State v. Stevens

[Cite as State v. Stevens, 2023-Ohio-362.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY

State of Ohio, : Case No. 22CA11

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
DECISION AND
v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

Robert A. Stevens, :

Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 2/03/2023

______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

R. Jessica Manungo, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Ohio Public Defender,
Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecutor, and Steven K. Nord, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

{¶1} Robert A. Stevens appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County Court

of Common Pleas convicting him, following a jury trial, of tampering with evidence in

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). In his sole assignment of error, Stevens contends that

the trial court erred when it denied his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for judgment of acquittal

because there is insufficient evidence to support all the essential elements of that offense.

However, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the

offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of

error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On January 27, 2021, Stevens was indicted in Case No. 20-CR-460 on one

count of aggravated possession of drugs, one count of improper handling of a firearm in

a motor vehicle, and one count of having weapons while under disability, all alleged to

have occurred on or about December 11, 2020.1 On June 1, 2021, Stevens was indicted

in Case No. 21-CR-182 on one count of tampering with evidence and one count of

escape, both alleged to have occurred on or about February 8, 2021. The trial court

consolidated the cases for purposes of trial.

{¶3} During the jury trial, Trooper Jeffrey Martin of the Ohio State Highway Patrol

testified about events underlying the indictment in Case No. 20-CR-460, i.e., a December

11, 2020 traffic stop which resulted in him arresting Stevens and charging him with

possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, improper handling of a firearm in a motor

vehicle, and having weapons while under disability. Captain Lynn Stewart of the

Lawrence County Adult Probation Department testified about events underlying the

indictment in Case No. 21-CR-182. On December 23, 2020, Stevens secured a $15,000

“O.R.,” i.e., own recognizance bond.2 He had to wear an ankle monitor which was “a very

thick device” containing a global positioning satellite or “GPS” component to track his

location and a cell phone which the probation department could use to communicate with

him. Captain Stewart testified that when someone is released on an ankle monitor, the

probation department takes a photograph of the bottom of the monitor so it knows which

1 Some information about Case No. 20-CR-460, which is not the subject of this appeal, is taken from our
decision in State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 21CA15, 21CA16, 2022-Ohio-2518.
2 Evidently the trial court made the decision to release Stevens on bond during his arraignment hearing in

a third case before it, Case No. 20-CR-424, involving an attempted burglary charge which the jury heard
no evidence about and was later dismissed.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 3

one it gave the individual, and the individual must sign a Participant Conditions

Agreement which sets forth conditions they must “abide by.”

{¶4} Captain Stewart testified that there are restrictions on where individuals

required to wear an ankle monitor are allowed to go but did not testify to specific

restrictions on Stevens. She also testified that Stevens had to keep the ankle monitor

charged, that the monitor “can be charged for twenty-four hour increments,” and that it

must be charged “three hours every evening.” She testified that when a monitor powers

down, it “goes into like a sleep mode. There is an internal…an internal, so much it’ll store

internally as well, but after it powers down, it has no electrical device, and then we can

no longer supervise that offender.” In addition, she testified that Stevens had to report to

the probation department in person every Monday so a “test call” could be done on the

monitor to ensure it was “charging well.”

{¶5} On Friday, February 5, 2021, Stevens came to the probation department

and submitted a “doctor’s excuse” for a recent hospital stay and a request to change his

address. He was wearing the ankle monitor at that time. A monitoring company notifies

the probation department if an individual wearing an ankle monitor is “out of area” or “if

their batteries are low.” That evening, the probation department received notice that the

ankle monitor “was not taking a charge.” Captain Stewart testified that “for some reason

[Stevens] was not able to either secure it in a good outlet, which sometimes that happens,

but it…it was…it wasn’t charging. He wasn’t charging it.” She spoke with Stevens on his

personal cell phone “many times” that evening. She told him that the battery in the ankle

monitor needed charged. Stevens “advised the device would start to turn green, but then

turn red,” and Captain Stewart “advised him to keep charge on it to see if that worked.”
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 4

She “told him that the device had an internal charge for such purposes, that he still needed

to charge it * * *.” In addition, he told her “there were bedbugs at the address change that

he had put in for earlier in the day” and asked to go back to the address he stayed at the

previous night. She gave him permission to go to his previous address and told him to

check in with the probation department on Monday. He told her that he would bring in

$100 dollars then “for two address changes.” At 10:01 p.m., the probation department

lost communication with the ankle monitor and could no longer track Stevens’s

whereabouts.

{¶6} On Monday, February 8, 2021, Stevens failed to report to the probation

department. Captain Stewart unsuccessfully tried to reach Stevens on his personal cell

phone and on his girlfriend’s phone. She also had no communications with him on the

other two phone numbers he had previously given the probation department. On

February 9, 2021, Captain Stewart made a request to revoke Stevens’s bond. A capias

or warrant was issued for his arrest. Stevens did not report for any other Monday

meetings at the probation department. He was arrested in May 2021 while not wearing

the ankle monitor. Captain Stewart did not know what happened to the device and

testified that there was an “open investigation” with respect to it.

{¶7} In Case No. 20-CR-460, the state moved to enter a nolle prosequi as to the

having weapons while under disability charge. The trial court orally granted the motion

and later memorialized that decision in an entry. The jury found Stevens guilty of

aggravated possession of drugs and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle.

On October 18, 2021, the court issued a judgment entry sentencing Stevens on those

counts, which he appealed.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 5

{¶8} In Case No. 21-CR-182, the trial court orally granted the state’s motion to

enter a nolle prosequi as to the escape charge but did not memorialize that decision in

an entry. The jury found Stevens guilty of tampering with evidence. On October 18, 2021,

the court issued a judgment entry sentencing Stevens for that offense, which he

appealed.

{¶9} In Lawrence App. No. 21CA15, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment in

Case No. 20-CR-460. State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 21CA15, 21CA16, 2022-

Ohio-2518, ¶ 1. In Lawrence App. No. 21CA16, we dismissed the appeal from the trial

court’s judgment in Case No. 21-CR-182 for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court

failed to resolve the escape charge via journal entry, so the judgment appealed from in

that case was not a final appealable order. Id. at ¶ 2. Subsequently, the trial court issued

an entry memorializing its decision to grant the state’s motion to enter a nolle prosequi on

the escape charge. This appeal followed.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶10} Stevens presents one assignment of error: “The trial court erred by denying

Mr. Stevens’ Criminal Rule 29 motion in the absence of sufficient evidence to support all

the essential elements of a tampering with evidence charge.”

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Stevens contends that the trial court erred

when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the tampering with

evidence charge because there is insufficient evidence to support all the essential

elements of the offense.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 6

{¶12} Crim.R. 29(A) provides: “The court on motion of a defendant * * * after the

evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one

or more offenses charged in the indictment * * * if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a

conviction of such offense or offenses.” “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is

governed by the same standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported

by sufficient evidence.” State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847

N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, “[t]he

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other

grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4,

and following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

{¶13} “A sufficiency assignment of error challenges the legal adequacy of the

state’s prima facie case, not its rational persuasiveness.” State v. Anderson, 4th Dist.

Highland No. 18CA14, 2019-Ohio-395, ¶ 13. “That limited review does not intrude on the

jury’s role ‘to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Musacchio v. United States,

577 U.S. 237, 243, 136 S.Ct. 709, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), quoting Jackson at 319. A

reviewing court will not overturn a conviction based on insufficient evidence “ ‘unless

reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion that the trier of fact did.’ ” State v. Cook,

4th Dist. Gallia No. 18CA11, 2019-Ohio-4745, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Bradshaw, 4th Dist.

Scioto No. 17CA3803, 2018-Ohio-1105, ¶ 15.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 7

{¶14} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) states: “No person, knowing that an official proceeding

or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall * * * [a]lter,

destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its

value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation[.]” “There are three

elements of this offense: (1) the knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation in

progress or likely to be instituted, (2) the alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal

of the potential evidence, (3) the purpose of impairing the potential evidence’s availability

or value in such proceeding or investigation.” State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-

Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 11.

A. Alteration, Destruction, Concealment, or Removal

{¶15} Initially, we address the alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal of

the potential evidence element. Although the parties’ appellate briefs sometimes refer to

Stevens destroying or removing the ankle monitor, the indictment alleged that Stevens

“did alter or conceal a thing.” The trial court instructed the jury accordingly.

{¶16} R.C. 1.42 provides that words in the Ohio Revised Code “shall be read in

context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” If a

statutory term is not defined, “ ‘it should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.’ “

State ex rel. Data Trace Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer, 131

Ohio St.3d 255, 2012-Ohio-753, 963 N.E.2d 1288, ¶ 49, quoting Rhodes v. New

Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶ 17. “ ‘Courts have

used dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory

term.’ “ Denuit v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy, 2013-Ohio-2484, 994 N.E.2d 15, ¶ 30 (4th

Dist.), quoting State v. Jackson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-06-096, 2012-Ohio-4219,
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 8

¶ 34. Merriam-Webster defines “alter” to mean, inter alia, “to make different without

changing into something else,” and defines “conceal” to mean (1) “to prevent disclosure

or recognition of,” and (2) “to place out of sight.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/alter and https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conceal

(accessed February 1, 2023).

{¶17} In his appellate brief, Stevens makes the statement that the state failed to

present sufficient evidence that he “concealed or destroyed potential evidence.”

However, his brief does not elaborate on this statement and instead focuses on the other

two elements of the offense. And in his reply brief, Stevens states that the state presented

insufficient evidence of “two out of the three elements” of the offense and focuses on the

knowledge and purpose elements.

{¶18} Even though Stevens appears to concede in his reply brief that the state

presented sufficient evidence that he altered and concealed the ankle monitor, we must

determine when those events occurred in order to address the next element of the

offense—whether Stevens knew an official proceeding or investigation was in progress

or about to be or likely to be instituted when he altered or concealed the ankle monitor.

The state presented evidence that the conditions of Stevens’s bond required that he wear

an ankle monitor, keep the monitor charged, not go to unapproved locations, and report

to the probation department in person every Monday for monitor testing. The state also

presented evidence that Stevens was wearing the ankle monitor on Friday, February 5,

2021, when he met with Captain Stewart, that he knew the monitor was powering down

that evening, and that the probation department lost communication with the device at

10:01 p.m. After the ankle monitor powered down, Stevens did not report to or otherwise
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 9

communicate with the probation department, and he was not wearing the device at the

time of his arrest in May 2021.

{¶19} One can reasonably infer that Stevens had to alter the monitor, i.e., make it

different in some way without changing it into something else, in order to take it off without

authorization and that he concealed the monitor, i.e., placed it out of sight, by taking it

from the location it was supposed to be—his ankle—and placing it somewhere unknown

to the probation department.3 The precise moment when this conduct occurred is

unknown. However, there is no evidence it occurred before the monitor powered down,4

and the jury could reasonably conclude that as alleged in the indictment, Stevens

engaged in this conduct on or about February 8, 2021, i.e., around the time he failed to

report to the probation department and began to flee from justice.

B. Knowledge of an Official Proceeding or Investigation

{¶20} Next, we address the knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation in

progress or likely to be instituted element. “The likelihood of an investigation is measured

at the time of the alleged tampering.” State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-

7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 110.

{¶21} R.C. 2901.22(B) states:

A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the
person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge
of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a

3 The state does not appear to assert that Stevens altered or concealed the ankle monitor by failing to
charge it when he had a duty to do so, and we find it unnecessary to address whether such an omission
could constitute a violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) in order to resolve this appeal.
4 While one might expect the ankle monitor to have had the ability, when charged, to alert authorities to

removal attempts, Captain Stewart did not testify to that fact.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 10

high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

{¶22} “Notably, this definition does not encompass knowledge that a reasonably

diligent person should, but does not, have. Rather, the statute requires the accused to

be aware that conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain

nature or that circumstances probably exist.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Barry, 145 Ohio

St.3d 354, 2015-Ohio-5449, 49 N.E.3d 1248, ¶ 24. Consequently, “constructive

knowledge is insufficient to prove that [an accused] knew that an investigation was

ongoing or likely to be commenced * * *.” Id. at ¶ 25. “Ohio law does not impute

constructive knowledge of an impending investigation based solely on the commission of

an offense, and therefore, the fact that an act was unmistakably a crime does not, by

itself, establish that the accused knew of an investigation into that crime or that such an

investigation was likely to be instituted.” Id. at ¶ 2. However, “knowledge of a likely

investigation may be inferred when the defendant commits a crime that is likely to be

reported.” (Emphasis sic.) Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857,

at ¶ 118.

{¶23} Stevens maintains that there is no evidence that he had the requisite

knowledge. He asserts that “[a]t the time of the conduct resulting in the tampering with

evidence charge—February 5, 2021—[he] had been indicted for attempted burglary, drug

possession, and weapons charges, and he was out on an O.R. bond,” and “[t]he only

likely investigation or proceeding would have been into those charges.” He asserts that

there was “no other criminal activity that would have resulted in an investigation or

proceeding involving the ankle monitor and his whereabouts.” Stevens claims the ankle

monitor “was merely part of an administrative process” while he was on bond “to ensure
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 11

that he showed up to pretrial hearings and the jury trial,” and the ankle monitor data “was

not relevant to any of his criminal behavior or the charges he was facing or would likely

face.” Therefore, “it is impossible” for him “to have had knowledge of an official proceeding

or investigation in progress or likely to be instituted.” Stevens asserts that prior to

Monday, February 8, 2021, he “had not violated any bond requirements and had

remained in contact with the probation department.” He asserts that the probation

department’s loss of contact with the ankle monitor “clearly did not trigger any proceeding

or investigation” and “[r]emoving the monitor did not, by itself, establish that” he “knew an

investigation was likely to be instituted.” He “did not know and could not have known that

an investigation into the later removal or concealment of the monitor would likely be

instituted, given the last conversation he had with Captain Stewart and that the monitor

itself had powered down.”

{¶24} After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found that when Stevens altered and

concealed the ankle monitor on or about February 8, 2021, he knew that an official

proceeding or investigation was in progress or was about to be or likely to be instituted.

The state presented evidence that Stevens was arrested and charged with possession of

drugs and drug paraphernalia and weapons offenses on December 11, 2020, and he was

released on bond on December 23, 2020. The conditions of his bond included restrictions

on the locations he was allowed to go (the specifics of which are not in evidence), wearing

an ankle monitor to track his whereabouts, charging the ankle monitor each night, and

reporting to the probation department in person every Monday for monitor testing.

Stevens knew the monitor was powering down the evening of February 5, 2021, and the
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 12

probation department lost communication with it at 10:01 p.m. Although Stevens

indicated to Captain Stewart that he was trying to charge the device but unable to do so,

the Monday after the device powered down, he did not report to the probation department

to resolve the issue. He did not report for any other Monday meeting or otherwise

communicate with the probation department again, and he was not wearing the ankle

monitor at the time of his arrest in May 2021.

{¶25} Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that when Stevens

altered and concealed the ankle monitor, he knew that an official investigation was in

progress and that an official proceeding was likely to occur in connection with the events

of December 11, 2020. See generally R.C. 2921.01(D) (“ ‘Official proceeding’ means any

proceeding before a * * * judicial * * * agency or official authorized to take evidence under

oath * * *”). The jury could also reasonably find that when Stevens altered and concealed

the ankle monitor, he was planning to or had already failed to report to the probation

department. And the jury could reasonably find that Stevens knew his absence would be

noticed and that the probation department was likely to institute an official investigation

into his violation of the conditions of his bond requiring him to charge the ankle monitor

and report to the probation department and into his whereabouts. In reaching this

conclusion, we observe that some of Stevens’s arguments about the knowledge element

focus on whether the ankle monitor was relevant to any official proceeding or investigation

in progress or about to be or likely to be instituted. However, that is a separate issue we

will address in the next section.

C. Purpose to Impair Value or Availability as Evidence
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 13

{¶26} Finally, we address the purpose of impairing the potential evidence's

availability or value in such proceeding or investigation element. Here, the indictment

alleged that Stevens acted with purpose to impair a thing’s availability as evidence, not

its value. The trial court instructed the jury accordingly.

{¶27} “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause

a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain

nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s

specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “ ‘The intent of

an accused person dwells in his mind’ ” and “ ‘can never be proved by the direct testimony

of a third person.’ ” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978),

quoting State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936), paragraph four of the

syllabus. “ ‘It must be gathered from the surrounding facts and circumstances under

proper instructions from the court.’ ” Id., quoting Huffman at paragraph four of the

syllabus. For the “purpose” element to be met, “the act that constitutes tampering must

be a separate act from those that make up the crime itself.” State v. Crocker, 2015-Ohio-

2528, 38 N.E.3d 369, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.)

{¶28} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) “requires proof that the defendant intended to impair the

value or availability of evidence that related to an existing or likely official investigation or

proceeding.” Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, at syllabus.

“[T]he evidence tampered with must have some relevance to an ongoing or likely

investigation to support a tampering charge.” Id. at ¶ 16. Relevant evidence is “[e]vidence

tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019).

See generally Evid.R. 401 (for purposes of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, defining relevant
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 14

evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence”). Direct or circumstantial evidence can be used to prove

an item’s relevance. See Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857,

at ¶ 112-114.

{¶29} Stevens maintains that the “ankle monitor was not itself evidence relevant

to an ongoing or likely investigation.” He asserts that the “sole purpose of the ankle

monitor was to provide real-time GPS data about [his] precise location.” This data was

“uploaded from the GPS unit to a computer system managed and monitored by a

company that reported to the probation department,” which “means the probation

department possessed the stored data about [his] historical movements.” Stevens

asserts that there is no evidence that he “tampered with the data that had previously been

generated” by the ankle monitor and even if he had, that data “would not be relevant to

an ongoing or likely investigation or proceeding.” According to Stevens, “[a]lthough a

GPS monitor could be used to locate [him] and determine his whereabouts at any given

time,” “the monitor itself and the data it produces are not evidence of a crime,” so the

“removal or alteration” of the monitor “cannot constitute tampering with evidence.”

{¶30} Stevens also maintains that there is no evidence that he took the ankle

monitor off with the purpose of impairing its value or availability as evidence in an

investigation or proceeding. Stevens asserts that “[w]hile his removal of the ankle monitor

coincided with his failure to appear, it was not done to impair the monitor’s value or

availability as evidence in an investigation” because the “monitor and the data associated

with it were not evidence of a crime that would be used in a criminal investigation or
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 15

proceeding.” Stevens asserts that “as Captain Stewart acknowledged during trial, at the

likely time of its removal, the ankle monitor could not sustain a charge and had powered

down.” “[T]he ankle monitor itself could not have been of any evidentiary value to the

probation department or the court if the device was not charged, and so its removal or

destruction did not impair its value.” And his “purpose could not have been to impair the

value of a nonworking device or a device that was no longer transmitting anything.”

Stevens further asserts that “the act that the state has labeled ‘tampering’ was not a

separate act from those that make up a crime” and that the state “most likely conflated

tampering with or alteration of the monitor with tampering with evidence.” According to

Stevens, most tampering cases “involve an act in which a person alters, destroys,

conceals, or removes evidence with the intent of interfering with an investigation or

proceeding,” and typically “the defendant intends to cover up a crime.” But here, “the

monitor and its associated data at the time the monitor was removed would not have been

evidence supporting a conviction.” Stevens asserts that removing the monitor “may have

itself been a crime of criminal damaging or a bond violation,” but he ”did not tamper with

evidence that would be relevant to any criminal inquiries that were taking place or would

take place.”

{¶31} The ankle monitor had no relevance to the official investigation and likely

official proceeding regarding the events of December 11, 2020. However, the ankle

monitor did have relevance to the likely official investigation into the bond violation for

failing to charge the ankle monitor. If the probation department had recovered the device,

it could have been tested to determine whether it was capable of being charged. If it was,

that would tend to prove that Stevens intentionally failed to charge the device in violation
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 16

of the conditions of his bond. In addition, even though there is no evidence that the ankle

monitor was working when Stevens took it off or that Stevens thought it might be, the

device still had relevance to the likely investigation into his whereabouts. If Stevens had

continued to wear the “very thick” device on his ankle, the device would have drawn

attention to him. The device would have alerted third parties to the fact that he was an

individual subject to supervision, would have aroused suspicions if he was at a location

one would not expect such an individual to be allowed, and could have been compared

to the probation department’s photograph of the device assigned to him. Thus, the ankle

monitor could have been used to spot him, prove his identity, and thereby prove his

whereabouts.

{¶32} Making the ankle monitor unavailable for purposes of a bond violation

investigation for failure to charge the device may not have been at the forefront of

Stevens’s mind when he altered and concealed it. At that time he would have been fleeing

from justice—not trying to avoid revocation of his bond. However, the jury could

reasonably conclude Stevens altered and concealed the ankle monitor with purpose to

impair its availability as evidence in the likely investigation into his whereabouts.

D. Conclusion

{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the state presented sufficient

evidence to support the conviction for tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.

2921.12(A)(1). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it overruled the Crim.R. 29

motion for judgment of acquittal regarding that offense. We overrule the sole assignment

of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 17

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.