Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 21-0994
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LG Chem America, Inc. and LG Chem, Ltd.,
Petitioners,
v.
Tommy Morgan,
Respondent
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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
Argued March 22, 2023
JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Young did not participate in the decision.
This is a products-liability case in which two nonresident
defendants contest personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff bought a
lithium-ion battery at a store in Texas and was injured when he used it
to charge his e-cigarette. The defendants do not dispute they sold and
distributed the same batteries to Texas manufacturers. Yet they urge
personal jurisdiction is lacking because they did not send the batteries
to Texas for resale to individual consumers to use with e-cigarettes;
rather, they only expected that the manufacturers would incorporate the
batteries into branded consumer products, such as cordless power tools
and laptop computers. They argue the plaintiff’s claims arise out of the
use of the battery in a way they never intended by an individual
consumer they never targeted and thus are insufficiently related to the
defendants’ Texas contacts to justify haling them into a Texas court.
We hold, consistent with our precedents, that the
minimum-contacts analysis requires evaluation of a defendant’s
contacts with the forum—Texas—as a whole. Where, as here, a
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of doing business in
Texas by selling and distributing into Texas the very product that
injures a plaintiff, personal jurisdiction is not lacking merely because
the plaintiff is outside a segment of the market the defendant targeted.
Put differently, the relatedness prong of the minimum-contacts analysis
does not require that the plaintiff’s claims arise out of a set of facts
mirroring the defendant’s expectations about the course its product
would follow after it entered Texas. The trial court and the court of
appeals correctly concluded the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendants is, on this record, consistent with due process. We therefore
affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.
I. Background
Tommy Morgan, a Texas resident, was injured when a lithium-ion
battery “exploded” in his pocket. Morgan purchased the battery—
2
referred to by its model number, 186501—from Vapor Sense, a store in
Texas, to charge an e-cigarette he bought at the same store. The model
18650 battery that injured Morgan was allegedly manufactured by LG
Chem, Ltd., a company headquartered in South Korea. Morgan brought
products-liability claims2 against LG Chem and its American
distributor, LG Chem America, Inc., as well as the manufacturer of the
e-cigarette and Vapor Sense.
Morgan’s original petition included the following jurisdictional
allegations:
LG Chem “is in the business of . . . selling, exporting,
importing, distributing and/or otherwise introducing
lithium-ion batteries into the stream of commerce” and “was
conducting business in the State of Texas in a continuous and
systematic manner by marketing and/or selling its
manufactured products in the State of Texas.”
LG Chem America “works in conjunction with [LG Chem] in
the business of . . . selling, exporting, importing, distributing
and/or otherwise introducing lithium-ion batteries into the
stream of commerce” and “was and continues to conduct
business in the State of Texas in a continuous and systematic
manner by marketing and/or selling its manufactured
products in the State of Texas.”
“[T]he lithium-ion battery that injured [Morgan] was
manufactured, marketed, sold, distributed, or otherwise
1The battery’s model number refers to its dimensions—it is 18 mm in
diameter, 65 mm in length, and cylindrical in shape. See Yamashita v. LG
Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 501 (9th Cir. 2023).
2 Morgan asserts the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) strict
liability for manufacturing defects, (3) strict liability for marketing defects,
(4) breach of express warranty, (5) breach of implied warranty, (6) violations of
the Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act, and (7) gross
negligence.
3
placed into the stream of commerce by [LG Chem America]
and/or [LG Chem].”
“At all relevant times, Defendants were engaged in the
business of . . . selling and/or otherwise intentionally placing
. . . batteries into the stream of commerce and directing such
products to Texas, including the . . . battery that injured
[Morgan].”
LG Chem and LG Chem America each filed a special appearance,
challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction over them. Each supported
its special appearance with an employee’s affidavit. The affidavits
averred that neither LG Chem defendant is incorporated or
headquartered in Texas. Neither affidavit denied that LG Chem or LG
Chem America directed the sale and distribution of its products,
including lithium-ion batteries, to Texas. Instead, the affidavits denied
the LG Chem defendants sold or distributed their batteries for use by
individual consumers or for e-cigarettes. For example, LG Chem’s
senior manager, Joon Young Shin, averred that LG Chem “does not
distribute, advertise, or sell 18650 cells directly to consumers, and has
never authorized any manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retailer, or
re-seller to distribute, advertise, or sell [LG Chem]’s lithium-ion power
cells directly to consumers as standalone batteries” (emphases added).
Similarly, LG Chem America’s compliance manager, HyunSoo Kim,
averred that LG Chem America “has never sold or distributed any power
cells meant for e-cigarettes or vaping devices” and “has never authorized
any manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retailer, or re-seller . . . to
advertise, distribute, or sell LG brand power cells in Texas, or anywhere
else, for use by individual consumers as power cells in e-cigarette or
vaping devices” (emphases added).
4
Morgan responded to both special appearances and conceded that
neither LG Chem defendant is at home in Texas for purposes of general
personal jurisdiction. But Morgan insisted that both are subject to
specific personal jurisdiction. In particular, Morgan asserted that LG
Chem “directly targets the Texas market [by] shipping lithium-ion
batteries, like the battery at issue here, directly into the State of Texas.”
In support, Morgan submitted a declaration from his attorney with
several attachments. The bulk of the attachments consists of over 2,000
pages of spreadsheets, purportedly reflecting U.S. Customs data from
November 2006 through May 2019, showing LG Chem’s shipments of
thousands of products to Texas companies or through Texas ports.
Some, but not all, of these entries seemingly show that LG Chem
shipped lithium-ion batteries (and specifically model 18650 batteries) to
Texas. Many of those shipments were consigned to LG Chem America,
a subsidiary that generates about one-fifteenth of its total revenue in
Texas and is responsible for “sales and trading” of LG Chem’s products.
In reply, the LG Chem defendants argued they are not subject to
specific personal jurisdiction because Morgan has not shown that his
claims arise from or are related to any purposeful contacts between the
LG Chem defendants and Texas. Neither defendant objected to the
spreadsheets or other evidence attached to Morgan’s responses.
Following a hearing at which no additional evidence was offered, the
trial court denied both special appearances.
Both LG Chem defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7) (allowing an appeal from an order
granting or denying a defendant’s special appearance). The court of
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appeals affirmed, concluding that each of Morgan’s products-liability
claims for the LG Chem battery that allegedly injured him in Texas
“arises from or relates to [LG Chem]’s conduct in designing and
marketing its batteries for the Texas market, and marketing, selling,
and distributing them to customers here.” 663 S.W.3d 217, 237 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020). With respect to LG Chem America, the
court likewise concluded that Morgan’s claims “arise out of the [LG
Chem] batteries that [LG Chem America] marketed, sold, and
distributed to customers in Texas, including Morgan.” Id. at 238. The
court of appeals reasoned that both LG Chem defendants could
reasonably anticipate being haled into a Texas court when an allegedly
defective and unreasonably dangerous LG Chem battery that they sold
in Texas causes an injury in Texas. Id. at 237, 238–39. The LG Chem
defendants filed petitions for review,3 which we granted.
II. Applicable Law
A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue
a binding judgment. Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC,
625 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Tex. 2021). Texas courts may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if it is (1) authorized by the
Texas long-arm statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 17.041–.045;
and (2) consistent with federal due-process guarantees. Luciano,
625 S.W.3d at 8. The long-arm statute permits courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant who “does business in this state,” which
3 LG Chem and LG Chem America filed separate petitions for review,
but they jointly filed a brief on the merits. Nowhere in this Court do the LG
Chem defendants suggest that the jurisdictional analysis for LG Chem is
different than that for LG Chem America.
6
the Legislature defines to include, among other things, a nonresident
defendant who “commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.” TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042(2).
A nonresident defendant may challenge a Texas court’s personal
jurisdiction over it by filing a special appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.
The plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to
bring the nonresident defendant within the reach of the long-arm
statute. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex.
2010). The defendant then bears the burden to negate all bases of
personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Id. The defendant can
negate personal jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis. Id. at 659.
It can present evidence that contradicts the plaintiff’s factual allegations
supporting the assertion of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff can
then respond with its own evidence supporting its allegations. Id. Or
the defendant can show that even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true,
the evidence is legally insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Id.
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a party is a question of
law that we review de novo, although the court may have to resolve
questions of fact. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8.
A state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is constrained by the constitutional right to due process. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A tribunal’s authority depends on the
defendant’s having sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state
such that the maintenance of the suit is reasonable and “does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
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311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). “In giving content to that formulation, the
Court has long focused on the nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s
relationship to the forum State.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).
“[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection
of the laws of that state.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). These benefits and
protections include “the enforcement of contracts, the defense of
property, [and] the resulting formation of effective markets.” Ford,
141 S. Ct. at 1029. But the state’s assistance creates reciprocal
obligations, including an obligation that products the defendant sells or
distributes in the state be safe for its citizens to use. Id. at 1030. A
state’s enforcement of that commitment through the exercise of personal
jurisdiction can “hardly be said to be undue.” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 319).
There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction: “general (sometimes
called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called
case-linked) jurisdiction.” Id. at 1024. Morgan concedes that he cannot
establish general jurisdiction. Therefore, the only issue in this case is
whether Morgan has established specific personal jurisdiction over the
LG Chem defendants.
8
As noted, to establish specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
has minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8. This specific-jurisdiction analysis
involves “two co-equal components”: purposeful availment and
relatedness. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 579
(Tex. 2007).
First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Luciano,
625 S.W.3d at 8. In cases involving products liability, this Court has
adopted the “stream-of-commerce-plus” standard to establish whether
this purposeful availment exists. See id. at 13; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d
at 577 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (plurality op.)). Under that standard, the defendant’s act of
placing a product into the stream of commerce does not establish
purposeful availment unless there is “additional conduct” evincing “an
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.” Moki Mac,
221 S.W.3d at 577 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112). Mere knowledge
that the defendant’s product will reach the forum state is not sufficient.
Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 13 (citing CMMC v. Salinas, 929 S.W.2d 435,
439 (Tex. 1996)).
Second, the plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. at 9. “This so-called
relatedness inquiry defines the appropriate ‘nexus between the
nonresident defendant, the litigation, and the forum.’” Id. at 14 (quoting
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Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579). Under our precedents, the plaintiff must
demonstrate a “substantial connection” between the defendant’s
contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d
at 585.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently examined the relatedness
inquiry and explained that, while a plaintiff need not establish a strict
causal relationship between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s
claim, neither is it the case that anything goes. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
Ford concerned two lawsuits in which plaintiffs brought
products-liability claims against a nonresident car manufacturer after
its cars were involved in accidents in the plaintiffs’ home states. There
was no dispute that Ford purposefully availed itself of the two states’
markets, including by advertising and selling its cars (including the two
models at issue in the lawsuits) in those states. Id. at 1028. But in each
case, Ford argued that personal jurisdiction was lacking because it did
not sell, design, or manufacture the particular injury-causing car in that
state. So, Ford’s argument went, its contacts with the forum did not give
rise to the plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 1026. The Court disagreed with
Ford, held there was personal jurisdiction, and reaffirmed that specific
personal jurisdiction requires a “connection” between a plaintiff’s suit
and the defendant’s activities. Id. It concluded a “causal showing” is
not required and the relatedness requirement is satisfied when a
company “serves a market for a product in the forum State and the
product malfunctions there.” Id. at 1026–27. The Court cautioned,
however, that its holding should not be read to suggest that “anything
goes.” Id. at 1026. Rather, there must be “real limits” on the relatedness
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inquiry that adequately protect the due-process rights of a foreign
defendant. Id.
III. Analysis
Neither LG Chem defendant disputes that it purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas through the sale,
shipment, or distribution of model 18650 batteries to Texas
manufacturers. Instead, they assert their contacts with Texas should
not subject them to personal jurisdiction in this case because Morgan’s
claims do not arise out of and are insufficiently related to their contacts.
In particular, they emphasize that the evidence shows they “never
sought to serve a consumer market for 18650 batteries” in Texas.
The LG Chem defendants describe the batteries they
manufacture, sell, and distribute as “industrial components”—power
cells that are incorporated into battery-powered products like cordless
power tools or laptop computers. Morgan, they contend, was injured by
something else: a standalone battery marketed and sold to individuals
as a “consumer product” by someone outside their intended chain of
distribution. Because they target industrial manufacturers and not
individual consumers like Morgan, the argument goes, Morgan’s claims
are not sufficiently related to the defendants’ contacts with Texas to
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
This Court has never endorsed the LG Chem defendants’
proposed granulation of the forum—the State of Texas—into distinct
market segments when evaluating personal jurisdiction. Indeed, we
recently described the minimum-contacts inquiry as “a ‘forum-by-forum’
or ‘sovereign-by-sovereign’ analysis that examines the nature and
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extent of the defendant’s relationship to the forum.” State v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2023 WL 3262271, at *7 (Tex. May 5,
2023) (cleaned up). The purpose of the personal-jurisdiction analysis is
to determine whether the forum—the State of Texas—may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process. See
Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 264 (“[T]here must be an ‘affiliation between
the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or
an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’” (quoting Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))).
Rather than focusing on the nature and magnitude of their contacts with
the sovereign forum and the close relationship of those contacts to this
litigation, the LG Chem defendants urge us to shift focus to whether the
plaintiff is within a particular Texas market segment—the “industrial
component” market—they intended to serve. The minimum-contacts
analysis is concerned with the objective existence, nature, and extent of
the Texas contacts rather than the particulars of what the parties
thought, said, or intended about the course their product might take
after the defendant targeted, and the product entered, Texas. See
Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Tex. 2013).
Accordingly, here, the LG Chem defendants’ supposed intent to serve
only industrial customers in Texas is of lesser importance than the
larger and dispositive question: whether it would violate due process for
Texas to exercise personal jurisdiction over the LG Chem defendants
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when Morgan was injured by the very product—the model 18650
lithium-ion battery—they sold and shipped to Texas by the thousands.4
This conclusion is inescapable given our precedents, which
uniformly treat the whole forum—the entire state of Texas—as the
relevant market in the minimum-contacts analysis. For example, in
Luciano, we held that a defendant that sold insulation to manufacturers
in Texas for installation in Texas homes was subject to personal
jurisdiction for claims brought by Texas homeowners for the insulation’s
alleged defects. With respect to the relatedness inquiry, we stated that
“[i]t is sufficient that [the defendant] intended to serve a Texas market
for the insulation that the [plaintiffs] allege injured them in this
lawsuit.” Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17 (citing Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028); see
also Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 67 (Tex. 2016) (“[S]pecific
jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or are related
to the defendant’s contact with the forum.” (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted)); Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng.
China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 230 (Tex. 1991) (“When specific
jurisdiction is asserted, the cause of action must arise out of or relate to
the nonresident defendant’s contacts with Texas.” (emphasis added)).
Here, the LG Chem defendants intended to serve the Texas
market for their model 18650 batteries—the same model battery that
Morgan alleges exploded in his pocket and injured him. The LG Chem
4As both sides acknowledge, information about the way Morgan used
(or misused) the battery and whether the LG Chem defendants authorized that
use may be relevant to the merits of Morgan’s products-liability claims. We
express no opinion on whether it is or on any other aspect of the ultimate merits
of Morgan’s claims.
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defendants urge us to distinguish between the market of sophisticated
manufacturers they targeted and the market of individual consumers
like Morgan, which they did not target. But there is no requirement for
jurisdictional purposes that the market segment the LG Chem
defendants served be precisely the same one from which Morgan
purchased the battery. The LG Chem defendants undisputedly sold and
distributed model 18650 batteries in Texas, and they do not dispute that
is the same model battery Morgan alleges injured him in Texas. That is
sufficient to satisfy the relatedness prong and establish specific personal
jurisdiction in Texas. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17; see Ford, 141 S. Ct. at
1028 (describing “a strong relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation” as “the essential foundation” of specific jurisdiction
(internal quotations omitted)); Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585 (stating
that due process is satisfied where there is a “substantial connection”
between the defendant’s contacts and the operative facts of the
litigation).
The LG Chem defendants argue that the Court’s analysis must
focus on the absence of any intent to serve the market of individual
consumers. Otherwise, they contend, they will be subject to jurisdiction
without the clear notice that due process requires. See Ford, 141 S. Ct.
at 1025 (stating that the Court’s personal-jurisdiction doctrine “provides
defendants with ‘fair warning’—knowledge that ‘a particular activity
may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985))). We disagree. As Ford teaches, “[a]n automaker regularly
marketing a vehicle in a State . . . has ‘clear notice’ that it will be subject
14
to jurisdiction in the State’s courts when the product malfunctions
there.” Id. at 1030 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Texas’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the LG Chem defendants for a claim based on a defective model 18650
battery does not deprive them of due process simply because they may
not have anticipated the claim would be brought by someone outside
their intended chain of distribution. By selling and distributing model
18650 batteries in Texas, the LG Chem defendants purposefully availed
themselves of Texas and have enjoyed the benefits and protection of
Texas laws. Id. at 1029 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). Texas’s
enforcement of the LG Chem defendants’ reciprocal obligation to ensure
that its model 18650 batteries are safe for Texas citizens can “hardly be
said to be undue.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
The LG Chem defendants also assert that clear notice is lacking
because they cannot structure their Texas-directed conduct to avoid
exposure to consumer lawsuits such as Morgan’s other than by choosing
not to sell its product in Texas at all. See id. (observing that clear notice
of a state’s potential exercise of jurisdiction allows a defendant to
structure its primary conduct to “lessen or even avoid the costs of
state-court litigation”). But avoiding the Texas market altogether is not
a defendant’s only option. Defendants can also “act to alleviate the risk
of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance [or] passing the
expected costs on to customers.” Id. at 1027 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
Finally, we recognize multiple decisions of our courts of appeals,
at least one Texas federal district court, and courts in other jurisdictions
15
involving factually similar claims against the LG Chem defendants or
other battery manufacturers yielding seemingly conflicting conclusions
about whether personal jurisdiction exists.5 The result in each case is,
of course, dependent on the particular record before the court, including
the evidence presented to establish the existence of both purposeful
availment and relatedness. See Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92
(1978) (“[T]he ‘minimum contacts’ test . . . is not susceptible of
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed
. . . .”); see also Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., 617 F. Supp. 3d 638, 652
(S.D. Tex. 2022) (noting the defendant described the plaintiff’s evidence
of the defendant’s battery shipments into Texas as “not only
inadmissible and unpersuasive, but also paltry compared to” the
evidence of LG Chem’s shipments in this case). While we disapprove of
any reliance on the argument that the LG Chem defendants’ intent to
serve the industrial versus the individual-consumer market segment for
5 See, e.g., LG Chem, Ltd. v. Tullis, No. 05-21-01056-CV, 2022 WL
16959264, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 16, 2022, pet. filed) (affirming the
trial court’s denial of LG Chem’s special appearance); LG Chem Am., Inc. v.
Zapata, No. 14-21-00695-CV, 2022 WL 16559339, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Nov. 1, 2022, no pet.) (reversing the trial court’s denial of special
appearances by LG Chem and LG Chem America); Hause v. LG Chem, Ltd.,
658 S.W.3d 714, 733 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. filed) (reversing the trial
court’s grant of LG Chem’s special appearance); Dilworth v. LG Chem, Ltd.,
355 So. 3d 201, 211 (Miss. 2022) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of claims
against LG Chem and LG Chem America but remanding the claim against LG
Chem America for jurisdictional discovery); LG Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Ct.,
295 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 682 (Ct. App. 2022) (concluding that the plaintiff failed
to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over LG Chem); see also Ethridge
v. Samsung SDI Co., 617 F. Supp. 3d 638, 653 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (concluding that
a plaintiff alleging similar facts against a different nonresident battery
manufacturer failed to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over the
defendant).
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model 18650 batteries necessarily defeats relatedness, we express no
opinion on whether these cases, each of which is accompanied by a
unique evidentiary record, were correctly decided.
IV. Conclusion
LG Chem and LG Chem America do not dispute that they
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in
Texas by selling and distributing their model 18650 batteries in Texas.
Morgan alleges he was injured by a defective model 18650 battery
manufactured by LG Chem. Despite the LG Chem defendants’ claim
that they did not intend to serve a market for individual e-cigarette
battery consumers such as Morgan, we hold that Morgan’s claims are
sufficiently related to the LG Chem defendants’ undisputed contacts
with Texas to satisfy due process. Because the LG Chem defendants are
subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas in this case, we affirm
the court of appeals’ judgment.
Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: May 19, 2023
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