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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
15-MAR-2023
07:52 AM
Dkt. 23 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RAVEN S. MORTENSEN-YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee.
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01297)
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STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LANCE M. OSHIMA, Defendant-Appellee.
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01719)
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STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MARLIN TORNQUIST TUCKER, Defendant-Appellee.
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01463)
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STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RYAN D. WOOD, Defendant-Appellee.
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01472)
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
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APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
MARCH 15, 2023
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ.,
AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING
OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns whether Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 805-1 and this court’s holding in State v. Thompson, 150
Hawaiʻi 262, 500 P.3d 447 (2021), apply to a complaint used to
charge a defendant with Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence
of an Intoxicant (OVUII) after the defendant was properly
arrested without a warrant.
In July, August, and October of 2021, Plaintiff-
Appellant the State of Hawaiʻi (the State) charged Defendant-
Appellee Raven S. Mortensen-Young (Mortensen-Young), Defendant-
Appellee Marlin Tornquist Tucker (Tucker), Defendant-Appellee
Ryan D. Wood (Wood), and Defendant-Appellee Lance M. Oshima
(Oshima) by complaint with OVUII in the District Court of the
First Circuit (district court). On December 28, 2021,
Mortensen-Young, Tucker, Wood, and Oshima (collectively,
Appellees) each filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Defective
Complaint and Improper Arraignment” (Motions to Dismiss),
arguing that “the complaint . . . is not supported by:” (1) “The
complainant’s signature; or” (2) “A declaration submitted in
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lieu of affidavit,” as required by this court’s decision in
Thompson. The State filed memoranda and supplemental memoranda
in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss. After holding a
hearing, the district court orally granted Appellees’ Motions to
Dismiss.
On January 12, 2022, the district court issued a
“Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment”
(Notice of Entry of Judgment) granting Appellees’ Motions to
Dismiss. The district court issued its “Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss for Defective Complaint and Improper Arraignment” (Order
Granting Motions to Dismiss) on January 19, 2022. The district
court granted Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss without prejudice.
The State filed a notice of appeal in the Intermediate
Court of Appeals (ICA). On April 19, 2022, the State timely
filed an application for transfer, which this court granted on
May 6, 2022. In its opening brief, the State contends, inter
alia, that “[t]he district court erred in concluding that the
charging instruments in these cases were required to comply with
HRS § 805-1 and thus erred in dismissing these charging
instruments on the grounds that they did not comply with that
statute.” Appellees filed an answering brief disagreeing with
the State’s arguments, and the State filed a reply brief.
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The State’s argument that the complaints in Appellees’
cases were not required to comply with HRS § 805-1 has merit.
First, this court’s holding in Thompson and the plain language
of HRS § 805-1 establish that HRS § 805-1 applies only to
complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant. Second,
case law interpreting previous versions of HRS § 805-1 confirm
that the statute applies only to complaints for a penal summons
or an arrest warrant. In addition, the State properly initiated
the criminal proceedings against Appellees pursuant to Hawaiʻi
Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7.
Accordingly, we hold that the complaints in Appellees’
cases did not have to comply with HRS § 805-1, and the State
properly initiated the criminal proceedings against Appellees.
Thus, the district court erroneously dismissed without prejudice
the complaints in Appellees’ cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Appellees were all arrested for OVUII and Appellees
all posted bail. Appellees were examined and released after
posting bail before 48 hours passed.1
1 It appears that this information only appears in the parties’
briefings, but Appellees do not contest that Appellees were arrested,
examined, and released after posting bail before 48 hours had passed.
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B. District Court Proceedings2
On July 23, 2021, the State charged Mortensen-Young by
complaint with the offense of OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-
61(a)(1). On August 17, 2021, the State charged Tucker by
complaint with the offense of OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-
61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). On August 19, 2021, the State charged
Wood by complaint with the offense of OVUII in violation of HRS
§ 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). On October 11, 2021, the State
charged Oshima by complaint with the offense of OVUII in
violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(4).
The complaints, which largely contained the same
language, provided:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the
City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaiʻi charges:
On or about [date of offense], in the City and County
of Honolulu, State of Hawaiʻi, [defendant’s name], did
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly operate or assume
actual physical control of a vehicle upon a public way,
street, road, or highway while under the influence of
alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair his normal mental
faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against
casualty, thereby committing the offense of Operating a
Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant, in violation
of Section 291E-61(a)(1) [and/or (a)(3) or (a)(4)] of the
Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes. [Defendant’s name], is subject to
sentencing in accordance with [Section 291E-61(b)(1) or
(b)(2)] of the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes as a [first or
second] offender. [Definition of “prior conviction” in
Oshima’s case].
I [deputy prosecuting attorney], declare under
penalty of law that the foregoing is true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated at Honolulu, Hawaiʻi: [Date of complaint].
2 The Honorable William M. Domingo presided.
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Appellees filed Motions to Dismiss on December 28,
2021. Appellees all argued that “the complaint . . . is not
supported by:” (1) “The complainant’s signature; or” (2) “A
declaration submitted in lieu of affidavit,” as required by this
court’s decision in Thompson.
The State filed memoranda in opposition to Appellees’
Motions to Dismiss on January 3, 2022. The State maintained
that the complaints in Appellees’ cases were “made by
declaration” as required by HRPP Rule 47(d) and HRS § 805-1.3
3 HRS § 805-1 (2014) provided:
Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint is made
to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
offense, the prosecuting officer shall examine the
complainant, shall reduce the substance of the complaint to
writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by
the complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer
is hereby authorized to administer, or the complaint shall
be made by declaration in accordance with the rules of
court. If the original complaint results from the issuance
of a traffic summons or a citation in lieu of an arrest
pursuant to section 803-6, by a police officer, the oath
may be administered by any police officer whose name has
been submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been
designated by the chief of police to administer the oath,
or the complaint may be submitted by declaration in
accordance with the rules of court. Upon presentation of
the written complaint to the judge in whose circuit the
offense allegedly has been committed, the judge shall issue
a warrant, reciting the complaint and requiring the
sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed, except as
provided in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to
bring the accused before the judge to be dealt with
according to law; and in the same warrant the judge may
require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named
in the warrant to appear and give evidence at trial. The
warrant may be in the form established by the usage and
practice of the issuing court.
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On January 10 and 11, 2022, the State filed
supplemental memoranda in opposition to Appellees’ Motions to
Dismiss.4 According to the State,
The premise for the motion to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to [Thompson] relies on the proposition that
[Thompson] applies to all complaints. It does not. It
only applies to penal summons cases. The language used by
the Supreme Court makes it clear that the Court did not
intend to bring about a “sea change” as to how criminal
complaints are filed when it held in Thompson that the
State may not request a penal summons using a complaint
that does not comply with [HRS] § 805-1.
The State maintained that
[HRS] § 805-1 deals with arrest warrants. The
Thompson court extended this section to penal summons cases
which is reasonable given the reference in [HRS §] 805-1 to
[HRS §] 805-3 which allows the district judge, in the
district judge’s discretion, to issue a penal summons. It
would be absurd to interpret [HRS §] 805-1 which is
entitled, “Complaint; form of warrant” to a case, such as
the instant case, in which the defendant had been arrested;
bail was set; defendant posted bail and was released. In
these cases, there is no need for the State to request that
the Court issue an arrest warrant.
These warrantless OVUII arrests are authorized by
[HRS] §§ 803-1; 803-5; 803-6(a) and HRPP 5(a)(2). These
cases do not come under [HRS] § 805-1 which is captioned,
“Complaint; form of [warrant].” In OVUII cases, the arrest
has already occurred and the [S]tate is not requesting an
arrest warrant (which would be absurd).
The district court held a hearing on Appellees’
Motions to Dismiss on January 12, 2022. Counsel for the State
and counsel for Appellees made arguments and the district court
orally granted Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss:
THE COURT: All right. [The State], as far as the
Thompson case though, wasn’t it unequivocal that they
stated that the -- the complaint was defective because it
was not compliant with [HRS §] 805-1, is that correct? So
how can you argue -- at this point if a complaint is
4 The State acknowledged that it did not file a supplemental memorandum
in opposition in Tucker’s case but orally submitted the supplemental argument
during the January 12, 2022 hearing without objection from Tucker’s counsel.
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defective, then I don’t think anything can, if you want to
use fruit of the poisonous tree kind of analogy, you can’t
go further from that if you have a defective complaint.
[THE STATE]: Our response to that, your honor, would
be the complaint in Thompson, they asked the State -- they
asked the court to issue a penal summons, asked for --
court to -- for some sort of process and that process is
pursuant to [HRS §] 805-1, and we’re saying the process
that was used in these cases do not come under [HRS §] 805-
1. They come under the other statutes that we set forth in
our supplemental memo.
. . . .
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Ready to rule on these
matters.
Court finds that all of these cases have the same
issue regarding the request to dismiss. Based on the
Thompson case the court finds that all of these cases, the
complaints are defective as they were not made pursuant to
[HRS §] 805-1. There is no specific affidavit by the
complainant in this matter or also a declaration by
officer. Court also finds that the police officer is not
someone who can make that complaint effective at this
point, so they are defective complaints and those cases
will be dismissed.
Also on January 12, 2022, the district court filed its Notice of
Entry of Judgment.
On January 19, 2022, the district court issued its
Order Granting Motions to Dismiss. The district court made the
following relevant finding of fact:
4. Review of the Hawaii State Judiciary Information
Management System (JIMS) reveals that no document
containing the complainant’s signature, or declaration in
lieu of affidavit, or any other type of Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause was filed in this matter.
The district court made the following conclusions of law:
1. On December 10, 2021, in State v. Thompson (SCWC-17-
0000361), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the failure of
the prosecution to submit and file a complaint or
declaration in lieu of affidavit containing the
complainant’s signature was fatal and required dismissal of
the action.
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2. In Thompson, the supreme court found that the
prosecution violated HRS § 805-1 when it failed to comply
with its statutory obligation to perfect its complaint by
filing a complaint that was neither signed by a complainant
nor supported by declaration signed by the complainant.
3. The Court further stated, “The requirements of HRS
§ 805-1 therefore apply to all criminal complaints,
regardless of whether the State uses the complaint to seek
a penal summons or an arrest warrant.” “Thus in order to
comply with HRS § 805-1, the underlying complaint should
have been subscribed under oath by the complainant or made
by declaration in lieu of an affidavit in conformity with
HRPP Rule 47(d).”
4. The complaint filed in the instant case does not comport
with the mandates of the holding in Thompson and HRS § 805-
1.
Thus, the district court granted Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss
without prejudice.
C. The Appeal and Application for Transfer
On February 10, 2022, the State timely appealed the
district court’s decision to the ICA.5 On April 19, 2022, the
State timely filed an application for transfer, which this court
granted on May 6, 2022.
1. Opening Brief
The State filed an opening brief on June 16, 2022,
challenging the district court’s FOF 4 and COLs 1, 2, 3, and 4.
As relevant here,6 the State contends that the district court
5 Appellees’ appeals were consolidated on April 1, 2022.
6 The State also argues “[a]ssuming arguendo that the charging
instruments in these cases were required to comply with HRS § 805-1, the
district court erred in concluding that HRS § 805-1, as interpreted by
Thompson, requires a ‘declaration in lieu of affidavit containing the
complainant’s signature.’” Because HRS § 805-1 does not apply to the
complaints in Appellees’ cases, this opinion does not address the State’s
argument that the complaints in Appellees’ cases satisfied the requirements
of HRS § 805-1.
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mistakenly concluded that the charging instruments against
Appellees “were required to comply with HRS § 805-1 and thus
erred in dismissing these charging instruments on the grounds
that they did not comply with that statute.” Citing to
Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 267, 500 P.3d at 452, the State notes
that HRS § 805-1’s requirements “apply regardless of whether the
State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest
warrant.” The State asserts that the charging instruments
against Appellees did not seek a penal summons or an arrest
warrant and thus the charging instruments here are
distinguishable from those in Thompson.
The State maintains “[i]t appears that the import of
HRS § 805-1 has been substantially unchanged since 1892 when it
was enacted as Chapter LVII, An Act to Reorganize the Judiciary
Department.” The State further maintains that “[t]he earliest
codified iteration of HRS § 805-1 appears to be Chapter 53 Part
I § 606 of The Penal Law of the Hawaiian Islands, 1897.” Citing
to Territory v. Sing Kee, 14 Haw. 586, 587-88 (1903), the State
contends there is a difference “between a ‘charge’ which
initiates a criminal trial and a ‘complaint’ in order ‘to enable
the magistrate to determine whether or not there is probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the
accused so as to justify his apprehension.’” The State asserts
that Sing Kee makes clear a “complaint” under HRS § 805-1 is
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different from a “complaint” under HRPP Rule 7(d), which
“regulates the ‘Nature and Contents’ of a ‘Charge.’”7 The State
maintains that “[a] more accurate title for HRS § 805-1, in
modern parlance would be ‘application for a misdemeanor arrest
warrant.’” The State contends that a misdemeanor charging
instrument, which does not ask for a penal summons or an arrest
warrant, does not need to comply with HRS § 805-1 pursuant to
Thompson.
The State maintains that the charging instruments in
these cases need not comply with HRS § 805-1 because Appellees
were all properly arrested without a warrant pursuant to
7 HRPP Rule 7 (2012) provides in relevant part:
(a) Use of Indictment, Information, or Complaint.
The charge against a defendant is an indictment, a
superseding indictment, an information, or a complaint
filed in court. . . .
. . . .
(d) Nature and Contents. The charge shall be a
plain, concise and definite statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged. . . . A complaint
shall be signed by the prosecutor. . . .
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HRS §§ 803-58 and 803-6(a).9 According to the State, Appellees
were examined and released “after posting bail before 48 hours
had passed and before the requirement for a probable cause
determination was triggered.” The State therefore contends that
“the process used in these cases is separate and distinct from
the procedure required in HRS § 805-1.”
The State argues that the general rule for charges in
HRPP Rule 7(d), and not HRS § 805-1, applies in Appellees’
cases. The State thus argues that the district court
erroneously dismissed the charging instruments, which complied
8 HRS § 803-5 (2014) provides:
By police officer without warrant. (a) A police
officer or other officer of justice, may, without warrant,
arrest and detain for examination any person when the
officer has probable cause to believe that such person has
committed any offense, whether in the officer’s presence or
otherwise.
(b) For purposes of this section, a police officer
has probable cause to make an arrest when the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which
the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being
committed.
9 HRS § 803-6(a) (2014) provides:
Arrest, how made. (a) At or before the time of
making an arrest, the person shall declare that the person
is an officer of justice, if such is the case. If the
person has a warrant the person should show it; or if the
person makes the arrest without warrant in any of the cases
in which it is authorized by law, the person should give
the party arrested clearly to understand for what cause the
person undertakes to make the arrest, and shall require the
party arrested to submit to be taken to the police station
or judge. This done, the arrest is complete.
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with the requirements to initiate a prosecution in these cases
under HRPP Rule 7(d).
2. Answering Brief
Appellees filed an answering brief on August 24, 2022.
As relevant here, Appellees argue that, pursuant to Thompson,
the district court correctly applied HRS § 805-1 to the
complaints against Appellees. According to Appellees, “[t]he
issue of whether the complaint complies with the requirements of
HRS § 805-1 is distinct from whether a penal summons can be
issued on a defective complaint.”10
Appellees maintain that the specific issue before this
court in Thompson “was whether the ICA had gravely erred in
holding that compliance with HRPP Rule 7(d) satisfied the
‘declaration in accordance with the rules of court’ requirement
of HRS § 805-1.” Appellees argue that the State mistakenly
contends that the holding in Thompson “only requires compliance
with HRS § 805-1 in cases where the State seeks a penal summons
or arrest warrant.” According to Appellees, this court
concluded that HRS § 805-1 requires that a complaint be
subscribed by the complainant or supported by declaration in
lieu of affidavit “to protect the accused’s right to challenge
the veracity of the complainant.” Appellees note that this
10 In support of their argument, Appellees discuss the proceedings before
the ICA and the family court in Thompson.
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court “went on to hold that a complaint which does not meet the
requirements of HRS § 805-1 is a ‘fatally defective’ complaint.”
Appellees point out that “[b]ecause the complaint was fatally
defective, the supreme court held that it could not support the
issuance of a penal summons.”
Appellees maintain that this court’s holding in
Thompson was not limited “to only those instances where the
State seeks a penal summons or arrest warrant.” Citing to
Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 269, 500 P.3d at 454, Appellees argue
that this court “specifically stated that, ‘HRS § 805-1
unambiguously requires the State to ensure that complaints are
either subscribed under oath by a complainant or accompanied by
a declaration in lieu of an affidavit.’” Appellees maintain
that this court did not state HRS § 805-1 only applies to a
complaint seeking a penal summons or an arrest warrant.
Appellees contend that “a complaint which is ‘fatally defective’
is not fatally defective only because the State uses such a
complaint to seek an arrest warrant or penal summons.” In
addition, Appellees argue that since the underlying purpose of
HRS § 805-1 is to protect the accused’s right to challenge the
veracity of the accuser, “it would be nonsensical to allow the
State to choose the situations when this significant right was
protected and when it was not.” Appellees assert that would
lead to an absurd result and must be rejected.
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3. Reply Brief
The State filed a reply brief on August 25, 2022. The
State argues that the enactment of HRS § 805-6 in 1949 further
demonstrates “that HRS § 805-1 does not regulate all district
court charging instruments.” According to the State, the
language of HRS § 805-6 is a recognition by the Hawaiʻi
legislature of the district court’s practices as noted in Sing
Kee and the holding of “Sing Kee that the ‘complaint’ referred
to in HRS § 805-1 is not a charging instrument.” The State
maintains that “nothing in HRS § 805-6 or any other statute,
court rule or case holding . . . require[s] a charging
instrument that is not a ‘written complaint upon which the
warrant of arrest or summons has been issued’ to be governed in
any way by the requirements of HRS § 805-1.”11
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Statutory Interpretation
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
which this court reviews de novo.” Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 266,
500 P.3d at 451 (citing State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawaiʻi 227, 231,
160 P.3d 703, 707 (2007)).
11 The State also reiterates that HRPP Rule 7(d) is applicable to the
charging instruments in Appellees’ cases and notes that Appellees did not
argue the charging instruments failed to comply with HRPP Rule 7(d).
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B. Interpretation of Court Rules
“When interpreting rules promulgated by the court,
principles of statutory construction apply.” Id. at 266, 500
P.3d at 451 (quoting State v. Baron, 80 Hawaiʻi 107, 113, 905
P.2d 613, 619 (1995)).
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
[A] trial court’s findings of fact are subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the
finding, the appellate court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
A conclusion of law is not binding upon an appellate
court and is freely reviewable for its correctness. This
court ordinarily reviews conclusions of law under the
right/wrong standard. Thus, a conclusion of law that is
supported by the trial court’s findings of fact and that
reflects an application of the correct rule of law will not
be overturned. However, a conclusion of law that presents
mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard because the court’s conclusions
are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each
individual case.
State v. Rapozo, 123 Hawaiʻi 329, 336, 235 P.3d 325, 332 (2010)
(quoting State v. Gabalis, 83 Hawaiʻi 40, 46, 924 P.2d 534, 540
(1996) (brackets in original)).
D. Motion to Dismiss
“A [trial] court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss [a
charge] is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Thompson, 150
Hawaiʻi at 266, 500 P.3d at 451 (quoting State v. Akau, 118
Hawaiʻi 44, 51, 185 P.3d 229, 236 (2008)) (brackets in original).
The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly
exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or
principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment
of a party litigant. The burden of establishing abuse of
discretion is on appellant, and a strong showing is
required to establish it.
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Id. at 266, 500 P.3d at 451 (quoting State v. Wong, 97 Hawaiʻi
512, 517, 40 P.3d 914, 919 (2002)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. HRS § 805-1 does not apply to the complaints in Appellees’
cases.
The State first argues that the district court
erroneously dismissed the charging instruments against Appellees
based on its incorrect conclusion that those charging
instruments were required to comply with HRS § 805-1. According
to the State, the charging instruments in Appellees’ cases are
distinguishable from Thompson because the State did not seek a
penal summons or an arrest warrant in Appellees’ cases.
The State’s argument has merit for the following
reasons. First, Appellees’ cases are distinguishable from
Thompson, where the State used a complaint to obtain a penal
summons. Second, the plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrates
that the statute applies only to complaints that seek a penal
summons or an arrest warrant. Third, case law interpreting
previous versions of HRS § 805-1 demonstrate that the statute
applies only to complaints that seek a penal summons or an
arrest warrant. Thus, as discussed below, there is a difference
between a complaint used to obtain a penal summons or an arrest
warrant and a complaint used to charge a defendant with a
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criminal offense, and HRS § 805-1 applies only to a complaint
used to obtained a penal summons or an arrest warrant.
1. The complaints in Appellees’ cases are distinguishable
from the complaint in Thompson.
The State maintains that Appellees’ cases are
distinguishable from Thompson because the State did not seek a
penal summons or an arrest warrant in Appellees’ cases. In
Thompson,12 the State charged Corey Thompson by complaint with
the offense of abuse of family or household member. 150 Hawaiʻi
at 264, 500 P.3d at 449. The complaint was a single page signed
only by a deputy prosecuting attorney and did not include a
declaration or an affidavit. Id. “Based on the complaint, the
clerk of the Family Court of the Third Circuit (family court)
issued a penal summons compelling Thompson to appear in the Kona
district court.” Id. In response to the penal summons,
Thompson appeared in family court and filed a motion to dismiss.
Id. Thompson argued
that the family court should dismiss the case for three
reasons. First, the complaint was deficient because it was
“not by declaration, and it does not contain the required
sworn affidavit,” as required by HRS § 805-1. Second,
because the complaint was deficient, the family court
lacked probable cause to issue the penal summons under
HRS § 805-3. Third, in the absence of a supporting
affidavit or declaration, the State could not arraign
Thompson in compliance with Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure
(HRPP) Rule 5(b)(1), which requires the State to give
Thompson “[a] copy of the complaint, including any
affidavits in support thereof[.]” (Emphasis omitted).
12 As the State pointed out in its application for transfer, this case
presents “the first opportunity for an appellate court to interpret”
Thompson.
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Id. at 264-65, 500 P.3d at 449-50 (brackets in original). The
family court concluded that because the complaint was “fatally
defective due to a lack of supporting affidavit as required by
HRS § 805-1, the penal summons was issued upon a faulty
complaint, and the arraignment was improper for failure to
provide Defendant with the supporting affidavit, this case must
be dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at 265, 500 P.3d at 450.
On appeal, the State contended, inter alia, “that the
complaint was not defective because it complied with the
requirements identified in HRPP Rule 7(d).” Id. The ICA agreed
with Thompson, holding “that ‘Section 805-1 required the
Complaint to be signed by the complainant under oath or made by
declaration in lieu of an affidavit consistent with HRPP Rule
47(d)’” and thus “determined that the complaint against Thompson
did not comply with HRS § 805-1.” Id. at 266, 500 P.3d at 451.
However, “the ICA decided that a non-compliant complaint could
still be used to initiate and maintain a prosecution by penal
summons.” Id.
On certiorari, this court agreed with Thompson’s
argument “that the ICA erred in holding that a complaint used to
seek a penal summons need not satisfy the requirements of HRS
§ 805-1.” Id. at 267, 500 P.3d at 452. Looking at the plain
language of HRS § 805-1, this court noted that “Hawaiʻi law
provides for only a single type of criminal complaint regardless
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of whether the complaint is used to initiate proceedings through
an arrest warrant or a penal summons” and determined that HRS
§ 805-1’s “statutory obligations apply regardless of whether the
State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest
warrant.” Id. (emphasis added). This court further determined
that “once the State provides the district court with a
complaint that complies with HRS § 805-1, only then may the
district court choose to issue a penal summons if certain
requirements are met.” Id. (citing HRS §§ 805-1, 805-3). This
court reiterated that “[t]he requirements of HRS § 805-1
therefore apply to all criminal complaints, regardless of
whether the State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or
an arrest warrant.” Id. (emphasis added).
This court noted that “HRS § 805-1 unambiguously
obligates the State to either have a complaint subscribed under
oath by a complainant or make the complaint by declaration in
accordance with the rules of court,” but “the phrase ‘made by
declaration in accordance with the rules of court’ is ambiguous”
because HRS § 805-1 “does not identify the ‘rules of court’ to
which the declaration must conform.” Id. (citing HRS § 805-1).
This court determined that
The legislative history of HRS § 805-1 establishes
that the legislature intended for complaints “made by
declaration in accordance with the rules of court” to be
complaints made or accompanied by declarations in lieu of
affidavits. When the legislature amended HRS § 805-1 to
provide prosecutors with the option to make complaints by
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declaration, the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor
explained that “allowing the use of declarations in lieu of
affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime
complaints is consistent with current rules of court, and
would not harm the offender’s right to challenge the
veracity of the officer.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194,
in 2007 Senate Journal, at 1557-58 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the judiciary submitted testimony that the
amendment “would also authorize an alternative form for
verification of arrest citations and traffic crime
complaints by allowing the issuing or complaining officer
to verify the citation or complaint by declaration.
Declarations in lieu of affidavits are authorized by court
rules.” Judiciary, Testimony to the Senate Committee on
Judiciary and Labor on H.B. 1204, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mar. 9, 2007) (Hon. Russel Nagata, District Court, First
Circuit) (emphasis added); see also Judiciary, Testimony to
the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor on S.B. 1520,
24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 26, 2007) (Hon. Corinne
Watanabe, ICA). Thus, this elaboration that declarations
in lieu of affidavits were allowed by court rules
demonstrates that the legislature intended to allow for
complaints made or accompanied by “declarations in lieu of
affidavits.”
Id. at 268, 500 P.3d at 453. This court concluded that “HRPP
Rule 47(d) is the applicable rule of court pertaining to
declarations in lieu of affidavits” and “the underlying
complaint should have been subscribed under oath by the
complainant or made by declaration in lieu of affidavit in
conformity with HRPP Rule 47(d)” to satisfy the requirements of
HRS § 805-1. Id.
This court noted that “the ICA acknowledged that the
underlying complaint did not comply with HRS § 805-1’s
requirements” but “held that the district court may issue a
summons on a non-compliant complaint,” reasoning “that the State
did not need to establish probable cause to request a penal
summons.” Id. However, this court determined that “by focusing
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on the issue of probable cause, the ICA overlooked the
preliminary question of whether a district court may issue a
penal summons upon a complaint that does not comply with HRS
§ 805-1. It may not.” Id. This court stated
The courts must give effect to the State’s statutory
obligations. As previously discussed, when the text of a
statute is clear, “the court is bound by the plain, clear
and unambiguous language of the statute.” [State v. Sylva,
61 Haw. 385, 387-88, 605 P.2d 496, 498 (1980)]. Again,
HRS § 805-1 unambiguously requires the State to ensure that
complaints are either subscribed under oath by a
complainant or accompanied by a declaration in lieu of an
affidavit. Supra at 150 Hawaiʻi at 267-68, 500 P.3d at 452-
53. Given that the legislature recognized the need to
protect “the offender’s right to challenge the veracity of
the [accuser],” we cannot say that the State’s failure to
comply with HRS § 805-1’s requirements constitutes a mere
formal defect for which dismissal is not warranted under
HRPP Rule 7(d). S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194, in 2007
Senate Journal, at 1557-58. Thus, the courts must hold the
State to its obligations under HRS § 805-1 before granting
the State a penal summons. Sylva, 61 Haw. at 387-88, 605
P.2d at 498.
Id. at 269, 500 P.3d at 454 (footnote omitted) (second brackets
in original). This court concluded that “the ICA erred in
holding sub silentio that the State need not comply with its
statutory duties. In turn, the ICA also erred in concluding
that ‘the Complaint was not defective and the penal summons was
properly issued.’” Id.
This court further concluded that “HRS § 805-1 does
not distinguish between complaints for penal summons and
complaints for arrest warrants” and the ICA erroneously held
“that the State need not comply with its statutory obligations
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simply because it sought a penal summons.” Id. at 270, 500 P.3d
at 455 (emphasis added).
Appellees’ cases are distinguishable from Thompson,
where the State sought a penal summons by complaint. Id. at
264, 500 P.3d at 449. Here, in contrast, the State only used
the complaints in Appellees’ cases to charge Appellees with the
offense of OVUII. In other words, the State did not use the
complaints in Appellees’ cases to seek a penal summons or an
arrest warrant because Appellees were already arrested and had
posted bail when the State filed the complaints charging
Appellees with OVUII. Thus, the complaints in Appellees’ cases
are distinguishable from the complaint in Thompson because there
is a difference between a complaint used to charge a defendant
with a criminal offense and a complaint used to obtain a penal
summons or an arrest warrant.
Appellees contend this “court specifically stated
that, ‘HRS § 805-1 unambiguously requires the State to ensure
that complaints are either subscribed under oath by a
complainant or accompanied by a declaration in lieu of an
affidavit.’” However, when this court stated that “HRS § 805-1
unambiguously requires the State to ensure that complaints are
either subscribed under oath by a complainant or accompanied by
a declaration in lieu of an affidavit,” Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at
269, 500 P.3d at 454 (citing Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 267-68, 500
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P.3d at 452-53), this court cited to an earlier section of the
Thompson opinion, which states that “[t]he requirements of HRS
§ 805-1 therefore apply to all criminal complaints, regardless
of whether the State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons
or an arrest warrant.” Id. at 267, 500 P.3d at 452 (emphasis
added). The issue in Thompson specifically involved a complaint
that sought a penal summons. Moreover, this court did not hold
that all complaints must satisfy the requirements of HRS § 805-
1. Thus, this court’s holding in Thompson was limited to
complaints seeking a penal summons or an arrest warrant.
Appellees also maintain that HRS § 805-1 requires “a
complaint be either subscribed by the complainant or support[ed]
by declaration in lieu of affidavit” in order “to protect the
accused’s right to challenge the veracity of the complainant.”
Appellees contend that:
The bottom line is a complaint which is “fatally defective”
is not fatally defective only because the State uses such a
complaint to seek an arrest warrant or penal summons.
Under such reasoning, the State would be given the
unwarranted discretion to decide when a complaint would
require to be subscribed to by the complainant or supported
by declaration. As the Legislature had decided that the
underlying purpose of imposing the requirements of HRS
§ 805-1 was to protect the accused right to challenge the
veracity of the accuser ([Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi] at 269, 500
P.3d at 454 (citing S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No 1194, in 2007
Senate Journal at 1557-58)), it would be nonsensical to
allow the State to choose the situations when this
significant right was protected and when it was not. Such
an interpretation which leads to an absurd result must be
rejected. See e.g. Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC, 150 Hawaiʻi
387, 398, 502 P.3d 488, 499 (2022) (citing Alvarado v.
Kiewit Pacific Co., 92 Hawaiʻi [515], 517, 993 P.2d 549, 551
(2000)[)] (quoting Frank v. Hawaii Planning Mill Found., 88
Hawaiʻi 140, 144, 963 P.2d 349, 353 (1998) (holding that the
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appellate court is bound to construe statutes to avoid
absurd results and a statutory interpretation that is
“‘rational, sensible[,] and practicable . . . is preferred
to one which is unreasonable[,] impracticable . . .
inconsisten[t], contradict[ory], and illogical[].’”)
(First brackets added.).
Appellees mistakenly contend that limiting Thompson to
only complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant would
lead to an absurd result. As an initial matter, Appellees
erroneously argue that this court “concluded that the
requirement that a complaint be either subscribed by the
complainant or support[ed] by declaration in lieu of affidavit
was to protect the accused’s right to challenge the veracity of
the complainant.” Rather, this court stated:
When the legislature amended HRS § 805-1 to provide
prosecutors with the option to make complaints by
declaration, the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor
explained that “allowing the use of declarations in lieu of
affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime
complaints is consistent with current rules of court, and
would not harm the offender’s right to challenge the
veracity of the officer.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194,
in 2007 Senate Journal, at 1557-58 (emphasis added).
Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 268, 500 P.3d at 453 (emphasis added).
As stated in Thompson, this court did not conclude that the
purpose of HRS § 805-1’s requirement that a complaint be
subscribed by the complainant or supported by declaration in
lieu of affidavit was to protect the accused’s right to
challenge the veracity of the complainant. Instead, this court
noted that “allowing the use of declarations in lieu of
affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime
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complaints . . . , would not harm the offender’s right to
challenge the veracity of the officer.” Id. (emphasis added).
While this court stated that HRS § 805-1’s requirements “would
not harm” a defendant’s right to challenge the veracity of the
complainant, that does not mean the purpose of HRS § 805-1 is to
protect that same right. Thus, Appellees’ arguments regarding
their ability to challenge the veracity of the complainant lacks
merit.
2. The plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrates that
the statute does not apply to the complaints in
Appellees’ cases.
The plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrates that
the statute applies only to complaints seeking a penal summons
or an arrest warrant. “It is well-established that ‘when [a
statute’s] language is plain and unmistakable[,] the court is
bound by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the
statute.’” Id. at 267, 500 P.3d at 452 (quoting Sylva, 61 Haw.
at 387-88, 605 P.2d at 498) (brackets in original). As applied
to Appellees’ cases, HRS § 805-1 provided:
Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint is made
to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
offense, the prosecuting officer shall examine the
complainant, shall reduce the substance of the complaint to
writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by
the complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer
is hereby authorized to administer, or the complaint shall
be made by declaration in accordance with the rules of
court. If the original complaint results from the issuance
of a traffic summons or a citation in lieu of an arrest
pursuant to section 803-6, by a police officer, the oath
may be administered by any police officer whose name has
been submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been
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designated by the chief of police to administer the oath,
or the complaint may be submitted by declaration in
accordance with the rules of court. Upon presentation of
the written complaint to the judge in whose circuit the
offense allegedly has been committed, the judge shall issue
a warrant, reciting the complaint and requiring the
sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed, except as
provided in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to
bring the accused before the judge to be dealt with
according to law; and in the same warrant the judge may
require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named
in the warrant to appear and give evidence at trial. The
warrant may be in the form established by the usage and
practice of the issuing court.
(Emphasis added.)
The first sentence of HRS § 805-1 discusses the
requirements of a complaint and states:
When a complaint is made to any prosecuting officer of the
commission of any offense, the prosecuting officer shall
examine the complainant, shall reduce the substance of the
complaint to writing, and shall cause the complaint to be
subscribed by the complainant under oath, which the
prosecuting officer is hereby authorized to administer, or
the complaint shall be made by declaration in accordance
with the rules of court.
Although the first sentence of HRS § 805-1 does not state the
statute applies only to complaints for a penal summons or an
arrest warrant, the third sentence of HRS § 805-1 states:
Upon presentation of the written complaint to the judge in
whose circuit the offense allegedly has been committed, the
judge shall issue a warrant, reciting the complaint and
requiring the sheriff, or other officer to whom it is
directed, except as provided in section 805-3, to arrest
the accused and to bring the accused before the judge to be
dealt with according to law . . . .
The third sentence of HRS § 805-1 makes clear that the statute
applies to complaints for an arrest warrant, and Thompson makes
clear that the statute also applies to complaints for a penal
summons. However, based on the plain language of HRS § 805-1
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and Thompson, the requirements of HRS § 805-1 do not apply to
complaints used to charge a defendant who has already been
arrested. Thus, the plain language of HRS § 805-1 establishes
that the complaints in Appellees’ cases did not have to satisfy
the requirements of HRS § 805-1.
3. Case law interpreting past versions of HRS § 805-1
demonstrate that HRS § 805-1 applies only to
complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant.
This court’s precedent confirms what Thompson and the
plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrate: HRS § 805-1 applies
only to complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant. In
other words, there is a difference between a complaint for a
penal summons or an arrest warrant, and a complaint used to
charge a defendant who has already been arrested.
As the State points out, “[i]t appears that the import
of HRS § 805-1 has been substantially unchanged since 1892 when
it was enacted as Chapter LVII, An Act to Reorganize the
Judiciary Department.” The State also points out that “[t]he
earliest codified iteration of HRS § 805-1 appears to be Chapter
53 Part I § 606 of The Penal Laws of the Hawaiian Islands,
1897.” Citing to Sing Kee, 14 Haw. at 586-88, the State
maintains there is a difference “between a ‘charge’ which
initiates a criminal trial and a ‘complaint’ in order ‘to enable
the magistrate to determine whether or not there is probable
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cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the
accused so as to justify his apprehension.’”
The State correctly asserts that Sing Kee demonstrates
there is a difference between a complaint for a penal summons or
an arrest warrant and a complaint used to initiate a criminal
trial. In Sing Kee, the defendant was convicted “of the offense
of selling spirituous liquor without a license." 14 Haw. at
586. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings
because (1) the District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction, (2) the
complaint upon which defendant was arrested and tried did not
sufficiently state any cause, and (3) contrary to law, the
complaint did not state a direct and positive offense, but was
sworn to on information and belief. Id. at 586-87. The Supreme
Court of the Territory of Hawaiʻi stated:
These objections to the affidavit, so far as they
bear upon the question of the jurisdiction of the District
Court, need not be passed upon, for even if the warrant was
improperly or illegally issued by reason of its being based
upon an affidavit insufficient in form or in substance, the
District Court nevertheless had jurisdiction. The evidence
shows that when the offense was committed police officers
were present, about fifty feet away from the spot, in a
store, where the liquor was handed over, and saw such
delivery, and that they immediately rushed in and arrested
the defendant. Under these circumstances an arrest without
a warrant was legal. See section 545 and 547, Penal Laws.
The contention that the “complaint upon which the
defendant *** was tried does not sufficiently state any
cause,” would seem to be based upon a misconception of the
true function of the affidavit or so-called complaint. The
sole function of the complaint, as provided for by section
606 of the Penal Laws, is to support the issuance of the
warrant or, in other words, to enable the magistrate to
determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe
that an offense has been committed by the accused so as to
justify his apprehension. The complaint referred to in
that section is not the charge upon which the defendant is
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tried, although it is a statement in substance, and may
also be in exact language, of the offense to be set forth
in the charge subsequently entered against the defendant in
Court. The charge itself is, under the practice prevailing
in the District Courts, entered orally by the prosecuting
officer upon the defendant’s appearance and noted by the
magistrate in his record, and it is upon the charge as thus
entered that the trial is had. The precise form of the
charge entered against this defendant in the District Court
of Koloa, is not disclosed by the record before us, nor
does it appear that any objection was made on the ground of
its insufficiency, although the defendant was present and
represented by counsel. We cannot assume, under these
circumstances, that the charge as entered did not state an
offense.
Id. at 587-88 (emphasis added).
The Sing Kee court thus distinguished between a
complaint against a defendant “to enable the magistrate to
determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that
an offense has been committed by the accused so as to justify
his apprehension” and a complaint where the defendant is charged
with a criminal offense. Similar to the complaint referred to
“by section 606 of the Penal Laws,” the complaint referred to in
HRS § 805-1 “is not the charge upon which the defendant is
tried.” Sing Kee, 14 Haw. at 587-88. Instead, under HRS § 805-
1, “[t]he sole function of the complaint . . . , is to support
the issuance of the warrant[.]”. Id.
In addition, here, it appears that police officers
witnessed Appellees committing the offense of OVUII given that
Appellees were all arrested for OVUII. Appellees do not contend
that they were improperly arrested. Thus, as in Sing Kee,
Appellees were properly arrested without a warrant and the State
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did not use a complaint to request a penal summons or an arrest
warrant.
Furthermore, in Territory v. Mix, the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Hawaiʻi interpreted “Section 10770, Revised Laws
of Hawaii 1945,” which “prescribes the manner in which a
defendant shall be brought within the jurisdiction of the trial
court.” 41 Haw. 163, 164 (1955). Because HRS § 805-1 largely
retains Section 10770’s language,13 HRS § 805-1 likely follows
its predecessor to address how a defendant is “brought within
the jurisdiction of the trial court.” Id. at 164. The Supreme
Court of the Territory of Hawaiʻi noted that Section 10770,
Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945 “mandates two prerequisites to the
issuance of a valid warrant of arrest[.]” Id. at 165 (emphasis
added). Similarly, in Territory v. Williams, 41 Haw. 348, 355
(1956), the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaiʻi stated that
13 Section 10770, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945 provided:
“***Complaint; form of warrant. Upon complaint made
to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
offense, he shall examine the complainant, shall reduce the
substance of the complaint to writing and cause the same to
be subscribed by the complainant under oath, which he is
hereby authorized to administer. Upon presentation of the
written complaint to the magistrate within whose district
the offense is alleged to have been committed such
magistrate shall issue his warrant, reciting the complaint
and requiring the high sheriff, or other officer to whom it
is directed (except as provided in the next succeeding
section), forthwith to arrest the accused and bring him
before the magistrate to be dealt with according to
law***.”
Mix, 41 Haw. at 164-65.
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“section 10770, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, provides only for
the issuance of a complaint as the basis of a warrant of
arrest.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, as in Sing Kee, the
predecessor to HRS § 805-1 as interpreted by the Mix court and
the Williams court was limited to complaints for an arrest
warrant.
B. The State properly initiated the criminal proceedings
against Appellees.
1. Appellees were properly arrested and released after
posting bail.
The State maintains that, pursuant to HRS §§ 803-5 and
803-6, Appellees were all properly arrested without a warrant.
HRS § 803-5 (2014) provides:
By police officer without warrant. (a) A police
officer or other officer of justice, may, without warrant,
arrest and detain for examination any person when the
officer has probable cause to believe that such person has
committed any offense, whether in the officer’s presence or
otherwise.
(b) For purposes of this section, a police officer
has probable cause to make an arrest when the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which
the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being
committed.
HRS § 803-6(a) (2014) provides:
Arrest, how made. (a) At or before the time of
making an arrest, the person shall declare that the person
is an officer of justice, if such is the case. If the
person has a warrant the person should show it; or if the
person makes the arrest without warrant in any of the cases
in which it is authorized by law, the person should give
the party arrested clearly to understand for what cause the
person undertakes to make the arrest, and shall require the
party arrested to submit to be taken to the police station
or judge. This done, the arrest is complete.
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Here, according to the State, Appellees were all
examined and “released after posting bail before 48 hours had
passed and before the requirement for a probable cause
determination was triggered.” Appellees do not contest that
they were arrested, examined, and released after posting bail
before 48 hours passed. Appellees also do not argue that they
were improperly arrested. Thus, it appears that Appellees were
properly arrested without a warrant.
Although Appellees were properly arrested pursuant to
HRS §§ 803-5 and 803-6(a), the issue remains whether the State
properly initiated the criminal proceedings against Appellees by
charging Appellees via complaint.
2. The State properly initiated the criminal proceedings
against Appellees under HRPP Rule 7.
Given that the State did not use the complaints
against Appellees to seek a penal summons or an arrest warrant,
the State correctly asserts that “the general rule for charges
in HRPP Rule 7(d) applies” to Appellees cases. As relevant
here, HRPP Rule 7 (2012) provides:
(a) Use of Indictment, Information, or Complaint.
The charge against a defendant is an indictment, a
superseding indictment, an information, or a complaint
filed in court. . . .
. . . .
(d) Nature and Contents. The charge shall be a
plain, concise and definite statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged. . . . A complaint
shall be signed by the prosecutor. . . .
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Here, the State charged Appellees by complaint with
the offense of OVUII pursuant to HRPP Rule 7(d). As the State
points out:
The charging instruments in these cases are signed by
the deputy prosecuting attorney and comply in every respect
with HRPP Rule 7(d). Nothing in HRPP Rule 7(d) requires
that a charging instrument in a misdemeanor case be signed
by anyone other than a prosecutor. Nor does HRPP Rule 7(d)
require that anything should have been subscribed under
oath or made by declaration in lieu of an affidavit by
anyone. Nor does any constitutional provision, statute or
rule of court require that any misdemeanor charging
instrument by itself be subject to a probable cause
determination. Consequently, under HRPP Rule 7(d) these
charging instruments fulfill the necessary requirements to
initiate a prosecution for the offenses named within them
and the district court erred in dismissing these charging
instruments.
The State correctly notes that the charging instruments in
Appellees’ cases comply with HRPP Rule 7(d). Moreover,
Appellees do not contend the charging instruments failed to
comply with HRPP Rule 7(d). Thus, the charging instruments in
Appellees’ cases were sufficient to initiate a prosecution under
HRPP Rule 7(d). In turn, the district court erroneously
dismissed without prejudice the charging instruments in
Appellees’ cases.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that HRS § 805-1
applies only to complaints for a penal summons or an arrest
warrant, and the district court improperly dismissed without
prejudice the complaints charging Appellees with OVUII.
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Accordingly, the district court’s January 12, 2022 Notice of
Entry of Judgment is reversed.
Brian Vincent /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for appellant
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Alen M. Kaneshiro
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for appellees
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
35