Case: 22-1247 Document: 44 Page: 1 Filed: 02/14/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
STANLEY L. DAVIS,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2022-1247
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 18-4371, Chief Judge Margaret C.
Bartley, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Judge Joseph L. Toth.
______________________
Decided: February 14, 2023
______________________
KENNETH DOJAQUEZ, Carpenter Chartered, Topeka,
KS, argued for claimant-appellant.
ASHLEY AKERS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented
by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, ANDREW J. STEINBERG,
Case: 22-1247 Document: 44 Page: 2 Filed: 02/14/2023
2 DAVIS v. MCDONOUGH
Office of General Counsel, United States Department of
Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before STOLL, SCHALL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
STOLL, Circuit Judge.
Stanley L. Davis appeals the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans
Court) affirming the Board of Veterans Appeals’ (Board)
denial of an earlier effective date for Mr. Davis’s service-
connected disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) and vacat-
ing and remanding the Board’s denial under § 3.156(c). Be-
cause the Veterans Court’s decision is not final, we dismiss.
Remand orders from the Veterans Court are not final
judgments. See Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361,
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We generally decline to review a
non-final order of the Veterans Court, and we deviate from
this rule on finality only when a case meets each require-
ment of Williams’s three-pronged test. Id. At issue here is
Williams’s third prong, which requires “a substantial risk
that the decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the
remand proceeding may moot the issue.” Id. This prong is
not met if (1) there is a single claim or (2) there are sepa-
rable claims that are “inextricably intertwined because
both claim compensation for the same disability.” Joyce
v. Nicholson, 443 F.3d 845, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Here, re-
gardless of whether we view Mr. Davis’s claim under
§ 3.156(b) and (c) as a single claim or as separable claims
“inextricably intertwined” because they claim compensa-
tion for the same disability, this case does not meet Wil-
liams’s third prong. We thus dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.