George Skrettas v. Department of Veterans Affairs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GEORGE D. SKRETTAS, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, CH-1221-20-0549-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 31, 2022
AFFAIRS,
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

George D. Skrettas, Ann Arbor, Michigan, pro se.

Amy C. Slameka, Esquire, and Lauren Russo Ciucci, Esquire, Detroit,
Michigan, for the agency.

BEFORE

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
granted in part and denied in part his request for corrective action in his
individual right of action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
 2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous a pplication of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affec ted the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly
MODIFIED to find that the appellant made a protected disclosure when he
disclosed that a former Respiratory Therapist did not have the proper credentials,
we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant is a GS-08 Registered Respiratory Therapist in Detroit,
Michigan, who engaged in the following whistleblowing activities: (1) reporting
to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Secretary in July 2017 that an
individual who was not properly licensed had been employed by the agency as a
Respiratory Therapist, and the Respiratory Care Service lacked adequate policies
and procedures, and (2) filing a complaint with the Inspector General (IG) in July
2018 reiterating the same disclosure, as well as disclosing that employees were
issuing medication without entering it into the Bar Code Medication
Administration System (BCMA). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 2 at 4, Tab 9
at 68; Hearing Transcript (HT) (testimony of the appellant). The appellant was
subjected to several personnel actions taken by his first - and second-line
supervisors, to include a 10-day suspension, removal of his patient-care duties, a
July 9, 2018 detail to the Social Work Service, and an unacceptable performance
 3

evaluation issued on December 3, 2018. IAF, Tab 9 at 52, Tab 36 at 4, 27,
Tab 77 at 10-16; HT (testimony of the appellant).
¶3 On January 15, 2019, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that the agency had retaliated against him for his
protected disclosures and activities. IAF, Tab 6 at 26-34. After OSC closed its
investigation, the appellant filed a timely IRA appeal, and after notifying him of
the proper legal standards, the administrative judge determined the Board had
jurisdiction over his appeal. IAF, Tabs 1, 4, 11. A hearing was held, and the
administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the appellant made a
protected disclosure when he disclosed that the Respiratory Care Service lacked
adequate procedures and policies, and engaged in a protected activity when he
filed an IG complaint. IAF, Tab 89, Initial Decision (ID) at 10 -11. After finding
that the appellant met the contributing factor standard, the administrative judge
found that the agency established by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have suspended the appellant, removed his patient-care duties, and detailed him
absent his whistleblowing, but failed to establish that it would have issued him an
unacceptable performance rating absent whistleblowing. ID at 11-29. Thus, the
administrative judge granted the appellant’s request for corrective action in part,
and denied the request in part. ID at 29.
¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review reiterating his argument that
the unlicensed Respiratory Therapist had unlawfully performed her duties because
she did not have the proper credentials. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
at 7, 12. The agency has responded in opposition to the petition for review, but
does not challenge the finding of reprisal for whistleblowing . PFR File, Tab 3.
 4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
Contrary to the administrative judge’s findings, the appellant established by
preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure when he disclosed that
an employee did not have the proper licensing to be a Respiratory Therapist.
¶5 In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appella nt’s
disclosure that the agency employed a Respiratory Therapist lacking proper
credentials was not protected because he had not established that he had a
reasonable belief that the disclosure evidenced a violation of law, rule, or
regulation. 2 ID at 9. Specifically, the administrative judge found the employee,
who had retired in December 2015, was not employed as a Registered Respiratory
Therapist, but instead was employed as a lower grade Respiratory Therapist. ID
at 8-9. The administrative judge also found that her duties were appropriate for
her credentials, and there was no evidence that this employee acted outside of the
scope of her position. Id. On review, the appellant claims that he witnessed this
employee “perform all the duties of a Respiratory Therapist despite not having
any credentials as a Respiratory Therapist” which he asserts is illegal in the state
of Michigan. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7, 12.
¶6 Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA),
after the appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, he must prove
by preponderant evidence that (1) he made a protected disclosure described under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity descri bed under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) and; (2) the disclosure or protected activity
was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Salerno v. Department of the

2
We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not hold a
reasonable belief that such disclosure evidenced a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety, because the individual was no longer employed by the agency,
and thus the danger was neither substantial nor specific. See Miller v. Department of
Homeland Security, 111 M.S.P.R. 312, ¶ 6 (2009) (stating that disclosures regarding
danger to the public must be both substantial and specific to be protected and mere
speculative danger is not protected); ID at 9.
 5

Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). Whether an employee has a reasonable
belief is determined by an objective test: whether a disinterested observer with
knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the
employee could reasonably conclude that the matters disclosed show one of the
categories of wrongdoing set out in the statute. Id., ¶ 6. The appellant does not
have to prove that the matter disclosed actually violated a law, rule , or regulation;
rather, the appellant must show that the matter disclosed was one which a
reasonable person in his position would believe evidenced such a violation.
Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6 (2015).
¶7 We find that the appellant held a reasonable belief that the employee
discussed above did not have the licensing required to be a Respiratory Therapist
in violation of law, rule, or regulation. According to the American Association
for Respiratory Care (AARC), a respiratory therapist, whether a certified
respiratory therapist (CRT) or a registered respiratory therapist (RRT), must have
“an associate degree, bachelor’s degree, or a master’s degree from [an accredited]
respiratory therapy education program.” What is an RT? Credentials—CRT and
RRT, AARC. ORG , https://www.aarc.org/careers/what-is-an-rt/requirements/ (last
visited May 31, 2022). Further, Michigan’s Public Health Code provides: “[a]n
individual shall not engage in the practice of respiratory care or provide or offer
to provide respiratory care services unless licensed under this part.” Mich. Pub.
Health Code § 333.18707(1). While the statute allows for individuals without a
license to practice respiratory care under certain circumstances, these exceptions
prohibit these individuals from using specific titles, to include “respiratory
therapist.” Mich. Pub. Health Code §§ 333.18707, 333.18703.
¶8 The employee at issue had a certificate from a hospital respiratory program
from 1963, but had never completed her schooling, and thus, did not have a
degree. HT (testimony of the second-line supervisor, testimony of the
Administrative Officer); IAF, Tab 36 at 22. Based upon the plain language of
AARC’s guidelines, because she did not have a degree, she could not be licensed
 6

as respiratory therapist, either a CRT or RRT. However, she was employed as a
Respiratory Therapist by the agency, which appears to be contrary to the state’s
public health code. Mich. Pub. Health Code §§ 333.18707, 333.18703; IAF,
Tab 34 at 94. Thus, although this employee may have been able to operate as a
non-credentialed Respiratory Therapist, we nevertheless find that there is
sufficient evidence that would lead a reasonable person in the appellant’s position
to believe that her employment violated law, rule, or regulation. Accordingly, we
modify the initial decision to reflect that this disclosure is protected.

The additional protected disclosure does not affect the remainder of the
administrative judge’s analysis.
¶9 Despite the administrative judge’s erroneous finding regarding the
appellant’s disclosure about the respiratory therapist, that error does not affect the
outcome of this appeal. As discussed above, the administrative judge found that
the appellant established that his protected disclosure and activity contributed to
the personnel actions, and the inclusion of the additional disclosure does not
impact that analysis. ID at 13-14.
¶10 If the appellant proves that his protected disclosure or activity was a
contributing factor in a personnel action taken against him, the agency is given
the opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have
taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure.
Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. In determining whether an agency has met its
burden, the Board will consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence
and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who
were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar
actions against employees who do not engage in such protected activity, but who
are otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d
1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
 7

¶11 As for the analysis of the agency’s burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions absent the protected
disclosures and activity, the additional disclosure regarding the unlicensed
Respiratory Therapist has at most a negligible impact on only one of the Carr
factors, i.e., the agency’s motive to retaliate. The underlying allegation was not
significant, as the employee had retired over a year prior to the disclosure, and
the agency explained that the employee had been “grandfathered” in and was able
to operate as a non-credentialed Respiratory Therapist at the GS-06 level.
HT (testimony of the Administrative Officer). This appeared to have been the
general understanding at the agency, as several members of the Respiratory Care
Service staff testified that this was their understanding of the situation . HT
(testimony of the Associate Director of Patient Care Services, testimony of a
Registered Respiratory Therapist, testimony of the first-line supervisor, testimony
of the second-line supervisor). Furthermore, there is no evidence that anyone at
the agency suffered negative consequences as a result of this disclosure. Thus,
while an additional protected disclosure or activity may arguably add to an
agency’s motive to retaliate, given the circumstances present here, we find that an
additional disclosure had at most a negligible effect on the motive to retaliate . 3

3
The agency failed to present evidence of the third Carr factor. ID at 20-21, 26-28.
We reiterate that it is the agency’s burden to establish that it met the clear and
convincing standard. Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2012). Because it is the agency’s burden of proof, when the agency fails to introduce
relevant comparator evidence, the third Carr factor cannot weigh in favor of the
agency. Smith v. General Services Administration, 930 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2019); Siler v. Environmental Protection Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Here, the agency did not present comparator evidence. Under the circumstances, the
third Carr factor does not weigh in the agency’s favor. Soto v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 18. However, even if the third Carr factor does not weigh in
favor of the agency or even cuts slightly against it, it has no impact on the
administrative judge’s determination that the agency met its burden of proof or the
outcome of this case because the other factors outweigh the lack of comparator
evidence. See Rickel v. Department of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (noting
that the absence of evidence on Carr factor three “will not necessarily” prevent the
agency from meeting its burden); see also Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
 8

¶12 In conclusion, because the administrative judge’s remaining findings in the
initial decision are well-reasoned, detailed, and supported by the record, we
discern no basis for disturbing them, except as expressly modified above . 4
Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (declining to disturb
the administrative judge’s findings where she considered the evidence as a whole,
drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.
Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

ORDER
¶13 We ORDER the agency to rescind the December 3, 2018, unacceptable
performance appraisal and reissue the performance appraisal rating the appellant

22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to
a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
4
On review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s finding that the agency’s
investigation into an allegation that he tampered with a patient ’s ventilator was not a
covered personnel action because a qualifying personnel action was not taken in
conjunction with the retaliatory investigation. ID at 12; PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-13.
Specifically, he argues that his second-line supervisor “authored a letter which
proposed that [he] be terminated” as a result of the investigation. PFR File, Tab 1
at 12. This letter, addressed “to whom it may concern,” summarizes the second-line
supervisor’s findings of the investigation and concludes that the appellant should be
removed, but there is no evidence in the record that indi cates where this letter was sent,
whether it was provided to the appellant before litigation, or if any agency officials
involved in the personnel actions at issue viewed this letter. IAF, Tab 36 at 5 -6.
Furthermore, this is the first time the appellant has articulated an argument that this
letter was connected to the investigation. He failed to raise such an argument with the
administrative judge, despite having ample opportunity to do so . Indeed, the appellant
objected to the administrative judge’s prehearing order excluding this investigation and
failed to raise any argument about this letter despite it being in the record at that time.
IAF, Tab 79 at 5-6. Further, the appellant was aware that this letter was in the record,
because he asked his second-line supervisor during the hearing if he had ever authored a
letter proposing his removal. HT (testimony of the second-line supervisor). The Board
generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review
absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously avai lable
despite the party’s due diligence. Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245,
¶ 6 (2016). Accordingly, because this evidence was in the record, the appellant knew of
its existence, and he still failed to raise the argument before the administrative judge,
we decline to consider the argument for the first time on review.
 9

as fully successful in all elements. The agency must complete this action no later
than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶14 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶15 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes th at the agency has not
fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for a ttorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST CONSEQUENTIAL AND/OR
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your consequential
damages, including medical costs incurred, travel expenses, and any other
 10

reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages. To be paid, you must meet
the requirements set out at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(g) or 1221(g). The regulations may
be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202 and 1201.204.
In addition, the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012
authorized the award of compensatory damages including interest, reasonable
expert witness fees, and costs, 5 U.S.C. § 1214(g)(2), which you may be entitled
to receive.
If you believe you are entitled to these damages, you must file a motion for
consequential damages and/or compensatory damages WITHIN 60 CALENDAR
DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion with the
office that issued the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
A copy of the decision will then be referred to the Special Counsel “to
investigate and take appropriate action under [5 U.S.C.] section 1215,” based on
the determination that “there is reason to believe that a current employee may
have committed a prohibited personnel practice” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(f)(3). Please note
that while any Special Counsel investigation related to this decision is pending,
“no disciplinary action shall be taken against any employee for any alleged
prohibited activity under investigation or for any related activity without the
approval of the Special Counsel.” 5 U.S.C. § 1214(f).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
 11

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
 12

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to t he Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. distri ct court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
 13

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice describe d in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
 14

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
 15

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.