Pike v. Wilson

[Cite as Pike v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-814.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

KENNETH PIKE, ET AL., :

Plaintiffs-Appellees, :
No. 111688
v. :

PETER W. WILSON, ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellants. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 16, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-21-957143

Appearances:

Weltman, Weinberg & Reis, Co., L.P.A., and Roy J.
Schechter, for appellees.

Herman Law, LLC, and Edward F. Herman, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

Defendant-appellant Peter Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals the trial court’s

decision granting plaintiffs-appellees’ Kenneth Pike, Donna Anderson, and Kay Pike

Easton (“the victims”) motion for judgment on the pleadings, which entitled the
victims to recover a total of $99,978.78 plus any postjudgment interest from Wilson.

After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm.

In 2015, Wilson entered a guilty plea to securities fraud in violation of

R.C. 1707.44(G), a third-degree felony, and aggravated theft in violation of R.C.

2913.02(A)(3), a fourth-degree felony. Wilson was sentenced to community -

control sanctions for a term of five years and ordered to pay restitution to the

victims. Specifically, Wilson was ordered to pay $20,000 to Kenneth Pike; $30,000

to Donna Anderson; $30,000 to Kay Pike Easton. In 2018, the court held a status

hearing to obtain the status of restitution. This transcript is not in the record before

us, but the docket indicates that community control was continued after this

hearing. Exactly five years after Wilson’s initial sentencing hearing, a single docket

entry in July 2020 provided that community control was terminated.

In August 2020, the victims obtained a certificate of judgment from the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Clerk of Courts demonstrating the

restitution owed to the victims.

In December 2021, the victims filed a creditor’s bill against Wilson and

the entities PayPal, Upwork Inc., Upwork Escrow, Inc., and Upwork Global Inc.,1

seeking the full restitution with interests and costs, for a total of $99,978.78 plus any

interest accrued thereafter.

1 The victims alleged in the creditor’s bill that Wilson was a registered user, client,
or freelancer for the Upwork entities, and received payment for his services via the other
named defendant, PayPal.
 Wilson timely answered, disputing the validity and enforceability of the

creditor’s bill, and asserting several affirmative defenses. Wilson later amended his

answer and counterclaimed seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the

victims, setting forth various arguments alleging that the victims improperly and

unlawfully obtained the certificate of judgment, and that the certificate of judgment

was improperly executed.

The victims moved the court for judgment on the pleadings and

dismissal of Wilson’s counterclaim, arguing that the court’s sentencing order in

Wilson’s criminal case entitled them to collect the restitution. Wilson responded

with his own combined motion for judgment on the pleadings and opposition to the

victims’ motion, arguing that his obligation to pay restitution extinguished when he

was released from community control.

The trial court denied Wilson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

and granted the victims’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court ordered

Wilson to pay the judgment, and enjoined Wilson from receiving any “money,

properties, goods and effects” from the other defendants until the judgment was

paid in full, including postjudgment interest.

It is from this order that Wilson appeals, assigning two errors for our

review.

1. The trial court erred in concluding that criminal restitution orders
are enforceable after the expiration of community control.

2. The trial court erred in concluding at the close of pleadings that the
purported judgment creditors did not act under color of state law to
 deprive the previously convicted citizen of his protections under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Both of Wilson’s assignments of error allege that the trial court erred in

granting the victims’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. A trial court’s decision

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is reviewed

de novo. Pincus v. Dubyak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110135, 2021-Ohio-3034, ¶ 17.

In his first assignment of error, Wilson contends that the trial court

erred in determining that Wilson was still required to pay restitution because when

his community-control sanctions expired, so did his requirement to pay restitution.

Wilson directs us to R.C. 2929.15, which empowers a court to impose

community-control sanctions in lieu of a prison sentence. Wilson points out that

each subsequent code section pertains to different types of community-control

sanctions, including R.C. 2929.16, pertaining to residential sanctions; R.C. 2929.17,

pertaining to nonresidential sanctions; and R.C. 2929.18, pertaining to financial

sanctions. Restitution was imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.18. Wilson argues that

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) mandates that “[t]he duration of all community control sanctions

imposed on an offender under this division shall not exceed five years” and that

when read in pari materia with the other sections, this includes financial sanctions.

Wilson notes that “[i]t is clear from the statutory scheme that financial sanctions,

e.g. restitution, are part of a criminal sentence” and that criminal sentences “are not

eternal.” Wilson invites us to consider that this natural reading of the statute

suggests that when community-control sanctions are terminated, any financial
sanctions imposed as part of community control must also be terminated and barred

from pursuit in a civil action once the community-control sanctions are terminated.

Wilson does not point us to any caselaw that supports this contention.

The victims rely on State v. Aguirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 2014-Ohio-

4603, 41 N.E.3d 1178, in rebutting Wilson’s argument. In Aguirre, defendant

Aguirre applied to have the record of her felony conviction sealed pursuant to R.C.

2953.32(A)(1). As in the instant matter, Aguirre was sentenced to community-

control sanctions for a term of five years and ordered to pay restitution. In 2007,

her community-control sanctions were terminated after five years even though the

restitution was still outstanding; in 2012, she applied to have her record sealed. The

state objected to Aguirre’s request to seal her record because the restitution was still

outstanding. The Ohio Supreme Court held that “an offender does not attain a final

discharge, and is thus ineligible to have his or her felony conviction records sealed

under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), until all court-ordered restitution has been paid.” Id. at

¶ 29. The Aguirre majority reasoned that “[b]ecause Aguirre still owes restitution

in this case, she has not received a final discharge of her conviction and cannot have

her records sealed.”

We recognize that the Aguirre holding appears limited to cases where

an offender seeks sealing of their record under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). Wilson strongly

encourages us to apply this narrow interpretation, noting that the cases are easily

distinguished because sealing a record is a privilege, and continuing punishment
implicates various rights that an offender has. Wilson points to no caselaw

supporting this contention.

We find, however, that the Aguirre court’s reasoning is instructive in

the instant matter. The court acknowledges that “[w]hile community-control

sanctions end after five years, R.C. 2929.15(A)(1), the obligation to pay restitution

does not expire due to the passage of time.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 28, citing

R.C. 2929.18. Recently, in State v. P.J.F., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4152, the

Supreme Court determined the meaning of “final discharge” under the record

sealing statutes as applied to R.C. 2929.17 for nonresidential sanctions, noting that

when considering the context of the different types of sanctions in R.C.
2929.17 and 2929.18, the meaning of “final discharge” or completion of
a community-control sanction is clear. A defendant completes a
financial community-control sanction by paying it, and a defendant
completes a nonresidential community-control sanction at the end of
its duration.

Id. at ¶ 18.

The P.J.F. Court continued to clarify that its holding in Aguirre

“indicated that the only way the defendant could have received a final discharge

from her financial community-control sanction under R.C. 2929.18 was by

satisfaction of her payment obligation[.]” Id. at ¶ 19. While we note that P.J.F. also

dealt with sealing a record, we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning instructive in the

instant matter.

We are further persuaded by the language in R.C. 2929.18(D). This

section provides that “[a] financial sanction of restitution imposed * * * is an order
in favor of the victim of the offender’s criminal act that can be collected through [the

processes described in R.C. 2929.18(D)(1)-(3)].” This section further authorizes a

victim to “[o]btain execution of the judgment or order through any available

procedure” once the financial sanction is imposed as a judgment or order. R.C.

2929.18(D)(2). The availability of these remedies made available to victims to

collect restitution from the offender exemplify the General Assembly’s intent to

allow for actions such as the one that the victims in this matter initiated. We further

note that there is no temporal restriction in this code section, so we are unpersuaded

by Wilson’s contention that the victims were foreclosed from bringing a civil action

since they did not bring it before the expiration of Wilson’s community-control

sanctions.

Finally, we acknowledge Wilson’s argument that R.C. 2929.15(A)(1)

mandates that community-control sanctions shall not exceed five years and that

financial sanctions, including restitution, are included under the umbrella of

“community-control sanctions.” The absurd result principle is an exception to the

rule that statutes should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. State ex

rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-

8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶ 22. “If strict construction of a statute would result in

‘unreasonable or absurd consequences,’ a construing court may reject the strict

construction doctrine, because courts must presume that the legislature enacted a

statute for a ‘just and reasonable result.’” Yoby v. Cleveland, 2020-Ohio-3366, 155

N.E.3d 258, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), quoting Clay at ¶ 23. If we were to hold that financial
sanctions expire after five years, offenders may be incentivized to simply hold out

on paying restitution for as long as possible until the natural termination of their

community-control sanctions. This is consistent with the Aguirre holding that

found exception to the statutory five years when the financial sanctions were

imposed in the context of defendants seeking sealing of their records. We therefore

find that financial sanctions imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.18 are not fully satisfied

and a defendant is not discharged from this obligation until the financial sanctions

are satisfied or paid.

Wilson’s first assignment of error is overruled.

In his second assignment of error, Wilson alleges that the trial court

erred in finding that his protections under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S.

Constitution were not violated.

“It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects

against successive prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Martin, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 87618, 2007-Ohio-1833, ¶ 15, citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.

688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,

445-446, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Double-jeopardy protections

“protect against three abuses: (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after

acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3)

‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429,

2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 15, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds,

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).

We note that none of the three abuses are implicated here. Plainly,

Wilson was ordered to pay the restitution in his sole criminal prosecution and

sentence for the crimes. The restitution was never paid, so the victims utilized their

statutorily granted right to obtain execution of the judgment via a creditor’s bill.

Wilson also argues that “[a] reasonable person could therefore conclude that [the

victims] thereby impersonated the State of Ohio to enforce a criminal penalty

against Wilson which was no longer enforceable.” We are unpersuaded by this

argument. At no point does the record indicate that the victims attempted to collect

the restitution that they are entitled to by impersonating the state.

We further note that the victims’ action was explicitly authorized by

the General Assembly. “No financial sanction imposed under this section or section

2929.32 of the Revised Code shall preclude a victim from bringing a civil action

against the offender.” R.C. 2929.18(H).

The trial court did not err in granting the victims’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings, nor were Wilson’s double-jeopardy protections violated as a result

of the victims initiating a civil action to recover the restitution to which they were

entitled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
 It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR