IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1447
Filed May 10, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES PAUL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Kirk Daily, District
Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions following guilty pleas. APPEAL
DISMISSED.
Ryan J. Mitchell of Orsborn, Mitchell, Goedken & Larson, P.C., Ottumwa,
for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
2
BADDING, Judge.
In November 2021, James Smith tendered written guilty pleas in separate
criminal cases to felony charges of second-degree theft and felon in possession of
a firearm.1 Both pleas were signed by Smith and acknowledged his right to file a
motion in arrest of judgment in order to challenge his guilty pleas. See Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.24(3)(b). After a continuance, Smith’s failure to appear at the
rescheduled date, and his later apprehension, an unreported sentencing hearing
was held in both cases on September 1, 2022. The court entered sentencing
orders imposing concurrent terms of imprisonment not to exceed five years on
each charge. In separate orders, the court noted that Smith made an oral motion
in arrest of judgment at the time of sentencing, which the court denied as untimely.
The record does not disclose the grounds for Smith’s untimely motion in arrest of
judgment.
Smith now appeals. First, he claims his “counsel was ineffective in failing
to adequately advise [him] of the obligation to file a motion in arrest of judgment
and the consequences of not filing.” As the State points out, we are without
authority to consider this claim on direct appeal, so we decline to do so. See Iowa
Code § 814.7 (2022); State v. Tucker, 982 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Iowa 2022).
1 At the time, written guilty pleas to felony charges were authorized by order of the
supreme court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a procedure Smith does
not challenge. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing
Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services (Nov. 24, 2020)
(“Through June 30, 2021, district courts may accept written guilty pleas in felony
cases in the same manner as in serious and aggravated misdemeanor cases. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b) (last paragraph).”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In
the Matter of Ongoing COVID-19 Iowa Judicial Branch Court Services and
Processes Continued to January 1, 2022 (June 21, 2021) (extending November
24, 2020 order through January 1, 2022).
3
Second, Smith claims the “plea proceedings were defective due to [him] not
being fully and properly informed of his right to file [a] motion in arrest of judgment
and the consequences of not filing.” Smith acknowledges that his oral motion in
arrest of judgment—the denial of which he does not challenge on appeal—was not
timely, and his failure to otherwise move in arrest of judgment precludes relief on
appeal. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). But he submits that he falls under one
of the “two recognized exceptions to the prohibition on obtaining appellate relief
following a guilty plea when no motion in arrest of judgment is filed,” that being
“when the defendant is not adequately advised of the obligation to file the motion
and the consequences of not filing.” Accord State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109
(Iowa 2021).2
But Smith’s claim on this point is still only that trial counsel failed to properly
inform him of the consequences of failing to file his motion in arrest of judgment.
Specifically, he incorporates the arguments he made under his first claim and
reiterates: “Trial counsel failed to properly and adequately inform [him] of any and
all issues surrounding the motion in arrest of judgment.” While Smith tries to
present this claim as a challenge to his guilty pleas on the merits, it is just a
repackaging of his ineffective-assistance claim and does not present any
substantive grounds for relief.3 See State v. Vennink, No. 20-1629, 2021
2 The other historical exception “allowed a defendant to indirectly challenge his
guilty plea on appeal despite not filing a motion in arrest of judgment ‘if the failure
to file a motion in arrest of judgment resulted from ineffective assistance of
counsel.’” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 (citation omitted). That “exception no
longer provides an avenue for relief on direct appeal.” Id.
3 Smith’s brief makes a passing reference to his innocence, but that is not the type
of claim for which we could provide relief on appeal because it is unsupported by
evidence, affidavits, or authority. See State v. Kudron, No. 17-0614, 2018
4
WL 3378547, at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021) (“[F]ailure to inform a
defendant about a motion in arrest of judgment implicates error-preservation
issues; it is not a substantive ground for relief.”). Since Smith confines his
complaints to “his lawyer, he makes a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
that he can only pursue in postconviction proceedings.” State v. Basquin, 970
N.W.2d 643, 660 (Iowa 2022).
Because Smith only forwards ineffective-assistance claims upon which we
cannot provide relief on direct appeal, he does not have good cause to appeal
following his guilty pleas. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3); Treptow, 960 N.W.2d
at 109–10; State v. Altimus, No. 19-1609, 2021 WL 5918310, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 15, 2021). As a result, we dismiss the appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
WL 2722784, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 6, 2018) (declining to address a “bare
allegation” of innocence on direct appeal from a guilty plea); see also Kellar v.
Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 352 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (“We do not
consider such an ‘argument’ which here consists of nothing more than a bald
assertion without any elaboration.”).