NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 210598-U
Order filed April 7, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Whiteside County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0598
v. ) Circuit No. 17-CF-143
)
JESSE A. BONS, ) Honorable
) Stanley B. Steines,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hettel and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition did not
violate the procedural requirements of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
Affirmed.
¶2 Defendant, Jesse A. Bons, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of one count of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction
and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Bons, 2021 IL App (3d) 180464. On September 16,
2021, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Act, alleging that he was
deprived of a fair trial where the trial court admitted evidence of his and the victim’s chlamydia
diagnosis at trial. On December 2, 2021, the trial court made the following docket entry:
“D’s Pro Se Petition for Post Conviction Relief is examined. The issue raised was
already addressed by the Appellate Court on direct appeal. D’s Petition for Post
Conviction relief is denied at the first stage review as it fails to raise a gist of a
constitutional claim. Motion for Appointment of counsel is moot. Clerk instructed to
forward a copy of minute entry to SAO and D. Clerk instructed to file and forward copy
of Notice of rights for Appeal to D.”
¶5 Defendant timely appealed.
¶6 II. ANALYSIS
¶7 On appeal, defendant argues that “[t]he circuit court’s summary dismissal of [his] pro se
post-conviction petition should be reversed and the case remanded for second-stage post-
conviction proceedings where the circuit court failed to enter a final written judgment order
within 90 days of the filing and docketing of the petition.” We apply a de novo standard of
review to a first-stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition. People v. Coleman, 183
Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
¶8 Defendant specifies two grounds for reversal. First, he contends that the docket entry was
not a “written order” entered within 90 days as contemplated by sections 122-2.1(a) and (a)(2) of
the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2020) (“Within 90 days after the filing and docketing
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of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this
Section.”); 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020) (requiring a “written order”). Second,
defendant contends that, even if the docket entry were a written order as contemplated by
sections 122-2.1(a) and (a)(2), the docket entry did not otherwise comply with section 122-
2.1(a)(2)’s provision that the court enter a “written order, specifying the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision.” See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020).
A review of Illinois jurisprudence reflects that both arguments have been rejected, as set forth
below.
¶9 As to the first argument, we note that the docket entry was in fact entered within the 90-
day time period and was copied and forwarded to defendant, along with a copy of his appeal
rights. This satisfied the Act’s written order requirement. See People v. Cooper, 2015 IL App
(1st) 132971, ¶¶ 7, 14. In Cooper, the appellate court considered the summary dismissal of a
postconviction petition, where no written order was issued, but the trial court’s decision was
reflected on the docket entry or “half-sheet,” and notice of the decision was sent to the defendant.
The appellate court concluded, “[A] written order of summary dismissal is not required. Instead,
a court summarily dismisses a postconviction petition when its decision is entered of record.” Id.
¶ 14 (citing People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶¶ 15, 29 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 272 (eff. Nov. 1,
1990))).
¶ 10 Just as in Cooper, here, the trial court reached a decision, within 90 days, to dismiss
defendant’s petition, and that decision was clearly communicated to the clerk of the court and
spread of record, as documented by the docket entry pronouncing, “D’s Petition for Post
Conviction relief is denied at the first stage review as it fails to raise a gist of a constitutional
claim.” That this was a decision entered of record is further supported where the record reflects
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that a copy of the minute order was sent to defendant apprising him of the “Order by minute
entry dismissing Defendant’s Pro Se petition for Post-Conviction Relief, a copy of the minute
order is enclosed herewith.” Simply put, the docket entry here complied with the written order
requirement of sections 122-2.1(a) and (a)(2) of the Act.
¶ 11 Defendant’s second argument, that the docket entry order did not otherwise comply with
section 122-2.1(a)(2)’s provision that the court enter a “written order, specifying the findings of
fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision[,]” is equally unavailing. See 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). Initially, we disagree with defendant’s argument that the
language of the docket entry failed to specify the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its judgment. The docket entry pronounces, “The issue raised was already addressed
by the Appellate Court on direct appeal. D’s Petition for Post Conviction relief is denied at the
first stage review as it fails to raise a gist of a constitutional claim.” This language explains to
defendant in clear and straightforward terms that his petition was denied because his argument
had already been rejected by this court in defendant’s direct appeal.
¶ 12 Furthermore, we observe that, even where a court order dismisses a petition as frivolous
or patently without merit but does not otherwise specify the reasons for doing so, such is not a
basis to reverse. In interpreting the Act’s requirement that the court “shall dismiss the petition in
a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law[,]” our supreme court has
held that “shall” directs the court to dismiss the petition and not to specify the reasons for doing
so. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 81-82 (1988).
¶ 13 Moreover, the Porter court found the “shall” requirement in section 122-2.1(a)(2) to be
directory and not mandatory. Id. Finally, we decline any suggestion that the supreme court’s
decision in Perez, 2014 IL 115927, overruled Porter. In Perez, the court considered only whether
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a written order dismissing a defendant’s postconviction petition was timely, where it was not
filed with the clerk until after the 90-day period. Id. ¶ 29. The Perez court never referenced
Porter nor addressed the written order or specificity requirements of section 122-2.1(a)(2). See
People v. Ranft, 2023 IL App (1st) 210300-U, ¶¶ 30-31 (though Perez held that an oral
pronouncement alone was insufficient under section 122-2.1(a)(2), it did not supersede Porter’s
holding that the written order and specificity requirements were directory.). Accordingly, the
postconviction petition was properly dismissed.
¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is affirmed.
¶ 16 Affirmed.
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