2023 IL 127666
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 127666)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
MICHAEL WILSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 18, 2023.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, and Holder White
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justices Rochford and O’Brien took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner, Michael Wilson, filed a motion in the circuit court of Kankakee
County seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging his
sentence for murder. Wilson, who was a juvenile at the time of sentencing, alleged
that the sentencing court had violated the eighth amendment by imposing a de facto
life sentence without first making a finding of permanent incorrigibility or
specifically addressing the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
¶2 The circuit court denied Wilson leave to file his successive petition, finding he
had failed to establish either cause or prejudice under section 122-1(f) of the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). On appeal, the
appellate court reversed that determination, vacated Wilson’s sentence, and
remanded the case for resentencing. 2021 IL App (3d) 200181-U. For the following
reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to
that court for further proceedings.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On the evening of December 26, 2008, Ryan Graefnitz and two friends, Joseph
Benegas and Walter Waschke, drove to Kankakee in search of cocaine. While
stopping to get gas, Graefnitz encountered Wilson and Byron Moore, who told
Graefnitz they knew where to buy drugs. The group then drove to an apartment
building in Kankakee.
¶5 When they arrived at the building, Wilson, Moore, and Graefnitz got out of the
car and went into the building’s vestibule. Witnesses inside the building heard
someone announce that a robbery was taking place and then heard two or three
gunshots. Benegas and Waschke, who had been waiting in the car, also heard the
gunshots and then saw Graefnitz exit the building and collapse on the ground.
Graefnitz had been shot in the back and died from his wounds. Benegas and
Waschke also both saw Wilson and Moore run from the building.
¶6 The State subsequently filed a petition alleging that Wilson, who was 14 years
old at the time of the murder, was a delinquent minor. The State then moved to
transfer the case to criminal court.
¶7 Following a hearing, the circuit court reviewed the relevant statutory factors
governing the motion to transfer, including the seriousness of the offense and the
public’s interest in being protected from crime, as well as the personal history of
Wilson and his potential for rehabilitation. The court granted the transfer motion,
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concluding that charging Wilson in the juvenile justice system “ ‘with the hope that
this minor will somehow be transformed into a non-violent law abiding citizen
ready for release in society at age 21’ ” would not serve “ ‘the public interest nor
the interest of justice.’ ” People v. Wilson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130606-U, ¶ 13.
Wilson was then charged by indictment with first degree murder and armed
robbery.
¶8 Following a jury trial, Wilson was found guilty of first degree murder and
attempted armed robbery. In response to a special interrogatory prepared by the
State for sentence enhancement purposes, the jury found that Wilson did not
personally discharge the weapon that caused Graefnitz’s death.
¶9 The circuit court thereafter ordered the preparation of a presentence
investigation report (PSI) for sentencing. The PSI, which consisted of more than
200 pages of individual reports and supporting documents, indicated that Wilson
was born prematurely with cocaine and amphetamines in his system. He was placed
into protective custody by the Department of Children and Family Services and was
adopted when he was two years old. He was placed in a special education program
because of his behavior problems and learning disabilities.
¶ 10 The PSI additionally showed that Wilson was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in the third grade and later with oppositional defiant
disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and disruptive behavior disorder. By the
time he was 13, Wilson was consuming alcohol regularly and smoking marijuana
on a daily basis. School records dating from 2001 indicated that Wilson was
emotionally disturbed and suffered from speech and language impairment, was
noncompliant in the classroom, was aggressive to his peers and adults, and acted
out and shouted without thinking. Wilson was suspended from school several times
for his conduct.
¶ 11 The PSI contained a behavioral evaluation conducted in 2008 by the Riverside
Resolve Center in connection with outpatient substance abuse treatment Wilson
received because his behavior had become more severe over the years. Wilson’s
outpatient treatment was unsuccessful because he continued to use drugs. Later, he
entered a residential program but was also unsuccessful because he left the facility
without permission.
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¶ 12 In 2007, Wilson was found guilty of criminal damage to property and trespass
to real property. In the behavioral health screen for court supervision, Wilson was
diagnosed with disruptive behavioral disorder with some oppositional defiant
disorder. Wilson was sentenced to one year of court supervision, which was later
revoked. Wilson was then placed in the River Valley Juvenile Detention Center.
¶ 13 The records from the River Valley Juvenile Detention Center, dated from 2009
to 2011, included medical progress notes, incident reports, and case notes. Most of
these documents indicated Wilson had poor behavior and disregarded the rules.
Wilson incurred several incident reports for fighting, disobeying staff, making
deliberate or implied threats to staff, possession of contraband, damaging facility
property, and refusing lockdown while in the detention center.
¶ 14 Also included in the PSI was a report from Dr. Paul Pasulka, who had evaluated
Wilson in connection with the State’s motion to transfer his case to criminal court.
Dr. Pasulka diagnosed Wilson with mild retardation, ADHD, and depressive
disorder with atypical features. Professor Monia Mahan had also evaluated Wilson
in connection with the motion to transfer. Her report indicated Wilson was easily
frustrated, not able to follow directions, and engaged in inappropriate behavior. He
also had difficulty in all areas of functioning and only possessed a few adaptive
behaviors to help him cope with day-to-day living.
¶ 15 At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court considered the PSI, the parties’
evidence in aggravation and mitigation, a victim impact statement, and Wilson’s
statement in allocution. The court also heard argument from the State and from
Wilson’s attorney. The latter stressed to the court that it should look to what was
“going on with defendant,” including the fact that he was born with drugs in his
system and suffered from substantial mental defects and that there was evidence in
the PSI that it was reasonably likely Wilson could function in a structured setting.
Following the parties’ arguments, the court sentenced Wilson to 55 years’
imprisonment for first degree murder (which included a 15-year firearm
enhancement), to be served at 100%, and a consecutive term of 4 years’
imprisonment for attempted armed robbery.
¶ 16 In explaining its reasons for the sentences, the court emphasized that the victim
was shot in cold blood and left to die on the street. The court acknowledged
Wilson’s troubled history and developmental problems but stated that, in “page
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after page after page after page [of the PSI], there is not one page that I can think
of in this entire presentence investigation that doesn’t talk about how bad you are.”
In addition, according to the court, the PSI showed that Wilson was “a very
dangerous person,” as he did not care who he hurt and was not going to abide by
any rules.
¶ 17 On direct appeal, Wilson raised several arguments, including a contention that
the circuit court had abused its discretion in imposing sentencing because it failed
to consider mitigating factors, including Wilson’s age, history of neglect,
developmental delay, mental health history, and lack of a violent criminal history.
Wilson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130606-U, ¶ 66. The appellate court rejected this
argument, as well as others, and affirmed Wilson’s convictions and sentence. Id.
¶ 69. With respect to Wilson’s sentencing argument, the appellate court stated:
“Here, the trial court considered the mitigating and aggravating factors and
found that the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating ones because
of defendant’s conduct, including his behavior in juvenile detention, which
showed a pattern of aggressiveness and violence. In this case, defendant’s
sentence of 55 years for murder, which was well within the statutory range, was
not an abuse of discretion.” Id.
¶ 18 On September 26, 2016, Wilson filed a pro se postconviction petition, which
was summarily dismissed by the circuit court. On appeal, Wilson argued that he
had presented the gist of a constitutional claim of judicial bias and the gist of a
constitutional claim that his de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment
(U.S. Const., amend. VIII). People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App (3d) 160679-U, ¶ 20.
The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the summary dismissal.
Id. ¶ 24. With respect to his claim of judicial bias, the appellate court held that the
claim was forfeited because Wilson could have raised it on direct appeal but did
not. Id. ¶ 25. In addition, the claim was without merit because the record disclosed
that the sentencing court’s comments were derived entirely from Wilson’s history
of behavior as disclosed in the PSI. As to Wilson’s claim that his sentence was an
unconstitutional de facto life sentence, the appellate court found that the claim was
not contained on the face of his pro se postconviction petition and that counsel had
instead attempted to extrapolate it from Wilson’s claim of judicial bias.
Accordingly, the court held that the eighth amendment claim was forfeited. Id.
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¶ 19 On March 27, 2020, Wilson filed the pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition that is at issue here. In his motion and accompanying
petition, Wilson raised both an eighth amendment claim (U.S. Const., amend. VIII)
and a proportionate penalties clause claim under the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). With respect to his eighth amendment claim, Wilson
maintained that under Miller and People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, a sentencing
court must make a finding of permanent incorrigibility and must specifically
address the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in Miller before sentencing
a juvenile offender to life in prison. Wilson further maintained that, under People
v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, a prison sentence of 40 years or more constitutes a
de facto life sentence that triggers these protections. Wilson contended that his
sentencing court had not followed these procedures when imposing sentence and
had therefore violated the eighth amendment. The circuit court denied Wilson leave
to file his petition.
¶ 20 On appeal, the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing with directions that the court consider
Wilson’s youth and its attendant characteristics. 2021 IL App (3d) 200181-U, ¶ 16.
The appellate court concluded that Wilson’s Miller-based claim satisfied the cause
and prejudice test. Id. Specifically, Wilson established cause because he could not
have raised his claim prior to the decisions in Miller, Holman, and Buffer. Id.
Further, Wilson established prejudice because a review of the record demonstrated
the sentencing court did not make a finding that Wilson was permanently
incorrigible and did not specifically address Wilson’s youth and attendant
characteristics when it sentenced him to a de facto life sentence. Id. Thus, the
appellate court concluded Wilson was entitled to postconviction relief. Id. Having
granted Wilson relief on his eighth amendment claim, the court did not address the
proportionate penalties clause claim. This appeal followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2021).
¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 The Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) provides a statutory remedy
for criminal defendants who have suffered substantial violations of their
constitutional rights at trial. People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 53. A
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postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on a final judgment, and
constitutional issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred from
postconviction consideration by the doctrine of res judicata, while issues that could
have been raised, but were not, are forfeited. Id.
¶ 23 Both the Act and our caselaw make clear that the filing of only one
postconviction petition is contemplated. Id. However, there are two exceptions
where fundamental fairness requires that the bar against successive petitions be
lifted. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. The first is the “cause and prejudice” exception, which has been
codified in the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)). Taliani, 2021 IL 125891,
¶ 55. Under this exception, a petitioner must demonstrate both “cause” for the
failure to raise a claim in the initial petition and “prejudice” resulting from that
failure. People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. The second exception is the
“ ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ ” exception, which requires a petitioner to
make a persuasive showing of actual innocence (Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 55)
and does not require a showing of cause and prejudice (id. ¶ 58). Under either
exception, the petitioner must first obtain leave of court to file a successive petition.
Id.
¶ 24 In this case, the sole issue presented is whether the circuit court should have
granted Wilson leave to file his successive petition because he satisfied the cause
and prejudice standard with respect to his eighth amendment claim. To establish
“cause” a petitioner must identify “an objective factor that impeded his or her
ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction
proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(1) (West 2016). To establish prejudice, a
petitioner must show that the claim not raised during the initial proceeding so
infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. Id.
§ 122-1(f)(2); Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. Our review of these issues is de novo.
Id.
¶ 25 The State contends that the circuit court properly denied Wilson leave to file
his successive postconviction petition because he failed to establish either cause or
prejudice. We need not address the State’s arguments regarding cause because, for
the following reasons, it is clear that Wilson has not established prejudice. See, e.g.,
People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15 (both prongs of the cause and prejudice
standard must be met).
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¶ 26 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment
“forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The Court found that such
sentencing schemes were constitutionally flawed because juveniles “are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” (id. at 471) and
mandatory sentencing schemes, “by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking
account of [those differences]” (id. at 476). The Court explained that, by making
irrelevant the “offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances
attendant to it” (id.), mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes simply
pose “too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” (id. at 479).
¶ 27 The Court in Miller did not categorically prohibit life sentences for juvenile
offenders. Rather, the Court held that such sentences must be based on a process
employing judicial discretion rather than statutory mandates and that sentencing
courts must take into account how an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances
“counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480.
The Court also highlighted some of these attendant circumstances: the youth’s
chronological age and its “hallmark features,” including “immaturity, impetuosity,”
and the “failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; the circumstances of the
offense, including the extent of the juvenile’s participation and whether familial or
peer pressure may have affected the juvenile; and the juvenile’s individual
circumstances, including his family and home environment, his rehabilitative
potential, and whether he was able to meaningfully participate in the trial process.
Id. at 477-78.
¶ 28 Subsequently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016), the
Supreme Court held that Miller had announced a new rule that applied retroactively
to state cases on collateral review. In so holding, the Court repeated Miller’s
determination that juveniles “ ‘are constitutionally different from adults for purpose
of sentencing.’ ” Id. at 206 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S at 471). The Court also
reiterated that Miller “requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth
and attendant characteristics before determining that life without parole is a
proportionate sentence.” Id. at 209-10 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 483). Montgomery
further emphasized that a life sentence without parole is permitted only for “the rare
juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is
impossible” (id. at 208), juvenile offenders “whose crimes reflect permanent
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incorrigibility” (id. at 209), and “those rare children whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption” (id.).
¶ 29 This court addressed the scope of Miller and Montgomery in Holman, 2017 IL
120655. In Holman, the principal question was whether Miller and Montgomery
had any application to juvenile life sentences imposed under a discretionary
sentencing scheme. Id. ¶ 34. This court noted that a handful of cases from other
jurisdictions had read Miller and Montgomery as holding only that mandatory
juvenile life sentencing schemes were unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 40. However, this
court rejected that contention, stating that “Miller contains language that is
significantly broader than its core holding” and that “[n]one of what the Court said
is specific to only mandatory life sentences.” Id. ¶ 38. Holman therefore determined
that the principles of Miller and Montgomery applied with equal force to life
sentences for juvenile offenders imposed under a discretionary sentencing scheme.
Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 30 Holman held that, under Miller and Montgomery, a juvenile offender may be
sentenced to life in prison under a discretionary sentencing scheme only “if the trial
court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of
rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 46. Holman further concluded that the Supreme Court’s
admonition that the eighth amendment requires a sentencer to “consider a juvenile
offender’s youth and attendant characteristics” meant that the sentencing court may
impose a life sentence only after specifically addressing the characteristics of the
offender’s youth discussed in Miller. These “Miller factors” included, but were not
limited to,
“(1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and
any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home
environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the
homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected
him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal
with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys;
and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” Id.
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¶ 31 Following Holman, this court held in Buffer that a prison sentence of 40 years
or more constitutes a de facto life sentence that triggers the protections of Miller
and Holman. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41. This court summarized the governing
principles, stating that
“to prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced
for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was
subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and
(2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics
in imposing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 32 Relying on the holdings of Miller, Holman, and Buffer, the appellate court in
the case at bar concluded that Wilson had established prejudice for purposes of the
cause and prejudice test. The appellate court noted that Wilson had been sentenced
to a total of 59 years’ imprisonment and had thus a received a de facto life sentence
pursuant to Buffer. The appellate court then concluded that the sentencing court had
violated the eighth amendment because it did not properly “consider defendant’s
youth and its attendant characteristics” before sentencing Wilson. 2021 IL App (3d)
200181-U, ¶ 16. That is, the sentencing court did not make a finding of permanent
incorrigibility and did not specifically address the Miller factors, as required by this
court’s decision in Holman. For this reason, the appellate court vacated Wilson’s
sentence and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 33 Before this court, the State contends that the appellate court’s prejudice analysis
is incorrect. According to the State, the appellate court erred in relying on Holman
because the rule announced in that decision has been abrogated by the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307
(2021).
¶ 34 In Jones, the defendant argued that a sentencer who imposes a discretionary life
sentence without the possibility of parole on a minor must make a separate factual
finding that the minor defendant is permanently incorrigible or, at the least,
“provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an ‘implicit finding’ of
permanent incorrigibility.” Id. at ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1311, 1313. The United
States Supreme Court rejected both these arguments, finding that neither Miller nor
Montgomery required such findings. Id.
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¶ 35 Jones explained that Miller “declined to characterize permanent incorrigibility
as *** an eligibility criterion.” Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1315. Rather, it “required
that a sentencer consider youth as a mitigating factor when deciding whether to
impose a life-without-parole sentence” but “did not require the sentencer to make
a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing such a sentence.”
Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1316. Similarly, Jones noted that in Montgomery the Court
expressly stated that “ ‘Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement’ ”
and added that “ ‘a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility … is not
required.’ ” Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1313 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).
¶ 36 The United States Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s alternative
argument that an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of
incorrigibility was constitutionally required. The Jones Court noted that Miller “did
not even hint at requiring an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit
finding of permanent incorrigibility” and, if it believed such an explanation was
constitutionally necessary, it surely would have said so. Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at
1320. In addition, the Jones Court stated that an on-the-record sentencing
explanation was “not necessary to ensure that a sentencer considers a defendant’s
youth,” as Miller required. Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1319. The Jones Court explained
that, “if the sentencer has discretion to consider the defendant’s youth, the sentencer
necessarily will consider the defendant’s youth, especially if defense counsel
advances an argument based on the defendant’s youth.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.
at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1319.
¶ 37 The United States Supreme Court emphasized in the Jones case that, although
one sentencer might weigh the defendant’s youth differently than another, the “key
point remains” that “a sentencer cannot avoid considering the defendant’s youth if
the sentencer has discretion to consider that mitigating factor.” Id. at ___, 141 S.
Ct. at 1319-20.
¶ 38 The Court in Jones thus held that neither a finding of permanent incorrigibility
nor an on-the-record sentencing explanation is constitutionally required before a
juvenile may be sentenced to life without parole. Instead, “[i]n a case involving an
individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State’s
discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and
constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1313. Accordingly, unless a
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sentencing court “expressly refuses as a matter of law to consider the defendant’s
youth (as opposed to, for example, deeming the defendant’s youth to be outweighed
by other factors or deeming the defendant’s youth to be an insufficient reason to
support a lesser sentence under the facts of the case)” (id. at ___ n.7, 141 S. Ct. at
1320 n.7), a discretionary sentencing scheme, in itself, satisfies Miller’s
requirement that sentencing courts account for youth and its attendant
circumstances. As the Jones Court stated, “[t]he key assumption of both Miller and
Montgomery was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the
defendant’s youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are
imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s
age.” Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1318.
¶ 39 Notably, this court has previously recognized the import of Jones on the holding
of Miller. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 71 (noting that in Jones
“the Court clarified that the holding in Miller does not apply to discretionary life
sentences where the sentencing court does have discretion to consider youth and
attendant characteristics at sentencing”); People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 66
(Jones states that a sentencing decision imposed where “the trial court had
discretion to consider defendant’s youth and impose less than a de facto life
sentence” complies with Miller); People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 28 (citing
Jones and noting that “Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply
only when a trial court lacks, or refuses to use, discretion in sentencing a juvenile
offender to a life, or de facto life, sentence”).
¶ 40 Other courts have understood Jones similarly and have concluded that “no
viable Miller claim exists, ‘so long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is [ ] so
long as the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and
impose a lesser punishment.’ [Citation].” Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232,
1243 (Pa. 2022); see also United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2021)
(en banc) (same); United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2021) (same);
Holmes v. State, 859 S.E.2d 475, 480-81 (Ga. 2021) (same); Williams v. State, 500
P.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Kan. 2021) (same).
¶ 41 Given the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, the State contends
in this case that this court’s decision in Holman no longer accurately reflects eighth
amendment law. See Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 41 (noting that Holman “is
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questionable in light of Jones”). Therefore, according to the State, the appellate
court’s prejudice analysis was incorrect. We agree.
¶ 42 “[W]hen the Supreme Court adopts a particular framework for applying a
federal constitutional provision, we are required to follow that framework,
regardless of how other courts, including this one, may have approached the issue
in other decisions.” People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 22. Holman’s holding that
a juvenile offender’s discretionary life sentence does not comport with the eighth
amendment unless the sentencing court first makes a finding of permanent
incorrigibility after specifically addressing the “Miller factors” is directly at odds
with the holding in Jones—specifically, that additional findings are not required, in
that a discretionary sentencing scheme that allows a court to consider youth and its
attendant characteristics is “constitutionally sufficient” (Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141
S. Ct. at 1313). Accordingly, Holman is overruled.
¶ 43 Wilson also cites State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558, 2022-NCSC-77, in support of
his contention that he has established prejudice with respect to his eighth
amendment claim. In Kelliher, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed a
situation where the sentencing court had sentenced a juvenile offender to a de facto
life sentence after making an express finding that the offender was “ ‘neither
incorrigible nor irredeemable.’ ” Id. ¶ 2. After reviewing the United States Supreme
Court’s juvenile sentencing cases, including Miller, the North Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that those cases set forth a substantive, eighth amendment rule that
“categorically prohibits a sentencing court from sentencing any juvenile to life
without parole if the sentencing court has found the juvenile to be ‘neither
incorrigible nor irredeemable.’ ” Id. ¶ 38. Kelliher has no application here, since
the sentencing court did not make a finding that Wilson was “neither incorrigible
nor irredeemable.”
¶ 44 In this case, there is no dispute that Wilson was sentenced under a sentencing
scheme that granted the sentencing court the discretion to consider Wilson’s youth
and attendant circumstances and to impose less than a de facto life sentence. In
addition, it is clear from the record that the sentencing court did not refuse, as a
matter of law, to consider Wilson’s youth. At the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing, the court stated:
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“I’m going to tell you, [defendant], to this report. It’s about an inch-and-a-
half to two inches. And, normally, when I read a [PSI], normally you can read
it and there’s some redeeming value, there’s something good. You can see some
rehabilitation potential. I have to tell you, I started to tag the pages. And page
after page after page after page, there is not one page that I can think of in this
entire [PSI] that doesn’t talk about how bad you are.
Does it mention that you have ADHD? It does. That you have defiance
disorder, that you have impulsive behavior, hyperactivity, possibly some mild
retardation? It does. And it gives you those labels. But the entire [PSI] talks
about how you didn’t make it anywhere, quite frankly. And it wasn’t because
of other people, it was because of yourself. You were basically noncompliant,
a bully, disrespectful, in every place you ever ended up. You made certain that
everybody there, you know, was—was miserable around you.
There is not one page—I can pick any one page, and it’s terrible. Absolutely
terrible each and every place that you were at. And these are things that you just
did purposely all the time, whether you were in a facility, or whether you were
in the school room, or whether you were in an alternate school. Your behavior
never was good—never, ever. And so the problem is when I look at you, even
though you’re young, the past tells you a lot about the future. And this shows
you to be a very dangerous person, quite frankly. You don’t care. You don’t
care who you hurt. You don’t care what the rules are. And you don’t care who’s
making the rules, because you’re not gonna abide by those rules. That’s what
every one of these pages say, that you simply are not going to abide by the rules.
And I—I don’t believe that will change. I know you’re young. But, you know,
this is a significant—even though you’re young—significant account of your
young years. And, as I said, each page. I can’t pick one page out of here that
says one—even one thing good about you. Like I said, from the schools to the
rehabilitation to the people that have worked for you.
So I do believe you’re a danger to society. I believe you will continue to be
a danger to society. I’m not sure there’s any rehabilitation factor there that
you’re gonna follow. I guess you can prove me wrong when you are in prison.
But there is nothing in here that says you’re going to turn your life around.
Everything in here says you basically don’t have a conscience, and you’re
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gonna do what you want to do. And if it causes danger to others, you’re gonna
do that. And we saw that on the night of December 27th when we heard the
facts that, you know, you yelled out that it was gonna be a robbery. Ryan
Graefnitz turns around and runs away. At that point you could have just let him
run. Nothing had happened. But you decided to shoot—you and Byron Moore
decided that you’re gonna shoot him in the back and leave him for dead and
drive off and go talk to your friends and do whatever else you wanted to do and
leave him lay in that street. And I can consider that.
So, I am going to sentence you to 40 years on first degree murder with an
additional 15. So that’s going to be 55 years there. I am going to give you—and
the State recommended, and I will do that—on the attempt armed robbery, the
minimum on that, other than probation, is 4 years. So I am going to give him 4
years, which is the minimum prison time on that. And the 4 years is at 50
percent.
Now, on the Class 1 attempt robbery, that will be followed by 2 years
mandatory supervised release, possible fine up to $25,000. As to the first degree
murder, the 40 years plus the add-on of 15. When you get out of prison, it will—
but you’re gonna be a very old man. So—you know, and I hope sitting in prison
will change your ways. I’m just afraid it won’t. I’m afraid you’re gonna get out
and still be dangerous and still have no conscience. I hope I’m wrong. But after
you serve that 55 years, 40 plus 15, it will be followed by 2 years mandatory
supervised release, or what used to be called parole. As I said, so the record’s
real clear, there’s no such thing as probation, obviously, on a first degree
murder, which is served at 100 percent. I could give you probation on the
attempt armed robbery. However, I’m not. I’m giving you the 4 years, which is
50 percent. But I just wanted to—I just want to make known to the higher courts
that I know I could give you probation.”
The sentencing court reviewed the entire PSI, which contained extensive evidence
regarding Wilson’s developmental age, maturity, and other circumstances, and
announced several times that Wilson was young. Wilson thus received the
constitutionally required procedure under Miller. That being the case, Wilson
cannot establish prejudice, and the circuit court correctly denied him leave to file
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his eighth amendment claim. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate
court awarding Wilson a new sentencing hearing under the eighth amendment of
the United States Constitution.
¶ 45 Proportionate Penalties
¶ 46 Because the appellate court granted relief to Wilson on his eighth amendment
claim, it did not address his additional contention that he was entitled to relief under
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, § 11. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the appellate court to address
whether Wilson has satisfied the cause and prejudice test with respect to his
proportionate penalties clause claim. See, e.g., People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462,
473 (1997) (“where trial errors were raised but not ruled upon in the appellate court,
it is appropriate for this court to remand the cause to the appellate court for
resolution of those remaining issues”).
¶ 47 CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court granting Wilson
relief on his eighth amendment claim and awarding him a new sentencing hearing
is reversed. The cause is remanded to the appellate court to address whether Wilson
has satisfied the cause and prejudice test with respect to his proportionate penalties
clause claim.
¶ 49 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 50 Cause remanded.
¶ 51 JUSTICES ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
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