In re E.J.

[Cite as In re E.J., 2023-Ohio-1376.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE E.J. :
No. 112209
A Minor Child :

[Appeal by M.J., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. AD21907572

Appearances:

Law Office of Anthony J. Richardson, II, LLC, and
Anthony J. Richardson, II, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

Appellant, M.J., the mother (“Mother”) of E.J., appeals the judgment

of the juvenile court denying her request that legal custody of E.J. be awarded to

maternal grandmother, terminating her parental rights, and granting permanent

custody of E.J. to appellee the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family
Services (“CCDCFS” or the “agency”). After a thorough and careful review of the

facts and pertinent law, we affirm.

Procedural History

The agency became involved with the family when E.J. was born in

March 2021.1 At that time, Mother claimed the child “was the devil,” thereby raising

concerns for the child’s safety. The child was removed from Mother’s custody in

March 2021 and remained in CCDCFS’s custody, with the same foster family,

throughout the pendency of this case in the juvenile court.

In August 2021, the agency filed a complaint alleging that E.J. was

dependent and requesting an order of temporary custody. The agency’s request was

granted, and the child was committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS.

Following the child’s removal from Mother, the agency developed a case plan to

promote the permanency plan of reunification. The case plan included services for

Mother to address her issues with mental health, parenting, and substance abuse.

In February 2022, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody

to permanent custody. In June 2022, Mother filed a motion requesting that the

child be placed with maternal grandmother. CCDCFS opposed the motion, and the

trial court denied the motion. In July 2022, Mother filed a motion for legal custody

to herself or to maternal grandmother. In November 2022, maternal grandmother

filed a motion for allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and/or parenting

1
E.J.’s alleged father has had no involvement in the child’s life and never
responded to CCDCFS’s attempts to contact him. The juvenile court found that he
abandoned the child. We will not discuss him in this appeal.
time. On the morning of the November 2022 trial, maternal grandmother filed a

motion to intervene, which was denied. On November 22, 2022, the trial court

journalized its entry for the child in which it denied Mother’s motion for legal

custody to herself or grandmother, terminated all parental rights and ordered the

child placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.

Trial Testimony

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Issues

Mother’s case plan required her to obtain treatment for mental health

and substance abuse issues. Mother entered an outpatient program with a provider

called Exodus to address those issues. According to Mother, she “wasn’t getting the

help that she needed” from Exodus and she was discharged from the program in

August 2021, prior to completion of the services, and was referred for “a higher level

of care” for both her mental health and substance abuse issues. The agency referred

different services for Mother, but she was not initially willing to return to mental

health services. Eventually, Mother indicated that she wanted to return to Exodus,

despite the program not being able to accommodate her with the inpatient services

it had recommended for her.

Mother also refused to submit to any — random or requested — drug

screens mandated by the agency because, according to her, her drug use was helping

her deal with her mental health issues. Mother rejected the suggestion that legal

medication could help her manage her mental health issues, stating that she needed

marijuana and was going to continue using it.
 Darlene Palmore, a licensed chemical dependency counselor, was

assigned to Mother to help her with her substance abuse goals. Palmore testified

that Mother displayed erratic behavior, that was concerning to CCDCFS. For

example, Palmore testified about an occasion when Mother was threatening suicide

and refused help. In another incident that occurred at a July 2022 supervised visit

Mother had with E.J., Mother threatened Palmore and security had to physically

remove Mother from the building. Mother fought, both verbally and physically, with

the security guards during the incident. According to Palmore, Mother eventually

stopped communicating with her. It was Palmore’s belief that Mother was not

leading a sober life.

CCDCFS caseworker Andrea Flynn also testified about Mother’s mental

health crises. Flynn testified that, on at least six occasions, she had to call the police

or mobile crisis unit to Mother’s home because Mother was suicidal. The last time

it happened was in September 2022, two months before the trial in this matter.

Flynn testified that, as of the time of trial, Mother’s mental health was not stable

enough for her to participate in a parenting group. Specifically, Flynn had concerns

that Mother’s participation could jeopardize the safety of the other participants.

Flynn continuously advised Mother that she needed to get help with her marijuana

use in order to be reunited with her child, but Mother told her that she needed

marijuana and needed it in particular to sleep. Flynn testified that “it became more

difficult to work with [Mother] because of her mental health” and Mother’s

unwillingness to engage in mental health services.
 Flynn testified that Mother did engage in services with Ohio

Guidestone in the summer of 2022, but after approximately one month of doing so,

Mother “fell off.” Mother reengaged in services at Ohio Guidestone approximately

one month before trial, but Flynn testified that, as of the time of trial, Mother had

not made any meaningful progress on her case-plan objectives and would not be

able to provide a safe and appropriate home for E.J. in the foreseeable future.

The record further demonstrates that over the course of the

proceedings, Mother threatened CCDCFS and juvenile court staff with physical

violence. She also had an outstanding arrest warrant from an incident in which she

assaulted two MetroHealth Hospital police officers. Service providers who

interacted with Mother had to take safety precautions because of her volatile

behavior and did not enter her home alone.

Maternal Grandmother

Maternal grandmother, a licensed foster caregiver, testified that she

began fostering Mother when she was approximately one-month old and adopted

her when she was approximately three-years old. Mother began experiencing

mental health issues — bipolar disorder, depression, behavioral issues, and

anxiety — in her adolescence.

Maternal grandmother testified that she made Mother leave her

home when she was 18 years old because she was not compliant with her medication.

Grandmother testified that Mother would leave the house with the door open —

thereby leaving the house unsecured — and stay out all night; Mother would not tell
her when she planned to return. Mother would also get angry at times and knock

things off the wall. Grandmother explained that “[b]ecause [Mother] couldn’t follow

the house rules, then she was on her own” when she turned 18.

Mother’s Visitation With the Child

Mother was scheduled to visit with the child weekly on Fridays, and

although her attendance at visits was sporadic, according to Palmore, “[w]hen she

would come[,] she engaged pretty well with the baby.” After the July 2022 incident,

when Mother threatened Palmore, her visits were briefly suspended, and when

visitation resumed in September 2022, Mother was inconsistent in attending.

Because of Mother’s volatile behavior, the visits were conducted in the

most restrictive setting at the agency building, and during one visit, Mother

threatened to abscond with the child. It was discovered that she had a stun gun with

her.

CCDCFS’s Efforts Regarding Possible Relative Placement

At the time of E.J.’s removal from Mother’s custody, CCDCFS

approached maternal grandmother about the possibility of her caring for the child,

but she stated that “she had other foster children in her home at that time and she

wasn’t willing for them to move while [E.J.] moved in.” However, in January 2022,

the maternal grandmother indicated that she had changed her position about caring

for E.J. Specifically, the grandmother stated that she felt that her getting E.J. would

help Mother with her mental health issues. The agency was concerned about
grandmother’s reasoning, which it deemed unrealistic, given Mother’s untreated

and ongoing mental health issues.

Mother was initially upset with the idea of maternal grandmother

taking care of E.J. Mother called grandmother a “murderer” because Mother’s older

child died of sudden infant death syndrome while in grandmother’s care.

Throughout the proceedings, Mother wavered about grandmother having custody

of the child, sometimes requesting that the child be placed with grandmother and,

at other times, pleading that the child not be placed with her, saying that

grandmother “killed my other son” or that grandmother “didn’t raise me right,

please don’t place [E.J.] with her.”

Notwithstanding its concerns about grandmother, the agency offered

to provide her the opportunity to meet and interact with the child through virtual

visits at the agency. Initially, grandmother declined because it would have

interfered with her schedule; however, she did start visiting the child at the agency

in summer of 2022.

The agency also offered grandmother the opportunity to visit with the

child in her home, but she was unwilling to transport the child to and from the

visitations. Eventually, CCDCFS brought the child to grandmother’s home for two

visits.

CCDCFS met with grandmother in May 2022, with the goal of her

developing a plan in the event the child was placed with her to keep the child safe if

Mother ever posed as a threat. Grandmother said if that ever happened, she would
call 911. According to grandmother, she was “pretty sure” that she could “come up

with ways” to protect herself and the child if Mother posed as a threat. She suggested

that she could wear an “alert button,” but she maintained that she did not think it

was necessary; rather, she testified that “the system [i.e., CCDCFS] thinks it’s

necessary for me to have.”

Guardian Ad Litem

E.J.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) submitted a written report in which

she recommended that permanent custody be granted to CCDCFS. At trial, she

confirmed that her position remained the same. The GAL explained to the court

that Mother had not completed her case-plan objectives. According to the GAL, she

did not believe the child would be safe with Mother. The child, who was a little over

one and-a-half-years old at the time of trial, was “happy,” “part of the family,” and

“very engaged and very bonded” with the foster family, with whom the child had

been with since birth. According to the GAL, breaking E.J.’s bonds with the foster

family would be “catastrophic” for the child.

The GAL stated that the child could “absolutely not” be placed with

Mother. In regard to placement with maternal grandmother, the GAL stated that,

at that time, grandmother was not willing to do what she needed to do to form and

nurture a relationship with her grandchild. She explained that she believed it was

“too much” for grandmother because “she had other responsibilities.” She was

concerned that if grandmother’s other responsibilities made it too difficult for her

to transport the child for visitation, she would not be able to take care of E.J. “24/7.”
 However, the GAL recognized the importance of grandparents in

children’s lives and believed maternal grandmother should have a role in E.J.’s life

— but as a grandmother, not a custodian.

Based on this evidence, the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion for

legal custody to herself or grandmother, terminated Mother’s parental rights, and

granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody.

Assignments of Error

I. The trial court committed error by terminating appellant and
E.J.’s familial rights, where Ohio statutes would be
unconstitutional as applied.

II. The trial court committed error by not granting legal custody of
E.J. to his willing, fit grandmother.

Law and Analysis

Termination of Parental Rights Supported by Clear and
Convincing Evidence

In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that “termination

of her and E.J.’s rights under R.C. Chapter 2151 was unconstitutional as applied,

where appellant was fit to raise and parent [E.J.] and where E.J.’s grandmother was

willing to accept legal custody and keep E.J. in the family.” Although couched in

terms of a constitutional challenge, the substance of Mother’s argument is one of

weight of the evidence and that is how we will analyze it.

With regard to a challenge based upon manifest weight of the

evidence, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount
of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue
 rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [factfinder] that the
party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their [judgment], if,
on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater
amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be
established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
depends on its effect in inducing belief.’”

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12,

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).

When conducting a manifest-weight review, this court “weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Eastley at ¶ 20. “In weighing the

evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor

of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio

St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).

Therefore,

[t]he discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be
accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the
impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties
concerned. In re Satterwhite, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77071, 2001-
Ohio-4137. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing the
witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding (i.e., observing their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections and using these observations
in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony) cannot be
conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record. Id., citing Trickey
v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952).

In re C.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87159, 2006-Ohio-1944, ¶ 15.
 We begin our analysis with the recognition that, while a parent’s right

to raise a child is an essential and basic civil right, In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48,

679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), children have the right to “parenting from either [biological]

or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and

motivation.” In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th

Dist.1996).

R.C. 2151.414, Ohio’s permanent-custody statute, provides that the

juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody must be supported by clear

and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as

“that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty
as is required beyond a ‘reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which
will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction
as to the facts sought to be established.”

In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 42, quoting

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus. We will not reverse a juvenile court’s termination of parental rights and

award of permanent custody to an agency unless the judgment is not supported by

clear and convincing evidence. In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-

Ohio-314, ¶ 48; In re M.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100071, 2013-Ohio-5440, ¶ 24.

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by a

juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. Under the statute,

the juvenile court is authorized to grant permanent custody of a child to the agency

if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any
of the five factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e) exists and, furthermore,

permanent custody is in the best interest of the child under the factors enumerated

in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

Under the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the juvenile

court is to determine if any of the following factors exists: whether the child is

abandoned (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b)); whether the child is orphaned and there are no

relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody

(R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(c)); whether the child has been in the temporary custody of

public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more

months of a consecutive 22-month period (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)); whether another

child of the parent has been adjudicated as abused, neglected, or dependent on three

separate occasions (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e)); or, when none of these factors apply,

whether “the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents” (R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a)).

Here, the trial court found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that “the

child cannot be placed with either the Mother or alleged father within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with Mother or alleged father.” In making this finding,

the trial court relied on the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E), the finding of any

one of which requires the “cannot or should not be placed” finding. Specifically, R.C.

2151.414(E) states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the court determines, by clear and

convincing evidence, * * * that one or more of the [enumerated (E) factors] exist as
to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

either parent[.]”

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the trial court found that Mother failed to

remedy the conditions that led to the child’s removal. The record demonstrates that

a case plan was implemented for Mother at the outset of the child’s removal in March

2021. The plan required her to address her issues with mental health, parenting,

and substance abuse. However, Mother was not successful in achieving the goals of

her case plan. Throughout the proceedings, Mother maintained that she would not

stop her marijuana use, contending that it helped her sleep and with her mental

health issues.

Further, Mother refused to engage in mental health services for

approximately a year between August 2021 and summer 2022. According to

caseworker Flynn, Mother’s mental health was not stable enough to allow her to

participate in a parenting group; the agency feared Mother’s participation would put

the other participants in an unsafe situation. Indeed, the service providers who

interacted with Mother took safety precautions and would not enter her home alone

due to her volatile behavior. Thus, as of the time of trial, Mother had not made any

meaningful progress on any of her case-plan objectives and was not able to provide

a safe and appropriate home for E.J. in the foreseeable future.
 On this record, the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to remedy

the conditions leading to E.J.’s removal was supported by clear and convincing

evidence.

The trial court also made a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that

Mother had chronic mental illness and chemical dependency that was so severe that

it made her unable to provide an adequate, permanent home for E.J. as of the time

of trial and, as anticipated, within one year after trial. The record demonstrates that

Mother rejected the offer to obtain legal medication to help with her issues and,

instead, insisted on self-medicating with marijuana. She specifically stated that she

was not going to stop using marijuana. Indeed, Mother acknowledges her “cannabis

addiction and an attitude which led to incontrollable outbursts.” Appellant’s brief,

p. 10.

We are not persuaded by Mother’s insinuation that her drug use did

not interfere with her ability to parent E.J. because she “only” used marijuana and

it helped with her mental health issues. Nonmedical marijuana use in Ohio is illegal,

and its use impairs judgment. See In re G.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-752,

2016-Ohio-1188, ¶ 34. Mother could have sought medical marijuana, which, if

prescribed, would have subjected her use to supervision under the care of a medical

professional. But she rejected the idea of using legal medication to help with her

issues. Additionally, Mother’s marijuana use was not the agency’s sole concern.

Further, the record does not bear out Mother’s insinuation that her

marijuana use helped with her mental health issues — those issues continued
throughout the proceedings, including at trial where Mother had numerous

outbursts, that resulted in several admonishments and her removal from the

courtroom on more than one occasion.

Further, the record shows that Mother has had mental health issues

dating back to her adolescence, at which time she was not compliant with her

medications and resulted, in part, with maternal grandmother not allowing her to

live with her after the age of 18. In these proceedings, Mother failed to consistently

engage in mental-health services, at one point going approximately one year without

engagement. Her mental-health issues continued throughout the pendency of this

matter and included erratic, violent behaviors and repeated threats of suicide. As

the GAL noted in her written report, “most experiences with [Mother] were erratic,

threatening, awkward and confusing.” On this record, the trial court’s finding under

R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) regarding Mother’s chronic mental illness and chemical

dependency was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) allows a juvenile court to make a finding that a

parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward his or her child by failing to

regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by

other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for

the child. The trial court made a finding under this section in regard to Mother. The

record shows that Mother was advised that she needed to stop using mind-altering

substances in order to have a chance at reunification with E.J. Mother told

caseworker Flynn that she was not going to stop using marijuana because she
needed it, in particular to sleep. She rejected exploring legal medication to help her

with her issues. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding of Mother’s lack of

commitment.

The trial court also made a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) that

Mother was unwilling to provide for E.J. Again, this finding is supported by

Mother’s unwillingness to consistently engage in mental-health services and her

statement that she was going to continue her marijuana use, despite being advised

that her failure to make significant progress in those areas would hamper her ability

to be reunified with the child.

Thus, the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E) are supported

by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because the statute mandates that

if the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “one or more of the

following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that

the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not

be placed with either parent,” the trial court properly found that E.J. cannot or

should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time. See, e.g., In re

I.R., 2021-Ohio-3103, 179 N.E.3d 138, ¶ 69 (8th Dist.) (based on its findings under

R.C. 2151.414(E), the juvenile court was required to find that the child could not be

placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed

with either parent), citing In re C.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 82258 and 82852,

2003-Ohio-6854, ¶ 58.
 We now consider the second prong of a motion for permanent

custody, that is, the best interest of the child. In determining the best interest of the

child, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates that the juvenile court consider all relevant

factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.

This court reviews a trial court’s best-interest determination under

R.C. 2151.414(D) for an abuse of discretion. In re J.F., 2018-Ohio-96, 102 N.E.3d

1264, ¶ 55 (8th Dist.), citing In re D.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-

5618, ¶ 47. In this regard, “‘[a] trial court’s failure to base its decision on a

consideration of the best interests of the child constitutes an abuse of discretion.’”

In re J.F. at id., quoting In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314,

at ¶ 60. Further, although the juvenile court is required to consider each factor listed

in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is to be given greater weight than the others.
In re T.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re

Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

The trial court here considered the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)

and found that “a grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child.”

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding.

In regard to Mother’s interaction and relationship with E.J., the

record demonstrates that she was scheduled to visit with the child weekly on

Fridays. Her attendance at the visits were sporadic, including an approximate two-

month period where she did not visit at all, but when she did visit, she “engaged

pretty well with the baby.” The child was well-bonded to the foster family with

whom the child had been placed since birth and, according to the GAL, breaking

those bonds would be “catastrophic” for E.J. The GAL recommended permanent

custody to CCDCFS. Although Mother interacted well with E.J. during visits, this

court has stated that “‘the mere existence of a good relationship is insufficient.

Overall, we are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the mere existence

of a relationship.’” In re K.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95374, 2011-Ohio-349, ¶ 23,

quoting In re R.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83121, 2004-Ohio-2560.

In regard to the child’s need for a legally secure permanent

placement, the trial court found that E.J. cannot or should not be placed with

Mother. Such a finding precluded the trial court from considering returning the

child to Mother. See In re Mayle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 76739 and 77165,

2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379, 20-21 (July 27, 2000) (after finding that a child cannot
or should not be placed with a parent, the trial court is required by statute to place

the child with someone other than the parent).

In regard to the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors, as discussed, the juvenile

court found that several applied here, those being that Mother (1) failed to remedy

the conditions which led to E.J.’s removal; (2) had chronic mental health and

chemical dependency issues; (3) demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the

child; and (4) demonstrated an unwillingness to provide for the child.

On this record, the trial court’s finding that granting CCDCFS

permanent custody of E.J. was in the child’s best interest was not an abuse of

discretion.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

Denial of Legal Custody to Maternal Grandmother

In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court erred by not granting legal custody of E.J. to maternal grandmother. We

disagree.

The juvenile court may award legal custody of a child who has been

adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent to any person who filed a motion

requesting legal custody of the child. R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).

“Legal custody” [is] a legal status that vests in the custodian the right
to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where
and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect,
train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food,
shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental
rights, privileges, and responsibilities.
R.C. 2151.011(B)(21).

Following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency, a juvenile

court awards legal custody “‘by examining what would be in the best interest of the

child based on a preponderance of the evidence.’” In re T.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

102071, 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 44, quoting In re M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130,

2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 11, 14. A “preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that

is “‘more probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative value.’” In re C.V.M.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7, quoting In re D.P., 10th Dist.

Franklin Nos. 05AP-117, 05AP-118, 2005-Ohio-5097, ¶ 52.

When considering the best interest of a child in a legal custody matter,

“there is no ‘specific test or set of criteria’ that must be applied or considered.” In re

T.R. at ¶ 48. However, this court has found the factors delineated in R.C.

2151.414(D) to be “instructive.” In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and

100971, 2014-Ohio-4818, ¶ 20, citing In re E.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065,

2013-Ohio-1193, ¶ 13. As discussed, the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D) include

the interaction of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster

caregivers; the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been

in the temporary custody of a public children services agency and for how long; and

the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement.

The decision whether to grant a request for legal custody is within the

discretion of the juvenile court. In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108567, 2019-

Ohio-5128, ¶ 33. We will not reverse an award of legal custody absent a showing of
an abuse of discretion. In re B.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95794, 2011-Ohio-1967,

¶ 10. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an

unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

The record demonstrates that maternal grandmother did not

demonstrate full commitment to E.J.’s needs. She initially declined to take the child

because the responsibility would have conflicted with her other obligations. There

were also significant periods of time where she did not visit with the child because

she either could not or would not provide transportation for E.J. The record further

demonstrates that grandmother’s plans to keep E.J. safe were undeveloped or

unrealistic.

We are not persuaded by Mother’s citation to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c)

in support of her contention that by not granting legal custody to grandmother, the

juvenile court impermissibly foreclosed her chance of regaining custody of E.J. in

the event of her rehabilitation. R.C. 2151.42(B) specifically states that an order of

legal custody is intended to be permanent; it is not intended as a means to afford a

parent additional time to remedy the issues that led to agency involvement in the

first place.

“‘Courts are not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the

factors, it is in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted permanent

custody.’” In re S.F., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28606, 2020-Ohio-693, ¶ 50,

quoting In re A.A., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2008 CA 53, 2009-Ohio-2172, ¶ 19. Here, in
consideration of all the best interests factors, along with the GAL’s opinion that

removing E.J. from the only family the child has known since birth and to whom the

child is “very bonded,” would be “catastrophic,” we find no abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s denial of Mother’s request for legal custody to grandmother.

The second assignment of error is overruled.

Finally, we address two general contentions Mother has made in this

appeal. Specifically, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in rendering its

decision without the aid of expert testimony or a specific determination of her

unsuitability to parent the child.

In regard to expert testimony, this court has held that where mental

health is an issue, but not a predominant issue nor the determinative issue, in a

permanent custody case, due process does not require the court to appoint a

psychiatric expert to assist in the defense. In re M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 83409, 2005-Ohio-1305, ¶ 5; In re J.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82898, 2004-

Ohio-358, ¶ 9; In re B.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81982, 2003-Ohio-3256, ¶ 24.

The juvenile court here did not explicitly nor solely base its decision to terminate

Mother’s parental rights based on her chronic mental illness. Thus, it cannot be said

that Mother’s mental health issues were the determinative factor in the court’s

decision. Following this court’s precedent, we find no merit to Mother’s contention.

In regard to the lack of an unsuitability finding, the Supreme Court of

Ohio has held that “[a] juvenile court adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency

is a determination about the care and condition of a child and implicitly involves a
determination of the unsuitability of the child’s custodial and/or noncustodial

parents.” In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 23.

Here, the juvenile court found E.J. dependent. That adjudication carries with it the

implicit finding of parental unsuitability. The juvenile court was, therefore, not

obligated to make a separate finding of unsuitability prior to awarding CCDCFS

permanent custody.

Having found no merit to Mother’s assignments of error, the trial

court’s judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR