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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL STARK : No. 759 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-63-CR-0000976-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: April 28, 2023
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from an order entered on
June 24, 2022, which granted a motion to suppress filed by Appellee, Michael
Stark. The Commonwealth contends that the trial court abused its discretion
or committed an error of law in granting Appellee’s motion. After careful
review, we reverse the trial court’s suppression ruling and remand for further
proceedings.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts established at the May 31,
2022 suppression hearing as follows:
On January 2, 2022, Officer [Richard] Oddi of the Cecil
Township Police initiated a traffic stop of a silver Ford Mustang
[because] the registered owner of the vehicle [possessed] a
suspended drivers’ license. The driver of the vehicle matched
the profile of the registered owner, [Appellee]. The officer was
in an unmarked vehicle but wore full uniform. After
approaching the vehicle, [Officer Oddi] confirmed that
[Appellee] . . . was the driver. [Appellee] acknowledged that
his license was suspended and[, upon Officer Oddi’s request for
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his license and registration, Appellee gave him] a credit card for
identification. The passenger of the vehicle provided a drivers’
license. [Officer Oddi] took the credit card and license to his
patrol vehicle, [and instructed] the occupants of the [vehicle]
to “sit tight[”] and “[not to] get out of the car.” [After several
minutes, Officer Oddi] again returned to the vehicle to ask
[Appellee] his address, which he provided [via] two traffic
citations[. During this interaction, Officer Oddi] asked
[Appellee] where he was coming [from], to which [Appellee]
responded, “[c]ame from Pittsburgh[, Pennsylvania], came to
see him . . . not even gonna [sic] lie, I came to smoke with
him.”
[Officer Oddi’s] next question to [Appellee] was, “Did you have
some already?” [Appellee] admitted that he smoked about an
hour prior. [Officer Oddi then asked if either Appellee or the
passenger had a medical marijuana card. Appellee indicated he
did not. The passenger stated he did have a medical marijuana
card, but it was not with him. Lastly, Officer Oddi] asked if
there [was] any marijuana in the vehicle, to which [Appellee]
answered, “Yes.”
Officer Oddi then returne[d] to his patrol vehicle. When another
officer arrive[d] at the scene[, the officer asked what was] going
on [and] Officer Oddi responde[d], “[Appellee] admitted to
smoking an hour and a half ago, said there [was] weed in the
car, someone has a medical marijuana card but it [is] not him .
. . gonna [sic] take the driver out first.”
The officers then instructed [Appellee] to exit the vehicle.
[Appellee] consented to a search of his person and his vehicle.
The officers did not find any other paraphernalia or contraband
in the vehicle or on [Appellee]. The passenger was arrested for
possession and placed in the patrol vehicle. The officers []
subjected [Appellee] to [Standardized Field Sobriety Tests
(“SFST”) and Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement
(“ARIDE”)] field testing. Officer Oddi testified that the field
testing revealed [that Appellee] showed signs of impairment,
but did not so indicate in either the affidavit of probable cause
or his testimony [during the suppression hearing] which test
[revealed] signs of impairment, nor was it evident from the
bodycam footage. [Appellee] was [subsequently] arrested and
taken to the hospital for blood testing, to which he consented.
The blood testing results indicated positive [] marijuana and its
metabolites.
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Trial Court Order, 6/24/22, 1-3.
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts of driving under
the influence (“DUI”): controlled substance – schedule I; DUI: controlled
substance – Section II or III; and driving while license is suspended or revoked
DUI. On March 23, 2022, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, seeking
to suppress the evidence obtained from the sobriety field testing, as well as
his blood test results. Appellee argued that, at the time Officer Oddi asked
him if “he [already] smoke[d] some marijuana” he was subjected to a
custodial interrogation, warranting the issuance of Miranda1 warnings.
Appellee’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 3/23/22, at 7. Hence, Appellee claimed
Officer Oddi’s failure to issue Miranda warnings rendered “all of [his] answers
to [police] questioning, . . . [the] field sobriety testing, [the] observations and
the blood draw . . . fruit of the poisonous tree requiring suppression.” Id. As
such, Appellee asked the trial court to suppress his statement indicating he
smoked marijuana an hour prior to driving, together with the results of his
blood test.
A suppression hearing was held on May 31, 2022, during which Officer
Oddi testified. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at 1-33. On June 24,
2022, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion. Trial Court Order, 6/24/22,
at 1-6. Specifically, the trial court held that Appellee was “in custody” after
Officer Oddi initiated the traffic stop and then told Appellee to “‘sit tight’ and
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1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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remain in his vehicle.” Id. at 4. In addition, the trial court concluded that
Officer Oddi’s question, “[d]id you have some already?”, lodged in response
to Appellee’s admission that he “intend[ed] to smoke marijuana once he
reached his destination” was “the functional equivalent of interrogation” and,
as such, Appellee was subjected to a custodial interrogation, necessitating the
issuance of Miranda warnings. Id. Because Officer Oddi failed to Mirandize
Appellee, the trial court held that Appellee’s admission that he smoked
marijuana an hour prior to driving was inadmissible. Id. In addition, the trial
court held that, absent Appellee’s statement, Officer Oddi “did not have
reasonable suspicion to conduct the field testing and subsequently arrest
[Appellee] for suspicion of DUI.” Id. at 6. Based upon the foregoing, the trial
court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result, i.e., Appellee’s field test
and blood test results. Id.
On June 29, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal
from the trial court's June 24, 2022, interlocutory order and, within the
Commonwealth's notice of appeal, the Commonwealth properly certified that
the order “terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.”
Commonwealth's Notice of Appeal, 6/29/22, at 1; see also Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).2
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2“Certification of pretrial appeals by the Commonwealth [under Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d)] is an exception to the requirement that
appeals may be taken only from final orders.” Commonwealth v. Cosnek,
836 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. 2003). As our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen
a pretrial motion removes evidence from the Commonwealth's case, only the
prosecutor can judge whether that evidence substantially handicaps his ability
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal:3
Does the initial questioning during a roadside investigation
regarding the driver’s use of marijuana require the defendant
to be given Miranda warnings?
Commonwealth Brief at 6.
When reviewing a challenge to a suppression ruling, our standard of
review is
limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
[defense] prevailed before the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the [defense] and so much of the
evidence for the [Commonwealth] as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court's factual findings are supported by the
record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may
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to prove every essential element of his case. Additionally, only the prosecutor
can judge whether he can meet his constitutional burden of proving his case
without that evidence.” Id. at 875 (citations omitted). In following, the
Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth may utilize Rule 311(d) to
immediately appeal “a pretrial ruling [that] results in the suppression,
preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.” Id. at 877.
3 On October 28, 2022, Appellee filed an application to dismiss, arguing that
the Commonwealth failed to comply with various appellate rules in drafting its
brief and failed to file a reproduced record, and, as such, this Court should
dismiss or quash this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See Appellee’s
Application to Dismiss Appeal for Failure to Comply with Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 10/28/22, at 1-5. On November 2, 2022, the
Commonwealth filed its reproduced record. Although we do not condone the
Commonwealth’s failure to strictly comply with the appellate rules, the defects
in the Commonwealth’s brief and the untimely filing of the reproduced record
do not hinder our appellate review and therefore we decline to quash or
dismiss the appeal. See Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the Sisters of
Christian Charity, 32 A.3d 800, 804 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), aff'd,
91 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
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reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous.
Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court
turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal
conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty
it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the
law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted and formatting altered).
Herein, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erroneously
suppressed the incriminating statement Appellee made to police during a
lawful traffic stop. i.e., Appellee’s admission that he smoked marijuana before
driving.4 In particular, the Commonwealth argues that, under the precedent
set forth by the United States Supreme Court, “police need only give Miranda
warnings” if a motorist is “placed under arrest or when the questioning of a
suspect is so prolonged or coercive as to approximate the atmosphere of a
station house interrogation.” Commonwealth Brief at 17. Because Appellee
was only subjected to a temporary investigatory detention and was not, in
fact, “in custody” at the time he made the challenged statement, the
Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting suppression
because “Miranda warnings [were] not essential.” Id. We agree.
Under Pennsylvania law, there are three categories of police-citizen
interactions. As our Supreme Court has clearly articulated:
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4There is no dispute “that the traffic stop for driving under suspension was
valid.” Trial Court Order, 6/24/22, at 3.
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The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
information) which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to
respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be
supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a
stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such
coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be
supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 48 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis,
662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995).
“It is long-settled that Miranda warnings are only required for the
third-level interaction, i.e., custodial interrogation.” Commonwealth v.
Spence, 2023 WL 2002292 *1, *9 (Pa. Super. Feb. 15, 2023), citing
Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5 (Pa. 2003). Importantly, though, “it
is equally settled law that a motor vehicle stop is generally a second-level
interaction, an investigatory detention.” Id., citing Commonwealth v.
Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2006). We previously stated:
[a] traffic stop constitutes an investigative rather than a
custodial detention, unless, under the totality of the
circumstances, the conditions and duration of the detention
become the functional equivalent of arrest. Since an ordinary
traffic stop is typically brief in duration and occurs in public
view, such a stop is not custodial for Miranda purposes.
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en
banc) (citations omitted).
The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of
the circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive
as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the
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basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the
suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and
why; whether restraints were used; whether the law
enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the
investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019-1020 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citations omitted), aff’d, 78 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2013).
An ordinary traffic stop becomes “custodial” when the stop
involves coercive conditions, including, but not limited to, the
suspect being forced into a patrol car and transported from the
scene or being physically restrained. Such coercive conditions
constitute “restraints comparable to arrest” so as to transform
the investigative nature of an ordinary traffic stop into custodial
interrogation.
Mannion, 725 A.2d at 202 (internal citation omitted). Thus, “police need only
give Miranda warnings while detaining a suspect by the side of a public
highway when the suspect [has] actually [been] placed under arrest or when
the questioning of the suspect is so prolonged or coercive as to approximate
the atmosphere of a station house interrogation.” Commonwealth v.
Toanone, 553 A.2d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations and footnote
omitted).
Herein, the testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Officer
Oddi initiated a valid traffic stop after he “ran the registration plate for
[Appellee’s] vehicle” and learned that “the registration showed that [Appellee]
was DUI suspended.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at 5-6. After
initiating the traffic stop based upon probable cause, Officer Oddi approached
the vehicle and asked Appellee for “identifying information.” Id. at 6.
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Appellee responded that he “lost his license” but provided Officer Oddi with a
credit card. Id. Officer Oddi then returned to his patrol vehicle to “confirm”
Appellee’s identity, requesting him to “sit tight” and not to “get out of the car.”
Appellee’s (Defendant) Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1, 5/31/22, at 3:48. After
approximately six minutes passed, Officer Oddi reapproached Appellee’s
vehicle “to gather a correct address.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at
7. Appellee handed Officer Oddi vehicle citations which presumably contained
his address. Id. During this interaction, Officer Oddi asked Appellee “where
he was coming from,” to which Appellee responded, “Pittsburgh[,
Pennsylvania,]” and voluntarily offered that he and the passenger “were going
to go smoke [marijuana].” Id. at 8; see also Appellee’s (Defendant)
Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1, 5/31/22, at 10:26. In response to Appellee’s
statement, Officer Oddi asked Appellee “[d]id you smoke some already?” Id.
at 10:30. Appellee responded in the affirmative, adding that he smoked
marijuana about an hour prior. Id. Officer Oddi then asked whether there
was any marijuana in the vehicle and Appellee again responded in the
affirmative. Id. at 10:46.
The fundamental question on appeal is whether, after Appellee was
subjected to an investigatory detention during a valid traffic stop, the
circumstances elevated to a custodial interrogation, requiring the issuance of
Miranda warnings. The following factors are relevant to our review: (1) the
stop occurred on a public roadway during the day; (2) during the relevant
time, Officer Oddi was the only officer present at the scene and interacting
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with Appellee; (3) Officer Oddi detained Appellee because his registration
showed DUI suspended; (4) during the initial encounter, Appellee admitted
his license was suspended; (5) Officer Oddi requested Appellee’s identifying
information and Appellee provided Officer Oddi with a credit card, rather than
a driver’s license; (6) Officer Oddi then returned to his patrol car to run
Appellee’s information through the police data system and, before doing so,
told Appellee to “sit tight” and not to “get out of the car;” (7) because Appellee
only provided Officer Oddi with his credit card, Officer Oddi reapproached
Appellee’s vehicle to obtain additional information regarding Appellee’s
address; (8) Officer Oddi asked where Appellee was coming from, Appellee
responded, and then, without prompting, revealed his intention to smoke
marijuana with the passenger of the vehicle; (9) based upon Appellee’s
statement, Officer Oddi asked whether Appellee already smoked marijuana,
Appellee responded that he did about an hour prior; (10) Officer Oddi asked
whether there was marijuana in the vehicle, and Appellee indicated there was;
(11) the second interaction between Appellee and Officer Oddi lasted less than
one minute; and (12) the detention, before Appellee made the incriminating
statement, lasted less than 10 minutes, most of which Officer Oddi spent in
his own patrol vehicle.
Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that
Appellee was not subject to custodial arrest, and that the duty to issue
Miranda warnings was not triggered when Appellee admitted to smoking
marijuana an hour before driving. Officer Oddi, while investigating the
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circumstances for which he originally initiated the traffic stop (driving under a
suspended license) requested Appellee’s identifying information and then told
Appellee to “sit tight” so that he could run Appellee’s information through the
police data system. This order, itself, does not convert the interaction to a
custodial detention. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 33 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (explaining that the officer’s order to “sit tight” did not make the
appellant’s “initial detention . . . so coercive or her freedom so curtailed as to
constitute a former arrest,” warranting the issuance of Miranda warnings).
However, because Appellee only provided Officer Oddi with a credit card
during the initial encounter, Officer Oddi reapproached Appellee’s vehicle to
verify Appellee’s address. At that time, Appellee, unprompted, provided
Officer Oddi with additional information that gave Officer Oddi reasonable
suspicion that Appellee may be impaired. Indeed, at the suppression hearing,
Officer Oddi agreed that, after Appellee stated that he came to smoke
marijuana with the passenger of his vehicle, Officer Oddi’s investigation
shifted “from [Appellee] just violating driving under suspension DUI related to
also including . . . an investigation about whether or not [Appellee was] driving
DUI.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22, at 19. Hence, Officer Oddi was
permitted to ask Appellee “a moderate number of questions . . . to try to
obtain information confirming or dispelling [his] suspicions.” Spence, 2023
WL 2002292 at *9 (quotation omitted). That is exactly what Officer Oddi did.
Based upon for foregoing, we conclude that Appellee’s statement was
not made under “coercive conditions” that “constitute[d] ‘restraints
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comparable to arrest.’” Mannion, 725 A.2d at 202. To the contrary,
Appellee’s inculpatory admission was voluntarily uttered during a brief and
relatively collegial encounter with police. Accordingly, Miranda warnings
were not required, and the trial court erred in concluding Appellee’s statement
was inadmissible. See Spence, 2023 WL 2002292 at *9-11 (holding that the
trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s motion to suppress because the
relevant statements were made during an investigatory detention, not a
custodial interrogation); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 581 A.2d 956,
957-958 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that a defendant-motorist was not in
custody when subjected to an ordinary traffic stop and, as such, his
spontaneous admission that he was intoxicated was not subject to Miranda).
Moreover, we note the trial court also erred in concluding that Officer
Oddi lacked reasonable suspicion to further investigate Appellee for DUI even
without Appellee’s statement. This Court previously explained:
A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the
individual is engaging in criminal conduct. “This standard, less
stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as
reasonable suspicion.” In order to determine whether the police
officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the
circumstances must be considered. In making this
determination, we must give “due weight ... to the specific
reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience.” Also, the totality of
the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer.”
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Commonwealth v. Raglin, 178 A.3d 868, 872 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal
citations omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189
(Pa. 2004).
Herein, testimony from the suppression hearing revealed that, during
his initial interaction with Appellee, Officer Oddi noted Appellee was
“annoyed,” “antsy,” and had “bloodshot and kind of swelling around the eyes.”
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/31/22 at 7. Moreover, when Officer Oddi asked
for Appellee’s identification, Appellee handed him a credit card. Id. Then,
after Officer Oddi reapproached and requested additional information
regarding Appellee’s address, Appellee handed Officer Oddi previous traffic
citations. Id. Finally, Appellee readily admitted his intention to smoke
marijuana. Id. at 8. In contrast to the trial court’s decision, this behavior,
taken together, was sufficient to provide Officer Oddi reasonable suspicion
that Appellee was driving while impaired.
We therefore conclude that the suppression court improperly
suppressed the field test and blood test results.5 As such, we reverse the
suppression court’s June 24, 2022 order and remand this case for trial.
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5 In its June 24, 2022 order, the trial court noted that Officer Oddi “did not
give Miranda warnings at any point during the encounter, even while
informing [Appellee] that he was under arrest.” Trial Court Order, 6/24/22,
at 4. This was confirmed by our review of the body camera footage. However,
the record does not indicate that Appellee made any inculpatory statements
after his arrest, nor did Appellee argue before the trial court that any other
statements should have been suppressed. In addition, there was no testimony
at the suppression hearing that Officer Oddi issued Miranda warnings to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order reversed. Appellee’s application to dismiss appeal denied. Case
remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/28/2023
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Appellee before he submitted to a blood draw. The results of a blood draw,
however, are not subject to suppression as a result of a 5th Amendment
violation. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding
that “the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of
compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on
privilege grounds”).
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