Rel: February 10, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
_________________________
CR-2022-0665
_________________________
Lancaster DeShawn Lewis
v.
State of Alabama
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court
(CC-15-798)
WINDOM, Presiding Judge.
AFFIRMED BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM.
Kellum and Cole, JJ., concur. Minor, J., concurs in part and
dissents in part, with opinion, which McCool, J., joins.
CR-2022-0665
MINOR, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
A jury convicted Lancaster DeShawn Lewis of trafficking in a
synthetic controlled substance, see § 13A-12-231(12)(a), Ala. Code 1975.
The circuit court sentenced Lewis as a habitual felony offender with two
prior convictions—including a conviction for possession of cocaine—to life
in prison.
The Drug Demand Reduction Assessment Act, § 13A-12-281, Ala.
Code 1975, provides that every person convicted of a violation of an
offense defined in §§ 13A-12-202, -203, -204, -211, -212, -213, -215, or -
231, Ala. Code 1975, "shall be assessed for each offense an additional
penalty fixed at one thousand dollars ($1,000) for a first offense and two
thousand dollars ($2,000) for a second or subsequent offense." The record
on appeal shows that the circuit court imposed a $1,000 drug-demand-
reduction assessment for Lewis's conviction rather than the $2,000
assessment required because Lewis had a prior conviction for a drug
offense.
In Siercks v. State, 154 So. 3d 1085 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013), this
Court held that the drug-demand-reduction assessment is "not
waivable," describing it as "mandatory and jurisdictional." This Court in
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CR-2022-0665
Hall v. State, 223 So. 3d 977, 982 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016), addressed a
petitioner's claim in a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition alleging that his
sentence was illegal because the circuit court had not imposed the drug-
demand-reduction assessment. In response, the State asserted that the
claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because it could have been raised
at trial or on appeal but was not. 223 So. 3d at 979. This Court agreed
with the State and overruled Siercks "[t]o the extent that" Siercks held
that such a claim (one alleging that the sentencing court did not impose
the demand-reduction assessment) was not "subject to the grounds of
preclusion set forth in Rule 32.2, Ala. R. Crim. P." Id. at 982. The per
curiam opinion1 reasoned that “[b]ecause the demand-reduction
assessment is a 'mandatory' fine that is capable of being waived," the
logic in Siercks was faulty in describing the fine as "jurisdictional." Id.
In a separate writing, Judge Joiner "explain[ed] [his] basis for"
concurring in the per curiam opinion in Hall: "Stated simply, the Court's
decision today overrules [Siercks] … only to the extent that [it held] that
a circuit court's failure to impose a fine pursuant to the Demand
Reduction Assessment Act is a 'jurisdictional' claim in the context of a
1Two judges dissented from the per curiam opinion in Hall.
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CR-2022-0665
Rule 32[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] proceeding." 223 So. 3d at 982 (Joiner, J.,
concurring specially). Judge Joiner stated: "To be clear, this Court has
not overruled Siercks with regard to claims on direct appeal alleging that
the circuit court failed to impose a demand-reduction assessment." 223
So. 3d at 982 n.4.
I agree with the reasoning of the main opinion in Hall that the
demand-reduction assessment is not a "jurisdictional" issue because it
may be waived in some cases. But Lewis's case involves a direct appeal
of his conviction and sentence, not an appeal from a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim.
P., proceeding. The circuit court's imposition of a $1,000 assessment
shows that the assessment has not been waived. Because the record
shows that the circuit court imposed an incorrect assessment, I would
remand this case for the circuit court to impose the correct assessment.
Thus, I dissent from that part of the Court's judgment affirming the
circuit court's imposition of a drug-demand-reduction assessment in the
wrong amount. I concur in the rest of the Court's judgment.
McCool, J., concurs.
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