Filed 1/3/24 P. v. Young CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082059
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CR67930)
CHARLES YOUNG, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
Defendant and Appellant. NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 28, 2023, be
modified as follows:
On page 1, the counsel listing for Defendant and Appellant should be
replaced with the following:
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
McCONNELL, P. J.
Copies to: All parties
Filed 12/28/23 P. v. Young CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082059
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CR67930)
CHARLES YOUNG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Runston G. Maino, Judge. Reversed.
Allen G. Weinbert, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Lynne
G. McGinnis and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Charles Young appeals from an order summarily denying his petition
for resentencing filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 1172.6).1
He contends his petition established a prima facie claim for relief requiring
the trial court to issue an order to show cause. The People concede the trial
court erred in denying Young’s petition because the record of conviction does
not establish Young is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
We accept the People’s concession and remand the case with directions for the
trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary
hearing. Accordingly, the order is reversed and the matter is remanded for
additional proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1984, a jury convicted Young of first degree murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)), and the jury also found true an enhancement for personal use of a deadly
weapon in the commission of the crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The trial court
sentenced Young to prison for an indeterminate term. This court affirmed
the judgment in his direct appeal. (People v. Young (Nov. 12, 1985, D002247)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022, Young filed a petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No.
1437 in the superior court. The court appointed counsel, the People
responded to the petition, and Young filed a reply.
After briefing, the superior court found Young failed to state a prima
facie case for relief and denied the petition. The court determined Young was
not entitled to relief because the verdict for first degree murder in
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 without substantive change. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the subject statute by its current renumbered form.
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conjunction with the jury’s true finding on the personal use of a deadly
weapon enhancement precluded Young from stating a prima facie claim.
Young timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (See
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder except
under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189, subdivision
(e). That section requires the People to prove specific facts relating to the
defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the actual killer
(§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the defendant, with the
intent to kill, assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
the defendant was a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human
life as described in subdivision (d) of Penal Code Section 190.2, the felony-
murder special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong,
supra, at p. 708.)’
The legislature also enacted a procedure (now codified in section
1172.6) for an individual convicted of felony murder or murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she
could not have been convicted of murder under Senate Bill No. 1437’s
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changes to sections 188 and 189. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847.) When presented with a petition
seeking relief under section 1172.6, the trial court must first determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(c).) Where a petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she
falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
The court may rely on the record of conviction in determining whether
a prima facie showing has been made. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
However, “[w]hile the trial court may look at the record of conviction . . . to
determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section
[1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.”
(Ibid.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)
“Rather, it should decide such issues only after issuing an order to show
cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Duchine (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 798, 811.)
B. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Young’s Petition Without
Issuing an Order to Show Cause
The People concede the allegations and record of conviction in this case
do not establish Young is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. We agree and accept the concession.
In denying Young’s petition, the superior court considered the jury’s
true finding on the enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon in
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connection with the conviction for first degree murder as precluding Young
from stating a prima facie claim under section 1172.6. However, nothing in
the record before the superior court, including the verdict form, indicates
whether the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement was based on the
jury finding that Young had simply displayed the weapon in a menacing
manner or had actually struck the victim with the weapon. A finding of
personal use of a deadly weapon, standing alone, does not demonstrate the
defendant was the actual killer. (See People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084,
1120 (Jones); People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743.) For
example, “If two robbers display guns to intimidate robbery victims and one
shoots and kills a victim, both robbers could be found to have personally used
a gun in the robbery and the felony murder, even though only one is the
actual killer.” (Jones, supra, at p. 1120.) Thus, the fact the jury found true
the enhancement for personal use of a weapon does not automatically
establish Young is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
In this appeal, the People have provided additional evidence from the
record of conviction, which further establishes Young’s petition should not
have been denied at the prima facie stage.2 Specifically, the additional
records show the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences theory as it applied to a theory of aiding and abetting. The
2 The People request we take judicial notice of a portion of the appellate
record from Young’s prior appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)
Although Young correctly states in his opposition that these court records
were not before the superior court when it ruled on his petition for
resentencing, the documents are proper subjects for judicial notice and
provide helpful context to Young’s underlying criminal proceedings. (See
Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 306, fn. 2 [granting judicial notice of
prior court proceedings not presented to the trial court when doing so would
help complete the context of the case].) We therefore grant the People’s
request.
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relevant jury instruction stated: “The persons concerned in the commission
of a crime who are regarded by law as principals in the crime thus
committed, and equally guilty thereof include: One, those who directly and
actively commit the act constituting the crime, or, two, those who aid and
abet the commission of the crime. One who aids and abets is not only guilty
of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are
contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and
reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly and
intentionally aided or encouraged.” As to the personal use of a deadly
weapon enhancement, the jury was instructed it could make a true finding if
it found Young had “display[ed] such a weapon in an intentionally menacing
manner, or intentionally [struck] or hit a human being with it.” These
instructions confirm the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement could
have been based on the jury finding Young merely displayed the weapon in a
menacing manner even if he never actually struck the victim. Thus, the
record of conviction does not conclusively establish the jury relied on a still-
valid theory of murder, and Young is not precluded from obtaining
resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Young’s petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions
to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing as
required by statute. We express no opinion on the appropriate outcome of
such hearing.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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