In re Marriage of Kilby

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 210566-U

Order filed March 22, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
LORI A. KILBY, ) Tazewell County, Illinois,
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0566
and ) Circuit No. 19-D-38
)
CRAIG P. KILBY, ) Honorable
) Lisa Y. Wilson,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s determination of husband’s income for the purpose of
maintenance award was not an abuse of discretion where he failed to present
evidence and testimony sufficient for farming business valuation.

¶2 The petitioner, Lori A. Kilby, and the respondent, Craig P. Kilby, were married for over

thirty years before they separated and filed for dissolution of marriage. Although they were able

to resolve their property distribution and agreed that Lori was entitled to permanent maintenance,

they submitted the issues of maintenance computation, college expenses, and attorney fees for
 discovery sanctions to the circuit court. Craig now challenges the court’s determinations, arguing

that (1) the court erred in its calculation of his monthly income for maintenance, (2) the court

erred in ordering him to pay one-half contribution of his son’s college expenses, and (3) the

court’s award of attorney fees to Lori’s counsel due to discovery violations was excessive. Craig

also asks this court to review the circuit court’s supplemental order reaffirming its prior findings

and the order denying Craig’s motions to reconsider and reopen evidence. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The parties were married on February 16, 1985. Five children were born of the marriage,

all of whom are now adults. Their youngest son, Jared, was enrolled as a full-time student at

Iowa State University at the time of dissolution. Lori filed a petition for dissolution of marriage

on February 4, 2019.

¶5 The parties created Prairieview Farms, Inc., during the marriage. Prairieview Farms is

primarily a farming business but previously included operations incident to farming, such as

trucking and hauling done on behalf of Prairieview Farms and other corporations on a limited

basis. During their marriage, the parties owned approximately 255 acres, much of which was

tillable farmland. The majority of farmland Prairieview Farms utilizes, however, is through cash

or crop share rentals. In the years leading up to the dissolution of marriage, the acreage rented by

the corporation totaled around 980 acres. Of this total, approximately 580 acres were rented from

Craig’s relatives. Prairieview Farms rented 157 acres from Craig’s deceased mother’s estate and

193 acres from his father. The company rented an additional 241 acres from the parties’ mutually

owned property with Lori as the designated owner. The remaining acreage was rented from one

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 of Craig’s distant relatives, Ann Kilby, but testimony indicated that a large portion of the

property was sold before trial.

¶6 Craig is the sole owner and president of Prairieview Farms and retained all stock shares

post-dissolution. His education includes a Bachelor of Science degree in agricultural economics

from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. His other primary form of income is through

his work as a field agronomist for Beck’s Hybrids with an annual salary approaching $100,000

plus commissions. He also does farmwork for his father who was 90 years old at the time of trial.

Lori is a certified pharmacy technician and was duly employed in this capacity from August

2016 up until December 2020. She subsequently began employment as a full-time office

manager earning $31,200 annually on a $15 per hour wage. During most of the parties’ marriage,

Prairieview Farms’ tax returns showed W-2 income paid to Lori. Craig and Lori agreed that the

salary was used to get cash for family expenses, such as their children’s education, and was not

actually paid out to Lori. Instead, it was deposited into their joint checking account.

¶7 During pretrial discovery, Craig repeatedly failed to provide complete answers and

financial documents concerning the income he derived from Prairieview Farms. For instance,

Craig’s initial and updated financial affidavits failed to specify his farming income, stating

“FARM INCOME TO BE PROVIDE [sic]” and “FARM INCOME (UNKNOWN).”

¶8 Lori’s counsel made repeated efforts to procure this information. Specifically, Lori’s

counsel filed a motion to compel on May 20, 2019, which related to financial information

concerning Prairieview Farms that was sought in discovery. A petition for rule to show cause

was filed on July 3, 2019, alleging Craig failed to comply with an agreed mutual restraining

order as well as to provide financial information regarding Prairieview Farms. On June 28, 2019,

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 the court ordered Craig to comply with deficiencies identified within Lori’s motion to compel

within 21 days.

¶9 A subsequent petition for rule to show cause was filed on July 23, 2019, alleging Craig

failed to comply with the court’s order. Although Craig tendered documents in compliance with

Lori’s discovery requests, he failed to appear for the hearing, which was held on August 28,

2019, resulting in an award of $393.75 in fees to Lori’s counsel. A third petition for rule to show

cause was filed on January 7, 2020, concerning the sale of mutual assets and Craig’s failure to

respond to requests from the judicially appointed joint expert regarding Prairieview Farms’

valuation.

¶ 10 A second motion to compel was filed on July 16, 2020, once more attempting to ascertain

Craig’s income and other financial information. The court ordered Craig to respond to these

requests under oath by August 17, 2020, and reserved the attorney fee request in its order.

However, as the record reflects, Craig did not supply his financial affidavits and responses to

these discovery requests until September 9, 2020. A third motion to compel discovery was filed

on September 15, 2020.

¶ 11 After the September 25, 2020, pretrial settlement conference, the parties resolved the

property distribution and all other issues except for maintenance, Jared’s college expenses, and

attorney fees. Pursuant to the agreement, Lori retained the marital home, the parties’ three dirt

bikes, and received an $82,303 payment. Craig was directed to deed Lori an 80-acre tract of land

from the parties’ mutually owned land. Craig retained, among other things, the remaining 160

acres of tillable farmland and the Prairieview Farms operation. Lori’s resignation as secretary of

Prairieview Farms was a condition of this settlement. The retirement accounts were split equally.

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¶ 12 Thereafter, a trial ensued to adjudicate the remaining issues. The court heard evidence on

three separate dates: October 1, 2020, December 9, 2020, and February 16, 2021. The trial

testimony and evidence centered on Craig’s income from the farm operation.

¶ 13 Both parties prepared and presented demonstrative exhibits explaining their income

valuation for the purpose of maintenance calculation. Lori’s counsel prepared a 2021 projection

income chart which the court ultimately adopted. The chart utilized a mechanism known as a

three-year income averaging. Simply put, this averaging device distilled the parties’ respective

gross incomes for a three-year period into one figure. The gross income was then adjusted into

net income for the purpose of setting a maintenance award.

¶ 14 At the conclusion of the February 16, 2021, hearing, the court took the parties’ arguments

under advisement. Thereafter, the court entered an order resolving the outstanding issues. In

arriving at the monthly maintenance award of $8223.79 with retroactivity to October 2019, the

court adopted the income chart prepared by Lori. The court expressly rejected Craig’s proposal

of $33,615 per year in maintenance. It found that Craig’s proposal did not account for the

entirety of his earnings. Relying on this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Hochstatter, 2020

IL App (3d) 190132, the circuit court declined to deduct from Craig’s income for nonaccelerated

depreciation. Further, the court directed Craig (1) to contribute 50% to Jared’s college expenses

pursuant to section 513 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/513 (West 2020)) and (2) to pay Lori’s attorney a

total of $7935 in attorney fees pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002)

as a sanction for his failure to comply with discovery requests.

¶ 15 Craig subsequently filed two motions. His motion to reconsider, in part, argued that the

maintenance award failed to consider the prospective incomes of the parties and was grossly

inequitable. Craig also filed a motion to reopen evidence, seeking to call an additional witness to

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 analyze his tax returns which would provide a more accurate depiction of his income. On

October 4, 2021, the court heard argument on both motions as well as Lori’s rule to show cause

for failure to make payments as directed by the court’s prior order.

¶ 16 The court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage on October 19, 2021.

Concurrently, the court supplemented its July 12, 2021, order and reaffirmed Craig’s obligations,

inter alia, to contribute 50% of educational expenses for Jared’s education, pay Lori $8223.79 in

maintenance per month with retroactivity, and award Lori’s attorney fees in the sum of $7935

based on the repeated failures to provide Prairieview Farms’ financial information in discovery

pursuant to Rule 219. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). In denying Craig’s motions, the

court entered a November 16, 2021, order stating that, while it adopted Lori’s worksheet for

income computation, it reviewed all the exhibits and trial testimony and arrived at the monthly

maintenance award independently. Further, the court pointed out that Craig’s motion to reopen

evidence failed to provide an adequate reason to do so.

¶ 17 Craig appeals.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, Craig argues that the circuit court erred when it refused to deduct legitimate

business expenses from his income and inflated the income of Prairieview Farms. He also argues

that the three-year income averaging mechanism was not appropriate for his circumstances.

Because Craig’s finances have decreased due to the dissolution of marriage, he asserts that his

son Jared is in a better position to pay his college expenses and that Lori is in a better position to

pay her attorney fees. Lastly, Craig argues that the court’s denial of his motion to reopen

evidence and to allow an accounting expert to testify was an abuse of discretion. Craig asks that

we reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.

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¶ 20 A. Gross and Net Income Calculation for Maintenance Award

¶ 21 Craig asserts that the court erred when calculating his income for purposes of

maintenance in three distinct ways. First, Craig identifies specific items from the tax years of

2017, 2018, and 2019, which he argues were erroneously attributed to his income. Second, Craig

argues alternately that the court misinterpreted its authority when determining whether to include

nonaccelerated depreciation, and that by including it, the court abused its discretion. Third, while

Craig concedes the three-year income-averaging mechanism used by the trial court is potentially

appropriate, he argues that it failed to accurately reflect Craig’s current and future income and

therefore amounts to an abuse of discretion. We address each of Craig’s arguments in turn.

¶ 22 1. Income for Tax Years 2017, 2018, and 2019

¶ 23 Craig first argues that the circuit court misconstrued section 505 of the Act when it

included nonaccelerated depreciation against his Prairieview Farms’ business income

computation. 750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2020). Craig asserts that because the 2017 amendment to

section 505 explicitly requires the inclusion of accelerated depreciation into net business income

and omits any reference to nonaccelerated depreciation, the rules of statutory construction

mandate deducting Craig’s nonaccelerated depreciation from his net business income. While

Craig frames his argument as the inappropriate inclusion of these items, a more accurate

characterization of his challenge is whether the circuit court impermissibly refused to exclude

and deduct nonaccelerated depreciation when determining net income pursuant to section 505.

As such, he has presented a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. In re

Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129, 135–36 (2004).

¶ 24 This court has previously held that the amendment to Section 505 does not require the

trial court to deduct nonaccelerated depreciation when determining net business income. See

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 In re Marriage of Hochstatter, 2020 IL App (3d) 190132, ¶ 24. While nonaccelerated

depreciation may be deducted, that deduction is dependent on the court determining, in its

discretion, that the nonaccelerated depreciation is a necessary expense to carry on a trade or

business. See id. Craig is correct that the amendment to section 505 removed the requirement

that a party must first establish that an expense was for the repayment of debt prior to a court

deducting said expense from net income determinations for maintenance purposes. Compare 750

ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(h) (West 2016), with 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.1) (West 2020). He is mistaken,

however, that this amendment imposes a preference on courts to favor all claimed business

income deductions. Rather, the onus remains on the claimant. As this court has made clear,

“qualifying for the deduction still requires the claimant to convince the circuit court” that the

requested deduction “is an appropriate and reasonable business expense that is required to carry

on the trade or business.” Hochstatter, 2020 IL App (3d) 190132, ¶ 25.

¶ 25 Regarding Craig’s challenge to the amount of maintenance awarded, reviewing courts in

Illinois have consistently explained, “the propriety of a maintenance award is within the

discretion of the trial court and the court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 173 (2005). An abuse of discretion

occurs only “when ‘the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no

reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d

21, 36 (2009) (quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000)).

¶ 26 When a party challenges the court’s factual findings regarding maintenance, including

determinations of the parties’ income, such findings are set aside only if they are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 30; In re

Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144, 153 (2005). A finding of fact is against the manifest

8
 weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is evident or the finding is unreasonable,

arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 30.

¶ 27 Section 505 of the Act does not separately define “income.” See Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at

136. Under its plain and ordinary meaning, “income” is “ ‘something that comes in as an

increment or addition *** a gain or recurrent benefit that is usu[ually] [sic] measured in money

*** the value of goods and services received by an individual in a given period of time.’ ” Id. at

136–37 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1143 (1986)).

¶ 28 The only items Craig argues should not have been imputed against his net income are

Prairieview Farms incomes, expenses, and deductions. Section 505 of the Act identifies the

appropriate processes to determine an individual’s net income for the calculation of maintenance

and child support awards. See 750 ILCS 5/504(b), 5/505(a) (West 2020). Section 505(a)(3.1)(A)

offers specific instruction to a trial court on which “expenses” may, or even must, be deducted

from gross business income to calculate net business income, stating in relevant part:

Business income. For purposes of calculating child support, net business income from

the operation of a business means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary

expenses required to carry on the trade or business. *** The court shall apply the

following:

*** The accelerated component of depreciation and any business expenses

determined either judicially or administratively to be inappropriate or excessive shall

be excluded from the total or ordinary and necessary business expenses to be

deducted in the determination of net business income from gross business income.

750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.1)(A) (West 2020).

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¶ 29 In calculating Craig’s 2017, 2018, and 2019 income, the court adopted Lori’s income

chart prepared as a demonstrative exhibit. By doing so, it found that Craig’s gross income was

$268,902.61 in 2017, $368,895.63 in 2018, and $478,313.67 in 2019.

¶ 30 On appeal, Craig argues that these amounts were erroneously inflated through the

inclusion of business expenses at Prairieview Farms that should have been excluded from his

income. Specifically, Craig alleges that items improperly considered for purposes of income

computation inflated his income by $98,210 for tax year 2017, $267,536 for tax year 2018, and

$264,582.66 for tax year 2019. Outside of the nonaccelerated depreciation from Prairieview

Farms, Craig states that he was wrongly attributed $35,000 in income through “Prairieview

Farms Inc[.] W-2 Income” in 2017 and 2018 and $10,037.66 in 2019. He argues that this was in

fact Lori’s W-2 income. Lori claims that she did not receive this income and that this was done

merely for tax reduction purposes.

¶ 31 Initially, we note the record reflects Lori reported $35,000 in ostensible compensation as

an employee of Prairieview Farms in her 2017 and 2018 W-2 forms and $10,037.66 in 2019.

Craig’s trial testimony, however, indicates that this was done at the suggestion of Craig and

Lori’s accountant to avoid taxation on Prairieview Farms. This reported W-2 income was meant

to create an appearance of a wage for Prairieview Farms’ corporate officers. Lori further testified

that her salary was used as a device to avoid additional taxation while the parties paid expenses

such as college tuition, vacations, and loan payments through the corporation. The record also

reflects Lori was not paid as a board of director in 2018. Indeed, as Craig’s testimony

demonstrated, it was the regular practice of the parties to commingle Lori’s Prairieview Farms

income with Craig’s income in a joint account to pay nonbusiness expenses, such as costs

associated with their household and family. In light of this testimony, the court did not err when

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 it refused to deduct from Craig’s income the amounts that the parties previously charged to Lori

as Prairieview Farms W-2 income.

¶ 32 Craig next challenges 2018 rents reflected on his corporate tax returns included in his net

income in the amount of $152,860. He argues these expenses were paid to others on behalf of

Prairieview Farms and should thus be removed from income calculation.

¶ 33 Craig asserts the $152,860 in rent was for the farmland Prairieview Farms rented from his

father, mother, and Lori. As the record reflects, Craig possessed power of attorney for his father,

Donald, and is executor of his deceased mother Patricia’s estate. The record also reflects various

self-dealings between Craig and Donald. Lease agreements between Prairieview Farms and

Donald were unilaterally computed by Craig, who signed on behalf of his father as power of

attorney and as the person renting the property. Indeed, Craig testified that he determined rates

for the farmland rentals each year. Craig paid rent for land owned by his mother’s estate to

himself as executor of her estate. Granted, he and his sister are the beneficiaries of the estate; and

he owes her a fiduciary duty; but he controls the transactions. Craig testified that a good chunk,

but not all, of this rental money went to his parents. He also explained that he computed cash

rents from land purportedly owned by Lori to maximize their ability to cover expenses for

college, reduce tax liability, and pay taxes and interest.

¶ 34 In many cases, rents paid for farmland may be the quintessential necessary business

expense to carry out a farming operation. However, in the unusual circumstance presented here,

Craig admitted that the rents paid by Prairieview Farms to Lori were based on factors other than

market value or business purpose. In other words, they were not arm’s length transactions.

Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the circuit court to refuse to exclude it from income, and

we will not disturb the weight the court apportioned to Craig’s testimony. See In re Marriage of

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 Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d 639, 642 (1993) (“The determination of all issues regarding the

credibility of the parties and their witnesses or the weight to give the evidence lies with the trier

of fact.”). As such, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when refusing to deduct the

$152,860 in 2018 rent from Craig’s income.

¶ 35 2. Depreciation

¶ 36 Craig next argues that the court abused its discretion by not deducting Prairieview Farms’

nonaccelerated depreciation from Craig’s income.

¶ 37 Craig’s reliance upon various concurring opinions interpreting section 505 prior to 2017

is unpersuasive. First and foremost, these decisions predate the amendment to section 505 which

now offers specific instruction for the appropriate calculation of business income. Post-

amendment, these cases still serve to “provide a circuit court guidance when deciding, in its

discretion, whether to allow a deduction for nonaccelerated depreciation.” (Emphasis in

original.) Hochstatter, 2020 IL App (3d) 190132, ¶ 26.

¶ 38 Here, the court expressly referenced Hochstatter in declining Craig’s request to consider

nonaccelerated depreciation as a deduction from his income in the calculation of maintenance.

Id. While subsection 505(a)(3.1)(A) allows a court to deduct business expenses found judicially

or administratively inappropriate or excessive, such determinations remain permissive. The

amendment does not create the statutory obligation, or even preference, for a trial court to do so.

750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.1)(A) (West 2020). To rule otherwise would be inconsistent with a plain

reading of the statute and an uninterrupted line of cases within this district. See In re Marriage of

Nelson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 651 (1998); Hochstatter, 2020 IL App (3d) 190132.

¶ 39 We find the issue presented here analogous to that presented to the Illinois Supreme

Court when it decided In re Marriage of Minear, 181 Ill. 2d 552 (1998). There, the trial court

12
 added back a $10,874 depreciation expense to the husband’s income for purpose of a

maintenance award determination, because that depreciation did not represent an out-of-pocket

expense. Id. at 556. The husband did not explain the basis for this depreciation expense at trial.

Id. at 560. In upholding the trial court’s decision to include this expense against the husband’s

income, the court found the husband “failed to present evidence at trial” to “warrant the

exclusion of that expense.” Id. While the Minear court interpreted the pre-amendment provision

to section 505 of the Act, the rationale concerning depreciation exclusion offers this court

sensible guidance. Id. Here, while the nature of the depreciations and business deductions were

addressed at trial, Craig’s testimony undermined his efforts to convince the circuit court that the

purported Prairieview Farms’ business expenses were reasonably required to carry out the

business. See Hochstatter, 2020 IL App (3d) 190132, ¶ 25.

¶ 40 Craig’s failure to provide adequate testimony and documentation to satisfy his burden of

proof is fatal to his claim. His testimony suggests that his farming depreciation was not an

expense, but just another tax write off. According to Craig, money reported on the 4285

cooperative distribution form would return to him. The patronage credited against Craig’s

income, to which Craig categorized as a refund or distribution—not a deduction, as he argues on

appeal—would be his to claim. While Craig is correct that some of his depreciation deductions

resulted from expenses such as Prairieview Farms’ combines, he failed to identify which of the

reported depreciation expenses were associated with his farming equipment purchases. The

circuit court’s inability to deduce what, if any, of the reported deductions and expenses were

necessary to carry out the Prairieview Farms’ business was understandable considering Craig’s

failure to testify to such.

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¶ 41 Further, Craig’s reliance on In re Marriage of Britton, 2022 IL App (5th) 210065, is

misplaced. In Britton, the husband’s depreciation deductions were lumped into a single, total

depreciation report. Id. ¶ 62. Because the trial court failed to exclude accelerated depreciation

and make findings as to the nonaccelerated depreciation, the matter was remanded, in part, for

these considerations. Id. ¶¶ 63, 68. In contrast, the income chart adopted by the court here was a

distillation of income which expressly separated accelerated and nonaccelerated incomes. Based

on the parties’ testimony at trial, the demonstrative exhibits of income produced by the parties,

and the court’s reliance on Hochstatter, the court determined, within its discretion, that the

nonaccelerated depreciation should not be excluded from Craig’s income.

¶ 42 Therefore, consistent with this court’s decision in Hochstatter, we find that the circuit

court did not err when exercising its discretion by refusing to deduct the nonaccelerated

depreciation from Craig’s income computation.

¶ 43 3. Three-Year Income-Averaging

¶ 44 Craig next contends that the circuit court’s mechanism to calculate his maintenance

obligation was in error. Specifically, Craig alleges that, by averaging his income for a three-year

period, the maintenance award inaccurately depicts his current and projected future income.

¶ 45 It is within the sound discretion of the circuit court to determine whether income

averaging is necessary and such a decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that

discretion. In re Marriage of Evanoff & Tomasek, 2016 IL App (1st) 150017, ¶ 27. Past income

is an appropriate consideration where current and future incomes remain uncertain. See Reyna v.

Reyna, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1014 (1979).

¶ 46 Craig argues that income-averaging was inappropriately applied in this matter based on

the variance of his net incomes from 2017 through 2019. Specifically, Craig asserts the inclusion

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 of 2019 tax information into the court’s income-averaging resulted in an artificially inflated

average due to that year’s net income exceeding $200,000 more than his 2017 tax income.

¶ 47 Contrary to Craig’s position, Illinois precedent suggests that income-averaging serves to

further the ascertainment of a party’s accurate net income in situations of substantial income

variance. Income averaging is an approved method to determine a party’s current income and

may be applied in any case where appropriate. In re Marriage of Garrett, 336 Ill. App. 3d 1018,

1025 (2003). In circumstances where there is substantial year-to-year variance in income, courts

have stated a preference for income averaging in determining net income. In re Marriage of

Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103 (1995) (finding the vice-president of a road construction

corporation’s yearly income fluctuation, which varied as much as $289,000 in a two-year period,

necessitated an income averaging of at least the previous three-years to obtain an accurate

income picture for purposes of an award under section 505 of the Act).

¶ 48 Strict adherence to averaging an individual’s income from certain years is not required,

and a court’s modification with this form of income averaging is appropriate. Garrett, 336 Ill.

App. 3d at 1025 (finding the court would have been justified in substituting a net income figure

that predates one of the previous three years’ net incomes); see also In re Marriage of Gabriel &

Shamoun, 2020 IL App (1st) 182710, ¶ 41 (averaging two years of a father’s income was not an

abuse of discretion due to lack of credibility and difficulty in obtaining current income

information); but see In re Marriage of Schroeder, 215 Ill. App. 3d 156, 161 (1991) (holding six-

year-old income data to calculate net income was in error and did not reflect current

circumstance). Generally, the method of calculating income is left to the “discretion of the trial

court, as facts will vary in each case.” Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 103.

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¶ 49 We find that due to the significant variance in Craig’s yearly income, and not in spite of

this variance, the circuit court appropriately employed a three-year income average to ascertain

Craig’s net income. Craig is also incorrect in his assertion that the court’s adoption of Lori’s

income chart and corresponding rejection of Craig’s five-page competing demonstrative exhibit

arises to an abuse of discretion. As Lori correctly points out, while accounting for post-

dissolution income, Craig’s competing demonstrative exhibit includes speculative scenarios

leading to a decrease in Craig’s annual income. In contrast to Lori’s income chart, Craig’s

demonstrative exhibit does not refer to documentary evidence, such as the parties’ tax

information. His projected future income is neither supported by affidavit nor expert testimony.

Accordingly, Craig’s pre-dissolution income provides a more definite figure than the speculative

and uncertain future projections within Craig’s competing exhibit. See Reyna, 78 Ill. App. 3d at

1014. When adopting Lori’s income chart, the court made clear that it found the maximum

maintenance award offered by Craig’s competing exhibit did not account for all of his earnings.

¶ 50 This court is aware that Craig’s annual income will likely decrease because of the parties’

property division. There is no doubt that an individual’s income derived from a farming

operation is largely dependent on the farmable land available. The circuit court, however, was

confined to the income information presented at trial. While Craig argues that more recent tax

information would become available shortly after the trial concluded in this matter, he concedes

that such tax information was not available at that time. Further, Craig, as an educated,

sophisticated operator of a successful farm business, was in position to provide the court with

proof of the likely reduction in his income from the loss of the acreage awarded to Lori without

recourse to his tax return. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court

abused its discretion when it determined that Craig failed to prove his entitlement to his proposed

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 deductions. Nor can we conclude that the court abused its discretion in adopting Lori’s income

calculation.

¶ 51 B. Education Expenses

¶ 52 Craig next argues that the circuit court’s order directing him to contribute 50% to his

youngest son’s college tuition, books, and fraternity fees while attending Iowa State University

was an abuse of discretion. He contends that in light of his incurred debt and maintenance

responsibility as a result of his dissolution of marriage, there is no reason why Jared should not

bear the burden of his own education expenses.

¶ 53 Whether the court erred in ordering Craig to pay 50% of Jared’s remaining education

expenses requires an examination into the educational expenses in a dissolution proceeding and

is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Street v. Street, 325 Ill. App. 3d 108, 115

(2001).

¶ 54 Section 513 of the Act controls a circuit court’s ability to award educational expenses for

nonminor children. 750 ILCS 5/513 (West 2020). Specifically, a court may award “sums of

money out of the property and income of either or both parties *** for the educational expenses

of any child of the parties” and unless through prior agreement by the parties, “all educational

expenses which are subject *** to this section shall be incurred no later than the student’s 23rd

birthday.” Id. § 513(a). A non-exhaustive list of what type of educational expense a party may be

ordered to pay includes a child’s tuition and fees, housing expenses, and costs of books and other

supplies. Id. § 513(d)(1-2), (5).

¶ 55 Illinois courts have held that section 513 expenses, and specifically the payment of

college expenses, is a form of child support. See In re Marriage of Petersen, 2011 IL 110984,

¶ 13; see also In re Marriage of Jones, 2016 IL App (3d) 150237, ¶ 6. A trial court considers the

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 parties’ present and future financial resources in awarding college expenses. In re Marriage of

Deike, 381 Ill. App. 3d 620, 627 (2008); 750 ILCS 5/513(j) (West 2020).

¶ 56 In its July 12, 2021, order, the circuit court ordered Craig and Lori to share equally in

Jared’s college expenses until his graduation. It cited the parties’ history of funding their

children’s college expenses and noted the parties’ respective incomes, observing that Craig’s

income was “significant and persistent.”

¶ 57 The record reflects that, at the time of the order requiring the parties to pay for Jared’s

college expenses, Jared was 20 years old and remained a full-time student enrolled at Iowa State

University. 1 In ordering college expenses recognized under section 513, the court appropriately

considered the suitability of the parties’ finances to pay for these expenses. While this court is

mindful of the realities in Craig’s argument that dissolution of marriage may generally create

increased financial burdens upon the parties, Craig does not argue an inability to pay for these

expenses. Conversely, the record reflects Craig is situated to shoulder this expense as he has for

his four other children. Illinois courts have upheld a party’s obligation to pay college expenses of

his or her children in far more demanding circumstances. See Deike, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 629

(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring a father to pay his one-half share

of his children’s college expenses despite the loss of his job and failing business endeavor).

¶ 58 We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Craig to contribute 50% of

his youngest son’s college expenses pursuant to section 513 of the Act.

¶ 59 C. Attorney Fees

1 The record is inconsistent on Jared’s birthday. The judgment for dissolution of marriage states
he was born on January 22, 2000, while the order granting payment of his college expenses states he was
born on September 29, 2000. The September birth date is corroborated through financial affidavits filed
by both parties. Either date places Jared within the statutory age limit and thereby permits him to receive
educational expenses pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/513(a).
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¶ 60 Craig next challenges the circuit court’s award of attorney fees in the amount of $7935 to

Lori’s attorney. This award stems from various efforts by Lori, in the form of motions to compel

and petitions for rule to show cause, to secure discovery documents with accurate listings of

incomes and losses from Prairieview Farms. In its July 12, 2021, order, the court identified four

specific instances that were filed at the expense of Lori to secure documentation concerning

Craig’s farming income: (1) a July 16, 2020, motion to compel, (2) a notice to appear and

produce dated August 6, 2020, (3) evidence of Craig’s failure to comply with the notice to

appear and produce at his deposition on August 20, 2020, and (4) a subsequent September 15,

2020, motion to compel.

¶ 61 The attorney fee award was not limited to these four instances. Rather, the circuit court’s

initial and supplemental orders clarified that Lori’s attorney should be compensated for fees

incurred to secure all documentation required to determine Craig’s income from Prairieview

Farms, referencing prior motions to compel and petitions for rule to show cause. On appeal,

Craig asserts that Lori is positioned to pay her own attorney fees following the parties’

dissolution and the circuit court abused its discretion in obligating him to pay.

¶ 62 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c), a trial court may sanction a party for

failing to comply with its orders or supreme court rules. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1,

2002). When fashioning a sanction under this subsection, the trial court must specify the reasons

and basis of the sanction either in the judgment order or a separate written order. Id. A court may

impose sanctions from the non-exhaustive list that Rule 219(c) enumerates. See Ill. S. Ct. R.

219(c)(i)-(vii) (eff. July 1, 2002). Rule 219(c) allows for the imposition of reasonable attorney

fees. Id. A sanctioning order under Rule 219(c) is just where it “insures both discovery and a trial

on the merits.” Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 123 (1998).

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¶ 63 Trial courts maintain broad discretion in the oversight of pretrial discovery procedures,

including the ability to impose reasonable sanctions against dilatory parties. Savitch v. Allman,

25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 870 (1975). An award of attorney fees remains within the sound discretion

of the trial court and will not be disturbed save a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

¶ 64 Craig’s continued refusal to produce financial information relevant to his income from

Prairieview Farms is well-documented within the record. The efforts required by Lori’s counsel

to obtain this information is similarly documented. After a motion to compel, two petitions for

rule to show cause concerning financial information, and a granted continuance, Craig failed to

appear at the hearing to show cause on August 28, 2019, resulting in an award of attorney fees to

Lori’s counsel in the amount of $395.75. Going forward, the circuit court reserved Lori’s

requests for attorney fees. On July 27, 2020, the court ordered Craig to respond under oath to

certain items requested by Lori concerning his finances by August 17, 2020. One such request

was Craig’s updated financial affidavit. Yet Craig did not produce this updated financial affidavit

until September 9, 2020. Furthermore, and as previously addressed, Craig did not offer a

calculation of his Prairieview Farms income in this affidavit, opting once more to list his income

indeterminately: “FARM INCOME (UNKNOWN).” This fruitless pursuit of Craig’s hidden

finances turned costly for Lori’s attorney. He filed an affidavit of attorney fees on September 22,

2020, representing a running tab of $7935.

¶ 65 We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding Lori attorney fees

under Rule 219(c). Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). Craig characterizes his noncompliance

in discovery as minimal. The record reflects otherwise. At the outset, while the trial court

identified four instances of deficiency, the record is replete with additional instances wherein

Craig failed to comply with Lori’s discovery requests. Our review of the record reveals Lori’s

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 attorney made upwards of six separate attempts over a seventeen-month period to procure

financial information regarding Craig’s income from Prairieview Farms. Craig’s continued

inability to respond or meaningfully supplement discovery requests and his delay in providing

requested financial documents conveys a dilatoriness in the pretrial discovery process. The

imposition of attorney fees has been upheld in contexts where a party, as was done here,

“inexcusab[ly] fail[s] to provide” discovery information in a “timely manner.” In re Marriage of

Davis, 261 Ill. App. 3d 617, 621 (1994). The circuit court’s identification of Lori’s attorney’s

repeated efforts to secure this discovery documentation and ascertain Craig’s farming income

was encompassed within the court’s order pursuant to its obligation in specifying its reasons

under the rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c). Finally, we note that the court’s Rule 219(c) award

served to effectuate the rule’s very purpose by coercing compliance with discovery rules to

secure Craig’s financial information necessary to determine his income for maintenance

computation. See Kubicheck v. Traina, 2013 IL App (3d) 110157, ¶ 43.

¶ 66 In light of the record demonstrating Craig’s failure to comply with discovery requests and

corresponding court orders, the circuit court did not err by awarding Lori $7935 in attorney fees.

¶ 67 D. Denial of Motion to Reopen Evidence

¶ 68 Finally, Craig argues that the circuit court also abused its discretion by denying his

motion to reopen evidence. According to Craig, the court erred by refusing to afford him an

additional opportunity to call an expert witness to analyze his tax returns for the purpose of

providing a complete and truthful representation of his income for maintenance computation.

¶ 69 Trial courts should consider three factors when weighing a party’s motion to reopen

proofs, which include “whether (1) there is some excuse for the failure to introduce the evidence

at trial, (2) the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence, and

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 (3) there are cogent reasons to deny the motion.” In re Marriage of Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d)

150238, ¶ 64. The denial of a motion to reopen proofs is within the sound discretion of the trial

court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Sawicki, 346

Ill. App. 3d 1107, 1120 (2004).

¶ 70 Here, the circuit court exercised its sound discretion to deny Craig’s motion to reopen

evidence. First, the requested relief does not seek to introduce new evidence, but rather requests

an opportunity to call an expert witness to clarify any inaccuracies of maintenance computation

based on Craig’s tax information which was already established in the record. Such a request to

rehash previously introduced evidence stands antithetical to the principle of finality that a denial

of a motion to reopen evidence seeks to promote. See In re Marriage of Holder, 137 Ill. App. 3d

596, 603 (1985).

¶ 71 Craig’s request to reopen evidence came after the submission of the case and following

the court’s entry of its order ruling on the parties’ outstanding issues, but prior to the judgment

for dissolution of marriage. Craig had ample opportunity in the pretrial discovery stage to clarify

any uncertainties concerning his income. Craig then had the obligation of gathering and

introducing evidence of his income when presented with the adequate opportunity to do so at

trial. See In re Marriage of McCartney, 116 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515 (1983). We cannot condone

the practice of failing to fully disclose financial resources when that information is essential to

the trial court’s equitable determination of maintenance. See In re Marriage of Lehr, 217 Ill.

App. 3d 929, 938 (1991). The aim of pretrial discovery is full disclosure between the parties in

efforts “ ‘to enhance the truth-seeking process, to enable attorneys to better prepare for trial, to

eliminate surprise and to promote an expeditious and final determination of controversies in

accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.’ ” Dameron v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,

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 2020 IL 125219, ¶ 18 (quoting D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 561 (1997)). The circuit court’s

denial of the motion to reopen evidence prevents an undeserved windfall of income reassessment

when Craig failed to meaningfully participate in discovering this information. Similarly, it

prevents Craig from benefitting from his failure to introduce his complete and truthful income

situation at trial. See In re Marriage of Suarez, 148 Ill. App. 3d 849, 858 (1986).

¶ 72 Furthermore, as the court’s November 16, 2021, order denying Craig’s motion correctly

points out, Craig’s motion failed to provide an adequate reason as to why additional expert

testimony could not have been timely introduced at trial. Indeed, Craig’s motion is devoid of any

reason why additional expert testimony, or any new information deduced therefrom could not

have been presented at trial. Regardless of the veracity of Craig’s assertion that the failure to

offer expert accounting testimony satisfied the relevant factors (i.e., whether excluding this

expert testimony was not intentional, would not result in prejudice to Lori, and is of the utmost

importance to this case), this analysis misses the mark. While true that the court adopted Lori’s

income chart, the record reflects it reviewed all exhibits and pertinent testimony offered at trial

prior to setting the monthly maintenance award. As such, there is no new evidence Craig seeks to

introduce.

¶ 73 Finally, we note that, at the conclusion of the December 9, 2020, trial hearing, Craig’s

counsel brought forth the possibility of producing an accountant’s opinion as to the parties’ 2019

taxes. The court did not object. However, no expert opinion was produced at the following trial

date. This context further highlights Craig’s failure to meet his burden to explain why the

additional expert testimony he requested was not produced at trial. See Sawicki, 346 Ill. App. 3d

at 1120.

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¶ 74 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s denial of Craig’s motion to reopen evidence was

not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 75 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 76 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell

County.

¶ 77 Affirmed.

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