and (B), a felony of the fifth degree, one

count for each victim (Counts 1 and 2) and two counts of aggravated menacing, in

violation of R.C. 2903.21(A) and (B), a misdemeanor of the first degree, again one count

for each victim (Counts 3 and 4).

{¶ 11} On September 27, 2021, Baker filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the

state had engaged in selective prosecution on the basis of race when it charged her for

“using racial slurs” and “threatening the alleged victims” but failed to charge the victims,

who had engaged in the same conduct. The state opposed the motion, and a hearing was

held on October 26, 2021. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to a composite exhibit,

identified Joint Ex. 1, consisting of the four videos previously described. Based upon its

review of the videos and the arguments at hearing, the trial court denied Baker’s motion.

5.
 {¶ 12} A three-day jury trial was held, beginning on November 8, 2021. At trial,

the state called both victims, the eye-witness, and the arresting officers. The defense

moved for an acquittal and renewed its motion to dismiss, both of which were denied.

The trial court also denied a defense request for a self-defense jury instruction.

Following deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to all four counts, and the

court ordered a presentence investigation in preparation for sentencing.

{¶ 13} At sentencing, the trial court found that the aggravated menacing counts,

set forth in Counts 3 and 4, merged with the ethnic intimidation counts, set forth in

Counts 1 and 2, and the state elected to proceed with sentencing as to the ethic

intimidation counts. The trial court then sentenced Baker to serve six months in jail and

to serve five years of community control. The imposition of community control included

conditions that, among others, required Baker to have no direct or indirect contact with

the victims and to submit to mental health treatment. The trial court also imposed two

years of discretionary post-release control. Baker appealed and assigns two errors for

review:

I. The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss,

in violation of defendant’s right to due process and equal protection, as

guaranteed by the Fifth and Fifth [sic] Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution of the State of

Ohio.

6.
 II. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for an

instruction of self-defense pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2901.05, in

violation of defendant’s rights to equal protection and due process, as

guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the State

of Ohio.

III. Baker presented no evidence to support her claim of selective prosecution.
{¶ 14} In her first assignment of error, Baker alleges that the trial court erred when

it denied her motion to dismiss. Baker complains that, while both she and the victims

violated the ethnic intimidation statute, only she was charged. She claims that the state’s

charging decision was based upon her race.1

{¶ 15} “[A] trial court’s determination regarding a motion to dismiss on selective-

prosecution grounds presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Michel, 181

Ohio App.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-450, 908 N.E.2d 456, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); see also, Cleveland v.

Oko, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103278, 2016-Ohio-7774, ¶ 15. Appellate review of the

trial court’s determination “is analogous to our review of a motion to suppress.” Id.

When considering a motion to [dismiss on the grounds of selective

prosecution], the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore

in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility

1
Baker does not allege that the state engaged in selective prosecution as to the
aggravated menacing counts.

7.
 of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.

Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently

determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether

the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.

(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Accord Michel at ¶ 9.

{¶ 16} “A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the

criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the

charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.” State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180,

203, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998). Selective prosecution claims sound in equal protection and

protect against prosecutions “based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or

other arbitrary classification.’” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767

N.E.2d 166, ¶ 43, quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480,

134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7

L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

{¶ 17} In State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134, 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980), the Ohio

Supreme Court adopted the following test with regard to selective-prosecution claims:

To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a

defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1)

that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded

8.
 against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge

against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the

government’s discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been

invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations

as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional

rights.

“A mere showing that another person similarly situated was not prosecuted is not enough;

a defendant must demonstrate actual discrimination due to invidious motives or bad faith.

Intentional or purposeful discrimination will not be presumed from a showing of differing

treatment.” State v. Freeman, 20 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 485 N.E.2d 1043 (1985). See also

Flynt at 134 (“The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself *

* * a violation of the United States Constitution.”).

{¶ 18} In this case, the court found that Baker failed to satisfy either prima facie

element required under Flynt. As to the court’s conclusion that Baker failed to show that

the parties were similarly situated, the court made the following findings:

· Baker instigated the altercation by being the “first” to use a

“derogatory comment” and to threaten “to do bodily harm,” specifically by

threatening “to kill [the victims].”

· The victims used derogatory language [i.e. cracker and honkie]

“only * * * after” Baker told them that “they were going to die,” and using

the “N” word.

9.
 · The victims “turned on their phone to start videotaping” because

they “felt” that they had been the subject of a crime.

· Baker posed a threat to the victims because “she was inside her

car.”

· The victims did not pose a threat to Baker, because they were “on

foot” and never got “close enough” to harm her.

· Baker’s actions were motivated by race. In the court’s own words,

“you can’t change what you said, Ms. Baker, [from] that video, [which is]

that you did this because they were African American.”

· Race was not a motivating factor for the victims. The court found

that their words and conduct were “clearly in reaction” to Baker, who

instigated the conflict.

{¶ 19} The court concluded that Baker failed to show any discriminatory animus

by the state in its decision to prosecute Baker. It commented that that the police officers

“[did]their job” in that “they made a fairly immediate charging decision after

interviewing everybody at the scene.”

{¶ 20} Baker raises the same arguments on appeal as she did before the trial court.

That is, she claims that the parties were, in fact, similarly situated because both used

racial slurs—Baker by calling the victims the “N” word and the victims by calling her a

“honkie” and a “cracker”—and both made threats of violence—Baker by driving her car

at them and the victims by threatening to “beat [Baker’s] ass.”

10.
 {¶ 21} It was Baker’s burden to show that the state treated her differently than

other persons “who [were] in all relevant aspects alike to [her].” State v. Williamson, 9th

Dist. Summit No. 29935, 2022-Ohio-185, ¶ 41 quoting Harsco Corp. v. Tracy, 86 Ohio

St.3d 189, 192, 712 N.E.2d 1249 (1999) (Defendant failed to establish that he was

similarly situated with four Caucasian deputies who were subjected to administrative,

rather than criminal investigations). For purposes of a selective enforcement claim, a

“similarly situated” individual is someone of another race or ethnicity who could have

been arrested for the same offense as the defendant but was not. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at

469, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.E.2d 687 (Noting that “[t]he vast majority of the [Circuit]

Courts of Appeals require the defendant to produce some evidence that similarly situated

defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not, and this requirement

is consistent with our equal protection case law.”).

{¶ 22} Ethnic intimidation, as defined by R.C. 2927.12, can be committed by

violating, with the requisite racial or ethnic animus, R.C. 2903.21 (aggravated menacing),

2903.22 (menacing), 2909.06 (criminal damaging or endangering), 2909.07 (criminal

mischief), or 2917.21(A)(3), (4), or (5) (telecommunications harassment). State v.

Mutter, 150 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 20. Here, the state

indicted Baker alleging one predicate offense—aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.

2903.21—in the ethnic-intimidation charge. Therefore, the offense of ethnic

intimidation, contains two elements: first, that Baker committed the predicate offense of

aggravated menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21 and second, that she committed that

11.
offense because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person or group

of persons. Accord Mutter. Again, the trial court found that Baker admitted to, and did,

commit the predicate offense “because they were African American,” whereas it found

no evidence of racial animus by the victims,

{¶ 23} We agree. There is simply no evidence in this case that the victims

“selected” Baker because she is Caucasian, nor is there any evidence that their actions

were motivated by Baker’s race. Rather, the evidence fully supports the trial court’s

conclusion that the victims’ actions were taken in response to a confrontation instigated

by Baker, who called them the “N word” and told them that they were going to “die.” “It

would not be unreasonable for anyone to react in anger to such confrontational conduct.”

State v. Chopak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96947, 2012-Ohio-1537, ¶ 24. And, although

the victims’ use of the terms “honkey,” and “stupid-cracker bitch” was offensive,

“repugnant or obnoxious language does not, in itself, demonstrate than an action was

undertaken “’by reason of the [another’s] race.’” Chopak quotiing State v. Kingery, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 24063, 2012–Ohio–505, ¶ 20. This is especially true in this case,

where it was Baker who, unprovoked, instigated the altercation by accosting the victims

with hateful and threatening language. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the

victims could not have been prosecuted for ethnic intimidation in this case because there

is no evidence that they committed the predicate offense of aggravated menacing “by

reason of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person” as is required to

12.
prosecute a case under R.C. 2927.12. For these reasons, we find that Baker failed to

satisfy the first prong of the Flynt test.

{¶ 24} The second element of the Flynt test required Baker to produce evidence

that the state’s decision to charge her was based upon “impermissible considerations as

race, religion, or the desire to prevent [her] from exercising a constitutional right.” Flynt.

The mere fact that Baker was prosecuted and the victims were not is insufficient, as a

matter of law, to establish a defense of selective prosecution. State v. Freemam, 20 Ohio

St.3d 55, 485 N.E.2d 1043 (1985). Despite her claim, Baker has failed to produce any

evidence that the state’s prosecution of her was “because she is Caucasian.” Moreover, it

bears repeating that, initially, the charges against Baker were limited to two counts of

aggravated menacing. It was not until she admitted to police that she drove at the victims

as a way to “fight back,”—not at the victims, in particular, because she did not “even

know” them—but against all black people, that the state, with good reason, added the

ethnic intimidation charges.

{¶ 25} We find that the trial court’s findings are supported by competent, credible

evidence, and accepting these facts as true, Baker has failed to satisfy either prong of the

Flynt test to establish a prima facie claim of selective prosecution. Accordingly, the trial

court did not commit error in denying Baker’s motion to dismiss on selective prosecution

grounds, and her first assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Baker was not entitled to self-defense jury instruction.

13.
 {¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, Baker alleges that the trial court erred in

denying her request for a self-defense jury instruction.

{¶ 27} “The elements of self-defense differ depending upon whether the

defendant, in defending [herself], used deadly or non-deadly force.” In re N.K., 6th Dist.

Sandusky No. S-21-001, 2021-Ohio-3858, ¶ 12. “Deadly force” is defined as “any force

that carries a substantial risk that it will proximately result in the death of any person.”

R.C. 2901.01(A)(2). A “substantial risk” is “a strong possibility, as contrasted with a

remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain

circumstances may exist.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(8). In this case, Baker concedes that the act

of driving her automobile “at” the victims constituted deadly force. See, e.g., State v.

Sepeda, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1123, 2022-Ohio-1889, ¶ 40 (A vehicle can be a deadly

weapon “when used in a manner likely to produce death or bodily harm.”).

The elements of a valid claim of self-defense [involving the use of

deadly force] are as follows: (1) the defendant was not at fault in creating

the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the defendant had a bona fide

belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm

and that his or her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of

such force; and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid

the danger.

14.
Sepeda at ¶ 47, citing State v. Petway, 2020-Ohio-3848, 156 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 41 (11th

Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). (Additional

citations omitted.)

{¶ 28} Self-defense is an affirmative defense—not an element of a crime. State v.

Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562. Recently, in Messenger, the Ohio

Supreme Court “clarified the burden of proof where a defendant asserts a claim of self-

defense under the version of the statute that became effective March 28, 2019.” State v.

Greer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1082, 2023-Ohio-103, ¶ 34, citing Messenger. It

recognized that “R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) triggers the state’s duty to disprove self-defense so

long as ‘there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the

force in self-defense’”—a burden that is not all that heavy. Id. at ¶ 20, 22 (“The

reference in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to ‘evidence presented that tends to support’ self-defense

indicates that the defendant’s burden of production is not a heavy one and that it might

even be satisfied through the state’s own evidence.”). As such, “a defendant charged with

an offense involving the use of force has the burden of producing legally sufficient

evidence that the defendant’s use of force was in self-defense.” Id. at ¶ 25. “[I]f the

defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a

rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the

light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden,” and

the state must then disprove self-defense. Id. at ¶ 25. In that case, “the sufficiency-of-

the-evidence standard of review applies to [the defendant’s] burden of production and a

15.
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to the state’s burden of

persuasion.” Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 29} “[A] determination as to whether the trial court applied the correct legal

standard in reviewing and weighing the evidence presents a question of law requiring de

novo review.” Greer at ¶ 33 quoting Dublin v. Starr, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-173,

2022-Ohio-2298, ¶ 50.

{¶ 30} Here, Baker argues that she satisfied her burden of production to warrant a

jury instruction on the issue of whether she acted in self-defense when she drove her

vehicle at the victims because the record contains evidence that the victims “threatened”

Baker by “asking her to exit her vehicle so [that] they could fight her * * * and ‘beat her

ass.’” Baker maintains that such evidence “tends to support” her claim that her use of

deadly force was “only * * * because she felt she was being threatened.” Baker urges, at

a minimum, that it was a “debatable issue,” that should have been decided by the jury,

not the court.

{¶ 31} While discussing defense counsel’s request—that the trial court instruct the

jury on the issue of whether Baker acted in self-defense—the trial court reviewed the

evidence on that issue. First, it noted that, according to A.H.’s testimony, he told Baker

to “get out of your car; I’m going to beat your ass,” from a distance of about ten feet from

Baker’s car. Although Baker did not testify, the “video of her at the scene” established

that, in response to A.H.’s statements, Baker “stayed in her car” and then “did go after

[the victims]” in her car. In finding that Baker was not entitled to a self-defense

16.
instruction, the court concluded that there was no evidence to support Baker’s claim that,

when she “did what she did,” she acted out of a bona fide belief that she was in imminent

danger of death or great bodily harm. Instead, Baker’s “mindset” was “not because she

was fearful” but rather “because [the victims] were African American.”

{¶ 32} Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court complied with its

obligation not to weigh the credibility of the evidence when determining whether Baker

had satisfied her burden of production. See, e.g., State v. Estelle, 2021-Ohio-2636, 176

N.E.3d 380, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“In deciding whether to give a self-defense instruction, the

trial court must view the evidence in favor of the defendant, and the question of

credibility is not to be considered.”); State v. Gambino, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2021-T-

0018, 2022-Ohio-1554, ¶ 24, appeal not allowed, 167 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2022-Ohio-2953,

193 N.E.3d 585 (“In determining whether the self-defense instruction is appropriate the

‘court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant’ without

consideration of credibility.”). Indeed, the trial court specified that its legal conclusion—

that Baker failed to satisfy the second “element of self-defense”—was not predicated on

the “credibility” of the evidence. That is, the court could not find “even a little bit of

evidence” tending to show that Baker believed herself to be in imminent danger of death

or great bodily harm. Other record evidence supports that conclusion, including

testimony from the eyewitness who told police that Baker “could have left the parking

lot” but instead “tried [to hit them] multiple times.”

17.
 {¶ 33} Because we find that Baker failed to produce any evidence tending to show

that her use of deadly force was predicated upon a bona fide belief that she was in

imminent danger of death or great bodily harm or that her only means of escape from

such danger was in the use of such force, the trial court did not err in refusing to provide

a self-defense instruction to the jury. Accordingly, we find Baker’s second assignment of

error not well-taken.

V. Conclusion

{¶ 34} It was Baker’s “heavy burden” to establish a claim of selective prosecution,

and the record supports the conclusion that she produced no evidence of others being

similarly situated to her and not prosecuted or that the state was motivated by

discriminatory animus toward Baker on the basis of her race. Accordingly, we must

conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Baker’s motion to dismiss, and her

first assignment of error is found not well-taken.

{¶ 35} Likewise, Baker failed to present any evidence that, at the time she used

deadly force, she had a bona fide belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great

bodily harm and that her only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such

force. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing her request to instruct the jury on

the issue of self-defense, and Baker’s second assignment of error is also not well-taken.

{¶ 36} Having found Baker’s assignments of error not well-taken, the December

8, 2021 judgment by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to

App.R. 24, Baker is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.

18.
 Judgment affirmed.

State of Ohio v.
Angela Baker
C.A. No. L-21-1258

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
____________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

19.