State v. Palacio

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-231

Filed 21 February 2023

Onslow County, No. 18CRS054443

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JAIRO PALACIO PALACIO

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 1 April 2021 by Judge Charles H.

Henry in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 October

2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin
Szany, for the State-Appellee.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender John F.
Carella, for Defendant-Appellant.

COLLINS, Judge.

Defendant Jairo Palacio1 appeals from judgment entered upon a jury verdict

of guilty of statutory rape of a child 15 years or younger, sexual activity by a

substitute parent, incest, and two counts of indecent liberties with a child. Defendant

1The trial court allowed the State’s motion to amend the indictment to read Jairo Palacio, but
the judgment, appellate entries, and amended appellate entries identify Defendant as Jairo Palacio
Palacio.
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

contends that (1) he is entitled to a new trial because the transcript for one day of the

proceedings is missing; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the

incest charge; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; and (4) the

case must be remanded to the trial court to correct a clerical error in the trial court’s

judgment. We conclude that Defendant is not entitled to a new trial and that the

trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress. However, we vacate

Defendant’s incest conviction and remand for resentencing, and remand for correction

of a clerical error on the written judgment.

I. Procedural History and Factual Background

Mary,2 a Columbian citizen, moved to Jacksonville, North Carolina, in April

2018 with her mother, father, and sister. Mary and her family lived with Defendant

and his wife. Defendant’s wife is Mary’s mother’s sister, making Defendant’s wife

Mary’s aunt by blood and Defendant Mary’s uncle by marriage. Because Mary’s

parents did not initially plan to stay permanently in the United States, Defendant

began the process of legally adopting Mary.

One Tuesday in the summer of 2018, when Mary was 15 years old and

Defendant was 42 years old, Mary, her mother, her sister, and Defendant were by the

pool in the backyard. Mary went inside the house to get drinks; Defendant followed

her into the kitchen and kissed her on the lips. The next day, Mary and her family

2 Mary is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the child victim.

-2-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

were again at the pool; Mary went inside the house to use the bathroom. Defendant,

who was already inside, pushed her through the doorway. Defendant touched her on

the vagina over her swimsuit, made her touch him on his penis over his swimsuit,

and pulled her hand inside his swimsuit. Defendant stopped after Mary began to cry

and said, “No” loudly.

On 16 July 2018, Mary and her younger sister were home alone with

Defendant. Mary was doing laundry in the garage when Defendant came in and

grabbed her buttocks. When Mary turned around, Defendant grabbed her arms and

tried to kiss her. Defendant pushed her to the ground and continued to try to kiss

her. Defendant took off his pants and underwear and then took off Mary’s pants and

underwear. Defendant grabbed a condom and engaged in vaginal intercourse with

Mary. After Defendant finished, Mary grabbed her little sister, went into her

bedroom, and locked the door until Defendant left the house. Defendant left that

same day to visit his family in Colombia. Mary did not immediately tell her family

about these encounters out of fear that it would destroy her family’s future. About

two weeks after Defendant had left for Columbia, Mary told her father what

happened, and he called the police.

As part of the subsequent investigation, the Child Advocacy Center conducted

a forensic interview with Mary through an interpreter during which Mary detailed

the encounters with Defendant. During the medical evaluation, Mary told the nurse

practitioner that she was worried that she might be pregnant by Defendant. The

-3-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

nurse practitioner conducted a genital exam of Mary and determined that, although

there was no evidence of injury to Mary’s hymen, Mary’s symptoms and

characteristics were consistent with the profiles of children who had been sexually

abused.

Defendant was indicted for statutory rape of a child who was 15 years or

younger, sexual activity by a substitute parent, three counts of indecent liberties with

a child, incest, and obstruction of justice. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress

his inculpatory statements made at the Onslow County Sheriff’s Office following his

arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court orally denied the motion and

subsequently entered a written denial order.

The case came on for trial on 1 March 2021. After all the evidence was

presented, and prior to submitting the case to the jury, the trial court dismissed one

count of indecent liberties with a child and the single count of obstruction of justice.

The jury found Defendant guilty of the remaining charges. Prior to sentencing, the

trial court dismissed the charge of sexual activity by a substitute parent. The trial

court consolidated the remaining convictions into a single Class B1 felony. The trial

court sentenced Defendant within the presumptive range to 192 to 291 months’

imprisonment, ordered that Defendant register as a sex offender for a period of 30

years upon his release, and entered a permanent no contact order prohibiting

Defendant from contacting Mary. Defendant timely appealed.

-4-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

II. Discussion

A. Missing Transcript

Defendant first contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the

transcript for 2 March 2021 is missing, depriving him of meaningful appellate review.

“[W]hen an indigent defendant ha[s] entered notice of appeal, he is entitled to

receive a copy of the trial transcript at State expense.” State v. Hobbs, 190 N.C. App.

183, 185, 660 S.E.2d 168, 170 (2008) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-452(e)). However,

“due process does not require a verbatim transcript of the entire proceedings[.]” Id.

(quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Generally, a defendant is entitled

to “a transcript of the testimony and evidence presented by the defendant and also

the court’s charge to the jury, as well as the testimony and evidence presented by the

prosecution.” Id. (quoting Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964)).

Here, Defendant’s case was tried from 1 to 5 March 2021 and the transcript

consists of four volumes. Volume I transcribes the COVID-19 safety protocols and

initial jury impanelment proceedings that took place on 1 March 2021. At the end of

volume I, the transcript states, “The jury impanelment proceedings recessed at

4:21 p.m. on Monday, March 1, 2021, continued through Tuesday, March 2, 2021, and

resumed 9:00 a.m. Wednesday, March 3, 2021.” Volume II starts by noting, “The

following proceedings with the defendant present and outside the presence of the

jurors at 9:02 a.m.” The transcript indicates that the trial court then stated, “The

-5-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

defendant is present with counsel. The State is here represented by counsel. The

jury has been selected, not impaneled.”

Although the proceedings on 2 March 2021 are not transcribed, it is evident

from volumes I and II of the transcript that the trial court conducted jury selection

on that day. As the jury was not impaneled and no evidence was presented on

2 March, Defendant was not entitled to a verbatim transcript of those proceedings.

See Hobbs, 190 N.C. App. at 185, 660 S.E.2d at 170. Accordingly, that there is no

verbatim transcript of the jury selection on 2 March 2021 does not deprive Defendant

of meaningful appellate review.

Even assuming arguendo that the missing portion of transcript could possibly

contain information necessary for a meaningful appeal, Defendant has failed to

demonstrate he is prejudiced by its absence.

“[T]he unavailability of a verbatim transcript does not automatically constitute

reversible error in every case.” In re Shackleford, 248 N.C. App. 357, 361, 789 S.E.2d

15, 18 (2016). “To prevail on such grounds, a party must demonstrate that the

missing recorded evidence resulted in prejudice.” State v. Quick, 179 N.C. App. 647,

651, 634 S.E.2d 915, 918 (2006) (citation omitted). “General allegations of prejudice

are insufficient to show reversible error.” Id. (citations omitted).

We conduct a three-step inquiry to determine whether the right to a

meaningful appeal has been lost due to the unavailability of a verbatim transcript.

State v. Yates, 262 N.C. App. 139, 142, 821 S.E.2d 650, 653 (2018).

-6-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

First, we must determine whether defendant has “made
sufficient efforts to reconstruct the [proceedings] in the
absence of a transcript.” Second, we must determine
whether those “reconstruction efforts produced an
adequate alternative to a verbatim transcript—that is, one
that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript . . . .”
Third, “we must determine whether the lack of an adequate
alternative to a verbatim transcript of the [proceedings]
served to deny [defendant] meaningful appellate review
such that a new [trial] is required.”

Id. (quoting Shackleford, 248 N.C. App. at 361-64, 789 S.E.2d at 18-20).

Here, Defendant’s appellate counsel made sufficient efforts to reconstruct the

record from 2 March 2021 by contacting the trial judge, Defendant’s trial attorney,

the district attorney who prosecuted the case, the court reporting manager and court

reporter who transcribed the proceedings on 1 March 2021 and 3 March 2021, and

the deputy clerk of superior court.

Based on his efforts, Defendant determined that on 1 March 2021, the trial

court reviewed the COVID-19 safety protocols and began the process of jury

impanelment. At the end of the day, Defendant offered several objections to the

COVID-19 protocols, and the trial court suggested that Defendant make a list of his

objections to consider after impanelment.

Regarding the 2 March 2021 proceedings, Defendant’s trial attorney stated:

In an attempt to reconstruct March 2 and upon review of
the materials, I do not recall anything particularly unusual
or remarkable about the jury selection. There were no
outbursts, no overt comments about race, religion,
sexuality or politics by any juror or the State, or any juror
acting in a way that I felt was otherwise concerning or

-7-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

objectionable . . . .
The materials indicate that the judge denied
approximately five (5) of my motions to strike jurors for
cause, (3 on March 1, 2 on March 2). Three of the show
cause motions were because the respective jurors were
either the direct victim of a sexual offense or knew someone
close to them who was. One motion was due to the juror’s
prior professional relationship with Onslow County Sheriff
deputies. The fifth was a juror who worked for a property
management company I had been adverse to in prior,
unrelated civil litigation. As a result of the denials, we
elected to use peremptory challenges on all five jurors. The
notes from March 2 indicate we used the 6th peremptory
challenge that day.
Volume II of the transcript, which covers the proceedings on 3 March 2021,

begins with the trial court noting that the jury had been selected but not yet

impaneled. The transcript continues:

THE COURT: So I believe we left this time open to hear
from [Defendant] with regards to some motions that he has
raised earlier, and I gave him permission to expand on
those motions this morning outside the presence of the jury
before the case actually -- the evidence is actually received.

Defendant then detailed specific objections to the COVID-19 protocols, including the

physical layout of the courtroom, the size of the jury pool, the possible bias of jurors

“for having to be here during COVID,” and the length of time the proceedings would

take with the newly-implemented protocols. After Defendant’s objections were

addressed, the trial court impaneled the jury. Defendant’s efforts produced an

adequate alternative to a verbatim transcript in that Defendant can “identify all

potential meritorious issues, particularly as they relate to the procedures and manner

-8-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

in which his trial was conducted.” Yates, 262 N.C. App. at 142, 821 S.E.2d at 653.

Accordingly, because Defendant made sufficient reconstruction efforts that

produced an adequate alternative to a verbatim transcript, he was not deprived of

meaningful appellate review. Shackleford, 248 N.C. App. at 362, 789 S.E.2d at 19.

Defendant’s argument that he is entitled to a new trial is thus without merit.

B. Incest

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

dismiss the incest charge. Defendant specifically contends that the term “niece” in

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178 does not include a niece-in-law for the purposes of incest as

criminalized by that statute. We agree.

“This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo[.]”

State v. Moore, 240 N.C. App. 465, 470, 770 S.E.2d 131, 136 (2015) (citation omitted).

Moreover, “[i]ssues of statutory construction are questions of law which we review de

novo on appeal[.]” State v. Hayes, 248 N.C. App. 414, 415, 788 S.E.2d 651, 652 (2016).

Under de novo review, this Court “considers the matter anew and freely substitutes

its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628,

632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine “whether

there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of

the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. Substantial evidence is relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

-9-
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

State v. Worley, 198 N.C. App 329, 333, 679 S.E.2d 857, 861 (2009) (quotation marks

and citations omitted). “[T]he trial court must consider the record evidence in the

light most favorable to the State . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).

“The primary endeavor of courts in construing a statute is to give effect to

legislative intent.” State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 276-77 (2005)

(citations omitted). “Generally, the intent of the General Assembly may be found first

from the plain language of the statute, then from the legislative history, the spirit of

the act[,] and what the act seeks to accomplish.” State v. Huckelba, 240 N.C. App.

544, 559, 771 S.E.2d 809, 821 (2015) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation

omitted), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 368 N.C. 569, 780 S.E.2d 750 (2015). “If

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court eschews statutory

construction in favor of giving the words their plain and definite meaning.” Beck, 359

N.C. at 614, 614 S.E.2d at 277 (citation omitted). “When, however, a statute is

ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “criminal statutes are to be

strictly construed against the State.” State v. Raines, 319 N.C. 258, 263, 354 S.E.2d

486, 489 (1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The offense of incest is governed by section 14-178(a) of our General Statutes,

which provides:

A person commits the offense of incest if the person
engages in carnal intercourse with the person’s
(i) grandparent or grandchild, (ii) parent or child or

- 10 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

stepchild or legally adopted child, (iii) brother or sister of
the half or whole blood, or (iv) uncle, aunt, nephew, or
niece.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178(a) (2018).

In its primary sense, “niece” is defined as “[t]he daughter of a person’s brother

or sister[,]” Niece, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), and is understood to be a

relationship of consanguinity. See Consanguinity, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019) (defining “consanguinity” as “[t]he relationship of persons of the same blood or

origin”). In a secondary sense, “niece” is only “sometimes understood to include the

daughter of a person’s brother-in-law or sister-in-law[,]” Niece, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added), and is only sometimes understood to be

a relationship of affinity. See Affinity, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)

(defining “affinity” as “[a]ny familial relation resulting from a marriage”). The plain

language of the term “niece” in its primary sense indicates the legislature’s intent to

criminalize carnal intercourse with “[t]he daughter of a person’s brother or sister[,]”

a relationship of consanguinity. However, the scope of the term “niece” could be

subject to debate, depending on which dictionary definition is used, and thus could be

considered ambiguous. See State v. Sherrod, 191 N.C. App. 776, 778, 663 S.E.2d 470,

472 (2008) (The language of a statute is ambiguous when it is “fairly susceptible of

two or more meanings.”); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoyle, 106 N.C. App. 199, 201,

415 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1992) (“A word is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of

more than one meaning.”).

- 11 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

Even so, the text of the relevant statutory provision further supports the

legislature’s intent that a “niece” must be a consanguineous relationship to constitute

the crime of incest. See State v. Conley, 374 N.C. 209, 215, 839 S.E.2d 805, 809 (2020)

(“[A] statute must be considered as a whole[.]” (quotation marks omitted)). The

relationships detailed in section 14-178 are all those of consanguinity, except the

relationships of child by marriage or legal adoption. In the application of criminal

law, it would be an unwarranted extension and presumption to assume that, by

specifying the relationship of child by marriage or legal adoption, the legislature

intended to include other nonconsanguineous relationships. See State v. McCants,

275 N.C. App. 801, 824, 854 S.E.2d 415, 432 (2020) (“Under the doctrine of expressio

unius est exclusio alterius, when a statute lists the situations to which it applies, it

implies the exclusion of situations not contained in the list.”).

Furthermore, the legislative history, the spirit of the incest statute, and what

the statute seeks to accomplish all confirm the legislative intent that a “niece” must

be a consanguineous relationship for the purpose of criminalizing incest.

In January 1878, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued State v. Keesler,

78 N.C. 469 (1878), dismissing an indictment against the defendant for incest for his

having had improper intercourse with his daughter. The Court explained, “This

offence was not indictable at common law, and as we have no statute in this State

declaring it to be a criminal offence, this indictment cannot be maintained.” Id. at

469. Noting that “[i]n most of the States of the Union incest is made an indictable

- 12 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

offence by statute[,]” the Court opined that “[p]erhaps its rare occurrence in this State

has caused the revolting crime to pass unnoticed by the Legislature.” Id. at 469-70.

Immediately following Keesler, the General Assembly criminalized incest in

1879 by sections 1060 and 1061 of the North Carolina Code. Section 1060 provided:

In all cases of carnal intercourse between grand parent and
grand child, parent and child, and brother and sister, of the
half or whole blood, the parties shall be guilty of felony, and
punished for every such offence by imprisonment in the
county jail or penitentiary for a term not exceeding five
years, in the discretion of the court.

1 N.C. Code of 1883, § 1060. Section 1061 provided:

In all cases of carnal intercourse between uncle and niece,
and nephew and aunt, the parties shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and punished by fine or imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court.

Id. § 1061.

In State v. Laurence, 95 N.C. 659 (1886), our Supreme Court held that section

1060 applies to both legitimate and illegitimate children. The Court stated that “[i]t

is obvious that the legitimacy of birth in one of the offending parties is not, and ought

not to be, an essential ingredient in the crime” because the statute prohibits

intercourse between those who are “related in those degrees by consanguinity[.]” Id.

at 660.

In 1905, the General Assembly recodified sections 1060 and 1061 as sections

- 13 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

3351 and 3352, respectively. See 1 N.C. Revisal of 1905, §§ 3351, 3352.3 Section 3351

continued to criminalize as felony incest “carnal intercourse between grandparent

and grandchild, parent and child, and brother and sister, of the half or whole blood,”

punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, but changed the

location of imprisonment from the “county jail or penitentiary” to the “state’s

prison[.]” Id. § 3351. Section 3352 continued to criminalize as misdemeanor incest

“carnal intercourse between uncle and niece, and nephew and aunt,” punishable by

fine or imprisonment. Id. § 3352.

In State v. Harris, 149 N.C. 513, 62 S.E. 1090 (1908), our Supreme Court

upheld the defendant’s conviction for incest where the sole question before the Court

was whether the daughter of the defendant’s half-sister came within the language of

section 3352. The Court explained:

For obvious reasons, nothing is said [in section 3352] of the
half or whole blood. The relation of uncle and niece must
of necessity be of the half blood, as in all other relations of
consanguinity, other than those defined in [section 3351].
As here, the daughter of defendant’s sister is of course
related to him only by the half blood. The fact that the
mother of the girl is only half sister of defendant cannot
affect the case . . . .

3 Section 3351 provided that “In all cases of carnal intercourse between grandparent and
grandchild, parent and child, and brother and sister, of the half or whole blood, the parties shall be
guilty of a felony, and punished for every such offense by imprisonment in the state’s prison for a term
not exceeding five years, in the discretion of the court.” 1 N.C. Revisal of 1905, § 3351. Section 3352
provided that: “In all cases of carnal intercourse between uncle and niece, and nephew and aunt, the
parties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by fine or imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.” Id. § 3352.

- 14 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

Id. at 514, 62 S.E. at 1090-91. Accordingly, the Court concluded the “defendant and

his niece, the daughter of the half sister, are clearly within the statute.” Id. at 514,

62 S.E. at 1091.

In 1919, the General Assembly recodified sections 3351 and 3352 as sections

4337 and 4338, respectively, of the Consolidated Statutes.4 Section 4337 continued

to criminalize as felony incest “carnal intercourse between grandparent and

grandchild, parent and child, and brother and sister, of the half or whole blood,”

punishable by a term of imprisonment in the state’s prison, but increased the

allowable term of imprisonment from “not exceeding five years” to “not exceeding

fifteen years[.]” 1 N.C. Consol. Stat. of 1919, § 4337. Section 4338 continued to

criminalize as misdemeanor incest “carnal intercourse between uncle and niece, and

nephew and aunt,” punishable by fine or imprisonment. Id. § 4338. In 1943, sections

4337 and 4338 were recodified as sections 14-178 and 14-179, respectively, of the

North Carolina General Statutes. The recodified sections were identical to their

predecessors.

In State v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 406, 133 S.E.2d 1 (1963), our Supreme Court

reversed the defendant’s conviction for incest where the defendant had sexual

4 Section 4337 provided that: “In all cases of carnal intercourse between grandparent and
grandchild, parent and child, and brother and sister of the half or whole blood, the parties shall be
guilty of a felony, and shall be punished for every such offense by imprisonment in the state’s prison
for a term not exceeding fifteen years, in the discretion of the court.” 1 N.C. Consol. Stat. of 1919, §
4337. Section 4338 provided that “In all cases of carnal intercourse between uncle and niece, and
nephew and aunt, the parties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by fine or
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” Id. § 4338.

- 15 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

relations with his adopted daughter. At that time, section 14-178 read:

In all cases of carnal intercourse between grandparent and
grandchild, parent and child, and brother and sister of the
half or whole blood, the parties shall be guilty of a felony,
and shall be punished for every such offense by
imprisonment in the State’s prison for a term not exceeding
fifteen years, in the discretion of the court.

Id. at 407-08, 133 S.E.2d at 2 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178). The Court explained,

“The crime of incest is purely statutory, and our statute is based on consanguinity

and, therefore, excludes affinity. Our statute . . . would not include the relationship

between a stepfather and his stepdaughter, since their relationship would not be one

of consanguinity.” Id. at 409, 133 S.E.2d at 3 (citation omitted). Noting that “[t]he

word ‘daughter’ means, and is generally understood to mean, ‘an immediate female

descendant,’ and not an adopted daughter, a stepdaughter, or a daughter-in-law[,]”

the Court concluded that while “[t]he defendant’s conduct . . . in having sexual

relations with his adopted daughter[] is indeed detestable, [i]t rests, however, within

the power of the Legislature to make such conduct incestuous.” Id. (quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Immediately following Rogers, the General Assembly amended section 14-178

in 1965 to include the affinity relationship of “stepchild” and the legal relationship of

“legally adopted child,” as follows:

The parties shall be guilty of a felony in all cases of carnal
intercourse between (i) grandparent and grandchild,
(ii) parent and child or stepchild or legally adopted child,
or (iii) brother and sister of the half or whole blood.

- 16 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

Punishment for every such offense shall be imprisonment
in the State prison for a term of not more than fifteen years,
in the discretion of the court.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178 (1969).5 Section 14-179 remained unchanged. See N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 14-179 (1969).

In 2002, the General Assembly enacted “An Act to Close the Legal Loophole

that Exists Under the State’s Incest Laws by Equalizing Punishments for Crimes

Committed Against Children Without Regard to Familial Status[.]” See 2002 N.C.

Sess. Laws 280 (capitalization altered). The Act consolidated portions of sections

14-178 and 14-179, repealed section 14-179, and enacted a new section 14-178,

labeled “Incest,” which reads as follows:

(a) Offense. – A person commits the offense of incest if the
person engages in carnal intercourse with the person’s
(i) grandparent or grandchild, (ii) parent or child or
stepchild or legally adopted child, (iii) brother or sister of
the half or whole blood, or (iv) uncle, aunt, nephew, or
niece.
(b) Punishment and Sentencing. –
(1) A person is guilty of a Class B1 felony if either of
the following occurs:
a. The person commits incest against a child
under the age of 13 and the person is at least
12 years old and is at least four years older
than the child when the incest occurred.
b. The person commits incest against a child
who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the person
is at least six years older than the child when

5 Section 14-178 was amended by 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 190, but the amended statute did not
appear in the North Carolina General Statutes until the 1969 volume.

- 17 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

the incest occurred.
(2) A person is guilty of a Class C felony if the person
commits incest against a child who is 13, 14, or 15
and the person is more than four but less than six
years older than the child when the incest occurred.
(3) In all other cases of incest, the parties are guilty
of a Class F felony.
(c) No Liability for Children Under 16. — No child under
the age of 16 is liable under this section if the other person
is at least four years older when the incest occurred.

2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 281.

The relationships specified remained unchanged, but the Act increased the

punishment and sentencing for individuals convicted of incest to equalize

punishments for crimes committed against children, without regard to whether the

perpetrators are related to their victims. Id. Notably, the Act increased the

punishment for incest based on carnal intercourse with an aunt, uncle, nephew, or

niece from a misdemeanor to a felony. Id. The Act also created different punishment

classes based on certain age requirements. Id. Finally, the Act excused any child

under the age of 16 from liability for incest if the other person was at least four years

older when the incest occurred. Id. The version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178 adopted

in 2002 remains in effect today.

By tracing the legislative history and judicial treatment of incest from 1878 to

the present, the following is apparent: Our legislature has actively criminalized incest

since 1879, presumably in response to our Supreme Court dismissing an incest

indictment because North Carolina had no incest statute. See Keesler, 78 N.C. at 469.

- 18 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

The first incest statutes criminalized carnal intercourse between an uncle and a

niece, and the punishment was later increased from a misdemeanor to a felony. Our

courts have repeatedly stated that our incest statutes are based on consanguinity,

not affinity, except where the legislature has specified otherwise. See Laurence, 95

N.C. at 660 (holding that the incest statute prohibits intercourse between individuals

who are “related in those degrees by consanguinity”); Harris, 149 N.C. at 514, 62 S.E.

at 1091 (“The relation of uncle and niece must of necessity be of the half blood, as in

all other relations of consanguinity, other than those defined in [section 3351].”);

Rogers, 260 N.C. at 409, 133 S.E.2d at 3 (“The crime of incest is purely statutory, and

our statute is based on consanguinity and, therefore, excludes affinity. Our

statute . . . would not include the relationship between a stepfather and his

stepdaughter, since their relationship would not be one of consanguinity.”). The

legislature acted swiftly in 1965, presumably in response to Rogers, to amend the

statute to include the affinity relationship of “stepchild” and the legal relationship of

“legally adopted child.”

The legislature has the authority, and has had the opportunity, to expand the

definition of incest to include familial relationships by affinity or other means, as it

did in 1965 with stepchildren and legally adopted children. However, even in 2002

when it consolidated sections 14-178 and 14-179 and significantly overhauled the

punishment and sentencing for incest, the legislature did not expand the definition

of incest to include familial relationships by affinity or other means. Had the

- 19 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

legislative intent been to include what, in this case, would commonly be called a

relationship of niece-in-law and uncle-in-law, it would have done so.

Furthermore, judicially expanding the definition of incest to include familial

relationships by affinity or other means “could lead to absurd results.” Beck, 359 N.C.

at 615, 614 S.E.2d at 277. Incest is defined as “sexual intercourse between persons

so closely related that marriage is illegal[.]” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 251

(2019). See also Incest, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “incest” as

“[s]exual relations between family members or close relatives, including children

related by adoption”). In North Carolina, “marriages between any two persons nearer

of kin than first cousins, or between double first cousins” are void. N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 51-3 (2018). In ascertaining whether persons are nearer of kin than first cousins,

“the half-blood shall be counted as the whole-blood . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-4 (2018).

Expanding the scope of section 14-178 to include a niece-in-law would mean that,

while an individual could marry their niece-in-law where certain age restrictions do

not prohibit otherwise, that individual would be guilty of incest if the marriage were

consummated.

We thus conclude that the term “niece” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178 does not

encompass a niece by affinity for the purposes of incest as criminalized by that

statute. Our construction is consistent with a majority of other jurisdictions with

similar statutes that have addressed whether sexual intercourse between an uncle

and niece, related only by affinity, is incestuous within the meaning of their statutes.

- 20 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

See State v. Tucker, 93 N.E. 3, 4 (Ind. 1910) (“[T]o constitute the crime of incest by

uncle and niece under the provisions of the act under consideration they must be such

kindred by the ties of consanguinity.”); State v. Moore, 262 A.2d 166, 169 (Conn. 1969)

(“Had the legislative intent been to include what, in this case, would commonly be

called a relationship of niece-in-law and uncle-in-law, it would have been a simple

matter to say so.[6]”); State v. Anderson, 484 N.E.2d 640, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)

(“Although the statute[7] does not contain a requirement for consanguinity in the case

of incest between an uncle and a niece, this precise question was addressed by our

Supreme Court in State v. Tucker . . . . Thus, the trial court’s judgment dismissing

the charges is affirmed.”); Hull v. State, 686 So. 2d 676, 677 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1996) (“The relationship of uncle-in-law and niece-in-law is clearly not alone

sufficient to . . . implicate the incest statute, section 826.04, Florida Statutes

(1995)[.8]”); State v. Dodd, 871 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (reversing

the conviction of a defendant who had sexual relations with the daughter of his wife’s

6 “Every man and woman who marry or carnally know each other, being within any of the
degrees of kindred specified in section 46-1, shall be imprisoned in the State Prison not more than ten
years.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-223 (1969). “No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, daughter,
granddaughter, sister, aunt, niece, stepmother or stepdaughter, and no woman shall marry her father,
grandfather, son, grandson, brother, uncle, nephew, stepfather or stepson . . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46-
1 (1969).
7 “A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate

sexual conduct with another person, when he knows that the other person is his parent, stepparent,
child, stepchild, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew, commits incest, a
Class D felony.” IND. CODE § 35-46-1-3 (1977).
8 “Whoever knowingly marries or has sexual intercourse with a person to whom he is related

by lineal consanguinity, or a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece, commits incest[.]” Fla.
Stat. § 826.04 (1995).

- 21 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

half-sister where the applicable incest statute “include[d] all relationships of

consanguinity and only a limited number of those by affinity[.]” (emphasis added)).

In this case, because Mary is not Defendant’s niece by consanguinity, Mary is

not Defendant’s niece as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-178 and the trial court

erred by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the incest charge. We therefore

vacate Defendant’s incest conviction and remand for resentencing.

C. Defendant’s Statements at the Sheriff’s Office

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress his inculpatory statements made at the Onslow County Sheriff’s Office

following his arrest. Defendant specifically contends that the trial court’s findings of

fact are incomplete and that the evidence does not support the conclusion that his

statements were made voluntarily.

“The standard of review for a motion to suppress evidence is whether the trial

court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the findings

support the court’s conclusions of law.” State v. Boyd, 207 N.C. App. 632, 636, 701

S.E.2d 255, 258 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Unchallenged

findings of fact are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on

appeal.” State v. Davis, 237 N.C. App. 22, 27-28, 763 S.E.2d 585, 589 (2014) (citation

omitted). “The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable on

appeal.” State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).

The trial court made the following relevant findings of fact in its written order

- 22 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

denying Defendant’s motion to suppress:

6. Accompanied by local law enforcement, the detectives
arrested the defendant once he arrived back at
Raleigh-Durham Airport on August 7, 2018 at
approximately 11:00 a.m. after a flight from Colombia.
7. The defendant was transported to Onslow County by the
detectives in an Onslow County Sheriff’s Department
motor vehicle. The defendant, at the time of the arrest, was
42 and was an active duty marine stationed in the provost
marshal office aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C.
8. The defendant was handcuffed in front of his body and
sat in the front passenger seat while Detective Pete
Johnston drove, and Detective Charles Parrish was seated
in the rear seat behind the defendant. They arrived at the
Onslow County Sheriff’s Office at shortly after 1:30 p.m.
An audio recording of the conversation in the car during
the trip was captured through a Go-Pro device in the car,
and portions were played for the jury.
9. Shortly after they left RDU on the trip back to Onslow
County, the defendant initiated questioning about his case.
The detectives stopped him, and Johnston told him that “as
long as you are in custody, you know as well as we do, that
we cannot really talk.” He was told that if he wanted to
talk, they would have to go over the rights form. The
defendant asked what they thought he ought to do, and
Johnston told him it was “what he thought.” He advised
the officers that he wanted to ask them “what is coming”
and “what he is facing.” In response the officers told him
that whether he talked about the case was “totally up to
him.” He was told that after they went over the form, he
could then make a decision as to what he wanted to do.
After his rights were read to him, the defendant appeared
to decide that he would not sign the waiver and talk then
but wait until he got back. Discussion about the case
ceased at that point.
10. They basically advised him that it was his choice as to
whether he wanted to talk about the case. In the car
Detective Parrish at 11:28 a.m. read him his Miranda

- 23 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

rights . . . . The language of the waiver was also read to the
defendant by Detective Parrish, but he chose not to execute
the waiver at that time.
11. In the car after each right was read to him, the
defendant orally answered “Yes, Sir.” After being handed
the printed Interrogation-Advisement of Rights form on a
clipboard, the defendant initialed each right in the space
provided after each right. He advised that from his work
in the Provost Marshal’s office, he jokingly stated that he
had read those rights “a few times himself” in his law
enforcement work. He chose not to sign under the waiver
of rights paragraph at that time, and returned the
clipboard containing the rights form back to Detective
Parrish.
....
14. Once the defendant got seated next to the table, he was
provided the same rights waiver form, which he had
previously been read from in the car and on which he had
initialed next to each right during the trip from the airport.
15. Once he joined the defendant and Deputy Parrish
already seated in the room, Detective Johnston told him
that now they had to be a “little more candid than they
were in the car.” The defendant was told not to say
anything but just to listen, and they will go over “some
stuff.” The defendant was told “Nothing you say here is
going to change the things that happened. You are fully
charged with the offense.”
16. This was said to the defendant by Detective Johnston
because the warrant for arrest for statutory rape had
already been issued, and because of that, nothing that was
going to be discussed during the interrogation was going to
change the status of the case.
....
18. The defendant was advised that they work in the
Special Victims Unit, and they know there are always “two
sides to every story, and they are never going to arrest
anyone without giving them an opportunity to tell them
what’s going on.” In order to give the defendant that

- 24 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

opportunity, they had to “finish signing and going over that
[rights] form” which the defendant had in front of him.
“That is up to you. Before we address that and ask you
what you want to do with that, keep in mind, again, that
nothing you say in here is going to hurt you or change the
situation as it stands. It will give us some insight. Right
now we have a little girl that “we kind to (sic) have more
questions than we have answers for. Now we are hoping
that you can shed some light on what is going on with her.”
Parrish advised him that part of their job was the
consideration of the welfare of the victims.
19. . . . After which, the defendant signed the waiver form
at 2:02 p.m . . . .
....
24. After the defendant continued to deny any misconduct,
Detective Johnston eventually told the defendant that
based on other sources that the defendant did not know
about, “stuff” was not adding up and he could not explain
it. He intimated that defendant was not telling the truth.
25. About thirty minutes into the interrogation the
defendant stated that “I fucked up. I screwed up.” He
stated that he and the victim got close and kissed. On the
day he left for Colombia while the victim’s parents were at
work, he had gotten the victim to put coconut butter on his
back after he had been sunbathing. They talked about the
victim’s boyfriend in Spain and went into the garage and
had intercourse. He told law enforcement that he did not
force her.
26. When it appeared to Detective Johnston that the
defendant was close to making an inculpatory statement,
he reached over and touched the defendant on his knee
with an open palm. Johnston explained that this was a
technique to show empathy and humanity to the
defendant . . . .
27. The defendant never requested counsel, never asked
that the questioning stop and never invoked his right to
remain silent.

- 25 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

1. Findings of Fact

Defendant does not challenge any findings of fact; they are thus binding on

appeal. See State v. Hoque, 269 N.C. App. 347, 361, 837 S.E.2d 464, 475 (2020).

Defendant instead argues that the trial court’s findings of fact are incomplete because

the trial court failed to “make [a] finding of fact as to how many times and when

Johnston touched [Defendant].” However, the findings of fact need not summarize

all the evidence presented at voir dire. State v. Dunlap, 298 N.C. 725, 730, 259 S.E.2d

893, 896 (1979). Indeed, if there is no conflicting testimony about the facts alleged,

it is permissible for the trial court to admit evidence a defendant seeks to suppress

without making specific findings of fact at all, although it is better practice to make

them. Id. In light of this rule, it is enough that the findings are supported by

substantial and uncontradicted evidence, as they are here, and Defendant’s argument

is overruled.

2. Voluntariness

“The determination of whether a defendant’s statements are voluntary and

admissible is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Maniego,

163 N.C. App. 676, 682, 594 S.E.2d 242, 245-46 (2004) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). We look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the

confession was voluntary. State v. Cortes-Serrano, 195 N.C. App. 644, 655, 673 S.E.2d

756, 763 (2009).

The requisite factors in the totality of the circumstances

- 26 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

inquiry include: 1) whether the defendant was in custody
at the time of the interrogation; 2) whether the defendant’s
Miranda rights were honored; 3) whether the interrogating
officer made misrepresentations or deceived the defendant;
4) the interrogation’s length; 5) whether the officer made
promises to the defendant to induce the confession;
6) whether the defendant was held incommunicado; 7) the
presence of physical threats or violence; 8) the defendant’s
familiarity with the criminal justice system; and 9) the
mental condition of the defendant.

State v. Martin, 228 N.C. App. 687, 690, 746 S.E.2d 307, 310 (2013) (citation omitted).

“The presence or absence of one or more of these factors is not determinative.” State

v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 579, 422 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1992) (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and, after each right was

read to him, he orally answered “Yes, Sir.” After Defendant was handed the

Interrogation-Advisement of Rights form, he initialed in the space provided after each

right. At the time of his arrest, Defendant was an active duty marine stationed in

the provost marshal office in Camp Lejeune and “he jokingly stated that he had read

those rights ‘a few times himself’ in his law enforcement work.” Upon arrival at the

Onslow County Sheriff’s Office, Defendant was placed into an interrogation room

where he waited for approximately fifteen minutes for the officers to return.

Thereafter, he was permitted to use the restroom before returning to the

interrogation room. Defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, and he

signed the rights waiver form. The interrogation proceeded for approximately thirty

minutes before Defendant made inculpatory statements. Defendant did not appear

- 27 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

to be under the influence of any alcohol or drugs, did not display any ill effects from

his trip from Colombia, and conversed in fluent English.

The findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that “[f]rom the totality

of the circumstances, the defendant was aware of his constitutional rights at the time

of his interrogation[,]” and that “the defendant was fully and completely advised of

his Miranda warnings, and his waiver of his Miranda rights was executed freely,

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.” The findings of fact also support the trial

court’s conclusion of law that “the defendant’s inculpatory statements were made

voluntarily and understandingly.” Thus, Defendant’s argument lacks merit.

D. Clerical Error

Defendant contends, and the State essentially concedes, that the case must be

remanded to the trial court to correct a clerical error in the trial court’s judgment.

We agree.

“When, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the trial court’s judgment or

order, it is appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction because of

the importance that the record speak the truth.” State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842,

845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696-97 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the jury convicted Defendant of sexual activity by a substitute parent.

Prior to sentencing, however, the trial court orally dismissed Defendant’s conviction

of sexual activity by substitute parent:

[DEFENDANT]: I would make further motions to dismiss

- 28 -
 STATE V. PALACIO

Opinion of the Court

all charges. The arguments previously set forth for the
record, if the Court could just take judicial notice of the
content of those. They were voluminous. That would be
the bases for any further motions.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENDANT]: I’m happy to expound upon anything you
want, Judge, but --
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENDANT]: -- they’ve been argued several times.
THE COURT: The Court is going to allow the motion to
dismiss as to the sexual activity by substitute parent.
[DEFENDANT]: Thank you, Judge.

Thereafter, the trial court consolidated the remaining convictions for

sentencing. However, the judgment and subsequent modified judgment indicate that

Defendant was convicted of sexual activity by a substitute parent. Accordingly, we

remand for correction of the clerical error.

III. Conclusion

Defendant’s incest conviction is vacated and remanded for resentencing and

for correction of a clerical error on the written judgment.

NO ERROR IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR

RESENTENCING AND FOR CORRECTION OF JUDGMENT.

Judges DILLON and WOOD concur.

- 29 -