Ankola v. Ankola CA2/3

Filed 2/17/23 Ankola v. Ankola CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
C alifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
c ertified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been
c ertified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

MANISHKUMAR ANKOLA, B322550, B322558,
B322562
Petitioner and Appellant,

v. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 15FL173072)
PRIYANKA ANKOLA,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, James E. Towery, Judge. Affirmed.
Manishkumar Ankola for Petitioner and Appellant.
No appearances for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________________________
 INTRODUCTION
These are three appeals1 arising from a judgment of
dissolution. Petitioner Manish2 Ankola challenges numerous
rulings by the trial court below; specifically: 1) the court erred in
its ruling on the parties’ date of separation; 2) the court abused
its discretion in denying Manish’s motion to compel and request
for terminating and/or monetary sanctions; 3) the court abused
its discretion in denying temporary spousal support to Manish; 4)
the court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees to
Manish as a prevailing party in domestic violence restraining
order proceedings; and 5) the court exhibited bias against him
during the trial on property issues, necessitating different orders
or a remand for a new trial.3

1On the court’s own motion, the appeals were ordered to be
considered together for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and
disposition. They were then transferred from the Sixth Appellate
District to the Second.
2Petitioner refers to himself throughout his brief as “Manish”
and we do the same. No disrespect is intended.
3 Although Manish sets forth additional rulings in his three
notices of appeal and three additional amended notices of appeal,
and references facts relating to some of these other rulings in his
statement of facts, his opening brief is limited to the issues
referenced above. An “appellant must present each point
separately in the opening brief under an appropriate heading,
showing the nature of the question to be presented and the point
to be made; otherwise, the point will be forfeited.” (Keyes v.
Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656.) “Courts will ordinarily
treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or her opening
brief as a waiver of that challenge.” (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford,
Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685.)

2
 Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Manish filed a petition for nullity on December 15, 2015
alleging that his marriage to respondent Priyanka Ankola was
voidable based on fraud.4 He stated that the date of marriage
was June 12, 2014, and the date of separation was November 30,
2015. Priyanka filed her response seeking a dissolution of the
marriage and claiming the date of separation as October 4, 2015.
1. Prior appellate proceedings
This case has already resulted in two published opinions
arising from at least four prior appeals. (In re Marriage of
Ankola (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 560 (Ankola I) and In re Marriage
of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369 (Ankola II).) As relevant to
the issues in the present appeals, we will summarize the facts
from those two opinions briefly.
In Ankola I, the Court of Appeal reversed the grant of a
mutual domestic violence restraining order where the statutory
requirements were not met. Priyanka filed a request for a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) in May 2016.5
(Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) After several
continuances, the trial on the DVRO and on Manish’s petition for

4 Priyanka Gupta was formerly known during the marriage as
Priyanka Ankola. As with her former husband, we will refer to
her by her first name for ease of reference, with no disrespect
intended.
5The record reveals that while Priyanka filed her first request for
DVRO in May, a second one was filed by her in July 2016.
Manish claims the May request was never served. For ease of
reference, we refer to the one filed in July–which is the first one
that actually went to hearing–as her “first” DVRO.

3
nullity came on for hearing in September 2016. The trial court
denied both Manish’s request to declare the marriage a nullity
and Priyanka’s request for a DVRO. (Ibid.)
In February 2017, Priyanka filed a second request for a
DVRO, which was granted by the trial court on August 15, 2017
(the August 2017 DVRO) for the maximum allowable period of
five years. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 563.)
The very next day, August 16, 2017, Manish filed his own
request for a DVRO against Priyanka. (Ankola I, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) While Priyanka filed a response, she did
not file a separate application for another DVRO. (Ibid.)
Manish’s request for a DVRO came on for hearing in 2018.
After the matter was submitted, the trial court found “ ‘under
Family Code section 6305 that each party has committed acts of
domestic violence’ ” and that neither party was “ ‘primarily acting
out of self-defense,’ ” and thus ordered mutual restraining orders
against Priyanka and Manish. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 564.) In April 2018, the trial court entered the second
DVRO against Manish (the April 2018 DVRO).6 (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed the April 2018 DVRO against
Manish, reasoning that the criteria set forth in Family Code
section 6305, subdivision (a)(1) had not been met. Specifically, as
to the second DVRO, Priyanka had not filed a second request for
restraining order using a Judicial Council restraining order
application form. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 565–

6 A DVRO was issued against Priyanka the same day. The
DVRO against her was not referenced in that appeal although
the record reflects that she separately tried to appeal or set aside
that order.

4
567.) The appellate court further rejected the argument that the
April 2018 DVRO was a modification of the August 2017 DVRO,
which was by then the subject of a separate appeal. (Id. at
p. 567.) The court ordered that “the parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.” (Id. at p. 568.)
In Ankola II, the appellate court ruled on three appeals
relating to various rulings of the lower court as of that date. It
first affirmed the five-year August 2017 DVRO against Manish,
finding substantial evidence supported the order.7 It also
affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Manish’s petition for
nullity and granting a judgment of dissolution instead. (Ankola
II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 372.)
The appellate court reversed, however, the trial court’s
ruling rescinding a prior award of attorney’s fees in Manish’s
favor.8 (Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 372–373.) The
facts leading to this conclusion were as follows. Subsequent to
the hearing on the first request for DVRO filed by Priyanka,
which was denied by the trial court in September 2016, the court

7 Among other things, the Ankola II court found that Priyanka’s
evidence that Manish had stalked her by moving into an
apartment “ ‘directly next door’ ” to hers after she had moved out,
as well as sending numerous emails to her after she had asked
him to stop communicating with her or her family, was
substantial evidence supporting the issuance of the DVRO.
While Manish claimed he did not know Priyanka was still living
in that complex at the time he moved in, the trial court rejected
his testimony, finding that Manish “ ‘lied repeatedly on
significant points.’ ” (Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
8 While Manish is self-represented on appeal, at various times in
the lower court he had counsel representing him.

5
held a separate hearing on Manish’s request for attorney’s fees as
a prevailing party in that DVRO action. In March 2017 the court
granted Manish’s request in the amount of $10,000. (Id. at
pp. 373–374.)
After Priyanka obtained the August 2017 DVRO against
Manish, she then moved for attorney’s fees as a prevailing party
in that proceeding. (Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.)
In October 2017 the court both awarded fees to Priyanka (in the
amount of $10,562.50) and rescinded the $10,000 fees it had
previously awarded to Manish. (Ibid.) Explaining its order
rescinding Manish’s fee award, the trial court had stated that it
“ ‘recall[ed]’ ” the first DVRO request that Priyanka filed and was
“ ‘sorry, in retrospect, [that the court] denied it.’ ” (Id. at p. 382.)
The court further referenced Manish’s “ ‘untruthful testimony’ ”
on the witness stand in connection with the August 2017 DVRO.
(Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal held this was reversible error because
the basis of the trial court’s rescission of Manish’s attorney’s fee
award was new evidence, rather than the evidence presented at
the original proceeding. Thus, the court had effectively and
improperly granted a new trial, sua sponte. (Ankola II, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at pp. 383–384.)
The Ankola II court granted Priyanka her costs on the two
appeals she prevailed on. But it ordered the parties to bear their
own costs on the appeal Manish prevailed on. (Id. at p. 390.)
2. Manish’s request for attorney’s fees in connection
with DVRO proceedings
The opinion in Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 560 was
issued in June 2019. The following September, Manish filed in
the trial court a request for order (RFO) for attorney’s fees and

6
costs in the amount of $36,059 for having prevailed in the DVRO
against Priyanka (the April 2018 DVRO) and for the mutual
DVRO “reversed on appeal.”
Manish sought $15,868 in connection with the underlying
trial on the April 2018 DVRO, $17,900 for attorney’s fees
expended on the Ankola I appeal, and $2,291 for opposing
Priyanka’s motion to set aside the DVRO against her.
The hearing on Manish’s motion for fees was held in
November 2019. The court denied the motion. At oral argument,
the court articulated its reasoning as follows: 1) the Court of
Appeal did not make any order for attorney’s fees on appeal; 2)
the trial court had already made a finding that neither party was
a prevailing party at the hearing on the mutual DVRO and did
not intend for either party to be awarded fees relating to that
April 2018 DVRO hearing; 3) it would be inequitable to require
Priyanka to pay Manish’s fees from the second DVRO, given that
there was at the time a five-year DVRO against Manish; and 4)
the court had already denied Manish’s request for fees in
connection with the hearing on Priyanka’s request to set aside
the DVRO against her.
3. Motion for terminating and monetary sanctions
While the various appeals were pending, discovery was
ongoing. Multiple motions to compel were filed. In August 2019,
Manish filed a motion for terminating sanctions, to compel
further responses and production of documents, and for monetary
sanctions against Priyanka and her counsel.
This motion was also heard at the November 2019 hearing.
The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that it was
untimely and that Priyanka “used good faith to provide
reasonable responses to the best of her ability.”

7
 4. Manish’s requests for temporary spousal support
Manish first requested temporary spousal support in
February 2019. The trial court denied the request in March
2019.
In November 2020, Manish again requested temporary
spousal support. The trial court again denied the request.
5. The trial on property issues and date of separation
At a status conference in November 2020, Manish stated he
was not ready for trial and sought a continuance. The trial court
granted the request and set trial for January 2021. The court’s
estimate was two hours. Manish claims that he requested a two-
day trial and named four witnesses.9
Manish then filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any
evidence that had not been provided in Priyanka’s discovery
responses or in her trial brief. The court heard the motion on the
day of trial and deferred ruling on it until “conclusion of trial.”
The trial took place over a period of approximately two hours and
thirty-five minutes with a twenty-minute break. The court
issued its tentative statement of decision finding the date of
separation to be December 15, 2015 and making various orders
regarding property division. Manish filed objections to it, and the

9 Manish does not cite to anything in the record for this
proposition, although we assume for the sake of argument that it
is true. The trial brief Manish filed on January 4, 2021 did state
an estimate of two days but this was filed after the hearing of
November 2020. In that same brief, he named both parties as
witnesses, as well as “Amit Bhatnagar” to testify about “facts
related Parties’ marital relationship [sic], before and after, and
characterization of some assets.”

8
court then issued its final statement of decision, which did not
differ from the proposed draft.
DISCUSSION
A. Competing Rules of Court
Several of Manish’s contentions on appeal (the date of
separation and on the character and division of property) involve
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s findings.
However, in the statement of facts in his opening brief relating to
these issues, Manish has recited only those facts that are
favorable to his position. Such conduct is not to be condoned. (In
re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1530–
1531.) “ ‘It is incumbent upon appellants to state fully, with
transcript references, the evidence which is claimed to be
insufficient to support the findings.’ ” (In re Marriage of Fink
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.)
Normally, we would find Manish’s claims challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence waived due to this failure. (Hjelm v.
Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155,
1165–1166; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)
In this case, however, there is a competing rule under
which, if the respondent fails to file a respondent’s brief, “the
court may decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and
any oral argument by the appellant.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.220(a)(2).) Under a prior iteration of that rule, courts could
accept as true the statement of facts in the appellant’s opening
brief in the absence of a respondent’s brief. (Petrosyan v. Prince
Corp. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 587, 593, fn. 2.) Even in such a
case, however, the reviewing court must examine the record and
reverse only if prejudicial error is found. (Ibid.) Although the
statute’s language has changed, we deem the import of the

9
competing rules as remaining the same. Therefore, we will not
deem Manish’s sufficiency of the evidence claims waived in light
of Priyanka’s failure to file a respondent’s brief.
B. The trial court did not err in finding the date of
separation to be December 15, 2015
1. Standard of review
“Date of separation is a factual issue to be determined by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (In re Marriage of Manfer (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930.) “ ‘Our review is limited to
determining whether the court's factual determinations are
supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted
reasonably in exercising its discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)
2. Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s ruling
The date of separation can be relevant in certain cases
largely because the “earnings and accumulations” of a spouse
after the date of separation are the separate property of that
spouse. (Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a).)
The date of separation occurs “when either of the parties
does not intend to resume the marriage and his or her actions
bespeak the finality of the marital relationship.” (In re Marriage
of Hardin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 448, 451.) “All factors bearing
on either party’s intentions ‘to return or not to return to the other
spouse’ are to be considered. [Citation.] No particular facts are
per se determinative.” (Id. at p. 452.) “The ultimate question to
be decided in determining the date of separation is whether either
or both of the parties perceived the rift in their relationship as
final. The best evidence of this is their words and actions.” (Id.
at p. 453.)

10
 The trial took place on January 12, 2021, one of the dates
for which there is no transcript.10 In the absence of a transcript,
we look at the parties’ respective trial briefs. There, Manish
argued that the date of separation was December 26, 2015 while
Priyanka argued the date should be October 4, 2015. Manish
filed his petition for nullity on December 15, 2015, stating the
date of separation to be November 30, 2015.11 Manish stated in
his trial brief that he served his nullity petition on Priyanka on
December 30, 2015.
The trial court found the date of separation to be December
15, 2015, rejecting both parties’ proposed dates, but finding it to
be closer to Manish’s date than Priyanka’s. The trial court noted
that Priyanka consulted with an attorney prior to December
2015, never intended to resume her marriage, and moved her
furniture out of the family residence on October 4, 2015; on the
other hand, she admitted to having sexual relations with Manish
on two occasions after that date. The trial court concluded that
“the testimony of both parties was contradictory on the date of
separation” and that “[t]here was inconsistent behavior by both
parties regarding this issue. In considering the evidence as a
whole, the Court finds the date of separation to be December 15,

10 As reflected in the clerk’s certificate in B322562 dated 8/5/21:
“per minute orders dated 11/4/20, 12/16/20, and 1/12/21[,] [n]o
[c]ourt [r]eporter was present at these [h]earing dates” and thus
the reporter’s transcripts for those dates “will not be part of the
[r]ecord.”
11 Recitations in a petition may be considered as evidence but are

not conclusive as to date of separation. (In re Marriage of
Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 657.)

11
2015, which was the date that [Manish] filed the Nullity
Petition.”12
As noted, there is no reporter’s transcript of the trial
proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) [“If an
appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of
the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal
must include [either a reporter’s transcript, an agreed statement,
or a settled statement”]; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
973, 992 [“Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and
no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record,
the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct”].) “The
effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but
supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an
argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Fain,
at p. 992.)
There is no error apparent on the face of the record. In the
absence of a transcript, the decision reached by the trial court
must be presumed correct. Moreover, even if we reach the
question on the merits, and mindful that our job is not to reweigh

12Manish contends that 1) the “status only” judgment (which
adjudicated the status of the marriage being dissolved only)
which was entered previously in this case improperly included
October 4, 2015 as the day of separation and 2) a stipulation
regarding the date of separation being December 15, 2015 was
entered into by his attorney without his consent in April 2019.
However, it is evident from the court’s statement of decision that
the court neither held Manish to the date listed in the status only
judgment nor referenced the prior stipulation regarding
December 15, 2015, but rather allowed both parties to present
evidence that the date of separation was a different date than the
one entered or stipulated to.

12
the evidence in the way that appellant believes is most
persuasive to his claim, but to review the entirety of the available
record including all evidence presented by both sides, we find
that the factual determination as to the date of separation by the
court is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, even if substantial evidence did not support the
trial court’s date of separation, Manish does not set forth any
consequences to the parties arising from the trial court selecting
December 15 over December 26—a date only 11 days later. His
brief contains no reference to any way in which Manish was
harmed by the court’s selecting the first date over the other. (Cf.
Manfer, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 [“[b]ecause ‘[t]he
earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . . while living separate
and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the
spouse’ [citation], the date of separation can be of considerable
consequence with regard to the parties' property rights”].)
An appellant has the burden not only to show error but
prejudice from that error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) If an
appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his argument will be
rejected on appeal.
We affirm the trial court’s ruling on the date of separation.
C. Manish’s request for attorney’s fees incurred in
the DVRO proceedings
1. Standard of review
We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing
the amount of an attorney’s fees award. (Loeffler v. Medina
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509.) “ ‘[A]n experienced trial
judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to
assess the value of the legal services rendered in his or her court
. . .’ [Citation.] ‘The only proper basis of reversal of the amount

13
of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or
small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and
prejudice influenced the determination.’ ” (Ibid.) Similarly, a
trial court’s determination of a party’s entitlement to attorney’s
fees is also subject to review for abuse of discretion. (Canyon
Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
398, 408–409 [“ ‘Whether the statutory requirements have been
satisfied so as to justify a fee award is a question committed to
the discretion of the trial court, unless the question turns on
statutory construction, which we review de novo’ ”].)
We do not review the trial court’s reasoning, but rather its
ruling. “A trial court’s order is affirmed if correct on any theory,
even if the trial court’s reasoning was not correct.” (Loeffler v.
Medina, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504, fn. 11.)
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
At issue here is Manish’s request for attorney’s fees and
costs in the amount of $36,059 for having obtained a DVRO
against Priyanka (the April 2018 DVRO) and for getting the
mutual DVRO against him reversed on appeal, which had also
been issued in April 2018.13 The motion also requested fees for
opposing Priyanka’s motion to set aside the DVRO issued against
her.

13 The underlying attorney’s fees orders that were previously
granted by the trial court (the $10,000 to Manish that was
erroneously rescinded and then reinstated by the Court of
Appeal, as well as the $10,562.50 awarded to Priyanka) are not at
issue in these appeals and presumably, if they have not already
been offset in part and paid, will be part of the final calculations
regarding who owes what to whom.

14
 Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, a court shall
award attorney fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner, subject
to a determination that the party ordered to pay has or is
reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay. (Fam. Code,
§ 6344.)14
As an initial matter, we agree with Manish that the court
reached some erroneous conclusions. First, we agree that the
Ankola I court’s decision that each party shall bear their own
costs is not determinative of whether the trial court could have
granted attorney’s fees based on Manish’s successful appeal of
the April 2018 DVRO. California Rules of Court, rule 8.278,
which sets forth the general rule for costs to the prevailing party
on appeal, provides that: “In the interests of justice, the Court of
Appeal may also award or deny costs as it deems proper.” (Id. at
subd. (a)(5).) It further provides: “Unless the court orders
otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney’s fees on
appeal nor precludes a party from seeking them under rule
3.1702.” (Id. at subd. (d)(2).) In other words, the decision about
costs on appeal is entirely separate from a decision about the
entitlement to attorney’s fees on appeal. (Butler-Rupp v.
Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 927.) To collect appellate
attorney’s fees, “a party must demonstrate the right to do so
under either a statute or a contract.” (Ibid.)

14This code section was amended effective January 1, 2023.
However, under the version of Family Code section 6344 that was
in effect at the time of the hearings below, the language, while
different, still required that in the case of either a prevailing
petitioner or respondent a court was to consider the parties’
respective abilities to pay. (Former Fam. Code, § 6344 subd. (b).)

15
 We also agree that, as it relates to the fees sought for
obtaining his DVRO against Priyanka, as a prevailing petitioner,
Family Code section 6344, subdivision (c) requires a court to
consider the parties’ financial circumstances. Here, the court
considered the issue “irrelevant.”
However, we do not find either of these errors to require
reversal of the court’s denial of fees in this case. When we are
able to determine from the record that even if the lower court had
applied the correct standard, it would have reached the same
result, the error does not mandate reversal. (Loeffler v. Medina,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504, fn. 11 [“to the extent the trial
court erred in applying the wrong standard, that error is
harmless because . . . the trial court made factual findings that
we are able to apply to . . . determine that, had the trial court
applied the correct standard, it would have reached the same
result”].)
Here, the record reveals that these errors were harmless.
a. Fees for reversing the DVRO against
Manish in the Court of Appeal
As for the fees spent in the Court of Appeal reversing the
mutual restraining order against Manish, we find that the record
adequately shows that the court would have denied fees even
without its erroneous conclusion that the appellate court ruled
that each side should bear its own costs.
In the posture of receiving attorney’s fees for successfully
reversing a DVRO against him, Manish is effectively a prevailing
respondent. The statutory language thus makes any award of
fees discretionary.
The record of the argument is clear that the court found
that neither party was a prevailing party at the hearing that

16
resulted in the 2018 mutual DVROs. The court stated this
conclusion at the November 2019 hearing even after the Court of
Appeal had reversed the DVRO against Manish.
This conclusion is not an abuse of discretion. As the Court
of Appeal noted in its opinion reversing the “mutual” restraining
order as to Manish, there was already a five-year DVRO in effect
against him when the April 2018 mutual order was erroneously
granted. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.) That
August 2017 DVRO was later upheld. (Ankola II, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at p. 381.)
The trial court mentioned that preexisting DVRO against
Manish as an additional basis for denying Manish’s request for
fees for obtaining a DVRO against Priyanka. Specifically, the
court stated that “under all of the circumstances here I think it
would be inequitable to assess [Priyanka] with attorneys fees
from that second DVRO, given the context that there was and
remains a five-year DVRO against Mr. Ankola. And I, under the
circumstances, find it would be vastly inequitable to award fees
on that basis.” The trial court later stated that “the reason why
the [c]ourt entered a five-year restraining order is it found your
conduct to be egregious. So you are now suffering the
consequences of your behavior. And I’m sorry that that’s the
case, but that is the case.”15

15 Far from demonstrating bias or prejudice, as Manish argues,
these statements simply set forth the trial court’s opinion of the
evidence, which is wholly consistent with the performance of its
duties. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219–1220 [“ ‘[W]hen the state of mind of the
trial judge appears to be adverse to one of the parties but is based

17
 In essence, even though the April 2018 DVRO against
Manish had been reversed by the Court of Appeal, as of the date
of the hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees, there were still
active restraining orders against both parties—the five-year
August 2017 DVRO against Manish, which the court itself stated
was based on “egregious” conduct, and a three-year order against
Priyanka.
Where a statute providing entitlement to attorney’s fees to
a prevailing party does not define “prevailing party,” such a
determination is left to the discretion of the trial court. (See, e.g.,
Galan v. Wolfriver Holding Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1124,
1128.) The trial court must determine who is the prevailing
party “ ‘on a practical level.’ ” (Id. at p. 1129.)16
In this case, it is clear from the record that the court
concluded that there was no prevailing party after the April 2018
hearing—even after the second DVRO against Manish was

upon actual observance of the witnesses and the evidence given
during the trial of an action, it does not amount to that prejudice
against a litigant which disqualifies him in the trial of the action.
. . . The opinion thus formed, being the result of a judicial
hearing, does not amount to [improper] bias and prejudice’ ”].)
16 Other courts have held that when the statute is silent, the

general definition of “prevailing party” in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1032 may be used. (See, e.g., Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777.) In this case, it amounts to the same
thing, as Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4)
provides that when a party recovers “other than monetary relief”
and in “situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’
shall be as determined by the court, and under those
circumstances, the court, in its discretion, . . . may apportion costs
between the parties on the same or adverse sides.”

18
reversed—because the restraining order awarded to Manish was
offset by the existing five-year DVRO that had been awarded
against him.
The trial court is in the best place to observe the testimony
and the demeanor of the witnesses and to consider over all whose
attorney’s fees were justified and whose were not. Indeed,
although we lack the transcripts upon which the DVROs were
granted, the transcripts that we do have are replete with
references to Manish’s re-litigation of various matters, ending
with a warning that he could be declared a vexatious litigant if he
did not change his litigious ways. (Cf. In re Marriage of
Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 473 [court’s findings
that party overlitigated his divorce case were supported by
substantial evidence, so it was not abuse of discretion to deny his
request for fees].)
Because the record supports the court’s denial of Manish’s
fees, this is not a basis to reverse.
b. Evidence of financial condition
Next we address the trial court’s erroneous statement
during oral argument that the financial condition of the parties is
irrelevant to a ruling on a request for fees by a prevailing
petitioner. Upon the court’s announcing its tentative decision
against him, Manish began to argue that the court should
consider the parties’ ability to pay. Although the court stated
that the issue was “irrelevant,” it allowed the argument. In
response, the court then noted that it had, approximately six
months previously, denied Manish’s request for spousal support
and need-based attorney’s fees. The court inquired whether there
was any change of circumstances since it had ruled on those
matters, and noted that despite Manish’s alleged hardships,

19
Manish was in possession of real property that Manish valued at
$800,000. Thus, to the extent the trial court erroneously
concluded that evidence of Manish’s finances were irrelevant as it
related to fees regarding Manish’s having obtained the April 2018
DVRO against Priyanka, the record adequately demonstrates
that there is no likelihood that the trial court would have reached
a different result without that erroneous comment; indeed,
arguably the court did consider them.17 Especially in light of
Manish’s failures to meet his burden either below or on appeal,18
we find that this error was harmless.

17 When it stated that the financial condition of the parties was
irrelevant, the court did not distinguish between the fees
incurred by Manish as a prevailing party on his request, or as a
prevailing defendant in the mutual DVRO that was reversed on
appeal. Finally, Manish does not make any separate argument
challenging the court’s ruling that it had already denied the
$2,291 in fees incurred by Manish opposing Priyanka’s RFO to
set aside the April 2018 DVRO and so any such argument is
waived. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th
at p. 685.)
18 In his brief on appeal, Manish does not cite to his financial
documents in support of his RFO for attorney’s fees, citing
instead to documents filed in support of his request for spousal
support, filed some eleven months later. A court’s ruling at any
given time can only be based on, and must be reviewed with
reference to, the facts that were before it at that time. (In re Zeth
S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“ ‘an appeal reviews the correctness
of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of
matters which were before the trial court for its consideration’ ”].)
Moreover, even looking at the relevant documents filed in
support of his RFO, Manish failed to file any declaration by an

20
 D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to compel and denying
terminating or monetary sanctions
1. Standard of review
A trial court’s determination of a motion to compel
discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) An order for
discovery sanctions, including terminating sanctions, is also
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative
Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.)
We affirm a court’s ruling where there is a sufficient legal
ground to support it, regardless of the grounds relied upon by the
trial court. (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.) The order of the trial court is presumed
correct and all presumptions are indulged to support the order on
matters as to which the record is silent. It is an appellant’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate error and, where the
evidence is in conflict, this court will not disturb the trial court’s

attorney or attach any invoices and chose instead to summarize
them in his own declaration. As the moving party, a prevailing
defendant seeking fees and costs “ ‘ “ ‘bear[s] the burden of
establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the
appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’ ” ’ ” (City of Colton
v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) While lack of
invoices or billing statements is not fatal to a request for fees,
they can be made up for by a sworn declaration of counsel. (Id. at
p. 786.) Here, however, all the court had to go on was the
declaration of Manish, a party it had already found to have
lacked credibility.

21
findings. (Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991)
231 Cal.App.3d 481, 487.)
2. There is no basis for reversal of the order
denying the motion to compel
Manish argues that the ruling on the motion denying his
motion to compel should be reversed because the motion was
timely filed within 45 days of Priyanka’s supplemental responses.
However, Manish does not mention the second reason that was
given by the trial court; namely, that it found the responses
provided by Priyanka to have been in “good faith,” “reasonable,”
and to the “best of her ability.”
The record supports this finding. As detailed in Priyanka’s
counsel’s declaration in support of her opposition to the motion,
she complied with the terms of a stipulation that had been made
between her and Manish’s attorney at a prior hearing,19 and then

19 Though it is not directly at issue in this appeal, Manish claims
that the stipulation entered into by his attorney at a prior
hearing regarding discovery was not valid because he did not
consent to or authorize it. We reject this faulty conclusion, as did
the trial court. (See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d
396, 403–408 [attorney is authorized by virtue of his employment
to bind the client by entering into stipulations on procedural
matters but not to “ ‘impair the client’s substantial rights or the
cause of action itself’ ” by, for example, settling the case or
agreeing to transfer the action to arbitration]; Young v. Rosenthal
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 116 [attorneys were acting within their
authority as attorneys of record in entering into stipulation
resolving a discovery dispute, noting: “If we were to give any
credence to [appellant’s] argument, trial courts would no longer
have the ability to resolve discovery disputes by any means other
than formal, fully contested motions”].)

22
made numerous subsequent supplemental responses. Among the
exhibits attached to the declaration was a cordial “meet and
confer” letter from her counsel noting, among other things, that
she would be producing certain additional documents, did not
have other documents, and had already fully responded to yet
other requests as of the original due date, and thus any further
motion to compel would be untimely. Another exhibit consisted
of her verified Fourth Supplemental Responses to the Second Set
of Demands, served by mail on August 14, 2019. Her
memorandum of points and authorities contended that as to
certain documents, the motion to compel was untimely because
the responses had taken place on May 24, 2019 and there was no
indication that the response was incomplete or that she was still
looking for information. Her opposition also argued that
evidentiary and terminating sanctions should be denied because
respondent “has no history of violating a discovery order” and due
to Manish’s failure to fully meet and confer. We find no abuse of
discretion as it relates to the denial of the motion to compel, even
assuming the motion was filed timely.
Since we find it reasonable for the court to have denied the
motion to compel, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
failure to assess the requested monetary sanctions of $10,325 in
connection with his motion.
Turning to Manish’s request for terminating sanctions, the
standard for granting a motion for terminating sanctions is quite
high. Discovery sanctions should be “appropriate to the
dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to
protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied
discovery.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793.)
Despite a court’s broad discretion to select the appropriate

23
penalty, “the terminating sanction is a drastic penalty and should
be used sparingly.” (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of
New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 [imposition of the
terminating sanction was an abuse of discretion where it was the
first and only sanction imposed].)
Indeed, “[a] prerequisite to the imposition of the dismissal
sanction is that the party has wilfully [sic] failed to comply with a
court order.” (Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 488.) Here, there was no showing
that Priyanka had failed to comply, willfully or not, with any
prior court order.20
Manish also argues the trial court’s bias against him was
evident when, during a prior hearing on discovery, it mentioned
that the “context” of the case included that it had ruled against
him at a prior DVRO hearing and found him to lack credibility.
He also claims that the court inaccurately recalled the case,
appeared to be “annoyed” at him during the hearing on the
discovery sanctions when he requested a statement of decision,
and that while the court agreed to give an oral one at the end of
the hearing, it did not. None of these points merits reversal of
the court’s ruling.
Addressing the latter point first, we note the court was not
required to give a statement of decision on this matter. Under

20 Although Manish claimed that Priyanka violated unspecified
prior court orders on discovery, the record does not support this
argument. In fact, at the April 2019 hearing, the court issued a
tentative only, and as Manish concedes, there was no formal
stipulated order or findings and order after hearing relating to
that April 2019 discovery hearing.

24
Code of Civil Procedure section 632, upon timely request, a trial
court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual
and legal basis for its decision “upon the trial of a question of fact
by the court.” A hearing on a motion for discovery sanctions is
not a trial, and thus, no statement of decision was required.
(Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 183, 187–
188 [findings need not be made in proceedings to determine a
motion even when affidavits are filed on a question of fact and
testimony is taken to augment the affidavits, because section 632
only applies to a “trial.”].) There are some notable exceptions to
this general requirement in family law; for example, where the
issues are sufficiently important, as in a child custody hearing, a
statement of decision must be provided upon timely request
regardless of whether the hearing is based on a motion or takes
place at trial. (See City and County of San Francisco v. H.H.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 531, 544–547 [court erred in refusing
request for statement of decision when ordering a visitation
schedule].) However, Manish cites no case requiring a statement
of decision for a hearing on a motion for discovery sanctions and
the caselaw suggests otherwise. (City and County of San
Francisco, at p. 544 [section 632 “does not apply to an order on a
motion”].)
Second, although Manish contends the court had an
inaccurate recollection of the case, Manish does not explain in
what regard. The two statements quoted in his brief (that
“mother”21 had a DVRO and the court ruled in “dad’s” favor, and

21We understand the trial court to have been referring to
Priyanka as “mother” and Manish as “dad.” While there were no
children in this particular case, it is not uncommon for family

25
that the court awarded mother attorney’s fees for prevailing on
her renewed DVRO) do not indicate any error. Specifically, as of
the April 2019 hearing that Manish references, the court had
ruled in Manish’s favor on Priyanka’s first DVRO; then, at a later
hearing, the court granted Priyanka’s subsequent DVRO, found
Manish to lack credibility, and granted Priyanka fees.
More importantly, a reasonable review of this record does
not support an inference that the trial court denied the motion for
discovery sanctions because it was annoyed with Manish or
because of the prior DVRO history. In fact, despite the court’s
concerns about Manish’s “litigation tactics” and that his filings
were unreasonable in their bulk, in their frequency and in their
attempts to relitigate matters that had already been litigated, the
court denied (without prejudice) Priyanka’s motion to declare
Manish a vexatious litigant at the very same hearing that it
denied his motion for discovery sanctions.
Rather, the facts before the trial court supported a denial of
the motion based on the court’s reasoning that the discovery
responses were adequate. (Cf. Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society of New York, Inc., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 605–606
[reversing terminating and monetary sanctions where there was
no evidence that lesser sanctions would have failed to obtain
compliance with the document production order].) Since we
affirm on this ground, we need not address any other ground
raised.

courts to refer to the parties by these monikers (or as “husband”
and “wife”) rather than by individual names for ease of reference.

26
 E. The denial of temporary spousal support to Manish
1. Standard of review
The standard of review that applies to an order for
temporary spousal support is abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage
of Lim & Carrasco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 768, 773.) In
exercising that discretion, a trial court may properly consider the
“ ‘big picture’ ” concerning the parties’ assets and income
available for support in light of the marital standard of living.
(Ibid.)
2. The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of
discretion
Temporary spousal support is governed by Family Code
section 3600. That section provides that during the pendency of
any proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may order
“either spouse to pay any amount that is necessary for the
support of the other spouse, consistent with the requirements of
subdivisions (i) and (m) of Section 4320 and Section 4325.” (Fam.
Code, § 3600.)22
Awards of temporary spousal support do not serve the same
purpose, nor are they governed by the same procedures, as
awards for permanent spousal support. “ ‘Temporary spousal
support is utilized to maintain the living conditions and

22 Family Code section 4325 does not apply here, as it prohibits
an award of spousal support to a spouse who has been convicted
of certain crimes for domestic violence, which did not occur in this
case. Family Code section 4320, subdivision (i) relates to
“documented evidence of any history of domestic violence”
between the parties–which does apply in this case–and
subdivision (m) relates to a criminal conviction of an abusive
spouse–which does not.

27
standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as
possible pending trial and the division of their assets and
obligations.’ ” (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
581, 594.) “Awards of temporary spousal support rest within the
broad discretion of the trial court and may be ordered in ‘any
amount’ ([Family Code] § 3600) subject only to the moving party’s
needs and the other party’s ability to pay. [Citation.] Permanent
support, by contrast, is constrained by numerous statutory
factors set out in section 4320.” (Ibid.)
In light of this clear distinction, we reject Manish’s
argument that the court abused its discretion by failing to
consider the criteria set forth for permanent spousal support
orders in Family Code section 4320.
The initial order denying temporary spousal support, filed
April 2019, noted that with husband currently unemployed and
in law school, and wife earning $12,900 per month, guideline
support23 would be approximately $4,000 per month. However,
the court ruled that in this case there were “additional factors”
which made application of the guideline formula inequitable.
Specifically, the court noted that:
(1) while the case had been pending since late 2015, the
first request for spousal support wasn’t filed until February 2019;

23In many counties, including Santa Clara, temporary spousal
support can be calculated according to certain formulas or
standardized local schedules; however, the appropriateness of
ordering such “guideline” support can be rebutted. (In re
Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327–1328.)

28
 2) while the parties had been separated over three years,
the marriage itself lasted only fourteen months (or at most,
eighteen months, as argued by Manish’s attorney);
3) that during the marriage, both parties were employed,
each earning between $135,000 and $165,000 per year;
4) that Manish was laid off in March 2017, over a year after
separation; and
5) that although Manish claimed to have made efforts to
find employment since he was laid off, he enrolled in law school
the same year and has not worked since.
Thus, the court concluded: “The amount of time that has
passed since separation relative to the short duration of
marriage,24 coupled with Husband’s decision to attend school
rather than find employment, make application of the guideline
formula inequitable here.” As the court noted at oral argument:
“And his decision to go to law school is absolutely fine, but the

24Though not directly applicable here, because it relates to
permanent support, Family Code section 4320, subdivision (l)
codifies the goal that a supported party shall be self-supporting
within a reasonable period of time, and that a “ ‘reasonable
period of time’ ” in the case of a marriage of less than ten years is
generally one-half of the length of the marriage, subject to the
court’s discretion. Manish acknowledges in his brief that this
factor does not apply here, because section 4320 does not apply to
granting temporary spousal support yet elsewhere argues that
the court should have granted his “request for temporary spousal
support under § 4320.” (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1137, 1153, fn. 11 [“[A party] cannot rely on [section
4320] when it serves him but deny its applicability when it does
not. Further, nothing in section 3600 prevents a trial court from
considering the factors listed in section 4320”].)

29
question is should mother pay for that decision. Should [mother]
be required to pay support while he’s in law school; and [] that is
not part of the status quo.”
Manish did not appeal that order. Instead, he filed a
second request for temporary spousal support in November 2020,
about eighteen months later. In that request, he renewed his
request under both Family Code sections 3600 and 4320, stating
that there was a “substantial change in circumstances, and
because [his] financial hardships have worsened making it
difficult to sustain [him]self.” He did not cite any new efforts to
find employment since his previous filings in March 2019. He
stated, without corroboration from any third party or any
documentation, that no law firms would hire him due to the
DVRO against him “and the pending cases in court.” He stated
that he had completed law school and had a J.D. as of May 2020,
but he was still awaiting results from the California bar exam
and the moral character determination.25 He included numerous
accusations against Priyanka, including that she had made
fabricated allegations of abuse, frustrated discovery, and
disparaged him and deterred third parties from associating with
him. He stated that he now was in worse financial condition,
noting debt to the IRS, Franchise Tax Board, mortgage, loans to
family, attorney’s fees and credit cards.

25Although Manish’s opening brief claims that he received an
“adverse moral character determination from the State Bar,” the
record citation provided is to Manish’s declaration in support of
his request for spousal support, in which he stated that the moral
character determination was “still pending approval.”

30
 What Manish failed to address, however, was the reasoning
behind the trial court’s prior denial of spousal support to him.
None of Manish’s allegations in his new round of spousal support
addressed the grounds provided by the trial court: that the
marriage was of extremely short duration; that during the brief
marriage both parties had earned six figures; that over a year
after separation, Manish became unemployed and had chosen to
enroll in law school; and that it was more than three years after
separation that he made his first request for support.
The trial court was not persuaded.26 Neither are we. The
trial court denied the renewed request based on the fact that the
matter had been previously litigated in March 2019 and there
were no changes in circumstances, “as well as the Petitioner and
Respondent’s 15 month marriage being extremely short. The
trial court also took into consideration the existence of a 5 year
restraining order in denying the Petitioner’s request.”
Courts will not revise a support order, even a temporary
one, without a material change in circumstances. (In re Marriage
of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 638.) The trial court’s
previous denial of spousal support was reasonable and Manish
did not address that reasoning in his subsequent request. Put
simply, the fact that Manish purportedly got into a deeper
financial hole between 2019 and 2020 does not translate into
fixing the original problems cited by the trial court regarding the
duration of the marriage and the passage of time since

26The hearing on the motion was set for December 16, 2020, but
we have neither the reporter’s transcript nor the minute order in
the record before us. We do, however, have the findings and
order after hearing filed December 18, 2020.

31
separation.27 It is not unreasonable to conclude that granting
spousal support in this context would have unfairly rewarded one
spouse of a short-term marriage by making his partner bear the
burden of his subsequent financial misfortune.
In the context of domestic violence, the wisdom of denying
that bid is only more apparent. We reject Manish’s argument
that the trial court’s reference to the five-year restraining order
demonstrates an abuse of discretion. To the contrary, the trial
court was obligated to consider the history of domestic violence
between the two parties. (Fam. Code, § 3600; referencing § 4320,
subd. (i).) While Manish argues that the trial court showed bias
by considering the five-year DVRO against him but not the three-
year DVRO against Priyanka, we disagree. The same court

27Manish cites In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun (1987) 190
Cal.App.3d 645, 656, fn. 3 in support of his argument, but
appears to miscite the case. There, the court held that it would
not always be an abuse of discretion to order a substantive
stepdown (i.e., a reduction that will take place in the future) of
spousal support, noting “[a]fter a short-term marriage, where no
order for long term or ‘permanent’ support would be appropriate,
such an order [meaning, a step-down order] might be an
appropriate vehicle for assisting an economically disadvantaged
spouse to make an orderly and less traumatic transition to self-
supporting status.” Therefore, if anything, Prietsch & Calhoun
cuts the other way, since in the case at bar, Manish as the spouse
seeking support was self-supporting during the marriage, and
only became economically disadvantaged some two and a half
years after separation.

32
granted both DVROs and was in the best position to assess the
consideration merited by each one.28
F. There is no basis to reverse the orders made at
trial
Manish argues that he did not obtain a fair trial because the
trial court “exhibited continuous bias against [him] by ruling
against [him] on practically any and all matters,” and that
although Manish asked for a two-day trial, the court set a two-
hour trial which led to an erroneous ruling on the date of
separation. Manish also contends (under the same general
heading regarding bias) that the trial court did not rule on his
motion in limine and allowed Priyanka to look up information on
her phone; that the trial court unfairly divided up the community
assets and debts; and that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that each party sought attorney’s fees, when in fact, neither of
them made such a request.
On appeal, we assess whether any judicial misconduct or
bias was so prejudicial that it deprived a party of “ ‘ “a fair, as
opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1067, 1112.) Moreover, “a trial court’s numerous rulings against
a party–even when erroneous–do not establish a charge of
judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.” (Ibid.)
We examine Manish’s contentions in turn.

28 We decline Manish’s invitation to consider the fact that the
five-year DVRO against Manish was later terminated with
Priyanka’s agreement after all three of these notices of appeal
were filed. Generally, appellate courts disregard matters that
occur after rendition of an appealed judgment. (Truong v.
Nguyen (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 865, 882.)

33
 1. Date of separation
As noted in the section, ante, regarding the date of
separation, Manish has shown no evidence of any prejudice that
he suffered as a result of the trial court’s determination that the
date of separation was December 15, 2015 rather than December
26, 2015. We have already concluded that the trial court’s ruling
on the date of separation was based on substantial evidence. In
arguing that the trial court’s bias led to an incorrect decision on
the date of separation, Manish does not point us to any specific
witness or piece of evidence that he was unable to introduce.29
We see no reason to reverse this finding.

29Manish’s citation to an admission that Priyanka was trying to
work out the marriage until she was served with annulment
papers is akin to rearguing the evidence but it does not reveal
any evidence that he was prevented from presenting. The minute
order reflects that in fact the exhibit mentioned, Petitioner’s
Exhibit 1, was marked as evidence at the trial and that both
Manish and Priyanka were sworn in and argued at the trial.
There is no evidence that the time frame prevented him from
utilizing this exhibit or from having it admitted.

34
 2. Two-hour trial
As for the issue of Manish’s being given a two-hour trial
rather than a two-day trial, as his lawyer had apparently
requested, Manish fails to show prejudice on this issue as well.
As noted ante, Manish has failed to provide a transcript from the
trial. He appellate briefing does not proffer who he would have
called if he had been allowed to, and how it would have made a
difference, other than stating, without specificity, that he had
four unnamed witnesses he wanted to call.
The setting of a shorter trial than is requested by one party
does not, in itself, manifest bias or prejudice. To the contrary, a
superior court has the inherent authority to “provide for the
orderly conduct of proceedings before it.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128,
subd. (a)(3).) This includes a responsibility to “fairly and
efficiently administer the judicial proceedings before it . . . [and]
the power to . . . guard against inept procedures and unnecessary
indulgences that tend to delay the conduct of its proceedings.
[Citation.] In this vein, the court has the power to expedite
proceedings which, in the court’s view, are dragging on too long
without significantly aiding the trier of fact. [Citation.] But a
court need not wait until a trial has been unduly prolonged before
it takes measures to expedite the proceeding. We believe it is
clearly within the power of the court to impose time limits before
the trial commences. [The court’s] ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (California Crane School,
Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 12, 22.)
Indeed, Manish’s suggestion that it is a mark of bias for a
court not to adopt an attorney’s trial estimate would result in an
absurd and unmanageable result, tethering the length of trials to

35
the parties’ discretion, rather than the court’s. Rather, “[i]t is
incumbent upon trial judges to manage trials efficiently.”
(California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification
of Crane Operators, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) Indeed,
after obtaining trial estimates from both parties, “the court
should independently evaluate the estimates based on the
arguments of the parties, the state of the pleadings, the legal and
factual issues presented, the number of witnesses likely to testify,
the court’s trial schedule and hours, and the court’s experience in
trying similar cases.” (Ibid.)
Manish has cited no specific witness or piece of evidence
that he was unable to present to the court, nor any other specific
procedural flaw that reasonably would have made a difference,
had the court extended the trial beyond two hours, and thus has
not shown any prejudice or abuse of discretion. We find none.
3. Motion in limine
Manish also complains that he filed a motion in limine
seeking to preclude Priyanka from producing any documents not
already produced in discovery responses. He claims that the trial
court “refused to make a ruling, deferred making a ruling [sic]
until the conclusion of the trial[,] but never made a ruling.”
Manish’s motion in limine moved the court to preclude
Priyanka from presenting at trial “any expert witnesses, expert
witness reports, or any additional evidence not provided in her
discovery responses . . . [or] in her trial brief.”
Again, Manish provides no transcript from the hearing on
the motion, which took place on the day of trial. The statement of
decision addressed Manish’s motion in limine as follows: “The
Court reserved ruling on the motion, so that it could be
considered in context of evidence produced. Once the trial

36
commenced, [Manish] never objected based upon the motion in
limine, which is therefore moot.”
The court’s ruling on the motion in limine was correct. The
court in Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
659, was confronted with a similar motion in limine. As the court
stated there, where no specifics are presented of the evidence to
be excluded, a trial court is left to guess what may be included
within the scope of the ruling. In such a case, it is appropriate to
defer ruling on any exclusion of evidence until the time of trial
when an objection can be made to the proposed introduction of
evidence. (Id. at pp. 670–671.)
Manish claims, without any citation to the record, that the
trial court “allowed Priyanka to verbally assert credit card debts
in December 2015 by looking up on her phone, against Manish’s
objections, and taking her word for it, with no documentary
evidence or proof of the debts asserted.”
In the absence of a transcript or any other evidence that
Manish did object to any evidence presented by Priyanka as the
trial unfolded, we have no reason to doubt the court’s statement
in the statement of decision that Manish did, in fact, fail to
object. In fact, we must presume the court’s statement to be
correct. (See Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992
[“Where no reporter's transcript has been provided and no error
is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the
judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all
evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that
the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of
error”].) We find no error as to the motion in limine.

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 4. Rulings on division of property
Family Code section 2550 provides that in a proceeding for
dissolution of marriage, the court shall “divide the community
estate of the parties equally.” We review the trial court's
judgment dividing marital property for an abuse of discretion.
(In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 196, 201.)
In addition, we review the trial court's factual findings as
to the separate or community character of assets by the
substantial evidence test. (In re Marriage of Trantafello (1979)
94 Cal.App.3d 533, 546.) We view the evidence in a light
favorable to the successful party, according the benefit of every
reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the
judgment below. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604,
614.) All issues of credibility are within the province of the trier
of fact alone. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920,
925–926.)
Manish’s attacks on the court’s findings as they related to
the parties’ bank accounts, credit card debt, reimbursement for
life insurance loans, division of interest in the community
automobiles, are limited to arguing that the trial court’s bias was
“evident” anytime the court ruled in favor of Priyanka. However,
as noted above, simply ruling against Manish—even repeatedly—
does not constitute bias. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 1112.) The reason is evident: if such conduct constituted bias,
then nearly every trial would have to be reversed for bias, since
in nearly every trial one party loses.
Moreover, Manish omits the court’s rulings in his favor on
several matters. For example, the trial court ordered that both
parties’ bank accounts at date of separation should remain their

38
own, because both parties failed to adequately show their
entitlement to reimbursement for funds spent after the date of
separation on community debts. However, Manish mentions only
the unfairness of Priyanka not having to reimburse him funds,
neglecting the court’s order that he did not have to reimburse
Priyanka any funds, either. Nor does Manish mention how much
was in his bank account.
His argument regarding reimbursement for life insurance
loans also lacks merit. The argument is conclusory and does not
provide sufficient information for us to conclude that there was
any bias or prejudice. Contesting the court’s ruling, Manish cites
only to argument in his trial brief and two exhibits, one setting
forth the total amount of loans as of December 26, 2015 (his
preferred date of separation) as well as a document showing a
separate property loan taken out on May 21, 2012. This does not
prove false the court’s finding that there is no nexus between the
parties’ marriage and these loans. Manish does not cite to any
evidence or testimony as to what any of the loans, whether
before, during, or after marriage, were spent on. Again,
“[w]ithout a record, either by transcript or settled statement, a
reviewing court must make all presumptions in favor of the
validity of the judgment.” (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 929, 935.)
Manish further complains about the court’s decision on the
amount of Priyanka’s interest in Manish’s separate property
home. However, the trial court used the calculations made by
Manish’s own expert.
Manish’s challenge to the court’s order granting Priyanka
her engagement ring and two other bands given to her in
anticipation of their wedding (failing to mention that Manish was

39
also granted his own wedding band) is meritless. Manish’s sole
argument in support of this contention—that the marriage was a
“ ‘sham’ ”—has already been fully litigated. His request for
nullity was denied and that ruling was affirmed on appeal.
(Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 390.) As was noted by the
trial court, it is not reasonable for Manish to continue to make
arguments that the courts have already rejected.
Finally, Manish’s argument that the trial court erroneously
stated that both sides sought need-based fees and sanctions
pursuant to Family Code section 271 is another example of
argument for argument’s sake. The court did not order any fees
or sanctions. What is Manish complaining of here? There is no
prejudice and so there is nothing to correct on appeal.
In conclusion, it is true that the court credited Priyanka on
many matters at trial, but it also credited Manish on other
matters. There is nothing in the record that indicates any bias,30
abuse of discretion, or absence of evidence to support the trial

30 Manish points out that on February 25, 2021, two days after
the court issued its final statement of decision, it recused itself
“from any further role in [this case].” The record does not reflect
the reason why the court recused itself. However, this does not
affect our conclusion for two reasons. First, as noted previously,
generally conduct that takes place after the judgment complained
of will not be considered on appeal. Second, even were we to
consider this fact, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3,
subdivision (b)(4), when a judge disqualifies himself or herself
after making rulings on a case but before the matter is concluded,
“in the absence of good cause the rulings he or she has made up
to that time shall not be set aside by the judge who replaces the
disqualified judge.”

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court’s reasoned opinion dividing the parties’ community
interests concerning this short-term marriage.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their
own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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