People v. West CA1/2

Filed 2/6/23 P. v. West CA1/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A157163
v.
JASON WEST, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 152985C)
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before us following the Supreme Court’s transfer with
directions to vacate our prior decision (People v. West (Feb. 10, 2020,
A157163) [nonpub. opn.] (West I)), and reconsider the cause in light of
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) and People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). After reconsidering the cause, we conclude that the
court erred by summarily denying West’s petition for resentencing (former
Pen. Code, § 1170.95, now § 1172.6)1 without appointing him counsel. We
reverse the trial court’s order, and remand the matter to the trial court with
directions to appoint counsel, receive briefing, and determine if West has
made a prima facie case for relief.

On June 30, 2022, after West’s petition for review was granted, Penal
1

Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6 without substantive
change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

1
 BACKGROUND
In 2007, West was convicted, together with Ishmael Johnson and
Terrell Watson, of the first-degree murder of Lamar Whitehead (§ 187),
committed in the course of an attempted carjacking (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L)),
and, together with Watson, of the attempted murder of Keith Griffin (§§ 664,
187).2 In 2010, this court affirmed his conviction. (See People v. Johnson
(June 14, 2010, A121366) [nonpub. opn.].) Our opinion summarized the facts
of the offense, as shown by the evidence at trial, as follows:
“Keith Griffin testified that he and his long-time friend, Lamar
Whitehead, the murder victim, were interested in modifying and
accessorizing their cars. Griffin equipped a Chevrolet Monte Carlo with
elaborate 20–inch chrome wheel rims that cost about $1,400. These rims
could not simply be popped off with a crowbar; they could only be removed
after jacking up the car and unscrewing a number of lug nuts. He estimated
that it would take ‘about 15 minutes’ to remove the rims from his car, ‘plus
you got to get through the lock nuts.’ Therefore, he testified, if someone was
going to steal his rims, they would have to take his whole car to do it.
“Griffin worked in San Leandro and Whitehead, 21 years old at the
time of his death, worked a graveyard shift in Oakland starting at 11:00 p.m.
Griffin was often asked by Whitehead for a ride to work, and drove his car to
Whitehead’s residence at least 100 times after installing the rims. At
10:45 p.m. on January 27, 2005, Griffin drove his Monte Carlo to Whitehead’s
residence again, located in an apartment complex at 3901 Webster Street in

2 The jury also found true various firearm enhancements, including
that West personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death to
Lamar Whitehead, and great bodily injury to Keith Griffin (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a); § 12022.53, subd. (d)).

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Oakland, to give Griffin a ride to work again, arriving there at 10:51 p.m.
The apartment complex consisted of three apartment buildings, with a
parking lot serving all three, for which there was only one entrance/exit.
“As Griffin pulled into the complex parking lot, he saw a group of about
five men and women standing on the sidewalk, and a group of about three
young men standing across the street near a battered, brown Buick Skylark.
He stopped at the far end of the parking lot and called Whitehead, who came
out of his apartment and entered the car. As Griffin started to back up, he
heard a noise which, according to his testimony, sounded ‘like somebody
balled up their fist and . . . gave like two knocks on the side of the car, like
“Stop.” ’ Griffin put on his brakes. He saw a man ‘walking around the back
of the car. They came up the driver’s side, and they walked all the way
up. . . . I rolled the window down, and I was like “Ah, my bad.” ’ The man
walked toward the front of the car, turned around, and asked, ‘What did you
say?’ He then opened the driver’s side door, reached into his waistband and
said, ‘Nigger, check this out.’ Griffin testified that he assumed the man, who
looked like defendant Watson, was reaching for a gun.
“Griffin pulled the car door shut and ‘just hit the gas.’ As he backed
into the gate of the parking lot entrance, he heard a gunshot, which did not
hit any of his car’s windows. The man was standing in the middle of the
parking lot pointing a black revolver, which Griffin thought was probably
.38 caliber, straight at Griffin’s head from 20 to 25 feet away. Griffin
testified, ‘I threw the car in drive, and I punched the gas, and I tried to run
him over, and he jumped over to the side in between some parked cars and I
ran into a car.’ As Griffin shifted in reverse, he saw a flash, his driver’s side
window shattered, and he felt something land on his arm.

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 “Griffin ‘hit the gas to go backwards.’ He steered through the parking
lot gate and turned onto the street, where the crowd had grown bigger.
A man standing next to a rock quickly pointed a gun at Griffin’s vehicle and
fired, shattering the passenger-side window, and, Griffin thought, hitting
Whitehead, who slumped over and made a gurgling sound, as if he was
choking. Griffin could not describe this shooter, other than to say he was
calm. In his first two statements to police, Griffin thought it was the same
person who shot at him in the parking lot, but at trial he testified that he
thought there were two shooters. Griffin ducked down, shifted gears, and
‘punched the gas.’ He ran into the back of a parked truck, but pushed it out
of the way, and drove off. He heard more shots, but did not see where they
came from.
“As Griffin drove home, he called 911 and asked for an ambulance,
which arrived within a minute of his arrival at his house. Griffin was
eventually taken to the hospital. A gunshot had entered his body under his
armpit and come out at the top of his arm.
“Whitehead was killed. The parties stipulated that he died from a
bullet wound to the chest. It passed through his left arm, then penetrated his
left lung, pericardial sac, heart, liver, and right lung, exiting into his right
chest wall. Two bullet fragments were taken from Whitehead’s body, one was
found on his jacket, and another was found on the back floorboard of Griffin’s
car.” (People v. Johnson, supra, A121366.)
Our opinion also described the testimony of E.L., a witness who was a
minor at the time of the shooting:
“According to E.L.’s trial testimony, Watson opened the passenger side
door of his car, reached across E.L., and pulled out a black gun. He also put
on a ‘hoodie’ and a leather jacket. Watson and Johnson walked across the

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street together, and Watson entered the parking lot while Johnson stood by
the parking lot gate. West remained behind Watson’s vehicle.
“Within two to three minutes, E.L. saw a ‘big light flash’ and heard
gunshots coming from the parking lot. She testified, ‘I heard a big crash . . .
like, it was a big car accident, and then all of a sudden I seen a car spinning,
and he like hit all the cars trying to come out the parking lot. He hit about
like four cars coming out of the parking lot. And when he was like by the
fence where [Johnson] was at, that’s when [Johnson] hollered, “Shoot. Shoot.”
The very next thing that happened was after he said, “Shoot. Shoot,” all the
other guys just—I turned around. All the other guys just start pulling out
guns and just started shooting every which way.’ West stood in the middle of
the street and fired a silver gun twice at the car. About three others also
fired guns.” (People v. Johnson, supra, A121366.)
And we described the testimony of M.P., also a minor at the time of the
shooting, regarding her interview with the police:
“M.P. renounced the incriminating information about defendants she
told to police in her interview, testifying that none of what she said was true.
This included that she saw ‘the end’ of Whitehead getting shot, opened her
door and saw Whitehead’s friend’s car crashing, looked outside after the
shooting and saw Watson running away with a gun in his hand, saw West
fire two shots with a gun from across the street at a car driving away with
Whitehead inside, saw that West’s gun ‘broke,’ saw Watson shoot his gun
when Johnson yelled, ‘Shoot, shoot,’ saw the car crash into another car on
Webster Street, saw ‘heck of boys’ running when the car crashed, and saw,
that, as the car went towards 38th Street, Johnson, West and Watson
together, ran in the opposite direction, towards 40th Street, with Watson and
West holding guns in their hands. M.P. said she lied to the police, did not

5
know why she lied, and was nervous, scared, and under pressure at the time.”
(People v. Johnson, supra, A121366.)
West was sentenced to seven years for the attempted murder, a
consecutive term of life without parole for the murder, and two consecutive
terms of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancements under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).3
Senate Bill 1437 and West’s Petition for Resentencing
Senate Bill No. 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015), limits first degree felony-murder liability to three categories of
defendants: (a) “the actual killer”; (b) a defendant who “was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill,” aided and abetted the actual killer; or (3) a
defendant who “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; § 189,
subd. (e).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure—now set out in
section 1172.6—whereby a defendant convicted of felony-murder may petition
the sentencing court to have his or her conviction vacated if the following
three conditions are satisfied:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
“(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.

3 The remaining firearm enhancements were imposed and stayed.

6
 “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a), see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
Former section 1170.95, subdivision (c), in effect at the time of West’s
petition, also provided: “The court shall review the petition and determine if the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of
this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner. The prosecutor shall file and serve a response within 60 days of
service of the petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after
the prosecutor response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good cause. If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.”
On March 20, 2019, acting in propria persona, West filed a handwritten
petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437. The petition asserted a
variety of arguments, including that certain statutes and jury instructions
were unconstitutionally vague, and made a few brief references to Senate Bill
No. 1437. The petition also attached several exhibits: the abstract of
judgment (exhibit A); a reporter’s transcript of the return of the jury’s verdict
and sentencing hearing (exhibit B); copies of the jury instructions on murder,
felony murder, and aiding and abetting (exhibit C); the jury’s verdict (exhibit
D); a Senate Committee Analysis of Senate Bill 261 relating to youth offender
parole (exhibit E); the jury instructions on the carjacking special
circumstance (exhibit F); and the jury instructions on first degree murder
(exhibit G).
On March 26, without appointing counsel and before receiving a
response from the government, the trial court denied the petition in a 15-
page written opinion. After recounting the procedural background and the

7
facts of the offense as drawn from our opinion on appeal, the opinion denying
the petition concluded as follows:
“The Petition is denied because relief under section 1170.95 is
unavailable to Petitioner. As provided in Petitioner’s direct appeal, there was
substantial evidence that Petitioner intended to engage in the carjacking of
Griffin’s vehicle. As provided in that opinion, there was a significant amount
of substantial evidence, largely contained in E.L.’s and/or M.P.’s testimony,
that the defendants planned to take control of Griffin’s car and steal the rims.
Griffin testified that he had driven his rim-accessorized Monte Carlo to the
apartment complex at least 100 times, and often gave Whitehead a ride to his
job, which started at 11:00 p.m. Watson and Petitioner frequented the
apartment complex, and Johnson lived there. Johnson was heard talking to
Watson and Petitioner about waiting for someone to bring him some rims on
the day of the shooting. The three were seen leaving and returning to the
area of the apartment complex together, where they waited outside for at
least one-half hour. When Griffin drove up in his Monte Carlo, Johnson was
heard to say, ‘That’s him right there. That’s him. There he go.’ Watson was
seen immediately retrieving a gun from his car, putting on a hoodie, and
walking across the street to the complex’s parking lot with Johnson, while
Petitioner stayed behind Watson’s car. Subsequent events indicate Watson
and Petitioner were each armed with a loaded weapon. Watson then followed
Griffin’s car into the parking lot. Petitioner, already armed, remained across
the street from the apartment complex, and Johnson positioned himself by
the parking lot gate, somewhere between Watson and Petitioner. After
Whitehead got in the car, Watson approached, manufactured a confrontation
with Griffin, opened the driver’s side door, and showed Griffin his weapon.
Griffin’s testimony indicated that when he resisted Watson’s intimidation,

8
Watson did not hesitate to shoot at him—before Griffin tried to run him over,
indicating the willingness to use weapons fire to carjack Griffin’s car. When
Griffin continued his efforts to escape, Johnson promptly yelled to shoot and
Petitioner promptly did so, stopping only because his gun broke. It was only
after Griffin escaped that they ran away.
“As the Court of Appeal pointed out, the jury could reasonably infer
from defendants’ positioning (with Petitioner outside the complex and
Johnson by the parking lot gate) and Watson’s opening of the driver’s side
door, that they planned all along for Watson to jump into the driver’s seat
after intimidating or forcing Griffin and Whitehead to give up the car, pick up
Johnson and Petitioner, and drive away. Additionally, substantial evidence
presented at trial indicated that Watson and Petitioner fired multiple times
a[t] the car within moments of each other, that either could have been the
proximate cause of the injuries, and that it was not possible to determine who
shot Griffin or Whitehead. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at
trial that Petitioner had any ‘sudden quarrel’ with Griffin or Whitehead, that
they said or did anything sufficient to provoke an ordinarily reasonable
person to deadly violence, or that Petitioner acted under the heat of passion.
Similarly, there was not substantial evidence that Petitioner believed himself
or anyone else to be in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm when
he shot at the Monte Carlo. There was no evidence that Griffin attempted to
do any harm to Petitioner when he drove out of the parking lot. There was no
substantial evidence that Petitioner acted in response to anything other than
Johnson’s shout to shoot.
“Accordingly, Petitioner was either the actual killer or, with the intent
to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested,
or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murders in the first degree,

9
or was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, given the true finding on the special circumstance
allegation. (§§ 189, subd. (e); 190.2, subds. (c), (d).) Additionally, Petitioner
was not convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Rather, Petitioner was convicted on a valid theory of murder which
survives the changes to sections 188 and 189 made by [Senate Bill No.] 1437.
(§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)”
West appealed, and in West I, we concluded that he had not
demonstrated any error in the trial court’s summary denial of his petition
because in finding the special circumstance true, the jury necessarily
concluded either that West had the intent to kill, or that all of the following
were true: “1. The defendant’s participation in the crime began before or
during the killing; [¶] 2. The defendant was a major participant in the crime;
[¶] AND 3. When the defendant participated in the crime, he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (See CALCRIM No. 703; West I, supra,
A157163, p. 12.) We held that the trial court did not err in relying on the
summary of the facts of the offense contained in our opinion on direct appeal.
(West I, supra, A157163, p. 13.) And we concluded that any error in failing to
appoint counsel to represent West before ruling on his petition was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, because, given the jury’s special circumstance
finding, West had not explained how the assistance of counsel in preparing a
reply brief could have produced a different result. (West I, supra, A157163,
p. 14.)
West petitioned for review, and on April 15, 2020, our Supreme Court
granted the petition and deferred the matter pending disposition of Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 952. On February 9, 2022, the Court issued an order
expanding its review in this matter to include the issue then pending in

10
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698. Following its decisions in Lewis and Strong,
on November 16, 2022, the Court transferred the matter back to this court
with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of
Lewis and Strong.
DISCUSSION
Lewis
In Lewis, our Supreme Court held that once a petitioner files a petition
that complies with the three requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)
and requests the appointment of counsel, the superior court must appoint
counsel and permit the parties to submit briefing before deciding whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief as required by
subdivision (c). (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963 [“petitioners who file
a complying petition requesting counsel are to receive counsel upon the filing
of a compliant petition”]; id. at pp. 962–966.)
And, with respect to the question of whether the trial court can look to
the record of conviction, including appellate opinions, in determining whether
the petition has made that prima facie case, Lewis said this:
“While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the
appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under
subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas
corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the
court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ([People v.] Drayton [(2020)]
47 Cal.App.5th [965,] 978, quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(c)(1)).)
‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility

11
grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ (Drayton, at p. 978,
fn. omitted, citing In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 456.) ‘However, if the
record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ (Drayton, at p. 979,
quoting Serrano, at p. 456.)
“Appellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part of the record
of conviction. (See People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 454–455.)
However, as we cautioned in Woodell, the probative value of an appellate
opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion
might not supply all answers.’ (Id. at p. 457.) In reviewing any part of the
record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) As the People
emphasize, the ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’
“In sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid
the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief under section [1172.6], subdivision (c).” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.)
Following Lewis, the Legislature amended section 1172.6 to codify a
portion of that decision in subdivision (b)(3), which now provides: “Upon
receiving a petition in which the information required by this subdivision is
set forth or a petition where any missing information can readily be
ascertained by the court, if the petitioner has requested counsel, the court
shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.” After providing the parties
“an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If

12
the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to
relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to
make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth
its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Lewis further held that a trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to
represent a petitioner when assessing whether he or she has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief is state law error only, reviewable for
prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 973–974.) “More specifically, a petitioner ‘whose
petition is denied before an order to show cause issues has the burden of
showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been afforded
assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have been summarily
denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 974, quoting People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 676.)
Strong
In Strong, our Supreme Court held that special circumstance findings
that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life “issued by a jury before
[People v.] Banks [(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)] and [People v.] Clark
[(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) (which significantly changed the prevailing
understanding of major participation and reckless indifference)] do not
preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under
[§ 1172.6]. This is true even if the trial evidence would have been sufficient
to support the findings under Banks and Clark.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 710; accord, id. at p. 721 [major participation and reckless indifference
findings “will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case” unless those
findings were made after Banks and Clark were decided].)

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 Remand Is Required for the Trial Court to Evaluate West’s
Petition in Light of Strong and Lewis
Following the Supreme Court’s transfer in this case, West filed a
supplemental brief, arguing that under Lewis, the trial court erred in failing
to appoint counsel and receive briefing before evaluating whether he had
made a prima facie case for relief, and that the jury’s special circumstance
finding does not establish that he is ineligible for resentencing under Strong.
The Attorney General filed a short supplemental brief, agreeing with West
that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel and provide an
opportunity for briefing before determining whether West has made a prima
facie case for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
We agree with the parties that the trial court erred in failing to appoint
counsel to represent West and provide an opportunity for briefing before
ruling on West’s section 1172.6 petition under Lewis. (See Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 962–966.) And although our previous opinion found that
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the jury’s special
circumstance finding, that reasoning has been undermined by Strong.
Because the jury made its special circumstance finding in 2007, before Banks
and Clark were decided, that finding does not prevent West from making a
prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 710.) Accordingly, we will vacate the order summarily denying the petition
and remand for the trial court to appoint counsel, provide an opportunity for
briefing, and proceed to determine whether West has made a prima facie case
for relief under the current version of section 1172.6, as well as the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Lewis and Strong.
West also argues that the trial court erred in performing “factfinding
involving weighing of the evidence” by analyzing the facts in our opinion on
direct appeal. He relies on Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022,

14
which amended section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) to provide that at the
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief,
the court “may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in any
prior appellate opinion,” and cases holding that this precludes the trial court
from considering a prior appellate opinion’s statement of facts at the
evidentiary stage of ruling on a section 1172.6 petition. (See, e.g., People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 [“specificity” of the language
“indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should not rely on the
factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions when a section
[1172.6] petition reaches the stage of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing”];
People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, fn. 9 [“Senate Bill [No.] 775
prevents a trial court from relying on facts recited in an appellate opinion to
rule on a petition under section [1172.6]”].) The Attorney General contends
that even after Senate Bill No. 775, under Lewis, “the parties can, and
should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing
whether petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under [section
1172.6], subdivision (c).” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972, italics added.)
Because we will vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a new
evaluation of whether West’s petition makes a prima facie case for relief, and
because Senate Bill No. 775 was enacted after the trial court’s original order,
the trial court should consider to what extent it may rely on our opinion on
direct appeal under the current state of the law.

DISPOSITION
Our opinion in West I is vacated. The order summarily denying West’s
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed, and the matter is

15
remanded for the trial court to appoint counsel, provide an opportunity for
briefing, and determine whether West has made a prima facie case for relief
consistent with the current version of section 1172.6, as well as our Supreme
Court’s decisions in Lewis and Strong.

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 _________________________
Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

People v. West (A157163)

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