Truist Bank v. Eichenberger

[Cite as Truist Bank v. Eichenberger, 2023-Ohio-779.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Truist Bank, successor by merger :
to SunTrust Bank dba LightStream,
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 22AP-334
: (C.P.C. No. 20CV-4409)
v.
: (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Raymond L. Eichenberger,
:
Defendant-Appellant.
:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 14, 2023

On brief: Raymond L. Eichenberger, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.
{¶ 1} In 2018, defendant-appellant, Raymond L. Eichenberger, obtained a
consumer loan from SunTrust Bank. He agreed to repay that loan (with interest) by making
48 monthly payments. But, according to plaintiff-appellee, Truist Bank, Mr. Eichenberger
only made 7 payments under the consumer loan agreement (a fact that Mr. Eichenberger
does not dispute). Under the terms of the written loan agreement Mr. Eichenberger signed,
he was in default by July 2019.
{¶ 2} Later that year, SunTrust Bank merged with BB&T Corporation (“BB&T”),
and the resulting company was renamed “Truist Bank.” Truist Bank initiated a breach of
contract action against Mr. Eichenberger in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Mr. Eichenberger answered without presenting any evidence disputing the alleged failure
No. 22AP-334 2

to make payments under the consumer loan agreement and raised two counterclaims:
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court rejected those arguments
when it granted summary judgment in favor of Truist Bank and against Mr. Eichenberger
on both Truist Bank’s breach of contract claim and Mr. Eichenberger’s counterclaims.
{¶ 3} We agree and affirm that judgment and the trial court’s contemporaneous
judgment denying Mr. Eichenberger’s motion to strike.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 4} Mr. Eichenberger obtained a consumer loan from SunTrust Bank dba
LightStream (“SunTrust”) and signed a written loan agreement on August 31, 2018 (the
“Agreement”). The Agreement included the loan amount of $23,500.00, a finance charge
of $6,671.84, and the total payments—if paid as scheduled—of $30,171.84. Pursuant to that
Agreement, Mr. Eichenberger’s payments were to begin October 15, 2018, and last for 48
months at a rate of $628.58 per month.
{¶ 5} In addition to these terms of his loan, the Agreement also states that, by
signing, Mr. Eichenberger “agree[d] to pay SunTrust Bank d/b/a LightStream * * * and its
successors and assigns (‘Lender’, ‘we’, ‘us’ or ‘our’) * * * the principal sum of $23,500.00
with interest each day on all unpaid principal from the date of Funding * * * until paid in
full at an annual percentage rate of 12.84%.” (Emphasis added.) (Compl., Ex. A at 1.)
Further, the Agreement repeatedly describes the rights and obligations of the lender—at
the time, SunTrust—as being held by “we, our assignees or successors.” (Emphasis
added.) (See generally id.) Finally, the Agreement states that SunTrust and its
“successors and assigns may assign this Agreement to another party.” (Emphasis added.)
(Id. at 7.)
{¶ 6} Mr. Eichenberger has never disputed the existence of this written Agreement
or denied signing it.
{¶ 7} Between October 25, 2018 and May 14, 2019, Mr. Eichenberger made seven
payments of $628.58, the monthly rate set forth in the Agreement. Mr. Eichenberger has
never claimed that he made additional payments on the loan after May 14, 2019. Under the
Agreement, failure to make a payment on the loan within 30 days after the payment is due
constitutes an “event of default.” (Compl., Ex. A at 2.)
No. 22AP-334 3

{¶ 8} In December 2019, SunTrust merged with BB&T and adopted the name
“Truist Bank,” as described in the Articles of Merger appended to Truist Bank’s complaint
and summary judgment motion. In light of the merger and under the Agreement, Truist
Bank—as successor by merger to SunTrust—became the first-party creditor to Mr.
Eichenberger’s delinquent debt.
{¶ 9} In a letter dated April 2, 2020, a debt collection attorney notified Mr.
Eichenberger that Truist Bank, as successor by merger to SunTrust, had referred Mr.
Eichenberger’s delinquent debt of $21,094.73 to his office for collection. Mr. Eichenberger
was advised in that letter he could “avoid future collection attempts by paying [his] account
in full or setting up a payment arrangement” with the debt collection firm. (Reply in
Support of Summ. Jgmt. Mot., Ex. E.) Those pre-litigation debt collection efforts were not
successful.
{¶ 10} On July 8, 2020, Truist Bank filed a complaint alleging breach of contract
against Mr. Eichenberger. In the caption and the first paragraph of the complaint, Truist
Bank designated itself as the “successor by merger to SunTrust Bank dba LightStream.” A
copy of the Agreement and documents establishing Truist Bank as successor by merger to
SunTrust were attached to the complaint as exhibit A. Truist Bank alleged in the complaint
that Mr. Eichenberger owed $21,094.73 plus costs and interest at the rate of 12.84 percent
per annum from September 12, 2019. The outstanding balance sheet was attached to the
complaint as exhibit B.
{¶ 11} On October 20, 2020, Mr. Eichenberger filed an answer, admitting he had
“signed a written agreement with Sun Trust [sic] Bank for a loan,” but denying that Truist
Bank was “a rightful successor to that Sun Trust [sic].” Mr. Eichenberger also denied that
he was in default and owed the sum claimed. In addition, Mr. Eichenberger asserted lack
of standing and Truist Bank’s failure to notify him “that it intended to file suit on the alleged
account” as defenses to the breach of contract claim. With his answer, Mr. Eichenberger
asserted breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty as counterclaims against Truist
Bank.
No. 22AP-334 4

{¶ 12} During pretrial proceedings, Mr. Eichenberger twice moved to continue the
scheduled trial date. Each time, the trial court granted those motions.1 As a result of Mr.
Eichenberger’s second requested continuance, trial was scheduled to commence
February 28, 2022 and dispositive motions were due November 10, 2021. Neither party
filed a dispositive motion by that date.
{¶ 13} On February 17, 2022, Truist Bank moved for an extension of time to file its
dispositive motion. The next day, the trial court granted that motion, authorized an
extension of time until March 18, 2022, vacated the February 28, 2022 trial date, and
rescheduled trial for August 8, 2022. Mr. Eichenberger did not object to that order on or
before March 18, 2022, when the new dispositive motion deadline expired.
{¶ 14} On March 10, 2022, Truist Bank moved for summary judgment on both its
complaint and Mr. Eichenberger’s counterclaims. Several exhibits were attached to that
motion. On March 16, 2022, Truist Bank filed a second summary judgment motion. The
contents of that motion are identical to the previously filed summary judgment motion,
with the exception of the ordering of the supporting exhibits.
{¶ 15} The supporting exhibits included the following:

Exhibit A: The Agreement between Mr. Eichenberger and
SunTrust.

Exhibit B: A letter dated December 7, 2019 from Ellen M.
Fitzsimmons of Truist Financial Corporation
and Truist Bank to “our Clients and
Counterparties” containing the logos of BB&T
and SunTrust in the letterhead. This letter
describes a summary of the transactions
associated with the merger of SunTrust and
BB&T, as well as the renaming of the remaining
entities following the merger.

Exhibit C: Undated correspondence from LightStream to
Mr. Eichenberger regarding the August 31, 2018

1 In his May 2021 motion, Mr. Eichenberger requested the July 2021 trial date be continued to early 2022;
the trial court ordered that trial be continued until December 6, 2021. In his October 2021 motion, Mr.
Eichenberger requested that trial be continued until April 2022; the trial court instead selected
February 28, 2022 as the new trial date in the case.
No. 22AP-334 5

loan agreement and the due date for his monthly
payments under that Agreement.

Exhibit D: The outstanding balance sheet for Mr.
Eichenberger’s loan.

{¶ 16} Mr. Eichenberger replied to Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion on
April 8, 2022. In his memorandum contra, Mr. Eichenberger argued: (1) Truist Bank failed
to prove that Mr. Eichenberger owed money to Truist Bank under the Agreement; and
(2) Truist Bank violated notification and communication requirements imposed by federal
and/or Ohio law. Mr. Eichenberger’s own affidavit was the only document he produced as
evidence in support of his arguments against Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion.
{¶ 17} Also on April 8, 2022, Mr. Eichenberger filed a motion to strike both of Truist
Bank’s summary judgment motions. In support of his motion, Mr. Eichenberger argued the
trial court’s decision to grant Truist Bank’s motion for an extension of time to file a
dispositive motion was generally unfair and violated Civ.R. 56.
{¶ 18} On May 12, 2022, the trial court issued a decision denying Mr. Eichenberger’s
motion to strike and granting Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion on Truist Bank’s
breach of contract claim and Mr. Eichenberger’s breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty counterclaims. The trial court found Truist Bank was entitled to a judgment of
$21,094.73 plus interest at the rate of 12.84 percent per annum from September 12, 2019.
{¶ 19} Mr. Eichenberger timely appealed and asserts the following five assignments
of error for our review:
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY PERMITTING THE
PLAINTIFF TO FILE A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OUT OF RULE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
CONSTRUE THE FACTS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE NON[-]
MOVING DEFENDANT, AND BY ACCEPTING AN
AFFIDAVIT FROM THE TRUIST BANK EMPLOYEE AS TO
THE BALANCE OF THE ACCOUNT AND OTHER FACT[S] IN
No. 22AP-334 6

THE CASE WHICH WAS NOT BASED ON PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.

[III.] THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THIS CASE ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY
FINDING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE
DEFENDANT DID NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION
AS PLEAD [sic].

[IV.] THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY HOLDING THAT THE
ACTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND ITS PREDECESSOR
WERE, AS A MAT[T]ER OF LAW, NOT TANTAMOUNT TO A
VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS LAW.

[V.] THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF BANK AND ITS PREDECESSOR DID NOT HAVE
A DUTY TO NOTIFY THE DEFENDANT BEFORE IT FILED A
COLLECTION CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT OVER
THE ALLEGED LOAN BALANCES IN QUESTION.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 20} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Eichenberger alleges the trial court erred
as a matter of law and abused its discretion by allowing Truist Bank to file its summary
judgment motion “out of rule and in violation of [his] due process rights.” We disagree.
1. The trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion by
allowing Truist Bank to file its summary judgment motion after the
case had been set for trial and the dispositive motion date.
{¶ 21} Mr. Eichenberger argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting
Truist Bank’s motion for an extension of time because: (1) the action had been set for trial;
and (2) Truist Bank’s request was made shortly before the trial date. Mr. Eichenberger
contends that, under Civ.R. 56(A), summary judgment motions are to be filed before a case
has been set for pre-trial or trial. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Loc.R. 53.01
limits the application of Civ.R. 56(A), however, because it preemptively grants leave “in all
civil cases to file summary judgment motions between the time of filing and the dispositive
motion date, unless the Trial Judge decides otherwise by setting a different date.” See, e.g.,
No. 22AP-334 7

Am. Std. Ins. Co. v. Sealey, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1210, 2004-Ohio-4308, ¶ 7. In this case,
though, Truist Bank moved for an extension of time to file its summary judgment motion
after the dispositive motion deadline had passed. Thus, Civ.R. 6(B) instead guides our
analysis of this assignment of error.
{¶ 22} Trial courts have inherent power to manage their own dockets and the
progress of the proceedings before them. See, e.g., Canady v. Rekau & Rekau, Inc., 10th
Dist. No. 09AP-32, 2009-Ohio-4974, ¶ 16. Civ.R. 6(B) allows for an extension of time for a
required or permitted act, within the trial court’s discretion. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Lewis,
10th Dist. No. 18AP-550, 2019-Ohio-3014, ¶ 10. Civ.R. 6(B) provides:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or
within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any
time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after
the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done
where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but
it may not extend the time for taking any action under Civ.R.
50(B), Civ.R. 59(B), Civ.R. 59(D), and Civ.R. 60(B), except to
the extent and under the conditions stated in them.

{¶ 23} Under Civ.R. 6(B), a trial court is prohibited from extending the time for a
party to take certain enumerated actions. But, filing a Civ.R. 56 summary judgment motion
is not one of them. And, nothing in Civ.R. 56 limits a trial court’s ability to extend the time
a party can file a summary judgment motion—even if the extension request is made after
the dispositive motion date has passed. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err, as
a matter of law, when it granted Truist Bank’s motion for an extension of time to file its
summary judgment motion.
{¶ 24} Mr. Eichenberger also argues the trial court abused its discretion when it
granted Truist Bank’s motion for an extension of time. “ ‘The decision whether to grant a
motion for extension of time lies within the broad discretion of the trial court and will be
reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.’ “ McDougald v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &
Corr., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-285, 2017-Ohio-8378, ¶ 19, quoting Anderson v. Eyman, 180
Ohio App.3d 794, 2009-Ohio-102, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.), citing Miller v. Lint, 62 Ohio St.2d 209
No. 22AP-334 8

(1980). The phrase “abuse of discretion connotes that the court’s attitude is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Weaver, ___ Ohio
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-
6679, ¶ 60, quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). An abuse of discretion
involves more than a difference in opinion. Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 25} Mr. Eichenberger makes no arguments under this standard of review. Nor
does he offer any legal authority in support of his assertion the trial court abused its
discretion by granting Truist Bank’s motion for an extension of time. Consequently, we may
disregard it. See App.R. 12(A)(2). See also App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring an appellant’s brief
to include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each
assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant
relies”). But, even if this issue was properly before us, we would reject it.
{¶ 26} In its motion for an extension of time, Truist Bank represented that it needed
additional time to file its dispositive motion “[d]ue to press of business and the difficulty of
COVID restrictions.” Truist Bank noted this was its first requested extension and that its
motion was not made for purposes of harassment or delay. In its entry, the trial court stated
it was granting Truist Bank’s motion “for good cause shown.”
{¶ 27} On appeal, Mr. Eichenberger disputes the candor and sincerity of those
representations. He does not, however, demonstrate (or even argue) the trial court’s ruling
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. The record shows the trial court was justified in
granting leave: trial had twice been continued at Mr. Eichenberger’s request; this was Truist
Bank’s first request for any extension of time; and Mr. Eichenberger neither wanted nor
intended that trial go forward on February 28, 2022.2 Further, we find the trial court
reasonably relied on the representations Truist Bank made in its motion when the court
granted the requested extension of time.

2 See Mr. Eichenberger’s Motion for Continuance, filed October 14, 2021 (requesting the December 6, 2021
trial date be reset “in April of 2022 or thereafter”); Exhibit D-1 to Truist Bank’s Reply in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed April 15, 2022 (a copy of a letter from Mr. Eichenberger to opposing counsel
stating that there would be no trial on February 28, 2022 because he would file for bankruptcy prior to trial).
No. 22AP-334 9

{¶ 28} We therefore find the trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
unconscionably when it extended the dispositive motion deadline and allowed Truist Bank
to file its summary judgment motion. Nor did it violate Mr. Eichenberger’s constitutional
rights by allowing Truist Bank to file its summary judgment motion after the dispositive
motion deadline.
{¶ 29} In his statement of the first assignment of error, Mr. Eichenberger also
alleges the trial court violated his due process rights by granting Truist Bank’s motion for
an extension of time to file its summary judgment motion. Mr. Eichenberger further
contends (although not included in his statement of the first assignment of error) that
“summary judgment” as a procedural mechanism violates his constitutional right to a jury.
For both constitutional claims, Mr. Eichenberger simply states that his constitutional rights
were violated. He offers no arguments or authority in support of those assertions. Thus,
under App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7), we may disregard them. Even if we considered Mr.
Eichenberger’s constitutional arguments, we would reject them.
{¶ 30} Applying its discretion under Civ.R. 6(B), the trial court granted Truist Bank’s
motion for leave to file its summary judgment motion after the dispositive deadline passed.
Since the trial court granted Truist Bank’s motion just ten days before the February 28,
2022 trial date, the trial court vacated that trial date and rescheduled trial for August 8,
2022. In so doing, the trial court provided Mr. Eichenberger sufficient time to respond to
the summary judgment motion (which he did on April 8, 2022). A litigant is not denied due
process when the opposing party is afforded additional time to file a dispositive motion, so
long as they receive appropriate time to respond. See, e.g., Green Tree Servicing LLC v.
Graul, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-761, 2016-Ohio-4641, ¶ 11.
{¶ 31} “Because summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, it
must be awarded with caution.” Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 64, 66
(1993). At the same time, summary judgment is expressly permitted by Civ.R. 56. A litigant
is not denied due process or the right to a jury trial when a judgment is properly entered
against him in accordance with Civ.R. 56. “ ‘[T]he right to a jury trial is only enforceable
where there are factual issues to be tried, and the proper entry of summary judgment does
not violate an individual’s right to a jury trial.’ “ State v. West, 2d Dist. No. 2021-CA-17,
No. 22AP-334 10

2022-Ohio-2060, ¶ 34, quoting Natl. Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3 v. Dunlap, 4th
Dist. No. 17CA3611, 2018-Ohio-2701, ¶ 48, citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284,
292 (1992). See also Houk v. Ross, 34 Ohio St.2d 77, 83-84 (1973).
{¶ 32} Accordingly, Mr. Eichenberger’s first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Second and Third Assignments of Error
{¶ 33} The trial court granted Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion on both its
breach of contract claim against Mr. Eichenberger and Mr. Eichenberger’s breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims. Mr. Eichenberger challenges that
ruling in his second and third assignments of error. Accordingly, we will address them
together.
1. Summary Judgment Standard
{¶ 34} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate if the trial court finds
that the moving party demonstrated: “ ‘(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come
to but one conclusion and that conclusion is a[d]verse to the party against whom the motion
for summary judgment is made.’ “ Drummond v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist.
No. 21AP-327, 2022-Ohio-1096, ¶ 10, quoting Capella III, L.L.C. v. Wilcox, 190 Ohio
App.3d 133, 2010-Ohio-4746, ¶ 16.
{¶ 35} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis of the motion and identifying the portions of the record
that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the non-
moving party’s claim. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996).
{¶ 36} If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C), then
the non-moving party “ ‘has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving
party.’ ” Heimberger v. Zeal Hotel Group Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-99, 2015-Ohio-3845,
¶ 14, quoting Dresher at 293. The non-moving party may not rest on the mere allegations
and denials in the pleadings but instead must point to or submit some evidentiary material
that shows the existence of a genuine dispute over the material facts. A.M. v. Miami Univ.,
No. 22AP-334 11

10th Dist. No. 17AP-156, 2017-Ohio-8586, ¶ 30, citing Henkle v. Henkle, 75 Ohio App.3d
732, 735 (12th Dist.1991). In the summary judgment context, a “material” fact is one that
might affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Turner v.
Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993). A genuine dispute exists if the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement between the parties’ positions. Id.
{¶ 37} Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. Gabriel v. Ohio State
Univ. Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-870, 2015-Ohio-2661, ¶ 12, citing Byrd v. Arbors E.
Subacute & Rehab. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-232, 2014-Ohio-3935, ¶ 5. “When an appellate
court reviews a trial court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same
standard as the trial court and conducts an independent review, without deference to the
trial court’s determination.” Gabriel at ¶ 12, citing Byrd at ¶ 5.
2. Analysis
{¶ 38} To prevail on a summary judgment motion for breach of contract, a plaintiff
must prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the existence of a contract,
performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and damage or loss to the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Jarupan v. Hanna, 173 Ohio App.3d 284, 2007-Ohio-5081, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).
Truist Bank supported its summary judgment motion with several exhibits, including the
Agreement, documents establishing Truist Bank as the successor by merger to SunTrust,
an outstanding balance sheet, and an affidavit of Truist Bank’s Vice President, Godfrey
Bacon.
{¶ 39} Mr. Eichenberger did not dispute the existence of the Agreement. Nor did he
deny receiving the loan amount referenced in the Agreement (performance by the plaintiff).
Mr. Eichenberger offered no evidence—in his affidavit or otherwise—to refute the
documents produced by Truist Bank establishing its status as successor by merger to the
Agreement. Mr. Eichenberger produced no evidence rebutting Truist Bank’s claim that he
made only 7 of the 48 payments required under the Agreement (i.e., that Mr. Eichenberger
breached the Agreement). Mr. Eichenberger also did not offer any evidence disproving the
amount Truist Bank claimed was owed under the Agreement (damage or loss to the
plaintiff).
No. 22AP-334 12

{¶ 40} Mr. Eichenberger did not produce any evidence establishing the existence of
a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Truist Bank’s breach of contract claim or his
counterclaims. On appeal, Mr. Eichenberger likewise does not contest any material facts
relating to any elements of Truist Bank’s breach of contract claim against him. Instead, he
contends in his second assignment of error the trial court erred as a matter of law and
abused its discretion when, in granting Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion on its
breach of contract claim, it: (1) inappropriately accepted the affidavit of Godfrey Bacon,
Truist Bank’s Vice President, as evidence establishing relevant facts, including the balance
of Mr. Eichenberger’s delinquent debt; and (2) failed to construe the facts contained in Mr.
Eichenberger’s own affidavit to his benefit. In his third assignment of error, Mr.
Eichenberger argues it was an error as a matter of law and an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to find that Mr. Eichenberger’s counterclaim did not state a valid cause of action
as pled.
a. Affidavit of Truist Bank’s Vice President, Godfrey Bacon
{¶ 41} Mr. Eichenberger contends the affidavit of the Truist Bank employee offered
in support of Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion was not based on the affiant’s
personal knowledge. Thus, Mr. Eichenberger argues the trial court erred “by accepting an
affidavit from the Truist Bank employee as to the balance of the account and other fact[s]
in the case.” We disagree.
{¶ 42} Civ.R. 56(E) sets forth the requirements for affidavits submitted on summary
judgment and provides, in relevant part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with
the affidavit.
{¶ 43} Ohio courts have defined “personal knowledge” as “ ‘knowledge gained
through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief based upon
what someone else has said.’ “ See, e.g., RBC, Inc. v. McClintock, 5th Dist. No.
2016CA00045, 2016-Ohio-5800, ¶ 20, quoting Zeedyk v. Agricultural Soc. of Defiance
No. 22AP-334 13

Cty., 3d Dist. No. 4-04-08, 2004-Ohio-6187, ¶ 16; U.S. Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v. Williams,
10th Dist. No. 21AP-576, 2022-Ohio-4590, ¶ 34. Ohio law recognizes that personal
knowledge may be inferred from the contents of an affidavit. See Bush v. Dictaphone Corp.,
10th Dist. No. 00AP-1117, 2003-Ohio-883, ¶ 73. A mere assertion of personal knowledge
can satisfy Civ.R. 56(E) if the nature of the facts in the affidavit, combined with the identity
of the affiant, creates a reasonable inference that the affiant has personal knowledge of the
facts set forth in the affidavit. See, e.g., Home S & L Co. v. Eichenberger, 10th Dist. No.
12AP-1, 2012-Ohio-5662, ¶ 18.
{¶ 44} We find that Mr. Bacon’s affidavit complies with Civ.R. 56(E). Mr. Bacon
stated in his affidavit that, as Vice President of Truist Bank, he was “personally familiar”
with Truist Bank’s business records relating to Mr. Eichenberger and had “personal
knowledge” of the matter. Mr. Bacon also averred that he had “gathered all financial
records concerning this case,” and he had “researched and [was] personally familiar” with
the case. The nature of the facts stated in Mr. Bacon’s affidavit—combined with his position
and duties at Truist Bank and the records establishing Truist Bank as the successor by
merger to SunTrust—create a reasonable inference that Mr. Bacon had personal knowledge
of the facts contained in his affidavit. Thus, we find his affidavit was sufficient to establish
personal knowledge of the matters relevant to this case, including the precise amount of
Mr. Eichenberger’s delinquent balance, Mr. Eichenberger’s payment history, and the
historical background of the merger (SunTrust into BB&T) and the name of the successor
corporation (Truist Bank). As such, we find the trial court did not err as a matter of law or
abuse its discretion when it accepted Mr. Bacon’s affidavit in ruling on Truist Bank’s
summary judgment motion.
b. Mr. Eichenberger’s Affidavit
{¶ 45} Mr. Eichenberger also contends the trial court erred because it failed to
construe the statements contained in his affidavit—the sole evidence Mr. Eichenberger
offered against Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion—to his benefit.
{¶ 46} We agree that, when reviewing summary judgment motions, trial courts must
be careful to resolve doubts and construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the evidentiary materials in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ames v.
No. 22AP-334 14

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-119, 2014-Ohio-4774, ¶ 22. “ ‘Even the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the evidentiary materials,
such as affidavits and depositions, must be construed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.’ “ Vossman v. AirNet Sys., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-971, 2013-Ohio-4675,
¶ 13, quoting Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 482, 485 (1998). At the
same time, it is well-established that self-serving affidavits generally cannot defeat a
summary judgment motion without corroboration by outside evidence. Kean v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-177, 2021-Ohio-490, ¶ 17, quoting Bell v. Beightler, 10th Dist.
No. 02AP-569, 2003-Ohio-88, ¶ 33 (“ ‘Otherwise, a party could avoid summary judgment
under all circumstances solely by simply submitting such a self-serving affidavit.’ ”).
{¶ 47} Here, Mr. Eichenberger’s affidavit was inadequate, not because it was
“unsupported and self-serving,” but because it was insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact regarding Truist Bank’s breach of contract claim against him. Mr.
Eichenberger’s affidavit did not refute the allegations and factual material Truist Bank
offered in support of its motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. As
such, we find the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion when it
found that self-serving and uncorroborated assertions made in Mr. Eichenberger’s affidavit
did not create a genuine issue of material fact.
{¶ 48} Instead of refuting Truist Bank’s allegations, Mr. Eichenberger argued
against summary judgment in his memorandum contra and supporting affidavit by
claiming that Truist Bank violated federal and/or Ohio law. In support, Mr. Eichenberger
relied largely on Taylor v. First Resolution Invest. Corp., 148 Ohio St.3d 627, 2016-Ohio-
3444, a Supreme Court of Ohio case discussing the legal obligations imposed by the Federal
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and the Ohio Consumer
Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”), R.C. 1345.01 et seq., on third-party creditors seeking
judgment against consumers for delinquent debt. The FDCPA and the OCSPA, however,
have no bearing on our analysis of this case.
c. Allegations Under the FDCPA and the OCSPA
{¶ 49} In opposing Truist Bank’s summary judgment motion, Mr. Eichenberger
argued in his memorandum contra that, under Taylor, Truist Bank’s alleged violations of
No. 22AP-334 15

the FDCPA and/or OCSPA barred the bank’s recovery under a breach of contract claim and
supported his own breach of contract claim against Truist Bank.3 He makes those same
arguments in his second assignment of error. In his third assignment of error, Mr.
Eichenberger also contends the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion
by finding that his breach of contract counterclaim did not state, as pled, a valid cause of
action against Truist Bank. None of Mr. Eichenberger’s arguments regarding alleged
violations of the FDCPA and OCSPA are well-taken, for two reasons. First, he failed to raise
the alleged FDCPA and OCSPA violations in the manner required by the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure. Second, even if he had, we find the record does not support the application of
either the FDCPA or the OCSPA in this case.
{¶ 50} All of Mr. Eichenberger’s arguments regarding alleged FDCPA and OCSPA
violations are grounded in the mistaken legal premise that Ohio law allowed him to assert
counterclaims and/or affirmative defenses (here, violations of the FDCPA and OCSPA) for
the first time in a memorandum opposing a summary judgment motion. That premise is
flawed because it ignores the clear procedures set forth in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
for asserting claims and affirmative defenses.
{¶ 51} To properly assert a claim (or counterclaim) against a party in a civil action,
Civ.R. 8(A) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is
entitled to relief.” Notice pleading under Civ.R. 8(A) and (E) requires that a claim concisely
set forth only those operative facts sufficient to give fair notice of the nature of the action.
Ford v. Brooks, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-664, 2012-Ohio-943, ¶ 13. Nevertheless, to constitute
fair notice, the complaint (or counterclaim) must allege sufficient underlying facts that
relate to and support the alleged claim; it may not simply state legal conclusions. See
Montgomery v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1024, 2012-Ohio-5489, ¶ 20.

3 Mr. Eichenberger also alleged breach of fiduciary duty in his counterclaim against Truist Bank. But, as
noted by the trial court’s May 12, 2022 decision, Mr. Eichenberger made no arguments relating to that
counterclaim in his memorandum opposing summary judgment. On appeal, Mr. Eichenberger likewise
makes no argument regarding the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on his breach of
fiduciary duty counterclaim. The Supreme Court has held that, under App.R. 12(A), “ ‘[e]rrors not treated
in the brief will be regarded as having been abandoned by the party who gave them birth.’ “ Hawley v.
Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1988), quoting Uncapher v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 351, 356
(1933). Accordingly, because Mr. Eichenberger has abandoned his breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim,
we decline to address any arguments relating to it. See, e.g., State v. Nigro, 5th Dist. No. 2021CA00084,
2022-Ohio-2864, ¶ 30.
No. 22AP-334 16

{¶ 52} Civ.R. 8(C) governs the pleading of affirmative defenses and states in
pertinent part, “[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively
* * * any * * * matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” To preserve an
affirmative defense, a party must assert it in at least one of the following ways: (1) by motion
before pleading pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B); (2) affirmatively in a responsive pleading
pursuant to Civ.R. 8(C); or (3) by amendment made under Civ.R. 15. Marok v. Ohio State
Univ., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-921, 2008-Ohio-3170, ¶ 11, citing Mills v. Whitehouse Trucking
Co., 40 Ohio St.2d 55 (1974). Failure to utilize any of these three methods for raising an
affirmative defense waives a party’s right to subsequently raise that defense. See id.
Affirmative defenses cannot be asserted for the first time in a memorandum opposing a
summary judgment motion. See Marok at ¶ 11, citing Carmen v. Link, 119 Ohio App.3d 244,
250 (3d Dist.1997) (noting “affirmative defenses also cannot be asserted for the first time
in a motion for summary judgment”).
{¶ 53} Mr. Eichenberger failed to allege any FDCPA and/or OCSPA violations in the
manner contemplated by these rules. No express reference is made to the FDCPA or the
OCSPA in his answer or counterclaim. The conclusory statements in his counterclaim—
”unlawful attempt to collect” and “unlawful collection measures”—do not comport with the
rules as described above.
{¶ 54} Even if Mr. Eichenberger had alleged FDCPA and OCSPA violations in
accordance with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, we find the record below does not
support the application of either law in this case.
{¶ 55} The FDCPA “ ‘imposes civil liability only upon “debt collectors” as defined by
the Act.’ “ Helton v. U.S. Restoration & Remodeling, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-899, 2016-
Ohio-1232, ¶ 79, quoting Games v. Cavazos, 737 F.Supp. 1368, 1382 (D.C.Del.1990). Under
the FDCPA, “ ‘debt collector’ means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of
any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed
or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). First-party creditors
engaged in their own debt collection are excluded from liability under the FDCPA. See
Taylor, 2016-Ohio-3444 at ¶ 11.
No. 22AP-334 17

{¶ 56} Mr. Eichenberger never claimed in his pleadings or presented any evidence
in the trial court showing Truist Bank (or its counsel) qualified as “debt collectors” subject
to the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). Notwithstanding Mr. Eichenberger’s failure to plead
this essential element of an FDCPA offense in his answer or counterclaim, the record does
not support the finding that Truist Bank was acting as a “debt collector” in this case. Truist
Bank brought the breach of contract claim against Mr. Eichenberger in its capacity as the
successor by merger to the Agreement—i.e., the first-party creditor to Mr. Eichenberger’s
delinquent debt. We thus reject all of Mr. Eichenberger’s arguments that are predicated on
the erroneous premise that Truist Bank is a third-party creditor subject to liability under
the FDCPA.
{¶ 57} In evaluating Mr. Eichenberger’s alleged OCSPA claims, we reach a similar
conclusion. The OCSPA also provides protections for consumer debtors against debt
collectors and their attorneys. Taylor at ¶ 12. A violation of the OCSPA occurs when, in
connection with a “consumer transaction,” the supplier commits: (1) an “unfair or deceptive
act or practice” under R.C. 1345.02(A); or (2) an “unconscionable act or practice” under
R.C. 1345.03(A). A “consumer transaction” subject to the OCSPA is “a sale, lease,
assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, a franchise,
or an intangible, to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or
household, or solicitation to supply any of these things.” R.C. 1345.01(A).
{¶ 58} Transactions between financial institutions and their customers are generally
exempted from the definition of a “consumer transaction” subject to liability under the
OCSPA. See R.C. 1345.01(A); R.C. 5725.01(A); Taylor at ¶ 96-102, discussing Reagans v.
Mountainhigh Coachworks, Inc., 117 Ohio St.3d 22, 2008-Ohio-271, ¶ 33. Specifically, the
OCSPA provides that a “ ‘[c]onsumer transaction’ does not include transactions between
persons, defined in sections 4905.03 and 5725.01 of the Revised Code, and their customers,
except for transactions involving a loan made pursuant to sections 1321.35 to 1321.48 of the
Revised Code [short-term loans] and transactions in connection with residential mortgages
between loan officers, mortgage brokers, or nonbank mortgage lenders and their
customers.” R.C. 1345.01(A).
No. 22AP-334 18

{¶ 59} Here, Mr. Eichenberger did not allege in his pleadings or present any
evidence in the trial court showing that Truist Bank does not qualify as a “financial
institution” exempted from liability under the OCSPA. See R.C. 1345.01(A); R.C.
5725.01(A); Taylor at ¶ 96-102. Mr. Eichenberger thus failed to allege or present any
evidence of a “consumer transaction” on which an OCSPA violation could be based. See R.C.
1345.01(A). As a result, we reject Mr. Eichenberger’s arguments that are grounded in the
flawed premise that Truist Bank is subject to liability under the OCSPA.
{¶ 60} Based on the foregoing, summary judgment in favor of Truist Bank was
proper. Mr. Eichenberger produced no evidence showing that a genuine dispute over the
material facts existed as to Truist Bank’s breach of contract claim or his counterclaims.
Moreover, because Mr. Eichenberger failed to properly allege—much less establish—the
essential elements of his breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims,
Truist Bank was entitled to summary judgment. See Lundeen v. Graff, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-
32, 2015-Ohio-4462, ¶ 12. We thus find no error in the trial court’s determination that Mr.
Eichenberger failed to allege in the required pleadings the operative facts necessary to
properly assert FDCPA and OCSPA violations as counterclaims and/or affirmative
defenses. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Eichenberger’s second and third assignments of
error.
C. Fourth and Fifth Assignments of Error
{¶ 61} The arguments Mr. Eichenberger makes in his fourth and fifth assignments
of error are also based on the flawed premise that Truist Bank is subject to liability under
the FDCPA and/or the OCSPA in this case. This premise is vital to Mr. Eichenberger’s
arguments, as his breach of contract counterclaim is based not on the express terms of the
Agreement but, rather, his contention that the FDCPA and OCSPA are incorporated into
the Agreement and therefore control. Accordingly, we will address both assignments of
error together.
{¶ 62} We have determined that Truist Bank was not subject to liability under the
FDCPA and/or the OCSPA in this case. The issues Mr. Eichenberger presents in his fourth
and fifth assignments of error are thus rendered moot by our resolution of the second and
third assignments of error. See State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio St.3d 142, 2020-Ohio-5635, ¶ 26
No. 22AP-334 19

(“Put differently, an assignment of error is moot when an appellant presents issues that are
no longer live as a result of some other decision rendered by the appellate court.”).
Accordingly, we need not address them. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c); Ridge-Pleasant Valley,
Inc. v. Navin, 8th Dist. No. 109777, 2022-Ohio-130, ¶ 32 (overruling appellant’s
assignments of error challenging trial court’s rejection of appellant’s rule-noncompliant
motions and granting of summary judgment, and then finding remaining assignments of
error moot).
{¶ 63} In any event, Mr. Eichenberger’s briefing on the fourth and fifth assignments
of error is procedurally defective under App.R. 12 and 16(A)(7). App.R. 16(A)(7) requires
an appellant to include in their brief “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the
appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in
support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
on which appellant relies.” An appellate court may rely on App.R. 12(A) in overruling or
disregarding an assignment of error because of “the lack of briefing” by the appellant. See
State v. Watson, 126 Ohio App.3d 316, 321 (12th Dist.1998), citing Hawley v. Ritley, 35
Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1988). “It is the duty of the appellant, not the appellate court, to
construct the legal arguments necessary to support the appellant’s assignments of error.”
Bond v. Village of Canal Winchester, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-556, 2008-Ohio-945, ¶ 16, citing
Whitehall v. Ruckman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-445, 2007-Ohio-6780, ¶ 20.
{¶ 64} Although he cites to Taylor, the FDCPA, and the OCSPA—none of which
apply here—as support for his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Mr. Eichenberger
offers no explanation of how they relate to the conclusory statements he makes in either.
He thus fails to provide any cognizable argument in support of his fourth and fifth
assignments of error. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Eichenberger has failed to comply with
App.R.16(A)(7) because he fails to present “reasons in support of the contentions” and
because of his “lack of briefing” on his fourth and fifth assignments of error. See Watson at
321-22; Hawley at 159.
{¶ 65} Further, in his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Eichenberger also fails to
“identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based.” See App.R.
12(A)(2). Mr. Eichenberger’s contentions in support of this assignment of error are
No. 22AP-334 20

ultimately a list of his general grievances about the conduct of Truist Bank. Because he does
not specifically identify any prejudicial error by the trial court in his fifth assignment of
error, we find Mr. Eichenberger’s brief also fails to comply with App.R. 12(A)(2). See, e.g.,
Columbus v. ACM Vision, V, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-79, 2021-Ohio-925, ¶ 12.
{¶ 66} For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Eichenberger’s fourth and fifth assignments
of error are moot based on our resolution of his second and third assignments of error, and
are overruled based on App.R. 12(A).
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 67} Having overruled all of Mr. Eichenberger’s five assignments of error, we
affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying
Mr. Eichenberger’s motion to strike and granting summary judgment in Truist Bank’s
favor.
Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER and BOGGS, JJ., concur.