In re P.S. CA4/1

Filed 4/27/23 In re P.S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re P.S. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D081222
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. NJ15699A-E)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael Imhoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, L.S.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant, J.S.
 Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
L.S. (Mother) and J.S. (Father) appeal orders terminating their
parental rights to three of their five children: P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. Joining
in each other’s arguments, the parents contend the juvenile court erred by
not applying the sibling relationship exception set forth in Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). They maintain
that the court should have selected legal guardianship for the children’s
permanency plan instead of adoption. We conclude the juvenile court did not
err and affirm the orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I.
Initial Proceedings
This family first came to the attention of the San Diego County Health
and Human Services Agency (Agency) in 2016 and has been the subject of 18
past referrals for lack of supervision. P.S. is now 14 years old, twins Ka.S.
and F.S. are 12 years old, Ke.S. is eight, and E.S. is seven. All of the children
except Ke.S. have been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and
F.S. and E.S. are nonverbal.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2 The facts summarized herein will be limited to those necessary for
context and to address applicability of the sibling relationship exception to
adoption.

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 For approximately a year prior to the Agency’s removal of the children,
the family resided with the paternal grandparents. The parents frequently
left the children with the paternal grandparents for days at a time without
warning and did not keep in contact. Despite their good intentions, the
paternal grandparents struggled to supervise the children on their own.
Although the Agency offered services, the parents avoided meeting with
Child Welfare Services and were otherwise uncooperative, and the paternal
grandparents declined to take advantage of any of the services offered.
A. Initiation of Dependency Proceedings through Disposition
In December 2020, the Agency took the children into protective
custody, placed them at Polinsky Children’s Center (Polinsky), and filed
petitions under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on their behalf based on a
substantial risk of serious physical harm. The petitions alleged the parents
failed to supervise the children and left them with the parental
grandparents, who also inadequately supervised them and failed to follow
through with additional resources provided by the Agency to assist in
meeting the children’s needs. In particular, the petitions cited an incident in
October when E.S., who was four years old at the time, left the family’s
beachfront hotel room unnoticed and ran into the ocean. He was found
struggling in the water by a kayaker, who notified police. The Agency also
noted ongoing concerns regarding the children wandering the neighborhood
naked or half-clothed and getting onto the roof of the paternal grandparents’
home while in the grandparents’ care.
At the continued detention hearing, both parents denied the allegations
in the petitions. The court found prima facie evidence of the allegations,
ordered the children detained, and authorized liberal supervised visitation
for the parents.

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 The Agency filed an addendum report prior to the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing wherein it indicated that the parents had not been in
contact with the Agency or visited the children. P.S. told a social worker she
did not expect her parents to visit because they had not returned her call, and
“they only do what they want, my grandparents take care of us and they just
come and go without telling us anything.” She said they had been coming
and going for up to 10 days at a time for a long time and that she did
everything for her brothers and sisters. The paternal grandparents did,
however, visit the children three to five times per week at Polinsky.
The Agency concluded in its initial assessment that the parents’
behavior resulted in the children having “vast dental needs,” failing grades,
poor school attendance, and lapses in supportive developmental and
educational services. Additionally, “[a]ll five of the minors present[ed] with
some level of special need or developmental delay that require[d] immediate
attention.”
In February 2021, the Agency placed P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. in a foster
home. The caregivers facilitated visits with the paternal grandparents and
the remaining siblings at Polinsky. The parents met once with a social
worker, but never completed the interview or paperwork, and did not attend
scheduled visitations with the children.
After several continuances because neither their attorneys nor the
Agency could reach the parents or engage them in the process, the juvenile
court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in March 2021 and
sustained the petitions. The court declared the children dependents, removed
custody from the parents, and adopted the Agency’s recommendations
regarding services.

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B. Reunification Period
In the Agency’s September 2021 status review report, a social worker
noted that P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. reported positive experiences with their
caregivers, such as going to the beach and learning how to surf. The three
siblings continued to have weekly visits—sometimes numerous visits per
week—with their paternal grandparents. The children also visited with F.S.
and E.S., and a social worker observed P.S. playing the ukulele for her
siblings. She also witnessed F.S. taking Ka.S.’s hand and motioning for her
to join him at Polinsky. The report further references one occasion when the
paternal grandparents, parents, and extended family members had a
supervised visit with the children and caregivers in a park.
The court appointed special advocate (CASA) for F.S. and E.S. observed
three weekly sibling visits at Polinsky. She noted that P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S.
interacted with F.S. and E.S. “on a somewhat limited basis, such as ruffling
E.S.’s hair or tickling him, and trying to redirect F.S. when he runs behind
trees.” The CASA further observed that “the three visiting siblings
interacted more with each other and the paternal grandparents” than with
F.S. and E.S. P.S. tended to interact with the boys the most and in a
caregiver role, such as when she showed F.S. how to gently strum her
ukulele. However, the CASA felt the consistent visits were “loving and
appropriate, although somewhat limited at times due to the boys’ diagnoses.”
The Agency placed E.S. with a nonrelative caregiver in September
2021. At the scheduled six-month review hearing the same month, Mother
requested that the court set a contested hearing. Because the parents
continued to have little contact with the Agency, a social worker made an
unannounced visit to the paternal grandparents’ residence in October. She
briefly spoke with both parents and provided them with their case plans, but

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then the parents drove away. The paternal grandfather indicated that
Mother began “throwing things” at him, including a sharp object that cut his
arm, when he refused to disclose the address of E.S.’s placement. As a result,
the paternal grandfather obtained a temporary restraining order against her,
and Mother moved out of the house and into the paternal grandparents’ van.
The court continued services at the contested hearing and ordered that the
children remain detained in their current placements.
P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. continued to engage in activities and improve
academically while in foster care, and all three reported that they enjoyed
residing with their caregivers. The caregivers expressed on multiple
occasions their willingness to adopt or assume legal guardianship of the three
children. F.S. remained at Polinsky. E.S. was reported to be doing well in
his placement, although he continued to have some behavioral issues such as
hair pulling and biting. All five siblings visited weekly at Polinsky, and P.S.
and Ka.S. told their CASA that they loved seeing their brothers and would
like to visit more often. Unfortunately, due to scheduling and transportation

issues,3 sibling visits with E.S. initially became more limited following his
placement change.
Mother was incarcerated for over a week in November 2021 due to
fraudulent activity involving her bank cards. The parents visited P.S., Ka.S,
and Ke.S. once in November and Mother spoke with a social worker after the
visit. The parents visited F.S. once as well during the reporting period but
did not visit E.S. Otherwise, Mother and Father did not respond to Agency
efforts to reach them or participate in services.

3 The reports by the Agency and F.S. and E.S.’s CASA repeatedly noted
that the boys are challenging to transport because both require additional
safety measures due to their diagnoses.
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 The children continued to have weekly sibling visits at Polinsky.
During a January 2022 visit at a park, E.S. was happy to see his siblings,
played for over an hour (particularly with Ka.S.), and said “bye” upon
leaving, which was the first word his CASA had ever heard him speak. At
the end of February 2022, the Agency placed F.S. with nonrelative extended
family members. In an addendum report before the 12-month review
hearing, the Agency reported that P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. all indicated they
would like to remain placed with their caregivers.
At the contested 12-month review hearing in March 2022, the juvenile
court concluded that returning the children to their parents’ care would be
detrimental to them, found there was not a substantial probability of return
by the 18-month date, terminated reunification services, and set a

permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.4 F.S. was
returned to Polinsky in April 2022, following inconclusive allegations of
physical abuse by the caregivers.
II.
Permanency Planning
In its June 2022 report prior to the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency
reported that P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. were doing well in school and had made
friends. A social worker further noted that she received a call from Father in
April 2022, informing her that he was in a recovery program in Hawaii.
Father wanted to know how to regain placement of his children. P.S., Ka.S.,
and Ke.S. subsequently began having multiple phone visits per week with

4 Following the hearing, Father filed a notice of intent to file a writ
petition seeking relief from the court’s order setting a section 366.26 hearing.
However, his attorney subsequently notified this court that there were no
viable issues for writ review and the case was dismissed (D080181, April 22,
2022).
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their father. Meanwhile, Mother reported being incarcerated in May, and
Father indicated she moved to Las Vegas in June. Mother contacted P.S.,
Ka.S., and Ke.S. a few times during this period.
According to P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S.’s caregiver and the girls’ CASA, P.S.
and Ka.S. were traumatized by their visits to Polinsky due to adverse
experiences during their stay there, which made visiting F.S. challenging.
Because of their feelings, the caregivers and paternal grandparents worked
out a monthly visitation schedule at E.S.’s home. F.S. required an escort and
adequate transportation to attend these visits, which was difficult to arrange.
Ka.S. also had a few virtual visits with her twin.
The CASA for the girls indicated in her June report that all five
siblings had not visited together in quite some time, and F.S. and E.S.’s
CASA echoed concern about the lack of visits. However, all five siblings
visited with Father and the paternal grandparents in July. P.S. chatted with
her cousin away from the group, Ka.S. and Ke.S. played ball with Father, and
F.S. played on the playground with Father and then sat with his
grandmother. During a visit in August, P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. played on park
structures and rolled a ball with E.S. F.S. would not get out of the transport
van, but a social worker said the siblings took turns laughing and playing
games with him in the van and seemed to be enjoying themselves. F.S.’s
CASA described the day somewhat differently, stating that F.S.’s
engagement with his siblings in the van “was limited since he was watching
videos on a phone.” The parents did not attend. In August, the siblings
visited E.S. twice at a park near his home. Visits with the parents were
limited as both parents were repeatedly arrested, and Father relapsed after
completing his substance abuse program in June.

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 In October 2022, counsel for P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. filed a section 388
petition requesting to modify the order allowing the parents liberal
supervised visitation and suspend visits to prevent further inappropriate
contact from the parents. Text messages from Mother had resulted in P.S.’s
hospitalization due to suicidal ideation, and all three minors reported not
wanting to communicate with their parents. During an October hearing, the
juvenile court made a prima facie finding on the motion, set an evidentiary
hearing on the same date as the contested section 366.26 hearing, and
ordered no contact from the parents in the interim. The court found Father
had not made a prima facie showing on a section 388 petition he filed
requesting to have all five children placed with him and denied the motion.
Meanwhile, the Agency recommended adoption for P.S., Ka.S., and
Ke.S., whose caregivers said they wanted to continue the siblings’ connections
with F.S. and E.S. and would make every effort to keep them bonded. P.S.
and Ka.S. both said they would like to be adopted by their caregivers; Ke.S.
avoided discussions about adoption and the social worker was not certain he
understood the concept. The Agency recommended continued foster care for
F.S. and E.S.
III.
The Contested Section 366.26 Hearing
At the contested section 366.26 hearing, counsel for P.S., Ka.S., and
Ke.S. withdrew her section 388 motion. Mother testified and, when asked if
she was concerned about P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S.’s ongoing contact with their
siblings, E.S. and F.S., if her parental rights were terminated, she responded,
“I’m concerned that the family is split up.” During closing arguments,
Mother’s and Father’s attorneys argued that the court should apply the

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parental-benefit exception or the sibling relationship exception and decline to
terminate parental rights.
The court concluded that P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. were likely to be
adopted and that the parental-benefit exception did not apply. In so doing,
the court specifically noted: “Both [P.S. and Ka.S.] are on the autism
spectrum. They have special needs. The daily routine as well as interaction
with professionals is extraordinarily important for them. All of [sic] three of
the children have shown progress while in the care of the current caretakers.
Each, in their own way, has expressed a desire to be adopted citing issues
such as security, role modeling and comfort.”
With regard to the sibling-relationship exception, the court found that
they were a five-sibling group, they were raised together in the same
household for a period of time, they shared common experiences, and there
were “varying levels of existing close knit, strong bonds with the siblings.”
However, the court determined “there would not be a substantial interference
with the three siblings’ relationship with their other two siblings.” In
balancing all the factors, the court further concluded that “both [F.S. and
E.S.] have such significant needs that those needs cannot be met in a family
setting. Here, two of the three children in the sibling subgroup are on the
autistic spectrum. They’re showing improvement in their care. [¶] So it would
appear to the court that the benefit of legal permanence to adoption does
outweigh the long-term emotional interests. As sad and tragic as that may
appear, I believe this record justifies that finding.” Accordingly, the court
found adoption in P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S.’s best interest, severed Mother’s and
Father’s rights to these three children, and granted prospective adoptive
parent status to their caregivers. Because F.S. and E.S. were not likely to be

10
adopted and no willing guardians had been identified, the court ordered
continued foster care for them.
DISCUSSION
Mother and Father challenge the juvenile court’s finding that the

beneficial sibling relationship exception did not apply.5 “Adoption is the
preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is
required to select adoption as the permanent plan.” (In re Fernando
M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.) The sibling relationship exception to
adoption applies where the court concludes “[t]here would be substantial
interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the
nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to,
[1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether
the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and
strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child’s
best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared
to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(v).) The parent bears the burden in the juvenile court of showing the
exception applies. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949 (L.Y.L.).)
This is considered “a heavy burden.” (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
804, 813.)
Although any sibling relationship necessarily involves two or more
siblings, a court considering the exception must focus its analysis on the child

5 To the extent the parents raised additional issues in their notices of
appeal that were not subsequently briefed on appeal, we deem them forfeited
and do not address them. (People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840
[issues not raised in the opening brief are forfeited]; see also Berger v.
Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119–1120 [an appellate court is not
required to “consider alleged error where the appellant merely complains of it
without pertinent argument”].)
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being considered for adoption, not the other siblings. (In re Celine R. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 45, 54.) “ ‘The author of the legislation adding the sibling
relationship exception anticipated that “use of the new exception ‘will likely
be rare,’ ” meaning “that the child’s relationship with his or her siblings
would rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption.” ’ ”
(In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174 (D.O.).)
Application of the sibling relationship exception requires a two-step
analysis. First, the court must determine whether terminating parental
rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. (D.O.,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) Second, if the court determines
termination would substantially interfere with the relationship, it must then
“ ‘weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship
against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 173–174.)
“To the extent appellants challenge the juvenile court’s ultimate
determination, we apply the substantial evidence standard to the juvenile
court’s underlying factual determinations, and the abuse of discretion
standard to the court’s weighing of competing interests.” (D.O., supra, 247
Cal.App.4th at p. 174.)
Both parents in this case expressed concern that terminating parental
rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. Father
argued that legal guardianship was the only way to guarantee the siblings
would have ongoing contact since there was no post-adoption contact
agreement in place. Mother expressed similar concerns and submitted that
the decrease in visits from weekly to monthly showed that the prospective
adoptive parents were not committed to maintaining the sibling relationship.

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 As an initial matter, in evaluating whether adoption would
substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, the juvenile court may
consider evidence that the children are likely to have ongoing contact with
their siblings even if there is no specific visitation contract in place prior to
the court terminating parental rights. As the court explained in D.O.,
although section 366.26 expressly enumerates three factors to consider when
determining whether to apply the sibling relationship exception, “it also
provides that the court’s analysis should ‘tak[e] into consideration the nature
and extent of the [sibling] relationship, including, but not limited to,’ those
expressly enumerated factors.” (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 174–
175.) In other words, “the plain language of section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)
authorized the juvenile court to consider factors other than those expressly
articulated in the statute—such as a proven history of, and expressed
commitment to, sibling visits.” (Id. at p. 175.) Although “the court may
include in the final adoption order provisions for the adoptive parent or
parents to facilitate postadoptive sibling contact” (italics added), it may do so
only “[w]ith the consent of the adoptive parent or parents” and “[i]n no event
shall the continuing validity of the adoption be contingent upon the
postadoptive contact.” (§ 366.29, subd. (a).) Thus, the juvenile court is not
obliged to include such a provision, and Father offers no authority requiring
the juvenile court to order guardianship in the absence of an express post-
adoption visitation contract. We therefore conclude the juvenile court
properly considered evidence that the siblings would have ongoing contact
even if the court terminated parental rights and was not prohibited from
ordering adoption under these circumstances.
Mother’s argument implies that, even though it was appropriate for the
court to consider the prospective adoptive parents’ assurances that they

13
would continue sibling visits, substantial evidence did not support the court’s
conclusion that “there would not be a substantial interference with the three
siblings’ relationship with their other two siblings.” Mother points to the
decrease in frequency of visits as evidence that there is no reason to have
confidence that the caregivers will keep up with visitation after the adoption
is final. However, speculation that visits will decrease or cease after
adoption, despite a caregiver’s expressed intention to maintain contact, is not
substantial evidence that adoption will interfere with the sibling
relationship. (See In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293.) We also
cannot consider this issue in a vacuum. (See In re Valerie A. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 987, 1014 (Valerie A.) [concluding that a court cannot “ignore the
practical realities of the extended family’s circumstances in considering
whether termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with the
sibling relationships”].) The caregivers in this case changed the visitation
schedule not because of a lack of commitment to maintaining the sibling
bond, but to protect P.S. and Ka.S. from the trauma of visiting Polinsky.
They then demonstrated their continued dedication to visitation by
proactively coordinating directly with E.S.’s caregiver and the paternal
grandparents to move visits to E.S.’s home. There is no evidence F.S. was
intentionally excluded from these visits; his need for an escort and adequate
transportation (issues outside of the prospective adoptive parents’ control)
simply made it challenging for him to attend. The caregivers also took P.S.,
Ka.S., and Ke.S. to several visits with the siblings and extended family
members in parks and facilitated virtual visits between F.S. and his twin.
Thus, although there are practical hurdles to overcome in maintaining
contact with F.S. and E.S., the caregivers have shown willingness to adapt
and craft alternate solutions and have fostered contact between the siblings

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for over a year and a half. On this record, we conclude substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s conclusion.
The parents also present no evidence that ordering guardianship would
lessen the difficulties of coordinating visits with F.S. Even court-ordered
visitation would not alter the reality that he is at Polinsky, visiting him there
causes the girls trauma, and transporting him elsewhere involves significant
logistical difficulties. (See Valerie A., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014
[declining to apply sibling relationship exception where “the selection of a
lesser-preferred permanency plan would not further the children’s interests
in maintaining their relationships with [their sibling], nor would it provide
them with the security and sense of belonging conferred by adoption”].) The
parents do not suggest that the court would order the girls to visit Polinsky
despite their trauma, nor do they point to any steps the court could take to
alleviate the transportation challenges. Furthermore, even if evidence
supported the conclusion that a guardianship would somehow result in more
sibling visitation, it would not alter our decision. “When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has
no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318−319 (Stephanie M.).) The juvenile
court acknowledged that the siblings had been raised together, shared
common experiences, and were strongly bonded and these points are largely
undisputed. But substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
determination that terminating parental rights would not substantially
interfere with the sibling relationship and we cannot reweigh the evidence on
appeal.
Even assuming the parents had met this threshold element, they also
were required to demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion in

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concluding that the benefits of adoption outweighed P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S.’s
interest in continuing the sibling relationship with their brothers. (D.O.,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173–174.) The evidence here shows that P.S.
and Ka.S. have ASD, P.S. also has a learning disability, and all three
children have individualized education plans to help them deal with their
struggles at school. The female caregiver is a special education teacher and
knows that children with ASD, like P.S. and Ka.S., need consistency and
stability. For this reason, she takes time to prepare the girls in advance for
activities, events, and meetings so they feel comfortable and do well. As a
result, all three siblings enjoy school and have improved grades. They also
have been able to make friends, in some cases for the first time, and engage
in new activities they enjoy such as music and sports. The caregivers also
have ensured that the three children attended all their medical and dental
appointments, and both caregivers immediately responded with appropriate
medical care and emotional support during P.S.’s emotional crisis. We
conclude this constitutes substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the caregivers are “proactive with regard to assisting the
children” and P.S., Ka.S., and Ke.S. are “showing improvement in their care.”
The question then is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in
concluding that these benefits of adoption outweighed any loss in ongoing
contact with F.S. and E.S. A dependency court abuses its discretion when its
decision exceeds the bounds of reason. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.
318–319.) In recent visits, the three foster siblings have only been able to
engage with F.S. and E.S. on a limited basis—such as rolling a ball with E.S.
or keeping F.S. company while he watched his phone. And, due to these boys’
extensive needs, visits remain challenging because they require a support
person to make it possible to attend and participate in visits. The juvenile

16
court weighed this evidence against the significant benefits P.S., Ka.S., and
Ke.S. have gained from this particular foster placement. While it
undoubtedly was a difficult decision, under these circumstances, it was
reasonable for the court to conclude that this was not the rare situation
where the three foster children’s relationship with their brothers was
sufficiently strong to outweigh the considerable benefits of adoption.
In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808 (Naomi P.), upon which
Father relies to support his claim of error, does not persuade us otherwise.
In Naomi P., the juvenile court heard testimony from Naomi’s three older
siblings, her maternal grandmother, her mother, and her resource mother
regarding the bond between the siblings. (Naomi P., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 811, 813, 824.) “In finding the exception applicable, the [juvenile] court
specifically noted that it relied on the demeanor of the witnesses in making
its decision.” (Id. at p. 824.) It particularly noted the “ ‘happy, joyful
expression[s]’ ” on the older siblings faces and expressed some concern about
the resource mother’s intentions. (Ibid.) On appeal, the reviewing court
concluded that because it is not a reviewing court’s “role to interfere with the
trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility,” and
because the “[t]he juvenile court had before it substantial evidence to support
its conclusion that all requirements had been met to justify application of the
sibling relationship exception,” it was appropriate to affirm the guardianship
order. (Id. at pp. 824–825.) While these facts may have been adequate to
affirm an existing guardianship order, they are not sufficiently comparable to
support reversal of an order finding adoption appropriate. To the contrary, in
the instant case, no one but Mother testified as to the sibling bond, and the
record contained evidence that at least P.S. and Ka.S. understood the
potential consequences of adoption and nonetheless wanted to be adopted.

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(See L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [factoring into the analysis the
fact that L. Y. wanted to be adopted even if it ended her relationship with her
sibling].) F.S. and E.S., unfortunately, were not able to voice their opinions,
and Ke.S. repeatedly expressed that he enjoyed living with his caregivers.
All three foster children thrived in their placement, and neither the court nor
the Agency expressed any reservations about the caregivers. Thus, the
record contained substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the requirements of the sibling relationship exception had not
been met and, like the court in Naomi P., we will not interfere with the
juvenile court’s assessment of witness credibility or its weighing of the
evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The November 8, 2022 orders are affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.

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