Bacon v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 2, 2023

S23A0256. BACON v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Nicholas Bacon was convicted of malice

murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony in connection with the shooting death of his 64-year-old

mother, Montez Bacon (“Montez”).1 On appeal, Bacon alleges that

On September 25, 2017, a Liberty County grand jury indicted Bacon for
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felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 1), aggravated assault
(Count 2), malice murder (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 4). A jury trial was held March 25 through 26,
2019, and the jury found Bacon guilty of all counts. Bacon was sentenced to
serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder. He also
received a consecutive five-year sentence with three years to serve in
confinement and two years suspended for the firearm charge. All remaining
counts were either vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing
purposes. Bacon timely filed a motion for new trial on July 30, 2019, which
was amended through new counsel on January 11, 2021, and February 1, 2021.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as amended on August 11,
2022. Bacon timely filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was docketed to the
term of this Court beginning in December 2022 and was submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the testimony

of the defense’s expert witness and that he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

1. In the afternoon of March 3, 2017, the Savannah Police

Department responded to a call concerning a domestic incident

between Bacon and Montez. Upon arriving on the scene on the side

of Highway 204, officers found Bacon in the backseat of Montez’s

car. Montez, who appeared “distressed” and “scared,” was standing

outside of her vehicle. She informed the officers that she wanted

Bacon “out of the car,” but refused to provide any additional

information. Bacon told the officers that “everything was fine” and

that Montez was “just mad.” The officers concluded that this was a

“disorderly person” incident and convinced Montez to drive home

with Bacon. Montez complied. The officers followed Montez and

Bacon through Chatham County, but then “lost sight” of the vehicle

as it crossed into Bryan County.

Montez’s brother, Andrew, testified at trial that Montez called

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him in a frantic state while she was in Savannah. Montez told her

brother that “she was afraid because [Bacon] was acting out of

character more so than what he normally would.” She asked

Andrew to meet them along their route home to Hinesville,

explaining that she needed help getting Bacon out of her vehicle

because the police would not remove him from the car. Andrew

testified that he believed Montez was “in danger” because she was

“not the type to involve [others] in her business as it relates to her

children or husband.”

Then, around 4:00 p.m. on March 3, the Liberty County

Sheriff’s Office received multiple 911 calls reporting that Montez’s

vehicle had slowly rolled into a local business’s storage building off

Highway 196. Among the callers was Andrew, who had found

Montez inside her vehicle unresponsive. Witnesses reported seeing

Bacon exit the back seat of the vehicle after it came to a stop and

then casually walk away from the car with a backpack slung over

his shoulder.

Police officers and paramedics arrived at the scene and found

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Montez dead on the ground with a dime-size gunshot wound to the

back of her right shoulder. The medical examiner later confirmed

that Montez’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to her right

scapula and recovered a .380-caliber bullet from Montez’s body

during her autopsy.

Officer Geoffrey Harriman testified at trial that he located a

man, later identified as Bacon, with a mesh backpack walking on

the side of Highway 196. Officer Harriman instructed Bacon to drop

the backpack and asked for some identification. Bacon dropped the

backpack but refused to give his name. He also told Officer

Harriman that “[my I.D. is] in my wallet, but I don’t know where my

wallet is.” Bacon told Officer Harriman that he was “coming from

Savannah” and going to Hinesville. When Officer Harriman picked

up the backpack, he saw, through the mesh exterior, a silver pistol

and a wallet. Officer Harriman pulled the gun out of the bag and

identified it as a Taurus PT-738 with five .380-caliber rounds in the

magazine and one in the chamber. Officer Harriman also found

Bacon’s wallet, which contained his identification. Bacon was

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subsequently arrested.

Officers searched Montez’s vehicle and found a spent .380-

caliber shell casing under the driver’s seat. That shell casing, the

bullet retrieved from Montez’s body, and Bacon’s firearm were all

sent to the GBI for testing. The GBI’s firearm analyst testified that

the shell casing found in the car and the bullet found during

Montez’s autopsy were both fired from Bacon’s Taurus PT-738

pistol. He further concluded that Bacon’s gun was in “good working

condition,” that the gun would not fire absent a “pull of the trigger,”

and that the “trigger remained locked” when the safety was fully

engaged.

Bacon testified at trial. He admitted to shooting his mother

but claimed that the shooting was an accident. According to Bacon,

during the car ride, he removed his pistol from his pants pocket and

placed it in his bag. He testified that when “the vehicle made a swift

right turn” he reflexively grabbed his backpack to “prevent [his]

stuff from falling forward” and “then the gun discharged.” Bacon

testified that his Taurus PT-738 had design issues that impacted the

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effectiveness of the gun’s safety lock. Specifically, Bacon testified

that a special wrench had to be inserted “like a key” into “a little

pinhole on the gun” in order to lock the safety mechanism, and that

it was difficult to “really know if [the safety was] set or not.”

After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found Bacon guilty

on all counts.

2. Bacon alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding the testimony of Kayton Smith. During the defense’s case-

in-chief, counsel sought to qualify Smith as a firearms expert.

During voir dire, Smith testified that he had “been in the [firearms]

business for 40 years”; that he owned a gun shop; that he was

involved in the “sales and service” of firearms; and that he did

“minor training, but mostly sales and service.” Smith testified that

he had certificates from Glock’s and Smith & Wesson’s armorer’s

schools, but he did not have anything from Taurus certifying him as

an expert on their firearms. He agreed that he had “practical

experience” with guns but no educational background on firearms.

The prosecution objected to Smith being tendered as a firearms

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expert, arguing that the defense had not laid a sufficient foundation

to qualify him as an expert. Defense counsel asked Smith for

additional information concerning his background and experience.

Smith noted that he had testified in court as an expert witness

regarding Smith & Wesson firearms. He also testified that he had

been gunsmithing since 1980, wherein he learned how to field strip,

clean, and tool new parts for guns. The trial court informed defense

counsel that it was “concerned . . . you know, he’s been around guns

and he’s worked on guns. But as to actually taking any courses other

than the Glock and the Smith & Wesson courses, you know, you’re

going to have to give me a little bit more than this.”

Defense counsel and the court asked Smith additional

questions concerning his background and knowledge of guns. Smith

testified that he had 40 years of experience in the sale and service

of “various” rifles, shotguns, and handguns including work with

antique firearms. Smith also testified he was a “range master” for

five years in the early 1980s wherein he “was making sure that

people were safe on the [gun] range itself. If there was a malfunction

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with [a] weapon, I’d go and, you know, put the weapon down. [I’d]

clear the weapon until we can make it safe.” Smith also testified as

to his 15 years owning and operating a gun shop wherein he “did

sales, service, like I said, you know, minor repairs [of firearms].”

Smith further explained

I mean, we’re not going to get into – we don’t get into the
trigger-type stuff because of the liabilities for insurance
purposes. But things, like, if you’ve got a barrel – you
know, the weapon is jamming, we’re going to try and find
out why it’s jamming and try to solve that problem. A lot
of the times, it’s just tossing the feed round, that sort of
stuff.

The trial court replied, “I don’t know. You’ve had – you know, your

testimony is to [the] safety. Do you have any knowledge, outside

your own knowledge, as to the safety item without going into it? Do

you have any knowledge outside of your own knowledge on that?”

Smith stated, “Little things, like fitting safet[ies] to 1911s.” The

trial court noted, and Smith agreed, that he was talking about

“antique collectibles of firearms,” and also agreed that the gun at

issue was not an antique weapon. When defense counsel asked if

Smith carried the Taurus at issue in his store, Smith replied, “Well,

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I still carry the Taurus spectrums from time to time, which is the

new version .380, which replaced the TCPs.”

The trial court stated, “I don’t know. He cleans guns. He does

minor repairs,” and then instructed defense counsel to proffer

Smith’s testimony, explaining “My concern[], [counsel] is that

there’s no – like, a Taurus is a low-line handgun. He works on

antique guns. He works on collectible guns.” The trial court then

asked Smith if he had worked on a Taurus gun that had jammed.

Smith replied, “Well, yeah, or send them back to the factory,

depending on what the problem is.”

Defense counsel then proceeded to question Smith regarding

his testing of Bacon’s gun. Smith testified that he fully inspected

the weapon externally and internally. Smith explained that, during

his examination, he performed a “trigger-pull test” on the firearm

and found that, when the safety was “fully engaged” at 180 degrees,

the firearm would not discharge. However, when the safety was only

partially engaged at 75 or 70 degrees, “[the firearm] would

sometimes fire.” When testing the gun, Smith found that, out of the

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18 times he shot the gun, it misfired three times. Smith explained

that the Taurus 700 series had “been discontinued” because

“[a]pparently, they . . . were having an issue with [the] keylock

safety” and that, at one point in time, there was a class-action

lawsuit because of the gun’s safety issues.

The trial court asked Smith whether he disassembled the

weapon before testing the safety. Smith responded, “Yes, I did.” The

trial court then concluded, “[W]e can’t let him testify. It wasn’t the

same gun. He’s disassembled it. I don’t know how he reassembled

it. . . . [H]e took it apart and he experienced the safety problems. He

did not fire it as it was and as it came to him.” The trial court also

ruled that Smith’s testimony concerning the safety recall was

inadmissible hearsay.2 Defense counsel objected to these rulings.

2 The trial court clarified its ruling in its order denying Bacon’s motion
for new trial, explaining that the defense had failed to lay a proper foundation
to tender Smith as an expert under OCGA § 24-7-707. Specifically, the court
found that “Smith’s testimony [was] not specific to any subject matter directly
within the realm of expertise of which he is qualified,” and that his “forty years
of experience selling firearms and his ownership and management of a gun
store do not qualify him as an expert capable of testifying to the integrity of
the safety lock mechanism of the specific firearm at issue in this case.” See
Harris v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 377 n.12 (2) (a) (850 SE2d 77) (2020) (“[I]t is well

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 Bacon alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by

finding that the defense failed to lay the proper foundation to qualify

Smith as an expert pursuant to former OCGA § 24-7-707.3

Pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding Smith as an expert witness, any error was harmless. “In

determining whether [an evidentiary] error was harmless, we

review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have done so.” Timmons v. State, 302 Ga. 464,

470 (2) (b) (807 SE2d 363) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is

whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the

verdict.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the evidence establishing Bacon’s guilt was strong.

Bacon admitted to shooting his mother, but claimed it was an

established that the superior court has the power to interpret and clarify its
own orders. Such power includes shedding light on the scope of an earlier
ruling.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
3 Although repealed in July 2022, this Code section was in effect at the

time of Bacon’s trial and provides that “[i]n criminal proceedings, the opinions
of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always
be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other
witnesses.” OCGA § 24-7-707 (2019).
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accident. The jury also heard testimony that Montez called 911

requesting Bacon be removed from her vehicle, that Montez called

her brother in a frantic state prior to the shooting expressing fear of

Bacon and requesting help, that Bacon left the car with the murder

weapon after his mother had been shot, and that Bacon refused to

provide his name or any identification to the police after walking

away from the scene. Furthermore, the jury heard Bacon testify

that he had previous issues with the safety mechanism on his gun.

Although Smith could have provided additional testimony

concerning the weapon’s safety mechanism, the jury would likely not

have given Smith’s testimony much weight since Smith

disassembled and reassembled the gun before conducting any

relevant testing. Consequently, it is highly probable that any error

committed by the trial court did not contribute to the verdict. Cf.

Tuggle v. State, 305 Ga. 624, 627 (2) (825 SE2d 221) (2019) (any error

in the admission of evidence was harmless where testimony was

cumulative of other evidence already admitted and where there was

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strong evidence of guilt).4

3. Bacon also alleges that he received ineffective assistance

of trial counsel based upon counsel’s failure to call Smith as a lay

witness and offer testimony concerning the integrity of the safety

lock mechanism on Bacon’s gun. In order to establish

constitutionally ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that

his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that, but

for such deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that

the result of the trial would have been different. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984).

To prove deficiency, Bacon must show that his attorney

“performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering

all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional

norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (745 SE2d 637) (2013)

4 Bacon also alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by finding,
in its order denying the motion for new trial, that Smith’s testimony was not
relevant under OCGA § 24-4-401 and, therefore, inadmissible. However, as
discussed, any error committed by the trial court in excluding Smith’s
testimony would have been harmless.
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(citation and punctuation omitted). “A strong presumption exists

that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable and that counsel’s

decisions and choices at trial fell within the broad range of

professional conduct as assessed from counsel’s perspective at the

time of trial and under the specific circumstances of the case.” Jones

v. State, 296 Ga. 561, 564 (2) (769 SE2d 307) (2015). Furthermore,

“[e]ven though [Appellant’s] trial counsel died prior to the hearing

on the motion for new trial, [Appellant] still must overcome this

presumption and is not relieved of his heavy burden of proving

ineffective assistance.” Rhoden v. State, 303 Ga. 482, 484 (2) (813

SE2d 375) (2018).

“In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we accept the trial

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly

erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the

facts.” Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 SE2d 876) (2012)

(citation and punctuation omitted). If the defendant fails to satisfy

either prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not required to

examine the other. See Green v. State, 291 Ga. 579, 580 (2) (731

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SE2d 359) (2012).

At the hearing on Bacon’s motion for new trial, Bacon was

unable to call his lead trial counsel, John Ely, as a witness because

counsel had died. Instead, to support his claim of ineffectiveness,

Bacon called Allison Lane Bruns, who sat as second-chair during

Bacon’s trial. Bruns testified that Bacon’s trial was her first as an

attorney and that her responsibilities were to handle opening and

closing arguments and to cross-examine “one, maybe two,

witnesses.” When asked why the defense never sought to tender

Smith as a lay witness, Bruns responded, “I’m not sure. I was a baby

attorney, so that was not my decision. I’m not sure why Mr. El[y] did

not go that route, and I definitely don’t want to speak for him since

he’s not here to speak for himself.” Bruns testified that she did not

discuss tendering Smith as a lay witness with Ely, but she did

explain that “[o]ur defense was that [the shooting] was an accident

and that the gun fired on safety.” She further testified that the

defense’s strategy concerning Smith was to “ha[ve] him test fire the

gun and to look at it since he was a firearms expert,” and she recalled

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that he was “able to determine that the gun would actually fire at a

certain degree of the safety being on.” Bruns opined that Smith’s

testimony would have been helpful to Bacon’s defense’s theory and

agreed that Smith’s testimony would have been consistent with

Bacon’s testimony at trial.

Based on this record, we agree with the trial court that Bacon

has failed to show that trial counsel acted deficiently under

Strickland. It is well settled that “[a]n attorney’s decision about

which defense witnesses to call is a classic matter of trial strategy,

and such a decision will not form the basis for an ineffectiveness

claim unless it is so unreasonable that no competent attorney would

have made that decision under the circumstances.” Davis v. State,

315 Ga. 252, 262 (4) (a) (882 SE2d 210) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Indeed, “[t]he standard regarding ineffective

assistance of counsel is not errorless counsel and not counsel judged

ineffective by hindsight, but counsel rendering reasonably effective

assistance.” Harris v. State, 280 Ga. 372, 375 (3) (627 SE2d 562)

(2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

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 Here, we cannot say that trial counsel’s “decisions regarding

trial tactics and strategy” were “so patently unreasonable that no

competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Davis v.

State, 299 Ga. 180, 183 (787 SE2d 221) (2016) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 12 (2) (e)

(792 SE2d 665) (2016) (“Hindsight has no place in an assessment of

the effectiveness of trial counsel. . . . Nor will speculation support a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Citations omitted)).

Indeed, counsel could have reasonably decided not to present Smith

as a lay witness because of Smith’s admissions that he had little

prior experience with the specific type of weapon at issue, and that

he did not test the firearm’s safety mechanism until after

disassembling and reassembling the weapon undermined the

credibility of his proffered testimony. Based on the foregoing, Bacon

has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient by not calling

Smith as a lay witness at trial.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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