NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-647
GLOUCESTER HOUSING AUTHORITY
vs.
BRITTANY MARAGNI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Brittany Maragni (tenant) appeals from an order denying her
third successive motion to vacate an amended judgment that
awarded possession to the Gloucester Housing Authority (GHA)
along with monetary damages.1 The tenant, acting pro se, makes
numerous arguments, but we address only those with cited legal
and factual support. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).2 Specifically, we address
1 The amended judgment is not before us; the tenant did not list
it in the notice of appeal. See Mass. R. A.
P. (3) (c) (1) (A) (ii), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1624 (2019).
See also West Springfield v. Olympic Lounge, Inc., 45 Mass. App.
Ct. 923, 924 (1998) (notice of appeal from postjudgment motion
not treated as appeal from underlying judgment).
2 While "some leniency is appropriate in determining whether pro
se litigants have complied with rules of procedure, the rules
nevertheless bind pro se litigants as all other litigants."
Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710, IAFF, 408
Mass. 1003, 1004 n.4 (1990).
three of the tenant's arguments: (1) the Housing Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the tenant was not provided
sufficient notice; and (3) the Housing Court committed treason.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Background. The tenant was served a thirty-day notice to
quit on August 27, 2021, and was served a summons and complaint
on October 4, 2021. The tenant represented herself in all
matters. A bench trial occurred on February 15, 2022, and the
Housing Court issued findings of fact and rulings in GHA's favor
on March 29, 2022. The tenant proceeded to file three motions
to vacate the judgment on April 29, 2022, May 16, 2022, and May
23, 2022. Each motion made similar arguments concerning
jurisdiction and due process and all were denied. On June 3,
2022, the judge denied the tenant's motion for relief from the
judgment but granted tenant's motion to stay execution. On the
same day, the tenant filed this notice of appeal.
Discussion. When reviewing the decision of a trial judge
in a summary process action, "we accept [the judge's] findings
of fact as true unless they are clearly erroneous," but "we
scrutinize without deference the legal standard which the judge
applied to the facts" (citation omitted). Andover Hous. Auth.
V. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 306 (2005). We review de novo the
denial of a motion to vacate brought on the ground that the
2
judgment is void. See Dumas v. Tenacity Constr. Inc., 95 Mass.
App. Ct. 111, 114 (2019).
1. Subject matter jurisdiction. The tenant's first
argument is that the Housing Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. "Subject matter jurisdiction is
jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief
sought" (quotation omitted). Cambridge St. Realty, LLC V.
Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 128 (2018). Here, the Housing Court had
proper subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process
action under G. L. c. 185C, § 3. See Cambridge St. Realty, LLC,
supra at 127 ("There is no question that summary process
eviction actions generally fall within the Housing Court's
jurisdictional grant").
2. Service. The tenant next makes several claims that she
did not receive proper service of either the notice to quit,
summons and complaint, or notice of motion hearing. She claims
that this lack of service both prevented the Housing Court from
having personal jurisdiction over her and denied her of her due
process rights. The tenant is correct that "the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing the validity of service of process."
Dumas, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 114. The record, however, indicates
that the GHA has met its burden. The record indicates that the
court had before it forms, each signed by the constable, stating
that the tenant had been served with the notice to quit and the
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summons and complaint. This was more than sufficient for the
judge to find the court had personal jurisdiction over the
tenant. Additionally, the docket entry of the motion hearing
was sufficient to permit the judge to find that the tenant was
given notice of the hearing as a party to the case. Finally, we
find no other evidence on this record that the tenant's due
process rights were violated.
3. Treason. The tenant's last argument is that the
employees of the Housing Court and the judge committed treason.
The tenant cites to a case decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States to support her position that a court acting
without jurisdiction might "be treason to the constitution."
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 n.19 (1980). It
appears clear, however, that the use of the word in that context
is legally distinct from the criminal act of treason under
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and G. L.
c. 264, § 1. The tenant points to no evidence or law or fact to
support that the court committed the criminal act of treason.
Additionally, as stated previously, the Housing Court did have
4
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the tenant.
Order dated June 3, 2022,
affirmed.
By the Court (Meade,
Wolohojian & Walsh, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: May 22, 2023.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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