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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13469
____________________
JESSICA GRAVES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRANDSTAR, INC.,
Defendant,
BRANDSTAR STUDIOS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60666-AHS
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
Jessica Graves was dealt a tough hand when, in relatively
quick succession, her father fell ill and she was let go from her po-
sition at Brandstar Studios. Following her termination, Graves
sued Brandstar under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Brand-
star summary judgment.
Graves presents three arguments on appeal. First, she con-
tends that Brandstar executives interfered with her rights under the
FMLA. Second, she asserts that her termination constituted asso-
ciational discrimination under the ADA. And finally, she claims that
the district court improperly weighed the evidence on summary
judgment rather than construing the facts in her favor.
After careful review, we conclude that the district court
properly granted summary judgment to Brandstar. We affirm.
I
A
From January 11, 2017 to May 30, 2018, Jessica Graves was
an employee of Brandstar Studios—a video-production and
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21-13469 Opinion of the Court 3
content-creation company based in Florida. As a “branded content
producer/writer,” she coordinated onsite shoots, managed editing
sessions, and generally shepherded video content from start to fin-
ish. According to Graves, from early on in her tenure at Brandstar,
her supervisors knew that her father lived in Pennsylvania and was
terminally ill. They also knew that Graves was her father’s primary
caregiver, coordinated medical services for him from afar, and vis-
ited him frequently.
On Wednesday, May 2, 2018, Graves received a call that her
father had been rushed to the hospital to undergo emergency brain
surgery to remove a cancerous tumor. She immediately sent her
supervisors at Brandstar the following email:
Subject: Family Emergency
Hi guys, I’m planning to fly out to see my dad in PA
tomorrow morning. My dad is in ICU. I will not be
available for calls/edits. Thank you in advance for
making any adjustments to my schedule.
Graves flew to Pennsylvania the following day and tended to her
father until Sunday, May 6, 2018, when she returned to Florida. A
few weeks later, Brandstar executives noticed that Graves had
clocked in on Thursday and Friday during her absence. Upon not-
ing this discrepancy, Brandstar’s HR team insisted that Graves cor-
rect her timecard to reflect the leave. It is undisputed, though, that
they didn’t inform her that her father’s medical emergency might
entitle her to benefits under the FMLA.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
Upon her return to Florida on May 6, Graves sent Brand-
star’s CEO the following email, which she later characterized as a
formal “show pitch . . . for a Military Makeover show”:
Subject: My Dad
Hi Mark, I just got back from PA where my dad was
having emergency brain surgery for a tumor. The ag-
gressive throat cancer that he just finally recovered
from last year has metastasized and formed two tu-
mors in his brain. This recent surgery was only able
to remove one, the other will need to be treated with
radiation and intense chemo and soon.
My dad is a Vietnam Vet who was affected by Agent
Orange: He spent his entire career working in the
probation and parole system, since retiring he has
lived alone in Western PA. He’s the kindest, strongest
and most stubborn man I’ve ever known and he’s my
best friend.
Fortunately, I was able to convince him to let me find
the best oncologists and radiologists in South Florida
for this next and hopefully final round of treatment,
but I will need to move him down here asap. Since
the last treatment resulted in pneumonia which re-
quired a portion of his lung to be removed and feed-
ing tube chest port to be put in. He nearly died twice.
The reason I’m telling you this is because I’m hoping
you can help.
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21-13469 Opinion of the Court 5
I have a 2-car garage that I need to convert into a stu-
dio apartment and I know that between
Ryan/Russ/Edwin/Vince they could knock this out
in a few days.
I am hoping you’ll see the benefit in allowing them a
few days to do this within the next couple weeks since
we can also turn this into a local Military Makeover
UFP. There are a few companies I can reach out to
for materials to help, but I am prepared to pay for eve-
rything myself, including labor. All I need from you
is permission to ‘borrow’ the guys.
I’m around if you want to give me a call otherwise we
can discuss Monday. I’m going to be driving him and
his beloved dog down to FL once he’s released from
rehab to begin treatments.
Graves also verbally requested to be excused from work-re-
lated travel and staffed only to local shoots as she prepared her
home for her father’s move to Florida. Again, it is undisputed that
no one at Brandstar told Graves that her father’s condition and her
role as his caretaker might entitle her to FMLA benefits.
On May 25, 2018, Graves arrived late to work and was es-
corted into a meeting with her supervisor, a studio manager, and
an HR assistant. During the conversation, they suggested that
Graves transition from her full-time role to a freelance position be-
cause it might better suit her schedule. Graves declined the offer
and asked whether this had to do with her father, to which the
Brandstar executives answered that it didn’t. At that point, they
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
decided to let Graves go effective May 30, 2018. Her father moved
to Florida three months later.
Graves’s employment record was mixed. She had a history
of “coming and going”—a practice that rankled her supervisors.
She also often missed editing sessions for her projects without no-
tice. Once, Graves left a junior editor waiting on her for an hour
until her supervisor contacted her to ask if she planned to attend.
And long before her father’s surgery, Graves’s supervisors repeat-
edly reported that her performance was subpar, that her projects
often went incomplete, and that her attitude at work made it diffi-
cult to collaborate.
B
Following her termination, Graves sued Brandstar in federal
court. As relevant here, Graves alleged that Brandstar (1) interfered
with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act and (2) en-
gaged in associational discrimination in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. After the district court granted summary
judgment to Brandstar, Graves appealed to this Court. 1
1 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing
all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Graves.
Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020). Summary
judgment is warranted when there are no genuine disputes of material fact.
Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).
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II
Graves presents three arguments on appeal. She contends
that the district court (1) misapplied the FMLA in rejecting her
claim that Brandstar failed to provide adequate notice of her statu-
tory rights, (2) wrongly rejected her ADA associational-discrimina-
tion claim, and (3) improperly weighed the evidence when consid-
ering Brandstar’s summary-judgment motion. We will consider
each in turn.
A
Graves first contends that the district court incorrectly re-
jected her contention that Brandstar failed to provide her the re-
quired notice of her FMLA rights. The FMLA provides up to 12
weeks of leave for an employee, like Graves, who is responsible for
caring for a family member with significant medical needs. See 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). To recover on an “interference” claim under
the FMLA, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements. First, she must
show that she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA. White v.
Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015).
Second, she must show that her employer denied her that benefit.
Id. And finally, she must “demonstrate harm, or prejudice, result-
ing from the employer’s interference with her exercise (or at-
tempted exercise) of an FMLA benefit.” Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping
Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2021).
As to the first element, it’s undisputed that Graves was eligi-
ble for FMLA benefits because she had worked full-time at Brand-
star for more than 12 months prior to the events giving rise to her
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
appeal and was charged with caring for a parent who had a serious
health condition. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110; see also 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1)(C).
That brings us to the second element—whether Brandstar
denied Graves her benefits under the FMLA. Graves contends that
Brandstar failed to provide her notice of certain statutory rights—
a failure, she says, that amounts to actionable interference with her
FMLA benefits. Under the FMLA and its implementing regula-
tions, there are several kinds of notice that an employer must pro-
vide—at different junctures and in different circumstances. See 29
C.F.R. § 825.300. The two at issue here are “[e]ligibility notice” and
“[r]ights and responsibilities notice.” Id. § 825.300(b)–(c). The for-
mer, as its name implies, “must state whether the employee is eli-
gible for FMLA leave,” id. § 825.300(b)(2), and the latter must “de-
tail[] the specific . . . obligations of the employee and explain[] any
consequences of a failure to meet these obligations,” id.
§ 825.300(c)(1).
Importantly for present purposes, it doesn’t take much to
trigger an employer’s obligation to provide both kinds of notice.
The operative regulation states that an employer must provide an
employee with eligibility and rights-and-responsibilities notice
when either (1) “an employee requests leave” or (2) “the employer
acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-
qualifying reason.” Id. § 825.300(b)(1) (eligibility notice); see id.
§ 825.300(c)(1) (stating that rights-and-responsibilities notice “shall
be provided to the employee each time the eligibility notice is
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21-13469 Opinion of the Court 9
provided”). Accordingly, if the employer learns from any source—
whether from the employee or otherwise—that the employee’s
leave might be for family or medical reasons, it is obligated to pro-
vide both types of notice.
Graves contends that she sought FMLA-qualifying leave on
two occasions that triggered Brandstar’s notice obligations: (1) her
May 2 email requesting leave for a short trip to care for her father
while he underwent emergency surgery; and (2) her May 6 email
and subsequent verbal communications requesting to be excused
from work-related travel. We consider each in turn.
1
In the May 2 email, Graves told Brandstar executives that she
intended to fly to Pennsylvania for her father’s emergency brain
surgery the next day and would “not be available for calls/edits”
while she was with him. We agree with Graves that her email was
sufficient to trigger Brandstar’s obligation to provide her eligibility
and rights-and-responsibilities notice under the FMLA because
Brandstar “acquire[d] knowledge that [her] leave may be for an
FMLA-qualifying reason.” Id. § 825.300(b)(1). It is undisputed that
Brandstar failed to provide Graves the required notice following the
May 2 email.
Brandstar’s failure to notify Graves of her FMLA rights may
well have interfered with her exercise of the corresponding benefits
within the meaning of the second prong of the interference analy-
sis. See supra at 7. But that failure alone isn’t enough to survive
summary judgment. To recover on her interference claim, Graves
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
must also—prong three—show that Brandstar’s failure caused her
harm. See Ramji, 992 F.3d at 1245; accord, e.g., Munoz v. Selig Enters.,
Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Graham v. State
Farm Mut. Ins., 193 F.3d 1274, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(“Even if the defendants have committed certain technical infrac-
tions under the FMLA, [a] plaintiff may not recover in the absence
of damages.”)). Under our precedent, an employee doesn’t suffer
harm from an employer’s technical non-compliance with the
FMLA’s notice requirements when she receives all her requested
time off and is paid for her absences. Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1275.
The parties agree that Brandstar provided Graves the leave
she requested in her May 2 email and that she received full pay for
those days. In fact, Graves accidentally clocked in on her two days
of requested leave, and Brandstar HR executives circled back weeks
later to ensure that she corrected her timecard to reflect her re-
quested leave. Thus, Graves can’t demonstrate that she was
harmed by Brandstar’s technical failure to notify her of her FMLA
rights. As a result, we must reject her interference claim arising out
of the May 2 request for leave.
2
Graves separately contends that her May 6 email—in which
she asked for ongoing flexibility to prepare her home for her fa-
ther’s move to Florida—triggered Brandstar’s obligation to provide
her eligibility and right-and-responsibilities notice, which it failed
to do. We disagree for a fundamental reason: Graves didn’t request
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21-13469 Opinion of the Court 11
leave either in her May 6 email or in her subsequent communica-
tions with Brandstar.
The Family and Medical Leave Act requires, at the very least,
that an employee actually seek leave—of some sort—to trigger an
employer’s obligation to give eligibility and rights-and-responsibil-
ities notice. As already explained, the operative notice regulation
requires either that an employee specifically “request[] FMLA leave”
or that the employer “acquire[] knowledge that an employee’s leave
may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1)
(emphasis added). That regulation, as we have said, sets a low bar,
but in either triggering instance, the employee must ask for time
off—i.e., leave—in order to prompt the employer’s notice obliga-
tions. See, e.g., Ramji, 992 F.3d at 1243–44 (holding that an employer
was obligated to give an employee notice of her rights under the
FMLA when she had clearly asked for sick leave to recuperate her
injured knee).
An examination of the May 6 email reveals that Graves didn’t
ask for leave—of any sort—to care for her ailing father. To the con-
trary, her message unambiguously discussed ongoing and future
work with Brandstar, which included developing a show around
her father’s transition to Florida. So, if anything, Graves’s father’s
medical needs, in her view, presented new opportunities for work,
not reasons for leave. True, Graves asked to be staffed on local pro-
jects to assist with her father’s transition to Florida. But at most,
those amounted to requests for accommodations to allow her to
continue to work, not a request for leave. Her rejection of
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
Brandstar’s offer to move from full-time to freelance also evidences
her desire to continue working. Put simply, all signs point to the
fact that Graves intended to keep working full-time at Brandstar,
not that she wanted leave. 2
Moreover, not only did Graves fail to “request leave” in the
May 6 email, but there’s also no indication that Brandstar “ac-
quire[d] knowledge” on its own that she wanted “leave . . . for an
FMLA-qualifying reason.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b). Therefore,
Graves’s email didn’t trigger Brandstar’s obligation to notify her of
her eligibility and rights and responsibilities under the FMLA. We
conclude that the district court didn’t err in granting summary
judgment to Brandstar on Graves’s FMLA claim.
2 In the final sentence of her email, Graves mentioned that she had planned to
“driv[e] [her father] and his beloved dog down to FL once he[ was] released
from rehab to begin treatments.” Even if we were to assume that sentence
implied a request for leave and that Graves’s proposal constituted “care”
within the meaning of the FMLA, see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), her claim
would fail on the same ground that precludes her FMLA claim related to the
May 2 email: Graves can’t show harm resulting from any technical non-com-
pliance with the FMLA’s notice regulation because her father didn’t move to
Florida until three months after she was let go. See supra at 7.
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B
Graves next contends that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Brandstar on her associational-discrimina-
tion claim.
Under the ADA, an employer is prohibited from discriminat-
ing against an employee who is “associated” with someone who
has significant medical needs for whom the employee may need to
provide care. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). We evaluate a claim of asso-
ciational discrimination under the ADA using the burden shifting-
framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802–04 (1973). See Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238,
1242 (11th Cir. 2001).
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the em-
ployee bears the initial burden to show a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226
(11th Cir. 1999). Once the employee has done so, the employer
need only produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its decision. Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1242. The burden then
shifts back to the employee to show sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s stated reason is
pretextual. Id. at 1243. If the employee can’t carry that burden,
then the employer is entitled to summary judgment. Id.
We will assume arguendo that Graves has made out a prima
facie case and move to the second and third prongs of the McDon-
nell Douglas analysis. On the second prong, Brandstar proffers am-
ple evidence that Graves was fired because of her haphazard
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13469
attendance, poor communication, incomplete work, and difficult
work demeanor.
By contrast, Graves offers little to no argument—in either
her initial or reply brief—to carry her burden on the third prong.
What we said in Wascura applies here foursquare: Graves “has
failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find that [Brandstar’s] proffered, non-discriminatory reasons
for her termination were pretextual.” 257 F.3d at 1243. The only
evidence she marshals is the “temporal proximity” between her fa-
ther’s acute onset decline and her termination—which, as we’ve
previously held, isn’t enough to show pretext. Gogel v. Kia Motors
Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1138 n.15 (11th Cir. 2020) (en
banc) (“While close temporal proximity between the protected
conduct and the adverse employment action can establish pretext
when coupled with other evidence, temporal proximity alone is in-
sufficient.”). Thus, the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Brandstar on Graves’s ADA claim.
C
Lastly, Graves contends that the district court improperly
weighed the evidence rather than viewing it in the light most favor-
able to her when deciding Brandstar’s summary-judgment motion.
Our review here is de novo, Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1272, and “we may
affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that finds sup-
port in the record,” Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151,
1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Having con-
cluded that the record supports the district court’s grant of
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21-13469 Opinion of the Court 15
summary judgment to Brandstar on both the FMLA and ADA
claims, we needn’t separately address this issue.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s de-
cision granting summary judgment for Brandstar.
AFFIRMED.