Filed 6/1/23 P. v. Young CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166313
v.
RONALD DEE YOUNG, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FC26089)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 1990, a jury convicted defendant Ronald Dee Young of first degree
murder and other crimes against Dawn Barth, and he was sentenced to
32 years to life in prison. This division affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. Young (Mar. 31, 1992, A050961).)
Decades later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.), which amended Penal Code1 sections 188 and 189 to alter
liability for murder under the theories of felony murder and natural and
probable consequences. The bill also established a procedure, under former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, for eligible defendants to petition for
resentencing. Young filed a petition for resentencing under the statute, and
the trial court summarily denied it on the basis that he was Barth’s actual
killer.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Young now appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing. His
appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222 (Delgadillo), which established the procedural
framework for appellate courts to follow when counsel finds no arguable
issues in a section 1172.6 appeal. Under that framework, we gave Young
notice that he had a right to file a supplemental brief or his appeal could be
dismissed. (See Delgadillo, at pp. 231–232.)
Young filed a letter in which he claims that he was improperly
convicted of first degree murder because evidence that would have negated
his intent to kill was not admitted, meaning he was effectively tried on a
theory of felony murder. He also seeks to replace his appellate counsel on the
basis that counsel failed to raise the felony-murder issue or any other issues
under section 1172.6. But the only theory of first degree murder on which
the jury was instructed was premeditated murder, and it is clear from the
record that Young “was the actual killer and the only participant in the
killing.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) As a result, he is ineligible
for relief under section 1172.6, and any potential procedural error in the
denial of his resentencing petition was necessarily harmless. Accordingly, we
deny his request for new counsel and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On October 28, 1988, Young shot Barth to death in the apartment the
two shared. He was tried and convicted of first degree murder, as well as
corporal injury to a cohabitant and false imprisonment by violence based on
2
an earlier incident involving Barth.2 The jury also found true the allegations
that Young personally used a firearm during all three offenses.3
In August 1990, the trial court sentenced Young to 32 years to life in
prison, composed of a term of three years for the corporal injury to a
cohabitant and consecutive terms of two years for the accompanying firearm
enhancement, 25 years to life for the murder, and two years for the
accompanying firearm enhancement, plus concurrent terms of two years for
the false imprisonment and two years for the accompanying firearm
enhancement. This court affirmed the judgment in March 1992.
Thirty years later, in 2022, Young submitted a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95. On a form petition, he checked boxes
indicating that he met all the statutory requirements for relief, including that
he “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because
of changes made to Penal Code [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019.” (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) He also requested that counsel be appointed
to represent him.
In an accompanying brief, Young claimed that he “was denied a fair
trial and was unjustly convicted of first degree murder” because evidence
relevant to his mind state during the murder was not introduced at trial.
Specifically, he argued that evidence of his voluntary intoxication with
methamphetamine and his underlying psychological problems would have
supported an argument that he did not have the “ability to form the specific
2 The convictions were under sections 187, subdivision (a) (murder),
273.5, subdivision (a) (corporal injury to cohabitant), and 236 (false
imprisonment).
3 The firearm allegations were found true under section 12022.5. The
jury also found that Young personally inflicted great bodily injury on Barth
during the murder under section 1203.075, making him ineligible for
probation.
3
intent to kill,” meaning “he might not have been convicted of first degree
murder.” Young also claimed that the denial of his pretrial motion to sever
the murder count from the other charges was “extremely prejudicial” because
the events underlying the other charges “were used by the prosecution to
show premeditation and deliberation for a first degree murder conviction.”
The resentencing petition was not officially filed until August 2022,
after the prosecution had filed a response to it. Later that month, the trial
court summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel for Young or
holding a hearing. In its order, the court stated that “[a] review of the Court
file confirms [Young] was the actual killer and not entitled to relief under
Penal Code Section 1170.95. He has failed to make a prima facie showing for
relief.” Young appealed from the denial, arguing in his notice of appeal that
he did not have a specific intent to kill and that “not allowing him a proper
hearing for malice under Penal Code section[s] 188 and 189” violated the law.
II.
DISCUSSION
Young argues that he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because
evidence of his voluntary intoxication and mental-health issues was not
introduced at trial. Below, he claimed that this evidence could have
established he did not act with a specific intent to kill. On appeal, he
reiterates this argument while also suggesting that the absence of such
evidence amounted to the prosecution’s trying him on a theory of felony
murder.
Young’s claim is meritless for two reasons. First, the jury was not
instructed on felony murder, and we are unable to perceive how the omission
of evidence that might have negated his specific intent amounted to trying
him on such a theory. Rather, the jury was informed that it could convict
him of first degree murder only if it found that Barth’s killing was willful,
4
deliberate, and premeditated. Thus, Young was not “convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime,” as required to obtain relief under
section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Second, resentencing under section 1172.6 is “unavailable if the
defendant was . . . the actual killer.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
710; Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) There is no dispute that Young
actually killed Barth and, indeed, was the only person involved in causing
her death. As a result, even if he did not in fact act with express malice, he
cannot obtain relief under section 1172.6.
Young also asks us to replace his appointed appellate counsel, based on
their disagreements about strategy for this appeal. As discussed, the claims
Young himself raises lack merit. Having exercised our discretion to perform
an independent review of the record, we do not perceive any other arguable
issues either. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Since Young is
categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, any error in the trial
court’s disposition of his petition would be harmless under any standard.
(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957–958 [assessing prejudice
from failure to appoint counsel under former section 1170.95].) Therefore, we
affirm the order denying his petition for resentencing and deny his request to
appoint new appellate counsel.
III.
DISPOSITION
The August 24, 2022 order denying Young’s petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95 is affirmed.
5
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Margulies, J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
People v. Young A166313
6