In re D.G. CA4/1

Filed 5/9/23 In re D.G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re D.G., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D081323
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J520568)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.W. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed in part, conditionally reversed in part
with directions.

Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, L.W.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, S.M.
 Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
L.W. (Mother) appeals a juvenile court order summarily denying her

petition under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 3881 to change the
order that terminated her reunification services and set the matter for
hearing under section 366.26. She further contends the court erred in finding
that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to
prevent termination of her rights under section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). S.M. (Father) joins in Mother’s arguments. Father also
separately appeals the order terminating his parental rights, arguing that
the juvenile court improperly found that the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) did not apply. Father contends the juvenile court and the San Diego
County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to further inquire
whether D.G. was an Indian child after Father disclosed possible Indian
ancestry. Mother joins in Father’s argument. The Agency concedes it did not
fully comply with aspects of its ICWA inquiry duties, and therefore agrees
that a limited remand is appropriate.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
summarily denying Mother’s section 388 petition and in determining that
Mother’s relationship with D.G. did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.
However, because we agree that the Agency did not satisfy its statutory
burden of inquiry and that the juvenile court’s ICWA finding was not
adequately supported as a result, we conditionally reverse the order
terminating parental rights, and remand for the limited purpose of

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise stated.
2
compliance with ICWA and section 224.2. In all other respects, we affirm the
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Initial Proceedings

Mother and presumed mother (B.G.)2 were in a romantic relationship
for several years. While B.G. was incarcerated, Mother had what she
described as a one-night stand with Father and became pregnant. She said
“[t]he animosity [with B.G.] began when I got pregnant while she was in jail.”
But the women initially remained together, and Mother reported that B.G. is
listed as a parent on D.G.’s birth certificate. Even after the mothers
subsequently ended their relationship, they continued to co-parent D.G.
In early September 2020, Mother and B.G. engaged in a physical
altercation at Mother’s home and both sustained facial lacerations. Mother
stated that she placed D.G. on the bed before the fighting began and D.G. was
not injured. Law enforcement determined that Mother was the dominant
aggressor, arrested her for domestic battery, and contacted the Agency. The
Agency created a safety plan with Mother wherein Mother and D.G.’s
maternal grandmother agreed to call the police if B.G. came to the home or
threatened violence. Mother also agreed to obtain a restraining order against
B.G.
The Agency learned in late September that B.G. had punched and
strangled an ex-girlfriend until she briefly lost consciousness. Police arrested
B.G. and found two pocketknives and a glass pipe with brown or black
residue in her possession. Although Mother initially claimed that her adult

2 B.G. is not a party to this appeal and will be discussed only when
relevant for context.
3
daughter was caring for D.G. during the altercation, the Agency later learned
that the baby was present during the incident. D.G. was uninjured and
B.G.’s wife reported that she returned D.G. to Mother following the fight.
The Agency also learned that B.G. had been to Mother’s home in violation of
the safety plan, and that Mother had not sought a restraining order.
After many unsuccessful attempts to reach Mother in person, by
telephone, and via text message, Mother finally agreed to create a new safety
plan in mid-October. The plan required Mother to prohibit unsupervised
visits between B.G. and the baby, obtain a restraining order, and contact the
family court to obtain custody of D.G.
In early November, B.G. arrived at a Child Welfare Services office to
inquire about the case and admitted that she and Mother alternated caring
for the baby. Two days later, a social worker met with B.G. to discuss the
case, but while the social worker called Mother, B.G. drove off with the baby.
When contacted by the social worker, B.G. would not disclose the baby’s
location. B.G. did not arrive at Mother’s home with D.G. until 90 minutes
later. In the meantime, Mother told a social worker she wanted to continue
co-parenting with B.G. and did not feel she needed a restraining order or
custody. Both Mother and B.G. agreed to drug test but neither did so.
A. Initiation of Dependency Proceedings Through Disposition
The Agency filed a petition in November 2020 alleging that then five-
month-old D.G. was a child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under
section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged D.G. was at substantial risk
of suffering serious physical harm because her mothers repeatedly exposed
her to violent physical altercations and minimized the violence and its impact
on D.G. The Agency expressed concern that it often could not reach either of
the mothers, that Mother lied about D.G. being present during the domestic

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violence incident between B.G. and her girlfriend, that B.G. would not
disclose the baby’s location, and that Mother violated both safety plans. It
did not explore relative placement because it considered Mother and B.G. to
be flight risks. Instead, the Agency obtained a protective custody warrant
and detained D.G. at a confidential foster home.
During initial questioning pursuant to the ICWA, Mother indicated

that she might have Blackfoot heritage,3 but was not registered with the
tribe. She said she did not know if Father had Native American ancestry.
B.G. told a social worker she believed she had Native American heritage but
did not know the name of the tribe. The social worker indicated on an ICWA-
010(A) form that her inquiry gave her reason to believe the child is or might
be an Indian child. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court granted B.G.
presumed mother status and deferred making a finding as to whether the
ICWA applied.
In its December 2020 report, the Agency noted that Mother had
provided the names and dates of birth of her paternal grandmother, whom
she believed “may have been Blackfoot,” and her paternal great grandfather.
Both relatives were deceased, and Mother could not think of any living
relatives who might have further information.
When asked about drug use, Mother reported that she smoked one to
two marijuana joints a day to alleviate stress and pain due to nerve damage.
She said she had used narcotics about 10 years prior, but presently only
drank alcohol socially and smoked marijuana. Although she was prescribed
medication for anxiety, she indicated that she had been waiting until after

3 Although Mother references the “Blackfoot” tribe, we refer to the tribe
as Blackfeet, as it is listed in the Federal Register. (See 80 Fed. Reg. 1942
(Jan. 14, 2015).)
5
pregnancy to start taking it and had not yet begun. B.G. stated that she had
been clean of marijuana and alcohol for almost two years. She acknowledged
using methamphetamine three to four years prior but said she “did not get
into it.”
Meanwhile, the foster mother reported that D.G. was generally a
“happy baby” and was easy to soothe. D.G. was diagnosed with “[f]ailure to
[t]hrive” and weighed only nine pounds upon entering foster care.
The Agency referred both mothers to the Family Visitation Center
(FVC) for in person visits, but the FVC closed their cases in January due to
failure to attend and tardiness. A social worker resubmitted their request for
visits. The Agency also referred both mothers to domestic violence groups
and a substance abuse specialist.
In November and December of 2020, Mother visited virtually with D.G.
six times. She missed most of her January visits and so the caregiver allowed
an extended visit on January 28, 2021. B.G. had three virtual visits with
D.G. between November and January, all of which were rescheduled by B.G.
after missing the original dates.
In its February report, the Agency noted that on January 29, 2021, its
ICWA liaison emailed a follow up to the informal ICWA inquiry it apparently
previously sent to a representative of the Blackfeet tribe. On February 1,
2021, the liaison called the number listed on the Federal Register for the
Blackfeet tribe and two additional numbers for the tribe, but was unable to
leave messages at any of the numbers.
At the February 2021 contested adjudication and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the petition. The Agency requested a
continuance to investigate Mother’s ICWA claims and explained that it would
not pursue further ICWA inquiry as to B.G. because she was not a biological

6
or adoptive parent. The court agreed and deferred disposition to allow
further ICWA inquiry regarding Mother only.
The Agency’s ICWA liaison reported that he sent an informal ICWA
inquiry letter via certified mail to the Blackfeet tribe on April 1, 2021. He
also emailed the inquiry to the tribal representative on the same date and left

a follow up voicemail a few days later.4
Mother had four in person visits with D.G. in March. The visitation
monitor reported that she arrived on time and engaged appropriately and
lovingly with D.G.
As of April 2021, neither mother had participated in their domestic
violence groups, although they each began receiving individualized domestic
violence education. Mother engaged in online parenting education classes,
but B.G. missed most of the classes and was dropped from the program.
Mother did not contact the substance abuse specialist because she said she
did not have a substance abuse problem. It appears the social worker was
unable to reach either mother in April.
During the April 2021 contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court
concluded that the Agency had conducted adequate further inquiry with the
Blackfeet tribe in January and April and that, given the tribe’s lack of
response, there was no reason to believe D.G. was an Indian child. It ordered
D.G.’s continued detention in foster care and authorized liberal supervised
visitation.

4 None of the ICWA letters or emails referenced in Agency reports
appear in the record on appeal.
7
B. Reunification Period
Between April and September, Mother had three supervised visits with
D.G. per week, although she was late for most visits. She attended D.G.’s
doctor’s appointments and stayed in constant contact with the caregiver. She
actively participated in a domestic violence group and was working through
parenting education modules, but the Agency described her as being in the
beginning stages of her groups. Although she enrolled in a substance abuse
program in July and initially attended regularly, she stopped attending
groups in September and then tested positive for methamphetamines and
marijuana at the end of September. Meanwhile, B.G. made little progress on
her case plan during this period. She did not obtain her substance abuse
assessment or participate in groups geared towards domestic violence and
parenting. The caregiver reported that B.G. had not visited D.G. since
January 2021. At the six-month review hearing, the court found that both
mothers’ progress toward alleviating the causes of placement was minimal.
D.G. continued to do well with her caregivers, having overcome her
initial failure to thrive. She learned sign language, took swimming lessons,
and developed a positive attachment to the caregiver’s other child.
In September 2021, Father reached out to Mother and requested a
paternity test. The court appointed counsel for Father and ordered paternity
testing.
Mother was removed from her domestic violence group in November
due to lack of attendance, but completed her parenting program the same
month. She testified that the substance abuse program she had been
attending was frequented by “a lot of familiar faces” she found triggering, so
after being discharged from that program, Mother requested inpatient
treatment. The Agency reported that Mother was actively using drugs and

8
had yet to enroll in intense substance abuse treatment. Mother admitted she
used marijuana and methamphetamine when she was nervous and stressed
and that she needed to attend her groups and find a sponsor. Mother did
continue to visit D.G. three times per week, though, and the caregiver
reported that Mother did well with D.G.
During the same reporting period, B.G. did not engage in services or
consistently visit D.G. Father did not visit while waiting for his paternity
test results. An Agency investigation revealed that Father was homeless, on
probation, and suspected of using methamphetamine. In January, Father
received confirmation of paternity and visited D.G. once.
At the March 4, 2022 contested 12-month review hearing, the court
elevated Father to biological father status but denied his request for
reunification services. Father indicated that D.G.’s maternal great
grandmother told him he had native American ancestry. He did not know
which tribe, but he believed his mother and sister might have more
information and provided their contact information to the Agency. In light of
this information, the court stated that “the ICWA inquiry is now back alive”
and ordered the Agency to further inquire as to Father’s ICWA status. The
court terminated reunification services as to both mothers, granted de facto
parent status to the caregivers, and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
II.
Permanency Planning
In its March 2022 addendum report, the Agency noted that B.G. had
not engaged in services or visited D.G. Mother had supervised visits twice a
week with D.G. and a social worker observed her to be affectionate and
bonded with the child. But Mother avoided all but two drug tests between

9
December 2021 and March 2022, and when she did test in January, Mother
was positive for methamphetamines.
On April 20, 2022, Mother reported that Father hit her on the head
with his fists and a speaker and slashed her tires. Five days later, Mother
completed intake at an inpatient substance abuse treatment facility. Father
visited D.G. twice in April but was late for both visits. The visitation center
then closed the referral due to Father’s failure to respond to calls.
Meanwhile, Father tested positive for drugs and his parole officer indicated
there was an active warrant for his arrest.
One of Father’s sisters, Aunt N., reported that the family had Indian
ancestry, but did not know which tribe. When a social worker called her
again in May, she said she did not have any information about any of her
family members having Native American heritage. Aunt N. asked if the
social worker would like to speak with the paternal grandmother, who was
there with her. The paternal grandmother stated that she had never heard
of anyone in her family having Native American heritage.
Father’s other sister, Aunt S., provided the Agency with documentation

that a great, great, great grandfather named John5 “ha[d] heritage of 1/16
Cherokee.” In May, Aunt S. told the ICWA liaison and a social worker that
she had located a document entitled “Cherokee Roll, Indians by Blood” that
listed only the paternal great, great, great, great grandfather’s second or
third wife Hattie and her children. As she had been a stepmother to John, it
appeared his descendants would not have had Native American heritage.
Furthermore, Aunt S. explained that she and Father did not share the same
father. Aunt S. inquired further of another aunt, who stated that she could

5 The record is not clear as to whether this is D.G.’s great, great, great
grandfather or the aunt’s.
10
not provide any additional information and that no other family members
would know more history.
In late May 2022, the ICWA liaison called Mother’s adult daughter and
left a message asking if her family had any Native American heritage. The
Agency then requested a continuance to further pursue the ICWA
investigation and assess other placement options. The court granted the
request and ordered the Agency to conduct further inquiry to determine
whether D.G. was an Indian child.
Although D.G. continued to progress developmentally, she was
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and began receiving 20 hours of
home services per week. Her caregiver also took her to weekly occupational
therapy, speech therapy, and early education services.
D.G. visited with Mother from May through early September. Before
Mother even arrived for the first two visits, D.G. had thrown herself on the
floor because she wanted to play on the playground structure outside of the
building. Mother was nonetheless able to engage D.G. for part of these visits,
but D.G. also played by herself at times and resisted Mother’s touch. The
same was true during additional visits in May and June. Mother was late for
a visit in July and did not show up for one visit in August and another in
September. Both times, she and Father offered identical excuses for missing
their visits. During a September visit, Mother began to doze off on the floor
and was woken up and given cold water by visitation staff. The visitation
facility closed out Mother’s referral due to lack of attendance later that
month.
In August 2022, the caregiver expressed concern that Mother had
relapsed because, as Mother had done when she previously used drugs,
Mother had begun missing visits, arriving late, and failing to communicate

11
with the caregiver. In September, Father texted a social worker twice in one
day stating that he did not think Mother should be able to visit D.G. for
safety reasons, explaining that Mother had engaged in “excessive drug use”
that had kept her awake for four days.
Mother then missed two visits at the CWS office in October because she
said she was confused as to the location. She attended one visit that month
and read to D.G., played with her, changed her diaper, and then kissed and
hugged her goodbye. As with earlier visits, D.G. interacted with Mother for
periods of time, but then screamed and pushed her away at other points.
Mother acknowledged to a social worker that she and Father continue to
have a relationship and be in communication.
In an October report, the Agency noted that the caregivers were bonded
with D.G. and wished to adopt her. A social worker who supervised seven
visits noted that it was hard for Mother to engage D.G., who wanted to play
by herself and often ran away from Mother. She observed that D.G. no longer
displayed affection for Mother and was not distressed when leaving after the
visits. In the social worker’s view, there was no emotionally significant
parent-child relationship between Mother and D.G. and it would not be
detrimental to D.G. to terminate Mother’s parental rights. As neither Father
nor B.G. had visited with D.G. in the months since the social worker became
involved in the case, she could not assess their relationships. Overall, the
social worker opined that the benefits of adoption were “much greater” for
D.G. Accordingly, the Agency recommended terminating parental rights and
ordering a permanent plan of adoption.
At an October 4, 2022 hearing, the Agency requested another
continuance to assess relatives for placement. The court denied the request,
finding the Agency had not shown good cause and it was not in the best

12
interest of the child. But because the Agency had not provided a
recommendation for a specific permanent plan, the court was unable to
proceed with the section 366.26 hearing. The court therefore scheduled a
pretrial status conference and a contested section 366.26 hearing.
Mother filed a petition on October 20, 2022, under section 388 asking
the court to change the March 4, 2022 order terminating her reunification
services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. She requested that the court
place D.G. with her or, alternatively, transition D.G. to her care with
services. As evidence that her circumstances had changed, Mother submitted
documentation showing that she had completed a 90-day drug treatment
program and was asked to speak at her treatment program’s completion
ceremony. She also offered proof that she had been prescribed medication to
treat her mental health issues, attended a mental health program, and
regularly visited D.G. Mother asserted that she had addressed the issues
that brought D.G. into the system and maintained her bond with D.G. In
response, the Agency recommended denying the section 388 petition, noting
that Mother had not addressed her domestic violence issues or followed up on
aftercare substance abuse or mental health services. The Agency also
expressed concern that Mother was suspected of having relapsed.
III.
The Contested Section 366.26 Hearing
On November 10, 2022, the court addressed Mother’s section 388
petition and then held a contested section 366.26 hearing. After hearing
argument, the court denied Mother’s section 388 petition finding she had not
made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. The court explained
that, while Mother had presented evidence she engaged in mainly substance
abuse services from April to July, the petition on its face did not indicate

13
what had happened between July and November. Mother also had not
provided any evidence that she followed up with any of the recommended
post-treatment services. Finally, the court highlighted that it had “no
evidence that the main issue that brought this petition to this court has been
addressed at all since that March 4th, 2022 date, and that’s domestic
violence.” The court concluded that granting the requested relief would not
be in D.G.’s best interest.
The juvenile court then allowed counsel to provide opening arguments
regarding termination of parental rights. Mother’s attorney argued that the
bond Mother had with D.G. outweighed the benefits of adoption and called
Mother to the stand to provide testimony. Mother began by testifying about
her visitation schedule with D.G. and acknowledged that it was fair to say
she was not “real regular” with her recent visits. However, she said that was
because she forgot that the location of the visits changed and went to the
wrong location, and then confused the day of the next visit. She also
explained that she missed visits for medical reasons. First, she was hit by a
car on September 29, 2022, which caused some back issues, made her dizzy,
and resulted in difficulty keeping track of which location to go to for visits.
She also stated that she had developed an abscess that caused so much pain
that she “[couldn’t] walk at all.” This resulted in her missing one or two
visits and having her visitation referral canceled. When she obtained a new
referral, she said “that was the location change. And that’s when I missed—
that was like the first time the location changed.” Due to the location and
days changing, she said she went to the visits but went to the wrong location
and was confused about the days. Mother also testified that she missed visits
and some of D.G.’s doctor’s appointments due to transportation issues before
obtaining a bus pass.

14
 When asked if she missed any visits due to being under the influence,
Mother said no. But she acknowledged that she was not attending aftercare
meetings on a regular basis.
Mother then talked about her bond with D.G. She said D.G. initiated
affection with her, gave her hugs, and said “I love you.” When asked if she
had a strong bond with D.G., she replied “Yes. Most definitely.” She
expressed her view that it would be a problem for D.G. if she did not see
Mother and they got out of their normal routine.
Mother’s adult daughter also addressed the court. The court first asked
if she was aware of any Native American heritage in the family, to which she
responded “No. I’m not aware of it.” The court then gave her an opportunity
to speak about Mother and D.G. She said that she, her daughter, Mother,
and D.G. “are a family together.” She further asserted that D.G. loves
Mother and “shows it every day when I do see her.” The adult daughter said
Mother understood her wrongs, and she expressed full confidence that
Mother would continue to learn and progress.
The court concluded that D.G. was likely to be adopted if parental
rights were terminated. It then evaluated whether the parental-benefit
exception to adoption applied. As to the regular visitation element, the court
noted that “[o]ver the course of this case, there were periods where there was
consistent visitation, but there [were] also periods where there was not.”
Although it acknowledged that Mother missed some visits due to the
detrimental things that happened to her, the court highlighted that even
before some of those events, “she stated that she got the dates mixed up and
the location mixed up.” Additionally, the court said “other reasons
throughout—things that predate those circumstances” resulted in Mother

15
missing visits. “Looking at the totality of the visitation, [the court could not]
say that there was regular and consistent visitation.”
For the second element, the court clarified that the question is whether
maintaining the relationship would benefit the minor. To make this
determination, the court said it must consider “the age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the positive or
negative affect [sic] of interaction between the parent and the child, and the
child’s particular needs.” In this case, the court noted that “the minor ha[d]
spent almost her entire life outside of the . . . care of the mother . . . and that
has shaped the relationship, because the relationship isn’t at a level where
there is a bond in the direction of the minor to the mother.” The court made
clear that “[n]o one is doubting that [Mother] loves her daughter.” But it
pointed out that the question the court had to ask itself is “whether or not
there is an attachment from the minor to the parent that . . . creates a
beneficial relationship.” It concluded “that second element is simply not met
here based on all the reasons we have in the report and also the evidence that
[the court] heard.”
Even if such a relationship existed, the court concluded that the
relationship with Mother was not so important in this case that it outweighed
the security and stability of a new adoptive home. Accordingly, the court
declined to find that the parental-benefit exception applied in this case. The
court terminated parental rights as to all three parents, referred D.G. for
adoptive placement, and designated the caregiver as a prospective adoptive
parent.

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 DISCUSSION
I.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition
Mother argues the juvenile court erred by summarily denying her
section 388 petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. She
contends that finishing her case plan and addressing the domestic violence
and substance abuse issues that prevented her from regaining custody
constituted the “changed circumstances” necessary to justify modification of
the prior court order. She also maintains that modification of the March
2022 order was in D.G.’s best interest because they share a strong bond and
having addressed her case plan allowed Mother to be an appropriate parent
to D.G. Father joins in Mother’s argument.
The Agency responds that Mother failed to make a prima facie showing
of changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification of the juvenile
court’s order. It highlights the juvenile court’s finding that Mother had not
addressed domestic violence, the primary issue precipitating D.G.’s
dependency, in her section 388 petition. While Mother claims to have
completed her case plan, the Agency points out that the evidence shows she
completed only six domestic violence group sessions and that she continues to
engage with Father despite the two of them having a domestic violence
altercation after Mother filed the section 388 petition. Additionally, the
Agency submits that the evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion
that Mother has not engaged in aftercare treatment for her substance abuse
issues and may not even have maintained her sobriety. Mother also did not
provide evidence that she established the recommended ongoing psychiatric
care or took the prescribed medication to treat her mental health issues.
Because D.G. has spent most of her life with her caregivers who have

17
addressed her physical, developmental, and emotional needs, the Agency
further contends that granting the requested relief would not be in D.G.’s
best interest.
Under California’s dependency scheme, the parent is given a
reasonable amount of time to reunify with the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993)
5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Once reunification services are terminated, the focus
shifts to prioritizing the child’s interests in permanency and stability. (Ibid.)
However, section 388 provides an “ ‘escape mechanism’ when parents
complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of
reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights.”
(In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528 (Kimberly F.); In re
Marilyn H., at p. 309.)
Pursuant to section 388, a parent may, upon “grounds of change of
circumstance or new evidence,” petition to change, modify, or set aside a prior
order of the court. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The petitioning parent bears the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) there has
been a change of circumstance or new evidence since the challenged court
ruling; and (2) the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests. (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re J.M. (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 833, 845 (J.M.); see § 388, subds. (a)(1) & (d).) A section 388
petition should be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (In re D.R.
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 480, 487.)
The moving party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the section
388 petition if they have made a prima facie showing of the two requisite
elements. (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127.) A prima facie
showing is made when “the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given
credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.”

18
(Ibid.) “ ‘[I]f the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a
prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change
would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a
hearing on the petition.’ [Citations.]” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
1438, 1445.) The juvenile court may consider the entirety of the “factual and
procedural history of the case” in determining whether a prima facie showing
has been made. (In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.) We review an
order summarily denying a section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing under an abuse of discretion standard. (In re G.B. (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.)
The juvenile court concluded that Mother did not present evidence that
she addressed the primary issues leading to dependency jurisdiction. This
decision is amply supported by the record. Indeed, “ ‘[n]ot every change in
circumstance can justify modification of a prior order.’ ” (In re N.F. (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 112, 120 (N.F.).) To be sufficient, the change must be material
and substantial. (Id. at pp. 120, 121, fn. 3.) Moreover, the parent must
establish that “during the period between termination of reunification
services and the permanency planning hearing, he or she has resolved the
previously unresolved issues supporting juvenile court jurisdiction.” (J.M.,
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 846.) In this case, the court removed D.G.
following two domestic violence incidents, yet Mother did not attend all of her
domestic violence treatment groups. She also openly continued to interact
with Father in the months after filing her section 388 petition, even after he
punched her in the head and hit her with a speaker. Thus, there is little
evidence Mother addressed the domestic violence concerns that lead to D.G.’s
removal.

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 Mother also provided no evidence that she pursued the substance
abuse, psychiatric, or mental health aftercare treatment that was
recommended to ensure she maintained her sobriety and mental health
progress. As the juvenile court pointed out, Mother presented evidence that
she engaged in treatment from April to July 2022. But even though she did
not file her section 388 petition until late October, Mother offered no evidence
that she continued to address her substance and mental health issues after
being released from her inpatient treatment program. Nothing in the record
indicates she enrolled or participated in the outpatient recovery program,
continued to receive psychiatric care, or actually took the medication
prescribed to treat her mental health issues. To the contrary, Mother told a
social worker in October that she had not had time to do the initial
paperwork for the recovery center and had not found a psychiatrist near
where she lived. As for her medication, she provided only a copy of her initial
prescription, which offered no insight into her compliance with treatment.
The juvenile court was particularly justified in questioning whether
Mother’s lack of follow-up constituted changed circumstances given evidence
that Mother had relapsed. “In the context of a substance abuse problem that
has repeatedly resisted treatment in the past, a showing of materially
changed circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period of
sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (N.F., supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) In August, the caregiver questioned Mother’s
continued sobriety, and Father outright confirmed in September that Mother
was engaging in “excessive drug use” and represented a safety threat to D.G.
The Agency continued to express concern in its November 2022 report that
Mother might be using drugs. Given that she had a criminal history related
to drug use from 2005 to 2013 and relapsed in 2021, the court could

20
reasonably conclude that a three-month period of sobriety did not constitute
changed circumstances. (See In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219,
223 [for the purposes of a section 388 petition, the parent’s recent sobriety
reflected changing, rather than changed circumstances, where the parent had
a history of drug relapses, was in the early stages of recovery, and was still
addressing a chronic substance abuse problem].)
Furthermore, even if her circumstances had changed, Mother fell short
of establishing a prima facie case that modification of the court’s order would
be in D.G.’s best interest. Because she filed her section 388 petition after
reunification services were terminated, Mother’s “interest in the care, custody
and companionship of the child [was] no longer paramount. Rather, at this
point ‘the focus shift[ed] to the needs of the child for permanency and
stability . . . .’ ” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) The child’s best
interests are not served by “further delay[ing] permanency and stability in
favor of rewarding Mother for her hard work and efforts to reunify.” (In re
J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)
By the time Mother filed her section 388 petition, D.G. had lived with
her caregivers for two years, having spent only the first five months of her
life with Mother. Although D.G. would sometimes play, sing, or read with
Mother, she often rebuffed Mother’s physical affection and was never in
distress when leaving visits. Mother acknowledged that D.G. only called her
“Mommy” when prompted by the caregiver.
By contrast, the caregivers helped D.G. overcome her initial failure to
thrive diagnosis, had her evaluated when they became concerned about her
developmental progress, and ensured that she obtained the 20 hours of
services her subsequent autism diagnosis required. The caregivers also took
D.G. to regular speech, occupational, and early education therapy sessions, in

21
addition to independently pursuing swimming lessons and home education.
D.G. was described as having “formed a secure bond with her caregivers.”
She also bonded with the caregivers’ child, and they considered her to be
their daughter.
Under these circumstances, there was nothing arbitrary about the
court’s conclusion that, even liberally construed, Mother’s allegations failed to
demonstrate that the proposed change would promote D.G.’s best interest.
(See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318 [a court abuses its discretion
only when it “has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination”].) Here, significant
evidence supports the court’s decision that an evidentiary hearing was not
warranted. The record shows the caregivers provided stability for D.G. for
two years and addressed all her developmental needs. They expressed a
desire to adopt her and give her a permanent home. Although Mother
testified about her positive relationship with D.G., she offered no insight into
how she would provide long-term stability for D.G. or meet her extensive
therapy needs, given the ongoing tumult in her life. On this record, it was
reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude it was not in D.G.’s best interest
to return her to Mother’s care.
Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in summarily denying Mother’s section 388 petition.
II.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Terminating Mother’s Parental Rights
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the parental-
benefit exception to overcome the statutory preference for adoption. Father
joins in this argument as well. The Agency submits that Mother did not
satisfy the threshold requirements to show the exception applied.

22
 “The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have
failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852.) At this hearing “the
juvenile court has three options: (1) to terminate parental rights and order
adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal guardian for the
dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-term foster care.
[Citation.] Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated
exception, the juvenile court is required to select adoption as the permanent
plan. [Citation.] The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the
exceptions.” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)
One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the parental-
benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this exception to apply,
the parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular
visitation and contact with the child”; (2) “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent”; and (3) “terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)
The first element, visitation, is “straightforward,” requiring that the
“ ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by
court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The second element
focuses on the child and is determined by taking into consideration factors
such as “ ‘the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.) For the third
element, “the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to

23
sever the relationship and choose adoption. [Citations.] Because terminating
parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain
the relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental rights
terminates the relationship.” (Id. at p. 633.) If the benefits of a stable,
adoptive, permanent home outweigh the harm the child would experience
from the loss of a continued parent-child relationship, the court should order
adoption. (Id. at p. 634.)
When deciding whether terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to the child, the court is not comparing the parent’s and custodial
caregiver’s attributes. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Additionally,
a parent’s lack of progress in addressing the issues that led to dependency is
not determinative. (Id. at p. 637.) Nonetheless, a parent’s inability to
address the issues leading to dependency can be relevant in assessing
whether the interaction between parent and child “has a ‘negative effect’ on
the child.” (Ibid.) Performing this analysis is a “subtle enterprise.” (Id. at
p. 634.) And “[i]n many cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural
parent/child relationship’ will substantially determine how detrimental it
would be to lose that relationship, which must be weighed against the
benefits of a new adoptive home.” (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the
existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) As a reviewing court, we do
“ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts’ ” and will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations
even where substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.)
“We review its ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard,

24
reviewing its factual determinations concerning the detriment analysis for
substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the relative harms and
benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion.” (In re Eli
B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068.)
Here, the juvenile court found Mother failed to carry her burden of
establishing any of the elements of the parental-benefit exception to adoption.
Substantial evidence supports this determination, and we conclude the court
did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Addressing the first element, the court note that “there were periods
where there was consistent visitation, but there [were] also periods where
there was not.” The record supports this conclusion. Mother missed most of
the virtual visits facilitated by the caregiver in January 2021, and the FVC
closed Mother’s case the same month due to failure to attend visits and
tardiness at their facility. Mother visited D.G. four times in March 2021, and
then had three supervised visits per week between April and September,
although she was late for most of those visits. As of April 2022, Mother was
consistently visiting D.G. twice a week. However, Mother was late for a visit
in July and did not show up for a few visits in August and September. The
FVC again closed her referral due to lack of attendance in September 2022.
Even acknowledging Mother’s testimony that she missed visits in late
September because she was hit by a car and suffered other health issues, the
court noted Mother’s testimony that she missed earlier visits because she was
confused as to the date and location of the visits.
Although this record presents a closer call than some, substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion. While another juvenile
court might look at the same history and find Mother’s visitation sufficiently
consistent to meet the standard, the juvenile court’s determination “should

25
‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a
different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 640.) Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court’s conclusion on the
first element is supported by substantial evidence.
Even assuming she met this threshold element, we agree that Mother
failed to show D.G. would benefit from continuing the relationship. As the
juvenile court correctly stated, the focus at this stage in on the benefit to the
child, and includes consideration of factors such as “ ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs.’ ” (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) In this case,
D.G. was only two and a half years old at the time of the section 366.26
hearing and had lived apart from Mother for most of her life. While Mother
visited her throughout their separation, D.G.’s primary interactions and
bonds were with her caregivers, and they addressed her significant therapy
needs.
Although no one, including the court and the caregiver, doubted that
Mother loved D.G., the juvenile court correctly determined that its focus must
be on “whether or not there is an attachment from the minor to the parent
that . . . creates a beneficial relationship.” (Italics added.) In assessing this
attachment, “courts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look
to, or talk about their parents.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The
evidence in this regard showed that in the months preceding the hearing,
D.G. often ran the opposite way when Mother approached her, forcefully
pushed herself away or twisted her body loose when Mother hugged her, said
“no” or “all done” when Mother touched her, and cried when Mother grabbed

26
and held her. A social worker stated that D.G. never showed distress when
leaving Mother. And even Mother acknowledged that D.G. “goes and finds
what she’s going to play with” and “doesn’t want to be bothered.”
In fairness to Mother, the desire to play independently with toys may
simply be characteristic of a two-year-old child. Nonetheless, even if we
attribute some of D.G.’s negative behavior to her age, Mother has not put
forth countervailing affirmative evidence showing that D.G. “has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to her. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 636.) For a child of that age, the reports indicating that D.G.
never showed distress when separating for Mother, did not return affection,
and was too young to recall having lived with Mother provide substantial
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s conclusion.
Only if Mother had satisfied the first two elements of the parental-
benefit test and demonstrated that terminating the relationship would be
detrimental to D.G. “even when balanced against the countervailing benefit
of a new, adoptive home,” could the court find the exception applied. (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Such is not the case here. The benefits of
D.G.’s prospective adoptive home are significant. She requires over 20 hours
a week of therapy and receives four different kinds of services. The
caregivers have maintained this schedule and provided D.G. with stability
and affection. Although Mother clearly loves D.G. and they have had many
positive interactions with each other, it cannot reasonably be said that D.G.’s
relationship with Mother is so important to her that “the harm from severing
the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of
placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 632.) Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supported the

27
court’s factual findings and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to apply the parental-benefit exception to adoption.
III.
Limited Remand for ICWA Compliance is Appropriate
Father, joined by Mother, contends the Agency and the court failed to
comply with the burden of further inquiry required by ICWA and section
224.2. We agree.
Congress enacted the ICWA to address rising concern that Indian
children were being separated from their tribes through adoption or foster
care and placed with non-Indian families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1,
7 (Isaiah W.).) California subsequently enacted its own statutes specifying
the steps the Agency and juvenile courts are required to take to determine
whether a child is an Indian child before making placement decisions. (In re
D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (D.S.).) Under these statutes, the
juvenile court and the Agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire” during dependency proceedings whether a child “is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
“This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty
to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA
notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.).) In the first phase,
the Agency’s initial duty requires it to, at a minimum, inquire from the party
reporting child abuse or neglect whether they have information that suggests
“the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) In the second phase,
“if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child,
then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian
status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ ”
(D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.) In the third stage, “if that further

28
inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the
formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (Ibid.)
Here, both Mother’s and Father’s claims of possible Indian heritage
created a reason to believe D.G. might be an Indian child. This triggered the
Agency’s duty of further inquiry. (In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 147
(E.C.) [“the majority view is that a report of possible Indian ancestry . . . is
sufficient to trigger the duty of further inquiry”].) Although Father is correct
that the juvenile court’s March 4, 2022 minute order states that “the court
has reason to know the child may be an Indian child” (italics added), the
transcript of the hearing reflects that the court struck the Agency’s
recommended finding that ICWA did not apply and instructed that it be
replaced “with a further inquiry order.” (Italics added.) (See People v. Smith
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [when the clerk’s minutes and the record are in
conflict, the reporter’s transcript shall prevail].) This occurred after Father’s
counsel advised the court that “the maternal great grandmother—told him he
has Native American Ancestry, but he doesn’t know what it is.” Taken
together, this information makes clear that Father and the court had reason
to believe D.G. was an Indian child, but not reason to know. Had it been
otherwise, the court would have instructed the Agency to provide formal
notice to the tribes as opposed to requiring further inquiry. (See § 224.2,
subds. (e) & (f).)
The Agency contends it satisfied its ICWA inquiry obligations as to
Father’s family but concedes ICWA error in complying with its statutory duty
of further inquiry with regard to Mother’s side of the family. Although
neither party expressly appealed the juvenile court’s ICWA finding as to
Mother’s side of the family, we conclude for the following reasons that
Father’s appeal of the order terminating parental rights based on ICWA error

29
and Mother’s joinder of the same sufficiently encompasses this issue. First,
as previously noted, the Agency and the juvenile court have a continuing duty
to inquire about ICWA status. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) What the juvenile court
ultimately must determine is whether the Agency (1) conducted “proper and
adequate further inquiry” and (2) provided the juvenile court with a sufficient
factual basis upon which to conclude that the child was or was not an Indian
child. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 605 quoting § 224.2, subd.
(i)(2).) It would yield an incomplete result if we evaluated the juvenile court’s
conclusion as to only one side of the child’s family simply because the appeal
did not specifically mention the inquiry regarding the other side of the family.
The focus is on the child and whether the record as a whole contained a
sufficient factual basis for the juvenile court to assess the child’s ICWA
status. (See E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157 [explaining that when
assessing whether an inquiry error is prejudicial and requires reversal, it is
not always appropriate to solely “focus on the specific deficiency identified by
the appellant” because “courts must take care to assess the inquiry as a
whole for adequacy”].) Second, “Indian tribes have interests protected by
ICWA that are separate and distinct from the interests of parents of Indian
children.” (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 13.) Our Supreme Court has
made clear that a parent cannot waive ICWA notice because it interferes
with the tribe’s rights to intervene in the case (Isaiah W., supra, Cal.5th at
pp. 13–14; see also In re Samuel P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1267 [“The
notice requirements serve the interests of the Indian tribes ‘irrespective of
the position of the parents’ and cannot be waived by the parent”]) and we
think the same logic applies here. Narrowly construing the appeal as
applying only to Father’s side of the family risks allowing Mother to forfeit
the tribe’s right to become involved if D.G. is found to be an Indian child.

30
(See generally In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606 [“The relevant
injury is the failure to gather the information necessary to make those
determinations in the first instance, and it is this gathering of information
which serves to ensure that the rights of tribes are protected as envisioned by
ICWA and related California law”].) Finally, this is not a situation where
construing the issue more broadly would result in unfairness as the Agency
not only was aware of the issue but brought it to the fore by offering a
concession in its briefing. Accordingly, we liberally construe Father’s appeal
of the order terminating parental rights, and Mother’s joinder of the same, as
challenging the sufficiency of all of the evidence underlying the juvenile
court’s conclusion that ICWA did not apply.
As to this claim, we conclude the Agency’s concession is proper. Rule
5.481(a) of the California Rules of Court required the Agency to file “all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as
evidence of how and when this information was provided to the relevant
tribes.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) & (5).) When there is reason to
believe a child is an Indian child, the Agency must conduct a further inquiry
and provide “documentation regarding to whom the [Agency] may have
directed ICWA inquiries and what responses, if any, were received.” (Italics
added). (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; see also In re
M.E. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 73, 85 [concluding substantial evidence did not
support the juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA did not apply where the
agency did not provide any information regarding what investigation the
investigator undertook, what information was sent to the tribes, or when that
information was sent]; In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 [requiring
that, “[a]fter these further inquiries, the department shall notify the court of
its actions and file certified mail return receipts for any ICWA notice they

31
sent, as well as any responses”].) Although Agency reports reflect that the
ICWA liaison sent informal inquiry letters and emails to the tribes in
January and April 2021, these letters and emails were not attached to the
reports and are not included in the appellate record. Absent this
documentation, it is not clear what evidence the juvenile court relied upon in
finding that ICWA did not apply. Accordingly, we conclude the Agency did
not adequately comply with its duty of further inquiry and, as a result, the
juvenile court’s ICWA finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
We also conclude the error is prejudicial. “Where the opportunity to
gather the relevant information critical to determining whether the child is
or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not been adequate inquiry
and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only effective
safeguard.” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) This is because “[a]
finding of harmlessness on this record would necessarily require speculation
[which] ‘is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California
law intend to afford Indian children and Indian tribes.’ ” (Ibid.) We will not
speculate as to whether the Agency offered the juvenile court documentary
proof of its efforts to contact the Blackfeet tribe regarding Mother’s ancestry.
Because none was included in the appellate record, the error is prejudicial.
We therefore conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights and remand the matter to the juvenile court so
the Agency may comply fully with ICWA and the court may make such
further findings as are necessary under section 224.2.

32
 In light of our decision to remand the case for further proceedings to
determine whether ICWA applies, we decline to address Father’s contentions

as to his side of the family.6
Given the importance of expediency and need for finality, we encourage
the parties to stipulate to immediate issuance of the remittitur in this case.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).)
DISPOSITION
The November 10, 2022 order terminating parental rights under
section 366.26 is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the
juvenile court with directions that, within 30 days of the remittitur, the
Agency must file a report with the appropriate evidence attached
demonstrating its compliance with the further inquiry provisions of section
224.2, subdivision (e), and, if applicable, the duty to provide notice to the
pertinent tribes (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3). Within 45
days of the remittitur, the juvenile court must conduct a hearing to determine
whether the Agency’s investigation satisfied its affirmative duty to
investigate. The juvenile court has the discretion to adjust these time periods
on a showing of good cause.

6 However, we reiterate that our remand is conditional and for the
purpose of correcting the deficiencies identified. “ICWA does not obligate the
court or [the Agency] ‘to cast about’ for investigative leads.” (In re A.M.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323.)
33
 If neither the Agency nor the juvenile court has reason to believe or to
know that D.G. is an Indian child, the order issued at the November 10, 2022
contested section 366.26 hearing shall be reinstated by the juvenile court.
Alternatively, if after completing the inquiry the Agency or the juvenile court
has reason to believe that D.G. is an Indian child, the court shall proceed
accordingly.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

34