People v. Reed

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 180533-U
This Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-18-0533, 4-18-0534, 4-18-0535 cons. June 8, 2023
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
DARIUS REED, ) Nos. 16CF807
Defendant-Appellant. ) 17CF1579
) 17CF1612
)
) Honorable
) Jeffrey S. Geisler,
) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) Although the trial court provided defendant an incorrect sentencing
admonishment, the court’s error did not require defendant’s global plea agreement
to be vacated.

(2) Defendant failed to establish he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2 On January 4, 2023, in light of its decision in People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116,

the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order (People v. Reed, No. 126750 (Ill. January

4, 2023) (supervisory order)) directing this court to both vacate and reconsider our initial

judgment in this appeal (People v. Reed, 2020 IL App (4th) 180533, 175 N.E.3d 717) to

determine if a different result is warranted on defendant’s argument the trial court erred in

denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas after the supreme court’s decision in Stewart.
That same day, this court vacated our prior opinion.

¶3 On January 18, 2023, this court ordered the parties to each file a supplemental

brief to address the effect the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Stewart had on this appeal.

Based on the supplemental briefs filed by the parties, defendant and the State agree the issues

before this court are still whether defendant’s global guilty plea was knowing and voluntary,

considering the trial court admonished defendant he was eligible for a Class X sentence of

between 6 and 30 years in Macon County case No. 16-CF-807, and whether defendant’s trial

counsel was ineffective for stipulating defendant was eligible for a Class X sentence in the same

case. After considering the supreme court’s decision in Stewart, the initial and supplemental

briefs submitted by the parties, and the record in this case, we again affirm the trial court’s denial

of defendant’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas and hold defendant did not establish he was

prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In March 2018, the trial court held a plea hearing in Macon County case Nos.

15-CF-1514, 16-CF-807, 17-CF-142, 17-CF-867, 17-CF-1579, and 17-CF-1612. The State

relayed the terms of the plea agreement between defendant and the State as follows. In case No.

16-CF-807, defendant would plead guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance with

intent to deliver 1 or more grams but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine, a

Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2016)). According to the charging instrument,

the charged offense occurred on or about June 21, 2016. The State noted defendant was subject

to Class X sentencing based on his criminal history. In case No. 17-CF-1579, defendant would

plead guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver 15 grams

or more but less than 100 grams of a substance containing cocaine, a Class X felony (720 ILCS

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570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2016)). In case No. 17-CF-1612, defendant would plead guilty to an

armed habitual criminal charge, also a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2016)). The

State indicated defendant would be required to serve 85% of his sentence for this offense.

¶6 Under the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court could only sentence

defendant to a combined maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s sentences in case

Nos. 17-CF-1579 and 17-CF-1612 would run concurrently. However, those sentences would run

consecutively to defendant’s sentence in case No. 16-CF-807. The remaining counts in the three

cases would be dismissed, as would case Nos. 17-CF-867, 17-CF-142, and 15-CF-1514.

Defense counsel acknowledged these were the terms of the plea agreement.

¶7 The trial court admonished defendant the sentencing range for each of the three

offenses to which defendant was pleading guilty was 6 to 30 years in prison. Further,

defendant’s sentence in case No. 16-CF-807 would run first, followed by concurrent sentences in

case Nos. 17-CF-1612 and 17-CF-1579. The court also advised defendant he would have to

serve 85% of his sentence in case No. 17-CF-1612. The State asked the court to take judicial

notice of its own case files, specifically Macon County case Nos. 06-CF-1032 and 07-CF-1207.

The court noted it would do so.

¶8 At the May 2018 sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated defendant

committed two new crimes while he was out on bond in case No. 16-CF-807. As for defendant’s

prior criminal history, the court noted defendant was convicted of burglary in case No.

06-CF-1032 and received probation. However, his probation was later terminated, and he was

sent to prison. He was later sentenced to prison for burglary (case No. 07-CF-1207), forgery

(case No. 07-CF-1228), and retail theft (case No. 08-CF-369). In case No. 10-CF-297, defendant

received probation. However, defendant’s probation was terminated, and he was sent to prison.

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Defendant was also sent to prison for financial institution fraud (case No. 12-CF-211) and

criminal trespass (case No. 12-CF-364). With regard to his prior criminal history, the court

indicated defendant had a “horrible record.”

¶9 The trial court noted defendant was not eligible for probation and a strong

sentence was needed as a deterrent and to protect the public. The court sentenced defendant to

eight years in prison with three years of mandatory supervised release (MSR) in case No.

16-CF-807. In case No. 17-CF-1579, the court noted the offense was a little more serious and

defendant was out on bond when the offense occurred. The court sentenced defendant to nine

years in prison with three years of MSR to be served after defendant’s sentence in case No.

16-CF-807. Finally, the court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison to be served at 85%

with three years of MSR in case No. 17-CF-1612. This sentence was also to be served

consecutively to defendant’s sentence in case No. 16-CF-807 but concurrently with his sentence

in case No. 17-CF-1579.

¶ 10 The trial court then advised defendant he would need to file a written motion

asking to have the court’s judgments vacated and for leave to withdraw his guilty pleas, setting

forth the ground or grounds for his request, if he wished to appeal the court’s decision. The court

also told defendant any issue or claim not presented in the motion would be forfeited on appeal.

¶ 11 On June 1, 2018, defendant filed motions to reconsider his sentences and motions

to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the judgments. The motions to withdraw the guilty pleas

stated defendant believed the evidence relied on by the State could not be connected to him and

was insufficient to convict him. Defendant also argued his sentences were excessive.

¶ 12 On July 5, 2018, the trial court denied defendant’s motions.

¶ 13 Defendant appealed, arguing he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas

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because they were not knowingly and voluntarily made because he was erroneously admonished

he was subject to a Class X sentence of 6 to 30 years in prison in case No. 16-CF-807 when he

was only subject to a Class 1 sentence of 4 to 15 years in that case. On November 12, 2020, this

court issued an opinion affirming the denial of defendant’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas,

holding the trial court did not err in admonishing defendant he was eligible for a Class X

sentence pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016)) in case No. 16-CF-807. Reed, 2020 IL App (4th) 180533, ¶¶ 29-30.

¶ 14 Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal this court’s decision with the Illinois

Supreme Court. On January 4, 2023, in light of the supreme court’s decision in Stewart, the

supreme court denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal but directed this court to both

vacate and reconsider its judgment in this case. Reed, No. 126750 (Ill. January 4, 2023)

(supervisory order). According to the supreme court’s supervisory order, “The appellate court is

directed to consider the effect of this Court’s opinion in People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, on

the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions to withdraw his guilty

pleas and determine if a different result is warranted.” Reed, No 126750 (Ill. January 4, 2023)

(supervisory order). That same day, this court vacated our judgment.

¶ 15 On January 18, 2023, this court ordered the parties to each file a supplemental

brief to address the effect of the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Stewart on the issue of

whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Defendant filed his supplemental brief on February 14, 2023, and the State filed its supplemental

brief on March 21, 2023. The parties agree the issues before this court are still (1) whether

defendant’s global guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, considering the trial court

admonished defendant he was eligible for a Class X sentence of between 6 to 30 years in case

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No. 16-CF-807, and (2) whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating

defendant was eligible for a Class X sentence in case No. 16-CF-807.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 In Stewart, our supreme court noted section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code (730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016)) was silent as to “whether the legislature intended a prior felony

conviction to be a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing if the same offense would have

resulted in a juvenile adjudication had it been committed on the date of the present offense.”

Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 16. The court stated it “has recognized that a statute’s silence on a

particular question is akin to an ambiguity in that it allows this court to look to extrinsic aids of

construction to resolve the question.” Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 18. However, the court

decided it did not need to rely on extrinsic aids to discern the legislature’s intent because of

Public Act 101-652 (eff. July 1, 2021), which amended section 5-4.5-95(b)(4) to provide the first

qualifying offense for Class X sentencing must have been “ ‘committed when the person was 21

years of age or older.’ ” Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 19 (quoting Public Act 101-652 (eff. July 1,

2021)).

¶ 18 While recognizing “a statutory amendment creates a presumption that it was

intended to change existing law,” the Illinois Supreme Court indicated the presumption is not

controlling in this situation because of the conflict over how section 5-4.5-95(b) should be

interpreted between the First District’s decision in People v. Miles, 2020 IL App (1st) 180736,

170 N.E.3d 984, and this court’s prior and now vacated decision in this case. Stewart, 2022 IL

126116, ¶ 20. According to the supreme court:

“The existence of these conflicting appellate court decisions negates the

presumption that the legislature intended to change existing law when it amended

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 the statute to require that qualifying offenses must have been committed when the

person was 21 years of age or older. [Citation.] Because of the differing views in

the appellate court, there was no clear interpretation of the law to be changed.

[Citation.] Accordingly, the split in the appellate court, when considered with the

silence in the previous version of the statute on this issue, leads us to conclude

that Public Act 101-652 was intended to resolve the conflict in the appellate court

and clarify the meaning of the original statute. [Citation.] We therefore hold that

defendant’s 2013 conviction for an offense committed when he was 17 years old

was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing under the previous version of

section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart,

2022 IL 126116, ¶ 22.

As a result, the supreme court held the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as a Class X

offender pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 23.

¶ 19 Based on our supreme court’s reasoning in Stewart, the trial court in this case

erred in admonishing defendant he was eligible to receive a Class X sentence in case No.

16-CF-807. Regardless, our supreme court’s decision in Stewart does not resolve the question

currently before this court of whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions to

withdraw his guilty pleas.

¶ 20 According to defendant, the answer is yes because he was told the incorrect

sentencing range for his offense in case No. 16-CF-807, which defendant argues means he did

not make a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44

(1969), defendant argues a guilty plea is only constitutionally valid where there is an affirmative

showing the guilty plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. Illinois Supreme Court Rule

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402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2012) provides a trial court must inform a defendant of the minimum and

maximum sentences allowed by law before accepting a guilty plea.

¶ 21 A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his or her guilty plea.

People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32, 983 N.E.2d 439 (2012). Instead, the defendant must

show a manifest injustice under the facts in the case. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. Further, a

plea does not have to be vacated simply because a defendant was not properly admonished.

People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 250, 582 N.E.2d 714, 719 (1991). “Whether reversal is required

depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether defendant has been prejudiced by the

inadequate admonishment.” Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 250, 582 N.E.2d at 719.

¶ 22 Generally, a trial court’s decision to deny the withdrawal of a guilty plea will not

be disturbed unless the court abused its discretion. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 244, 582 N.E.2d at 716

(1991). However, in this case, the trial court did not consider whether defendant was correctly

admonished because defendant did not include this argument in his motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. Defendant acknowledges he forfeited the issue he raises on appeal but asks this court to

consider it pursuant to the plain error doctrine.

¶ 23 According to the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis, “if a lower court fails

to give the defendant the admonishments required by Rule 402 it is possible that this action can

amount to plain error.” (Emphases added.) Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 250-51, 582 N.E.2d at 719. The

plain error doctrine applies to forfeited claims in two circumstances:

“(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the

defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or

obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of

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 the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless

of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48, 23

N.E.3d 325.

According to defendant, we should review the issue in this case for second-prong plain error. In

Davis, the supreme court indicated “[t]he doctrine of plain error is applied to remedy errors so

plain and prejudicial that failure to object to them is not a waiver for purposes of appeal.” Davis,

145 Ill. 2d at 51, 582 N.E.2d at 719.

¶ 24 Defendant focuses on the fact he was improperly admonished he faced a Class X

sentence of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment in case No. 16-CF-807 instead of a Class 1 sentence of 4

to 15 years. However, defendant’s guilty plea did not involve just case No. 16-CF-807. Instead,

defendant was entering a global plea involving multiple cases. Defendant agreed to plead guilty

to one charge in three separate cases in exchange for the State dismissing other charges and cases

and capping defendant’s total sentence for the three cases at a combined maximum of 20 years.

Defendant argues he felt pressured to give up his right to a trial because he believed he could

receive a 60-year prison sentence. As a result, defendant asserts the State’s 20-year sentencing

cap seemed more generous than it actually was. Defendant also seems to suggest he might have

received a lower sentence if the trial court knew the correct minimum sentence was 10 years

instead of 12. This is pure speculation.

¶ 25 While the trial court erred in admonishing defendant about the minimum and

maximum sentences he faced in case No. 16-CF-807, the error does not rise to the level of

second-prong plain error based on this record. Defendant’s reliance on Davis and People v.

Williams, 2014 IL App (3d) 120824, 18 N.E.3d 83, is misplaced.

¶ 26 In Davis, the defendant was charged with both residential burglary and burglary.

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Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 243, 582 N.E.2d at 716. Without any agreement as to the sentence he would

receive, the defendant pleaded guilty to the burglary charge and the residential burglary charge

was dismissed. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 243, 582 N.E.2d at 715. Before the defendant entered his

plea, a Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) program employee had indicated

the defendant would be eligible for the TASC program if he pleaded guilty to burglary but not

residential burglary. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 243, 582 N.E.2d at 716. After entering his plea, the

defendant learned he would not be eligible for the TASC program because of his criminal record.

Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 243, 582 N.E.2d at 716. The defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his

guilty plea because his reason for entering the plea was to allow him to request placement in

TASC instead of being incarcerated. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 244, 582 N.E.2d at 716. The trial court

denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 243, 582 N.E.2d at

715.

¶ 27 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court noted the trial court mistakenly

admonished the defendant that he could be sentenced to a term of probation or conditional

discharge, for which the defendant was not eligible. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 248, 582 N.E.2d at 718.

According to the supreme court, “the [trial] court never explained to defendant the mandatory

prison sentence facing him. Thus, it is likely that the defendant never fully understood the range

of penalties which he was subject to at the time of the plea.” Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 248, 582

N.E.2d at 718. Our supreme court ruled:

“We find that [the] defendant’s claimed misapprehension as to his

eligibility for TASC, alone, may be insufficient to disturb the trial court’s ruling,

as the denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea did not appear to

amount to an abuse of the court’s discretion. However, coupled with the fact that

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 the trial court gave incorrect admonishments, which further led the defendant to

believe that he would be eligible for a sentence other than incarceration, we find

there to be plain error present on the part of the trial court.” Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at

251, 582 N.E.2d at 719.

¶ 28 Unlike the defendant in Davis, who believed he had a chance of not going to

prison if he pleaded guilty, defendant in this case understood he would be going to prison for up

to 20 years pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement with the State. Further, this is not a

situation where the trial court was required to sentence defendant to something harsher than the

agreed upon 20-year sentencing cap. In short, defendant here received the benefit of his bargain.

¶ 29 In Williams, the defendant pled guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled

substance in exchange for a sentencing cap of 25 years’ imprisonment. Williams, 2014 IL App

(3d) 120824, ¶ 1, 18 N.E.3d at 85. The trial court had told the defendant on multiple occasions

he faced a maximum sentence of 60 years imprisonment absent his plea agreement. Williams,

2014 IL App (3d) 120824, ¶ 1, 18 N.E.3d at 85. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea and then an amended motion to withdraw his plea, stating his plea was not

knowing and voluntary because he had been improperly admonished he could be sentenced to 60

years’ imprisonment absent the plea deal. Williams, 2014 IL App (3d) 120824, ¶ 6, 18 N.E.3d at

85. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding the defendant had been properly

admonished. Williams, 2014 IL App (3d) 120824, ¶ 6, 18 N.E.3d at 85.

¶ 30 On appeal, the Third District determined defendant should have only faced a

maximum term of 30 years’ imprisonment at sentencing instead of 60 years. Williams, 2014 IL

App (3d) 120824, ¶ 22, 18 N.E.3d at 87. As a result, while the defendant believed he had

negotiated a 35-year reduction of his maximum possible sentence, he had only negotiated a

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5-year reduction. Williams, 2014 IL App (3d) 120824, ¶ 26, 18 N.E.3d at 88. The appellate

court found this was not an insignificant difference. Williams, 2014 IL App (3d) 120824, ¶ 26,

18 N.E.3d at 88. According to the appellate court, “As in Davis, defendant here lost the

opportunity to negotiate a lesser term of incarceration because of improper admonishments from

the court. Defendant was therefore prejudiced by those improper admonishments.” Williams,

2014 IL App (3d) 120824, ¶ 26, 18 N.E.3d at 88.

¶ 31 The situation in this case is also distinguishable from what happened in Williams.

While the trial court in the case sub judice erred in admonishing defendant regarding the

minimum and maximum possible sentences he faced without the guilty plea, the effect of the

mistaken admonishments was much less significant. Unlike in Williams, where the defendant

gained little by pleading guilty, defendant in the instant case was still receiving a 25-year

sentencing concession from the State, with a sentencing cap in the bottom third of the proper

sentencing range.

¶ 32 Based on the facts here, this is not a situation where defendant was denied real

justice or was prejudiced by the trial court’s incorrect admonishment.

¶ 33 We next turn to defendant’s claim his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating

defendant was eligible to receive a Class X sentence in case No. 16-CF-807. This court analyzes

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a

defendant must prove (1) his or her attorney’s performance was so deficient he or she failed to

function as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment and (2) defendant was prejudiced by

his or her counsel’s deficient performance. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708 N.E.1158,

1163 (1999). Courts may dispose of an ineffective assistance claim by proceeding directly to the

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prejudice prong of the analysis without addressing counsel’s performance. People v. Hale, 2013

IL 113140, ¶ 17, 996 N.E.2d 607.

¶ 34 “To establish prejudice, ‘[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.’ ” Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

¶ 35 As stated, even though the correct sentencing range on the offenses to which

defendant was pleading guilty was 10 to 45 years instead of 12 to 60 years, the State’s

willingness to cap defendant’s total prison sentence at 20 years for three serious felonies,

especially considering defendant’s prior criminal history and his apparent lack of defenses for

the charges, was a generous offer. The 20-year sentencing cap was 25 years less than the

maximum sentence defendant faced and in the bottom third of the sentencing range had

defendant been convicted of the three offenses. Based on the record, defendant cannot show a

reasonable probability exists he would not have entered the guilty plea in this case absent his trial

counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 38 Affirmed.

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