Maurice Gasaway v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0457-DG

MAURICE GASAWAY APPELLANT

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2020-CA-0031
HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CR-00927

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

Maurice Gasaway was convicted of one count of possession of heroin in

Hardin Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted discretionary

review to consider three overarching issues.

First, we must consider the bounds under which the warrantless search

of a parolee’s vehicle is constitutionally permissible. We adopt the

reasonableness test for such searches under the Fourth Amendment1 as

announced by the United States Supreme Court in Samson v. California, 547

U.S. 843 (2006), and we overrule our decision in Bratcher v. Commonwealth,

424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014), to the extent it holds the conditions of parole

imposed by Kentucky law are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis.

1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The scope of Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution2 is not properly before

this Court for review. We hold, albeit for different reasons, the Court of

Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of Gasaway’s motion to

suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his truck.

Second, we must consider whether Kentucky should recognize a per se

rule prohibiting the Commonwealth from introducing, in a subsequent

proceeding, evidence of a crime for which the defendant has previously been

acquitted. We hold Kentucky does not recognize such a per se rule.

Nevertheless, we further hold the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial

court’s admission of evidence, under KRE3 404(b), of methamphetamine for

which Gasaway had been acquitted, and evidence of marijuana for which

Gasaway had been found guilty.

Finally, we must consider whether the trial court improperly permitted

three witnesses to interpret the contents of a video recording. We hold the

Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s decision allowing the first

witness to testify regarding events he did not perceive in real-time. Any

questions regarding the propriety of the other two witnesses’ testimony were

not properly preserved for review.

Therefore, for the following reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals

is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand to the trial court for

further proceedings.

2 KY. CONST. § 10.
3 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

2
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Maurice Gasaway, a parolee under active supervision, was employed at

Knight’s Mechanical in Hardin County, Kentucky. On August 30, 2018,

Gasaway and two other employees were working in the sheet metal shop. At

some point, one of Gasaway’s co-workers, Austin McClanahan, noticed a small

plastic bag about the size of a thumbnail on the floor. McClanahan picked up

the bag just as his supervisor, Josh Bush, entered the room. Bush instructed

McClanahan to place the bag on the desk in Bush’s office. Bush covered the

bag with a few sheets of paper and notified his supervisor that he suspected

the bag contained illegal drugs. Bush’s supervisor informed his supervisor,

Jeremy Knight,4 about the situation.

After lunch, Knight went to Bush’s office and secured the bag in another

container. Knight also reviewed surveillance video from the area where the bag

was found. Based on the video, Knight suspected the bag fell from Gasaway’s

pocket when he reached in his pocket to retrieve his cellphone. Knight gave

the bag to another employee, Brian Tharpe, who then contacted Detective

Robert Dover of the Greater Hardin County Narcotics Task Force.

The next day, Det. Dover came to Knight’s Mechanical to investigate.

Det. Dover performed a field test and determined the substance contained in

the bag was heroin. After speaking with Tharpe and viewing the surveillance

video, Det. Dover also suspected Gasaway of possessing the heroin. Det. Dover

4 Jeremy Knight’s father, John Knight, is the owner of Knight’s Mechanical.

3
and two other officers confronted Gasaway inside the workplace. Gasaway

denied possessing the heroin. Det. Dover then handcuffed and Mirandized5

Gasaway before leading him outside.

Once outside the building, Gasaway realized parole officers were on the

scene. At this point, Gasaway launched into a sustained, vulgar tirade directed

at Det. Dover. Det. Dover then placed Gasaway in the back of a police cruiser.

Det. Dover searched Gasaway’s person, but did not discover any incriminating

evidence. However, Det. Dover retrieved a key fob from the search of

Gasaway’s person.

The key fob opened a truck in the parking lot. Det. Dover ascertained

the truck was registered to Gasaway’s wife and that Gasaway usually drove the

truck to work. Det. Dover requested consent to search the truck, which

Gasaway refused. Apparently, the parole officers commenced the search of the

truck and Det. Dover subsequently participated. In the console, Det. Dover

discovered two bags of marijuana and a pill which Det. Dover initially believed

to contain ecstasy, but was later determined to contain methamphetamine. He

also discovered a few marijuana “roaches” in a cupholder ashtray with

marijuana “shake” around it.6 The search also uncovered a Whizzinator—a

prosthetic penis which illegal drug users frequently use to store and pass clean

urine when drug testing is required.

5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Det. Dover explained that “roaches” are marijuana cigarette butts, and

“shake” is little pieces of marijuana.

4
 Gasaway was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled

substance, heroin; second-degree possession of a controlled substance,

ecstasy7; and possession of marijuana in Hardin Circuit Court. By

supplemental indictment, he was charged with first-degree possession of a

controlled substance, methamphetamine. Gasaway filed a motion to suppress

the evidence obtained from the search, which the trial court denied. Following

trial, Gasaway was found guilty of possession of marijuana, not guilty of

possession of methamphetamine, and the jury hung on the heroin charge.

The Commonwealth elected to retry Gasaway on the heroin charge and

the jury returned a guilty verdict. His conviction for possession of heroin

rested, in part, upon the evidence of methamphetamine for which he was

previously acquitted and the evidence of marijuana for which he was previously

convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. We granted

discretionary review and heard oral argument on April 19, 2023.

II. GASAWAY’S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RAP 32(A)(4)

At the outset, Gasaway’s opening brief to this Court does not comply

with RAP8 32(A)(4), which requires an appellant’s opening brief to “contain at

the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record

showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what

manner.” We have strictly mandated compliance with this rule since its

inception under the prior Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Skaggs v. Assad,

7 The ecstasy charge was later dismissed.
8 Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

5
By & Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (citing CR9 76.12(4)(c)(iv)

(“It goes without saying that errors to be considered for appellate review must

be precisely preserved and identified in the lower court.”). RAP 32(A)(4) does

not distinguish between this Court and the Court of Appeals when prescribing

the organization and contents of an appellant’s opening brief. The failure of an

appellant’s brief to conform to the appellate rules justifies the striking of the

brief under RAP 31(H)(1).

Regarding the suppression issue, Gasaway merely noted, “[t]he Court of

Appeals held it was ‘constrained’ to conclude that Section 10 of the Kentucky

Constitution would present no impediment against a warrantless and

suspicionless search of a parolee or his vehicle.” Gasaway then cited the Court

of Appeals’ opinion.10 This statement neither indicates the fact nor the manner

of preservation as contemplated by RAP 32(A)(4). It simply refers to an

observation made by the Court of Appeals.

Regarding the admissibility of the methamphetamine evidence,

Gasaway’s brief does not contain any statement of preservation. Regarding

the marijuana evidence, Gasaway simply quoted the holding of the Court of

Appeals and then cited to its opinion. Again, merely quoting the decision of the

Court of Appeals does not tell this Court whether the issue was preserved.

Regarding the interpretation of the surveillance video, Gasaway stated

“three witnesses were permitted to testify, over objection that they could see

9 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
10 Id.

6
something drop from Maurice’s hand on the video.” However, while we are

directed to the allegedly improper testimony, Gasaway failed to specify where

the objection occurred. Regarding the first witness, there was a relevant

objection, which was not cited and occurred over ten minutes prior to

Gasaway’s cite. Regarding the second witness, we were not directed to an

objection, nor could we find one in the record. Regarding the third witness, we

were directed to an objection, which the trial court remedied by rephrasing the

Commonwealth’s question and no further relief was requested.

The purpose of the preservation statement rule is to assure the reviewing

court that “the issue was properly presented to the trial court, and therefore, is

appropriate for . . . consideration.” Cotton v. NCAA, 587 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Ky.

App. 2019) (quoting Oakley v. Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012)).

While this procedural rule preserves judicial resources, it also serves an

important substantive purpose: the fact and manner of preservation generally

determines the applicable standard of review. Id. Furthermore, it is neither

the function nor the responsibility of this Court to scour the record to ensure

an issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. Phelps v. Louisville

Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003).

The Court of Appeals addressed each of Gasaway’s claimed errors as if

they were properly preserved for review.11 Additionally, the Court of Appeals

urged this Court to consider the applicability of Section 10 of the Kentucky

11 We except from this statement the unpreserved issue concerning the

prosecutor’s statements at voir dire which is not presently before this Court.

7
Constitution. We note the Commonwealth has not challenged the preservation

of any issues before this Court except for the adequacy of the trial court’s

admonition concerning the admission of the methamphetamine and marijuana

evidence. Because preservation determines the appropriate standard of review,

an appellate court should determine for itself whether an issue is properly

preserved. We are not bound by the view of the parties.

Our review of the record indicates Gasaway’s first claim of error before

this Court regarding the warrantless search was partially preserved for review;

his claim regarding the admissibility of the methamphetamine and marijuana

evidence was properly preserved; and his claim regarding the improper

interpretation of the video recording was partially preserved: Gasaway properly

objected to the testimony of Jeremy Knight, but he did not properly preserve

any issues regarding the testimony of Brian Tharpe and Det. Dover. Given this

unusual situation, we elect to impose no sanction here and begin our analysis

by clarifying the general principles of the preservation rule before turning to

our review of Gasaway’s claimed errors.

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ERROR PRESERVATION

In the exercise of its inherent power, an appellate court may decide an

issue that was not presented by the parties so long as the appellate court

confines itself to the record. Priestley v. Priestley, 949 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Ky.

1997). This power derives from an appellate court’s supervisory authority over

8
lower courts. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(a)12; and KY. CONST. § 111(2).13 Appellate

jurisdiction “is the power and authority to review, revise, correct or affirm the

decisions of an inferior court, and, more particularly, to exercise the same

judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction.”

Copley v. Craft, 341 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky. 1960).14 Additionally, KY. CONST. §

116 authorizes this Court to “to prescribe rules governing its appellate

jurisdiction . . . and rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.”

KRS15 21.050 codifies our appellate jurisdiction and power to establish the

procedure for appellate review:

(1) A judgment, order or decree of a lower court may be reversed,
modified or set aside by the Supreme Court for errors appearing
in the record.

(2) The method of bringing a judgment, order or decree of a lower
court to the Supreme Court for review shall be established by
Supreme Court rule. The procedures for appellate review shall
be established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of

12 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(a) provides “[t]he Supreme Court shall have appellate

jurisdiction only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause, or as may be
required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.”
13 KY. CONST. § 111(2) provides “[t]he Court of Appeals shall have appellate
jurisdiction only, except that it may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to
review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth, and it may
issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete
determination of any cause within its appellate jurisdiction. In all other cases, it shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.”
14 Justice Joseph Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, explained that the appellate
jurisdiction of American courts derives from the English common law writ of error
rather than the “appeal” procedure used in the English courts of chancery. See United
States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (C.C. Mass. 1812). The common
law writ of error was limited to the trial court record while the equitable appeal
permitted the retrial of factual disputes on review. Id.
15 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

9
 Criminal Procedure and other rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court.

Under this authority, we generally require a party to properly preserve

allegations of error at the trial court level and upon every level of appellate

review. Personnel Bd. v. Heck, 725 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Ky. App. 1986).16 The

rationale for the preservation rule is that “a court or quasi-judicial body may

not be found to be in error where it has not been given an opportunity to (1)

rule on the issue or (2) correct any alleged error.” Id. Beyond the order and

efficiency imposed by the preservation requirement, the rule ensures the

essential fairness of appellate proceedings by preventing a party from being

unfairly surprised by a question upon which he had no prior opportunity to

develop evidence and argument. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556

(1941). We would hasten to add the consistent enforcement of the preservation

rule promotes the equal application of our own decision-making authority.

While the preservation rule has been universally applied in American

law, many courts, including this Court, have used imprecise language to

delineate its contours. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004).

Strictly speaking, a party preserves “[a]llegations of error . . . for appellate

review.” RCr 10.12; see also KRE 103(a), (e). In a criminal case, an allegation

of error is properly preserved when

16 There are certain situations, inapplicable here, where a party may raise an

issue before this Court that was not raised before the Court of Appeals. Fischer v.
Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Ky. 2006). This Court will consider such an issue when:
(1) the party brought to the attention of the trial court; (2) the party was defending the
trial court’s ruling on direct appeal; and (3) the party included the issue in the motion
for discretionary review. Id.

10
 a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought,
makes known to the court the action which that party desires the court
to take or any objection to the action of the court, and on request of the
court, the grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object
to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection
does not thereafter prejudice that party.

RCr 9.22. Formal exceptions, as previously required under the former

Criminal Code of Practice, are unnecessary and appellate courts do not

demand the recitation of shibboleths before a preserved allegation of error will

be considered. Id.; Brewer v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.3d 363, 368 n.2 (Ky.

2015). However, while the form of the objection does not control, the fact that

an issue was made known to the trial court is paramount: even if a trial court

lacks authority to grant immediate relief, such as the power to overrule binding

precedent, neither our criminal rules nor our caselaw supports a futility

exception to the preservation requirement.17 See Greer v. United States, 141

S.Ct. 2090, 2099 (2021).

This Court has long held that “appeals are taken from judgments, not

from unfavorable rulings as such.” Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616, 618

(Ky. 1982). When confronted with a claim of lower court error, appellate courts

“review issues, not arguments.” Brewer, 478 S.W.3d at 368 n.2. An “issue” is

legally defined as “[a] point in dispute between two or more parties.” Issue,

17We recognize our decisions applying a futility exception to exhaustion
requirements in appeals involving judicial review from administrative decisions.
Popplewell’s Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 470 (Ky.
2004). This exception is based on an administrative body’s lack of authority to rule
upon the constitutionality of a statute. Id. Such considerations are inapplicable to
ordinary judicial proceedings. City of Louisville v. Coalter, 171 Ky. 633, 188 S.W. 853,
854 (1916)(“the circuit court may first pass on the constitutionality of the statute if the
question is raised in that court.).

11
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). For the purposes of appeal, “an issue

may take the form of a separate and discrete question of law or fact, or a

combination of both.” Id. By contrast, “argument” is defined as “[a] statement

that attempts to persuade by setting forth reasons why something is true or

untrue, right or wrong, better or worse, etc.; esp., the remarks of counsel in

analyzing and pointing out or repudiating a desired inference, made for the

assistance of a decision-maker.” Argument, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019).

Allegations of error (also known as issues, claims, or questions) are

supported by arguments. Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 534

(1992). “Once a . . . claim is properly presented, a party can make any

argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise

arguments they made below.” Id. Indeed, “[a] litigant seeking review in this

Court of a claim properly raised in the lower courts thus generally possesses the

ability to frame the question to be decided in any way he chooses, without

being limited to the manner in which the question was framed below.” Id. at

535 (emphasis added). Indeed, “appellate review. . . is to be conducted in light

of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to, or discovered by” the trial

court. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994).

However, when a party fails to raise an issue or otherwise preserve an

allegation of error for review, the issue is forfeited. United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court

than that a constitutional right, or a right of any other sort, may be forfeited in

12
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the

right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”) (cleaned up).

Again, while many courts, including this Court, have justified the refusal to

consider unpreserved errors under a waiver theory, the proper basis is

forfeiture. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 458 n.13. “Although jurists often use the

words interchangeably, forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a

right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

right.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (cleaned up). The valid waiver of a

known right precludes appellate review while a forfeited claim of error may be

reviewed for palpable error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.

In summation, we echo the wisdom of Justice Palmore on the necessity

of respecting the rules of procedure:

In the argument of this and other recent criminal appeals we
detect what appears to be a failure to appreciate the importance of
and necessity for procedural regularity in the conduct of trials.
Substantive rights, even of constitutional magnitude, do not
transcend procedural rules, because without such rules those
rights would smother in chaos and could not survive. There is a
simple and easy procedural avenue for the enforcement and
protection of every right and principle of substantive law at an
appropriate time and point during the course of any litigation, civil
or criminal. That is not to say that form may be exalted over
substance, because procedural requirements generally do not exist
for the mere sake of form and style. They are lights and buoys to
mark the channels of safe passage and assure an expeditious
voyage to the right destination. Their importance simply cannot be
disdained or denigrated. Without them every trial would end in a
shipwreck.

Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1977). Like other

procedural rules, the preservation requirement serves the orderly

administration of justice. It cannot be said to elevate form over substance or
13
otherwise unfairly cut off the rights of litigants. Palpable error review under

RCr 10.26 and other exceptions18 exist to prevent manifest injustice in the

event a party fails to preserve an alleged error. We implore appellate litigants

to scrupulously adhere to the rules of procedure for the sake of their own cause

and to ensure the orderly disposition of court proceedings. We now turn to

Gasaway’s claims of error on the merits.

III. SEARCH OF TRUCK WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE

For his first claim of error, Gasaway argues the warrantless search of

his truck violated Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. He specifically

urges this Court to interpret Section 10 to provide greater protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. Gasaway

further asserts this Court’s decision in Bratcher erroneously applied federal

precedent. 424 S.W.3d at 411.

At this time, we will not consider whether Section 10 provides greater

protection than the Fourth Amendment because the issue was not properly

preserved for review. We further conclude the trial court erred by denying the

motion to suppress under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement

under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the Commonwealth’s reliance on

the search incident to arrest exception is without merit. Moreover, we agree

18For example, subject-matter jurisdiction, incomplete jury verdicts, and
sentencing errors may be considered for the first time on appeal. Privett v. Clendenin,
52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky. 2001) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Smith v. Crenshaw, 344
S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1961) (incomplete jury verdicts); and Gaither v. Commonwealth,
963 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Ky. 1997) (sentencing errors).

14
that our decision in Bratcher was wrongly decided. Nevertheless, the search of

the truck was constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

Therefore, we conclude the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s

denial of the motion to suppress, albeit for different reasons.

A. SCOPE OF SECTION 10 IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT

Our review of the record indicates the issue of whether Section 10 of the

Kentucky Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment

against unreasonable searches and seizures was not raised before the trial

court. The sole issue before the trial court involved the question of whether the

warrantless search of Gasaway’s truck was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. These are discrete legal issues. Further, Gasaway did not raise

the issue of whether Section 10 provides greater protection than the Fourth

Amendment before the Court of Appeals.19

While the Court of Appeals encouraged this Court to consider the

application to Section 10 to parolees, this action does not necessarily preserve

the issue for further review by this Court. “Courts are not required to decide

constitutional questions whenever a party makes the suggestion.” Priestley,

949 S.W.2d at 599. This principle applies equally to suggestions made by

lower courts because “[c]onstitutional adjudication should be reserved for those

19 We note Gasaway cited Section 10 in his brief before the Court of Appeals for
the proposition “[s]ection 10 of the Kentucky Constitution also protects citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents.” Gasaway’s opening
Court of Appeals brief at 4. This was the sole reference in Gasaway’s brief to Section
10.

15
cases in which the issue is well-defined and advanced by parties substantially

affected by the controversy.” Id. (emphasis added). While we acknowledge the

Court of Appeals’ invitation to consider this important issue,20 it is not properly

before us because Gasaway failed to raise the question before the trial court.

As such, Gasaway has failed to demonstrate a sufficient basis for this Court to

reconsider our precedent concerning the scope of Section 10. Therefore, we

decline to address the issue.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCH

The propriety of the trial court’s denial of Gasaway’s motion to suppress

on Fourth Amendment grounds is properly before this Court as the issue was

raised and decided by the lower courts. The trial court found the warrantless

search was justified under the automobile exception and, alternatively, under

our decision in Bratcher, which Gasaway now asks this Court to overrule.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” All warrantless searches are unreasonable, per se, under the Fourth

Amendment unless an established exception applies. Commonwealth v.

Hatcher, 199 S.W.3d 124, 126 (Ky. 2006). “The Commonwealth bears the

burden of establishing the constitutional validity” of a warrantless search.

20 We adhere to the principle that “[a]ny court, though required to follow
precedent established by a higher court, can set forth the reasons why, in its
judgment, the established precedent should be overruled but cannot, on its own,
overrule the established precedent set by a higher court.” Special Fund v. Francis, 708
S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986).

16
Commonwealth v. Conner, 636 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Ky. 2021). Each of the

exceptions to the warrant requirement is “narrow and well-delineated.” Flippo

v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999). In other words, each exception is

conceptually distinct. Id. Therefore, the Commonwealth must satisfy every

element of the claimed exception. Id.; Hatcher, 199 S.W.3d at 126.

The standard of review from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence

depends on whether the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a

warrant. Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Ky. 2010). Because the

present appeal involves a warrantless search, we review the trial court’s: (1)

findings of fact for clear error and (2) determinations of reasonable suspicion

and probable cause de novo. Id. at 49 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.

690, 698-99 (1996)). The heightened de novo standard of review for probable

cause reflects this Court’s “preference for searches pursuant to a warrant.” Id.

at 48. Our review of the facts is generally limited to the evidence presented at

the suppression hearing. Conner, 636 S.W.3d at 472 (“we use the facts elicited

during [the suppression hearing] as the basis for our analysis.”). We note the

Commonwealth, throughout its response brief, refers to evidence presented at

trial to support the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. While the

evidence may have overlapped, the Commonwealth concedes there were “some

variations.” We have limited to our review of this issue to the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing.

Additionally, it is a fundamental precept of appellate review that “[w]hen

a judgment is based upon alternative grounds, the judgment must be affirmed

17
on appeal unless both grounds are erroneous.” Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d

724, 727 (Ky. App. 1979). We have applied this rule in the Fourth Amendment

context by refusing to consider alternative bases to justify the denial of a

suppression motion after first determining the search at issue was supported

by probable cause. See Pride, 302 S.W.3d at 51. Accordingly, with the

foregoing standards in mind, we examine the alternative grounds for the denial

of the motion to suppress.

C. SEARCH WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION FOR
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE

The trial court first determined the warrantless search of the vehicle was

proper under the automobile exception. The automobile exception to the

warrant requirement applies when the vehicle is readily mobile and probable

cause exists to believe evidence of criminal activity may be contained in the

vehicle. Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 128 (Ky. 2014). A

vehicle is considered readily mobile even if it has been secured by law

enforcement or there is little to no risk a suspect or his accomplices could

access the vehicle. Id. An independent finding of exigent circumstances is not

required under the automobile exception because the exception is based upon

“reduced expectations of privacy” in vehicles. Id. The automobile exception

may be invoked “[w]hen a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is

readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly

used for residential purposes—temporary or otherwise.” California v. Carney,

471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).

18
 Clearly, Gasaway’s truck was readily mobile and found in a non-

residential location. The question is whether probable cause existed at the

time the truck was searched. We conclude it did not. Specifically, the

Commonwealth failed to establish an objective nexus between Gasaway’s truck

and the information known to the officers at the time of the search.

The impossibility of precisely defining probable cause has often been

noted by appellate courts. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695. Reasonable suspicion

and probable cause are “commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal

with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which

reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (citing Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). The Supreme Court described “probable

cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are

sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in a particular place. Id. at

696. In other words, “[t]here must be a fair probability that the specific place

that officers want to search will contain the specific things that they are looking

for.” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021). Probable cause

is a “fluid concept,” rather than “a finely-tuned standard comparable to the

standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of

the evidence.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (quotation omitted) (cleaned up).

Direct evidence of probable cause is not strictly required and reviewing courts

afford “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and

local law enforcement officers.” Conner, 636 S.W.3d at 471 (citation omitted).

19
 The trial court determined probable cause existed based on three specific

findings of fact: (1) Gasaway drove the same vehicle to work on the previous

day when he was filmed on video having allegedly dropped the heroin; (2)

Gasaway was on parole for prior felony controlled substances cases, including

trafficking; and (3) Det. Dover observed marijuana roaches and shake in plain

view from outside the vehicle.

As in several other recent decisions, the trial court’s findings of fact are

contradicted by the record on a point essential to the court’s decision. Conner,

636 S.W.3d at 472; Commonwealth v. Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 818, 823 (Ky.

2021); and Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Ky. 2013).

Specifically, the trial court’s finding regarding Det. Dover’s observation of

marijuana roaches and shake in plain view was clearly erroneous. On cross-

examination at the suppression hearing, Det. Dover admitted the roaches and

shake were not in plain view:

Defense Counsel: You also found in the ashtray several roaches,
is that correct?

Det. Dover: It was a cup ashtray, yes.

...

Counsel: Now, with regard to the marijuana and the pill, which
you believed to be ecstasy, was in the console of the truck?

Det. Dover: Yes.

Counsel: And therefore, they weren’t in plain view, were they?

Det. Dover: Uh no, there wasn’t. . .

Counsel: And the roaches that we are talking about, they were not
in plain view were they?
20
 Det. Dover: They were in the ashtray, the ashtray was in plain
view, but there was a bunch of shake next to the ashtray, little
pieces of marijuana that was next to that.

Counsel: But you didn’t see those, did you, when you looked in
the window?

Det. Dover: If you look in the window, I believe, well, I don’t know.

Counsel: Ok. You don’t remember, is that correct?

Det. Dover: That’s correct.

The trial court also directly questioned Det. Dover concerning his observation

of the ashtray and the marijuana roaches. Det. Dover described the ashtray as

a cup with a lid on it that fit into the cupholder between the driver’s seat and

the front passenger seat. The trial court further inquired whether the ashtray

was easily observable from the outside of the vehicle. Det. Dover responded, “I

couldn’t observe the roaches, but the ashtray, yes.” Based on this record, we

cannot accept the finding that marijuana was observed in plain view.

While the trial court’s remaining factual findings are supported by

substantial evidence, we cannot conclude they amount to probable cause for a

warrantless search. The decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in

United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1994), is instructive.21

In Hogan, a confidential informant reported to federal Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) agents that the defendant was trafficking

21 We cite this federal decision only as a persuasive example, keeping in mind
that one court’s determination of probable cause “will seldom be a useful precedent for
another” given the fact-intensive analysis. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 698 (citation omitted).

21
methamphetamine and marijuana at the Chrysler plant where the defendant

worked. Id. at 691. The informant named two employees who had told the

informant that the defendant had supplied them with drugs for a long period of

time. Id. The informant also claimed he had personally observed the

defendant engage in three hand-to-hand drug transactions. Id. According to

the informant, the defendant only drove a white Dodge truck to and from work

at the plant. Id. The informant predicted that the defendant would be bringing

methamphetamine to the plant when he arrived for his shift the next day at

3:00 p.m. Id.

Based on this information, the agents obtained a warrant to search the

defendant’s truck and residence. Id. On the next day, the agents surveilled

the defendant’s residence and observed the defendant leave his residence in a

blue Oldsmobile car. Id. at 692. After the defendant travelled between 3-5

miles from his residence, a state trooper, who was assisting the investigation,

stopped the defendant’s car on the road. Id.

When the DEA agents arrived at the scene, an agent told the defendant

he had a warrant to search the defendant’s residence and truck. Id. The agent

requested permission to search the defendant’s car, which the defendant

refused. Id. At this point, the agent impounded the car until he could obtain a

warrant. Id. The agent then handcuffed the defendant and placed the

defendant in the agent’s car before returning to the residence. Id. Another

agent drove the defendant’s car back to the residence. Id.

22
 After searching the residence and truck, the agents discovered a small

amount of marijuana, two scales, weapons, a carton of freezer bags, and

$5,600 in cash. Id. The state trooper then investigated the outside of the car

with a drug detection dog. Id. The dog alerted at the trunk of the car. Id. The

agents then formally arrested the defendant for possession of the marijuana

found in the house. Id. An agent drove the car to the DEA office until a

warrant could be obtained. Id. After obtaining a warrant, the subsequent

search of the car revealed a half pound of marijuana and a quarter pound of

methamphetamine. Id.

The defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute

marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. at 691. The defendant moved to

suppress the evidence obtained from the search, which the trial court denied.

Id. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. Id. On direct appeal, the

Eighth Circuit reversed. Id.

The government argued the initial seizure of the car on the road was

justified, and further argued the agents could have properly searched the car at

that time under the automobile exception. Id. at 692. The Court rejected this

argument after concluding the agents lacked probable cause to stop and seize

the defendant’s vehicle on the road. Id. at 693. The information provided to

the agents indicated the defendant only used his truck to the transport drugs.

Id. Additionally, the agents did not possess sufficient information to determine

that the defendant was traveling to the plant when the car was stopped and

seized because of the time of day. Id. On these facts, the Court determined the

23
agents merely possessed “a hunch that the drugs from the house or truck”

would be found in the defendant’s car. Id. A hunch does not rise to the level of

probable cause. Id.

In the present appeal, we acknowledge Gasaway’s criminal history, as

known by Det. Dover and found by the trial court, is a legitimate factor in the

probable cause analysis. See Risby v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 686, 687

(Ky. 1955). However, a person’s criminal history, taken alone, does not amount

to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. Id. Moreover, the fact that

Gasaway drove the same vehicle the day before, even when considered in

tandem with Gasaway’s criminal history, does not establish an objective nexus

between the vehicle and illegal activity. There was no evidence that Gasaway

was involved in continuous or on-going drug activity or trafficking at the

workplace.

The heroin was discovered inside the workplace on the day prior to the

search. It was not discovered in Gasaway’s vehicle. Gasaway was confronted

and arrested inside the workplace. The search of Gasaway’s person prior to the

search of the vehicle did not reveal any incriminating evidence. Further,

Gasaway’s vulgar post-arrest tirade carries little weight in our analysis.

Indeed, this fact was apparently so insignificant that trial court did not make

any reference to it in its findings. Additionally, any inference linking the

suspected possession of heroin to Gasaway’s truck is especially tenuous given

the lack of any concrete evidence showing the truck was used to transport or

conceal any additional quantities of illegal drugs. Det. Dover testified the

24
reason he searched Gasaway’s truck was simply that he “believed there [were]

other drugs” located there. Given the lack of objective corroborating evidence

linking Gasaway’s truck to the heroin found in the workplace, we conclude Det.

Dover’s belief was based on suspicion, not probable cause. Therefore, the trial

court's reliance upon the automobile exception was in error.

Before turning to the trial court’s second ground for denying the motion

to suppress, we must consider the Commonwealth’s intervening claim that the

search was justified as a search incident to arrest.

D. SEARCH WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER INCIDENT TO ARREST
EXCEPTION

The Commonwealth insists, as it did before the Court of Appeals, that

the warrantless search was justified under the incident to arrest exception.

This claim was not directly presented to the trial court.

The Commonwealth asserts that we may consider the issue because our

caselaw holds that an appellate court may affirm a lower court on any basis

supported by the record. Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Ky.

2009). While the Commonwealth’s assertion is correct as a general matter, the

cited rule presumes the alternative basis of affirmance was properly raised

before the trial court. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 776 n.3

(Ky. 2014). When the prosecution fails to raise a claimed exception to the

warrant requirement before the trial court, the Supreme Court has explicitly

stated

The Government . . . may lose its right to raise factual issues of
this sort before this Court when it has made contrary assertions in
the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by
25
 those courts, or when it has failed to raise such questions in a
timely fashion during the litigation.

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981).

The Commonwealth implicitly disclaimed reliance upon the search

incident to arrest exception in its memorandum filed after the suppression

hearing:

[t]he search of the defendant’s vehicle comes within two exceptions
to the warrant requirement. First, the search was proper under
the automobile exception. Second, the search was proper as the
defendant was on parole and therefore could be subjected to a
warrantless and suspicionless search.

However, while the Commonwealth did not initially claim the search incident to

arrest exception justified the search, we note that Gasaway asserted at the

suppression hearing that the search was improper under Arizona v. Gant, 556

U.S. 332 (2009), a decision dealing with the search incident to arrest exception.

In response, the Commonwealth stated:

Judge, I appreciate [defense counsel] citing Gant. I’m a big Gant
fan. Gant did not change. . . it changed you can’t search a vehicle
search [sic] incident to arrest carte blanche. Which used to be the
rule. Arrest somebody, search the vehicle. What Gant came out
and said was unless that person has access to that vehicle you can
no longer search it for your safety. If they are detained, you have
to get a warrant unless, you have probable cause because a vehicle
in and of itself, there is, it is well-established, an automobile
exception. It is exigent circumstances in and of itself and that if
you have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband then you can still search the vehicle, you don’t need a
warrant, it is exigent circumstances, it doesn’t matter if the person
is detained. . . There are cases, Commonwealth v. Elliott,
Hedgepath, as well as Owens v. Commonwealth, all post-Gant
cases that say this was proper conduct.

26
The trial court ultimately limited its ruling to the automobile exception and,

alternatively, upon Gasaway’s status as a parolee.

The automobile exception, as set forth above in Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d

at 128, is distinct from what this Court has previously described as “Gant’s

alternative rule” in the search incident to arrest context. See Rose v.

Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. 2010). Gant’s alternative rule is “that

an officer may search a vehicle even when the arrestee is secured if he has a

reasonable suspicion that the vehicle harbors evidence of the crime of arrest.”

Id. Regardless of how the claim was labeled, it is clear the Commonwealth

solely and substantively relied upon the automobile exception rather than the

search incident to arrest exception at the trial court level.

From the argument at the suppression hearing, it appears the parties

conflated the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception

to some extent. We are dubious the search incident to arrest claim was

properly raised before the trial court. Regardless, any claim concerning the

search incident to arrest exception may be swiftly rejected because Det. Dover

plainly testified that he searched Gasaway’s truck looking for “other drugs.”

This statement indicates the motive for the warrantless search was generally

investigative, rather than a specific search for evidence of the crime of arrest,

possession of heroin.

E. BRATCHER WAS WRONGLY DECIDED

As its second, alternative basis for denying Gasaway’s motion to

suppress, the trial court ruled that Gasaway was subject to a warrantless and

27
suspicionless search by virtue of his status as a parolee under our decision in

Bratcher. Gasaway urges this Court to reconsider Bratcher’s “unduly expansive

interpretation” of the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. California, 547

U.S. 843 (2006). We agree that Bratcher was wrongly decided.

a. DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
RELATING TO PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES

Before examining the question of whether Bratcher was wrongly decided,

we must place the decision in proper context by recounting the development of

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to probationers and parolees.

i. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)

In Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, the Supreme Court held the warrantless

search of a probationer’s “home satisfied the demands of the Fourth

Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself

satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well-

established principles.” (Emphasis added). To properly frame the decision, we

will summarize the facts before summarizing the legal analysis.

The probationer was subject to a Wisconsin statute that subjects

probationers to conditions set by the sentencing court and rules and

regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Social Services. Id.

at 870. The Department established a regulation that permitted any probation

officer to search a probationer’s home without a warrant upon approval by the

officer’s supervisor and reasonable suspicion the probationer’s home contains

contraband. Id. at 870-71. The regulation also set forth various factors that a

28
probation officer should consider in determining whether reasonable suspicion

for a warrantless search exists. Id. at 871. Notably, the statute at issue was

generally applicable and the regulation was established after the court order

placing the probationer on probation. Id. Additionally, under a separate

regulation, a probationer’s refusal to consent to a search was deemed to

constitute an independent probation violation. Id.

A probation officer received information that the probationer possessed

firearms in his residence in violation of the conditions of probation. Id.

Following a search, the probation officer discovered a handgun. Id. The

probationer was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id.

He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the

warrantless search, which the trial court denied. Id. The probationer was

convicted following a jury trial. Id. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “to consider whether this search

violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 870.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 872. The Supreme

Court commenced its analysis by recognizing that “[a] probationer’s home, like

anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that

searches be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 873 (emphasis added). However, the “special

needs” exception allows for a warrantless search when “special needs, beyond

the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause

requirement impracticable.” Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,

351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The special needs exception permits

29
governmental employers to conduct warrantless searches of employees’ offices

and desks without probable cause. Id. Additionally, the exception allows

school officials to conduct warrantless searches of certain student property

without probable cause. Id.

In the context of probationers, the Supreme Court held, “that in certain

circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a

regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause

requirements as long as their searches meet ‘reasonable legislative or

administrative standards.’” Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.

523, 538 (1967)) (emphasis added). Application of the special needs exception

to probationers was justified because “probation is a form of criminal sanction

imposed. . . after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.” Id. at 874 (citation

omitted). In other words, “[p]robation is simply one point (or, more accurately,

one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from

solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of

mandatory community service.” Id. “To a greater or lesser degree, it is always

true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not

enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only. . .

conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]

restrictions.’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))

(alteration in original).

Restrictions upon the liberty of probationers are imposed “to assure that

the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the

30
community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.” Id. at 875.

“These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that

the restrictions are in fact observed.” Id. As such, “[s]upervision, then, is a

‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy

that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded “[t]he search of [the probationer’s]

residence was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing

probationers.” Id. at 880. The validity and meaning of the probation regulation

is to be fixed by state law. Id. at 875.

ii. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)

In Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, the Supreme Court held that the official

purpose of the search of a probationer’s residence is immaterial under the

Fourth Amendment if the search was “supported by reasonable suspicion and

authorized by a condition of probation.” Again, we will briefly recount the facts

before summarizing the legal analysis.

A probationer agreed to a condition of probation that provided for a

warrantless search of the probationer’s residence at any time without cause.

Id. at 114. A police detective suspected the probationer and another individual

were involved in a series of arsons. Id. A week before the latest arson, a

sheriff’s deputy stopped the probationer and another individual on the road

near the scene and observed gasoline and pipes in the bed of the truck. Id. at

115. Subsequently, the detective began surveillance of the probationer’s

31
residence and observed the other individual exiting the residence what

appeared to be pipe bombs. Id. The individual walked across the street to the

banks of a river. Id. The detective heard a splash and observed the individual

return without the items. Id. The individual then drove away in his truck. Id.

After the individual parked the truck in a driveway, the detective

observed a Molotov cocktail and other explosive materials in the bed of the

truck. Id. The detective then conducted a search of the probationer’s

residence. Id. The detective was aware of the probationer’s status and believed

he did not require a warrant. Id. The search of the probationer’s residence

revealed several incriminating items. Id.

The probationer was charged in federal court with conspiracy to commit

arson and other charges. Id. at 116. He moved to suppress the evidence of the

search, which the district court granted. Id. Although the district court

concluded the officers had reasonable suspicion, the court nevertheless

suppressed the evidence because the purpose of the search was investigatory

rather than probationary. Id. The government filed an interlocutory appeal.

Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the

evidence. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. at 122.

At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that California law

rejected any distinction between probationary and investigative searches when

considering the warrantless search of a probationer. Id. at 116. Nevertheless,

the probationer argued that the Griffin decision limited the special needs

32
exception to probationary rather than investigative searches. Id. at 117. The

Supreme Court rejected the “dubious logic” of the probationer’s argument. Id.

The Supreme Court declined to rest its decision of the probationer’s

agreement to the conditions of his probation or even under the special needs

exception itself. Id. at 118. Rather, the Supreme Court examined the

reasonableness of the search under the familiar totality of the circumstances

standard, “with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance.”

Id. The test for reasonableness assesses “on the one hand, the degree to which

[the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree

to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”

Id. at 119. A search condition attendant to probation “informs both sides of

that balance.” Id. The Court explained:

It was reasonable to conclude that the search condition would
further the two primary goals of probation-rehabilitation and
protecting society from future criminal violations. The probation
order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was
unambiguously informed of it. The probation condition thus
significantly diminished Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy.

Id. at 119-20 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

The Court held “that the balance of these considerations requires no

more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s

house.” Id. at 121. “When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a

probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there

is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the

probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.” Id. The

33
Supreme Court expressly left open the question of “whether the probation

condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, [the probationer’s]

reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer

without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 120 n.6.

iii. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)

In Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless

search conducted pursuant to a state statute requiring parolees to consent to

warrantless and suspicionless searches at any time did not violate the Fourth

Amendment. Before summarizing the legal analysis of the decision, we will

briefly recount the facts.

A police officer observed the parolee was walking down the street with a

woman and child. Id. The officer was aware of the parolee’s status and

believed there was an outstanding warrant for a parole violation. Id. The

officer confronted the parolee and asked if there was an outstanding warrant.

Id. The parolee replied that he was in good standing with his parole officer. Id.

The officer confirmed there was no outstanding warrant. Id. Nevertheless, the

officer searched the parolee’s person based solely on the parolee’s status and

discovered methamphetamine. Id. at 847.

The parolee was charged with possession of methamphetamine. Id. He

moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search, which

the trial court denied. Id. The parolee was convicted. Id. The California Court

34
of Appeal affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. Id. The Supreme

Court granted to certiorari

to answer a variation of the question this Court left open in United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120, n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151
L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)—whether a condition of release can so diminish
or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy
that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not
offend the Fourth Amendment. Answering that question in the
affirmative today, we affirm the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal.

Id. at 847 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court noted the “Fourth Amendment imposes no

irreducible requirement” of individualized suspicion. Id. at 855 n.4 (quoting

United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). The Supreme

Court examined the reasonableness of the search under the balancing test set

forth in Knights. Id. at 848 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 118). Regarding the

defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court recognized

“parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole

is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Id. at 850.

In addition, California law imposed substantial restrictions on parolees such

that “[t]he extent and reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that

parolees . . . have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their

status alone.” Id. at 852. The Supreme Court placed substantial weight on the

fact that the search condition was “clearly expressed” to the parolee and he was

“unambiguously” aware of it. Id. In sum, these circumstances indicated the

35
parolee “did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as

legitimate.” Id.

Regarding the government’s interest, the Supreme Court determined “a

State has an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees because parolees. .

. are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.” Id. at 853 (quoting

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)).

Specifically, “California’s ability to conduct suspicionless searches of parolees

serves its interest in reducing recidivism, in a manner that aids, rather than

hinders, the reintegration of parolees into productive society.” Id. at 854. The

Supreme Court rejected the argument that California’s imposition of

suspicionless searches as a condition of parole was constitutionally infirm

because other jurisdictions required reasonable suspicion to search a parolee:

Petitioner observes that the majority of States and the Federal
Government have been able to further similar interests in reducing
recidivism and promoting reintegration, despite having systems
that permit parolee searches based upon some level of suspicion.
Thus, petitioner contends, California’s system is constitutionally
defective by comparison. Petitioner’s reliance on the practices of
jurisdictions other than California, however, is misplaced. That
some States and the Federal Government require a level of
individualized suspicion is of little relevance to our determination
whether California’s supervisory system is drawn to meet its needs
and is reasonable, taking into account a parolee’s substantially
diminished expectation of privacy.

Id. at 855 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Supreme Court determined

California law, rather than the Fourth Amendment, provided sufficient

safeguards to prevent abusive or harassing searches. Id. at 856. Therefore,

36
the Supreme Court concluded “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a

police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id. at 857.

b. BRATCHER MISINTERPRETED SAMSON

With the foregoing legal standards in mind, we will now examine the

soundness of our holding in Bratcher. In Bratcher, this Court applied Samson

to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless and

suspicionless search of parolees despite the policy of the Kentucky Department

of Corrections requiring parole officers to have reasonable suspicion before

conducting a warrantless search upon a parolee. 424 S.W.3d at 415. Before

turning to our analysis, we will briefly summarize the facts.

Police suspected a parolee of manufacturing methamphetamine. Id. at

412. An informant reported to a police officer that the parolee possessed items

used to manufacture methamphetamine at the parolee’s residence and was

planning to “do a cook.” Id. Based on this information and the police officer’s

personal knowledge of the parolee’s criminal history, the police officer went to

the parolee’s residence and requested permission to search the premises. Id.

The parolee refused to the police officer’s request for consent. Id.

The police officer then contacted the parolee’s parole officer by phone. Id.

He informed the parole officer that he suspected the parolee was involved in

illegal activity and that the parolee had refused his request for consent to

search the residence. Id. The police officer then permitted the parolee to speak

to his parole officer. Id. The parole officer reminded the parolee of his

37
obligation to allow parole officers to search his residence and that the parolee

should consent to the search. Id. The defendant then consented. Id.

The police officer along with a different parole officer subsequently

searched the residence and “discovered various items used for the manufacture

of methamphetamine.” Id. at 412-13. The parolee was charged with

manufacturing methamphetamine and being a first-degree persistent felony

offender. Following the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained

from the warrantless search, the parolee entered a conditional guilty plea and

was sentenced to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. Id. at 412.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. Id. At the outset, we determined

the trial court properly concluded the parolee consented to the search. Id. at

413. Consent to search is a valid and independent exception to the warrant

requirement. Id. Indeed, we concluded “[t]his finding alone would have been

sufficient to support the legality of the warrantless search.”22 Id.

Despite the sufficiency of the consent justification, this Court considered

the application of the Samson decision because the defendant’s “parole status

and the constitutional standards relating thereto” were the “focus of the trial

court’s analysis and the focal point of the parties’ arguments.” Id. Specifically,

22 The fact that Bratcher had a correct, alternative holding does not permit us to

disregard an incorrect holding as dicta or otherwise allow us to simply confine the
decision to its facts because alternative holdings of an appellate court are treated as
binding precedent in contrast to the rule that an appellate court may affirm a trial
court if either of alternative holdings are correct. Bryan A. Garner, et. al., The Law of
Judicial Precedent 122-23 (2016); compare with Milby, 580 S.W.2d at 727.

38
we addressed the issue “to highlight the impact of [Samson] on this aspect of

our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id.

We began our analysis by examining the Knights decision. Id. This

Court recognized the Supreme Court held “a warrantless intrusion upon a

probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment only when an officer has reasonable suspicion that the

probationer is engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 412 (quoting Knights, 534

U.S. at 121) (cleaned up). We recognized our decisions previously applied the

reasoning of Knights and its reasonable suspicion standard to cases involving

parolees. Id. at 414 (citing Riley v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622 (Ky.

2003)).

This Court abandoned the reasonable suspicion requirement of Knights,

and applied the reasoning of Samson because Samson specifically dealt with

the search of a parolee rather than a probationer. Id. at 415. Relying upon

Samson, we concluded

it is immaterial whether the information available to the officers
who searched Appellant’s residence rose to the standard of
reasonable suspicion. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.

Id. We further explained that the conditions imposed on Kentucky parolees

may be seen as more stringent than Samson, they do not alter the
Fourth Amendment analysis. It is fundamental that by
administrative rule or statute a state may impose upon its police
authorities more restrictive standards than the Fourth Amendment
requires. Such standards, however, cannot expand the scope of
the Fourth Amendment itself. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128
S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008).

39
Id. This Court ultimately held “the Fourth Amendment presents no

impediment against a warrantless and suspicionless search of a person on

parole.” Id. (citation omitted).

After careful consideration, we hold that Bratcher was decided in error.

While this Court correctly determined the Fourth Amendment does not

categorically forbid the warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee, we

incorrectly determined that the conditions of parole imposed by state law were

immaterial to the analysis. Samson prescribed the application of the ordinary

Fourth Amendment balancing test to ascertain the reasonableness of the

search under the totality of the circumstances, including the conditions of

parole under state law. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848. While the Fourth

Amendment does not forbid a rule requiring parolees to submit to

suspicionless searches, neither does it demand one. In Bratcher, we erred by

failing to account for the conditions of parole.

Though the notion that state statutes and regulations impact the

permissibility of a search under the Fourth Amendment seems incongruous,

“[p]arolee searches are. . . an example of the rare instance in which the

contours of a federal constitutional right are determined, in part, by the

content of state law.” United States v. Freeman, 479 F.3d 743, 747-48 (10th

Cir. 2007). The view of the Tenth Circuit in Freeman prevails in the federal

courts and we think it sound. See United States v. Sharp, 40 F.4th 749, 756

(6th Cir. 2022) (“And our sister circuits have specifically rejected the notion

that Samson authorizes suspicionless parolee searches regardless of the search

40
condition or background state law.’’).23 Thus, our reliance on Moore, 553 U.S.

164, 171 (2008) to justify ignoring the conditions of parole and other

background Kentucky law as part of the Fourth Amendment analysis was

overbroad.

In Moore, the Supreme Court stated, “[o]ur decisions counsel against

changing the [Fourth Amendment] calculus when a State chooses to protect

privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires.” Id. (emphasis

added). Indeed, one of the primary purposes of the uniformity rule in the

Fourth Amendment context is to avoid the situation where the actions of state

and federal officers are judged by different standards. Id. at 176. There is no

such danger here because federal courts account for parole conditions under

state law when conducting the balancing test under Samson. Sharp, 40 F.4th

at 756. Furthermore, the Samson decision itself commands consideration of

state law factors when determining the reasonableness of a parolee search.

547 U.S. at 852. In Sharp, the majority recognized the Supreme Court’s

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not always resulted in nationwide

uniformity. 40 F.3d at 757.

Having concluded Bratcher was wrongly decided, we must next consider

whether the decision should be preserved under the principles of stare decisis.

23We find the reasoning of the majority in Sharp persuasive and decline to
adopt the reasoning expressed in Judge Batchelder’s concurrence as urged by the
Commonwealth. 40 F.4th at 758.

41
 F. STARE DECISIS DOES NOT REQUIRE RETENTION OF BRATCHER

This Court is aware of Kentucky’s strong and longstanding commitment

to stability in the law. Matheny v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 622 (Ky.

2006) (Cooper, J., dissenting). A Kentucky precedent may not be overturned

merely because it was wrong, but because “the principle established . . . is

clearly erroneous.” Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455, 458 (1922).

Justice Vance aptly and succinctly characterized our steadfast adherence to

stare decisis:

Appellate courts should follow established precedent unless there
is a compelling and urgent reason to depart therefrom which
destroys or completely overshadows the policy or purpose
established by the precedent.

Schilling v. Schoenle, 782 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1990). Recently, this Court

reaffirmed that a court should not overrule its own decisions simply because it

disagrees with them: there must be some additional, special justification for

doing so. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 451 (Ky. 2016).

Concomitant with a high court’s duty to “say what the law is,” is the duty

to maintain fidelity to the constitutional text as well as to maintain stability

and consistency in the law. Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law of Judicial

Precedent 356-57 (2016) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137

(1803)). Importantly, the force of stare decisis “is at its weakest when we

interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by

constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.” Agostini v.

42
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). Stare decisis does not compel us to disfigure

the law or perpetuate error.

We acknowledge the direct criticism of Bratcher by the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in Jones v. Lafferty, 173 F.

Supp. 3d 493 (E.D. Ky. 2016), and the recognition of same by numerous panels

of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Additionally, we note that Bratcher has been

cited in a leading Fourth Amendment treatise as an outlier. Wayne R. LaFave,

5 Search & Seizure § 10.10(c) n.116 (6th ed. 2022). Professor LaFave warned of

the flattening effect of the law into general rules based upon the imprecise

application of Supreme Court precedent. Id. (“While it would seem that a

balancing based upon California’s situation should not automatically convert

into a general rule applicable everywhere, experience regarding similar issues

suggests Samson may well end up being ‘flattened out’ into such a general

rule.”). Furthermore, any reliance upon the Bratcher decision appears to be

minimal. Not least because the Department of Corrections has consistently

maintained its policy requiring reasonable suspicion to justify a parolee search.

See KDOC24 27-16-01.

As Justice Jackson famously declared, “we are not final because we are

infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344

U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, “[w]isdom too often

never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”

24 Kentucky Department of Corrections Policy.

43
Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,

dissenting). Because the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is

among the most cherished liberties of our people, we cannot permit a flawed

interpretation to stand. Therefore, we must overrule Bratcher to the extent it

holds that conditions of parole are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment

analysis.

G. SEARCH OF TRUCK SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION

With the proper application of Samson in mind, we must determine

whether the search of Gasaway’s truck was reasonable under the totality of the

circumstances. 547 U.S. at 852. This issue is properly before us based on the

Commonwealth’s reliance on Gasaway’s parolee status and Bratcher before the

trial court. We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress

because the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

When a parolee has been charged with a crime and moves to suppress

evidence obtained from a warrantless search pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment, a court must determine whether the search was reasonable under

the totality of the circumstances by balancing the parolee’s reasonable

expectation of privacy against the necessity of the search to the promote the

Commonwealth’s legitimate interests. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848. This is the

test under Samson and we adopt it here.

A parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy should be determined by

considering the nature of parole itself, the conditions of parole, the place where

the search occurred, the circumstances giving rise to the search, the manner of

44
the search, and any other relevant information. Id. Without question, a

parolee enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy than an ordinary citizen. Id. at

850. On the continuum of state-sanctioned punishments, a parolee also

enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy than a probationer. Id. However, parole

is not tantamount to incarceration. Wayne R. LaFave, 5 Search & Seizure §

10.10(a) (6th ed.). The likeness of parole to imprisonment does not justify, in

itself, a parolee’s lessened expectations of privacy in the context of a parolee

search. Id. Rather, reliance upon the legitimate goals of the state in

connection with the parole supervision process provides a more coherent

doctrinal framework. Id. at § 10.10(c). This is where the conditions of parole

fit into the analysis under Samson. 547 U.S. at 851.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Gasaway was on active parole

at the time of the search. Gasaway was provided with a document setting forth

the specific conditions of his parole, which he signed. Gasaway explicitly

agreed that he would “be subject to search and seizure without a warrant if my

officer has reasonable suspicion that I may have illegal drugs, alcohol or other

contraband on my person or property.” We also note KDOC 27-16-01, which

sets forth the general procedure governing parolee searches.25 KDOC 27-16-01

25 We have not been directed to where a copy of this policy and the regulation
that incorporated it into law are included in the record. However, the Commonwealth
points out that they are publicly available on the KDOC website,
https://corrections.ky.gov/About/cpp/Pages/Chapter-27.aspx. Commonwealth’s
response brief at 16 n.9. While it is the duty of a court to determine the applicable
law, this appears to be a rare case where the content of administrative regulation and
policies constitutes an adjudicative fact. See Clay v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 210,
219-20 (Ky. 2008). In the present appeal, we are not specifically applying the KDOC
policies and regulations as law to fact. We are considering how the conditions of
45
carries the force of law as incorporated by refence into 501 KAR26 6:270 §

1(1).27 KDOC 27-16-01 II.A states “[a]n offender shall be subject to a search of

his person, residence, or other property under his control. The basis of any

search shall be consent, a search warrant, or reasonable suspicion that the

search will produce evidence of a violation of the offender’s conditions of

supervision.”

Under these facts, Gasaway’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his

person, residence, or property is minimal, but it does exist to the extent that

the minimum legal standard of reasonable suspicion is required to justify a

warrantless search. See Sharp, 40 F.4th at 753. To be clear, the reasonable

suspicion standard is generally the minimum standard imposed by courts to

uphold a warrantless search in the absence of a factual showing that a state’s

need to perform a suspicionless search outweighs a parolee’s reasonable

expectation of privacy.28 Samson, 547 U.S. at 851; Sharp, 40 F.4th at 753.

parole and related background law informs the Fourth Amendment analysis involving
Gasaway’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the degree of necessity for the search
to promote the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest. Therefore, we take judicial notice
of the content of the KDOC policies and associated regulations under the authoritative
source provision of KRE 201(b)(2).
26 Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
27 The Commonwealth’s argument concerning the validity of 501 KAR 6:270 §
1(1) and KDOC 27-16-01 are not properly before us.
28 Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, such a standard does not give
the Department of Corrections unrestrained policymaking authority. While the
conditions of parole imposed by the Department and Parole Board are relevant to the
analysis, it is solely within the province of a court to determine whether a search is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

46
 Once the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been

established, the extent to which the search is needed to promote the

Commonwealth’s legitimate interests must be determined. Id. In the parole

context, the state’s legitimate interests include the necessity of supervising

parolees because “parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal

offenses.” Id. at 853. Similarly, “a State’s interests in reducing recidivism and

thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers

and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated

under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

KRS 439.340(3)(b) requires the Parole Board to “adopt administrative

regulations with respect . . . to the conditions to be imposed upon parolees.”29

Effective December 4, 2015, the policy of the Board regarding the conditions of

parole is to “avoid unnecessary conditions of parole to reduce or minimize the

potential for failure by the offender based on technical violation of conditions

that are not substantially related to public safety or reduction of recidivism.”

KYPB30 11-01A.31 This policy carries the force of law through 501 KAR 1:080 §

1(1), which specifically incorporated KYPB 11-01 by reference. Clearly, the

policies concerning the conditions of parole as promulgated by the Parole

29 The Commonwealth’s claim that KRS 439.340(3)(b) is unconstitutional is not
properly before this Court.
30 Kentucky Parole Board Policies and Procedures.
31 As with KDOC 27-16-01, the content of administrative policies and
regulations is a question of adjudicative fact rather than a matter of applicable law.
We, therefore, take judicial notice of KYPB 11-01 under the authoritative source
provision of KRE 201(b)(2).

47
Board are reasonable and promote the legitimate goals of protecting public

safety and reducing recidivism.

On balance, we conclude the search of Gasaway’s truck was reasonable

under the totality of the circumstances. The Commonwealth clearly has a

legitimate and overwhelming interest in the supervision of parolees. Gasaway’s

reasonable expectation of privacy was minimal, requiring only reasonable

suspicion to justify a warrantless search on these facts. In the Fourth

Amendment context, reasonable suspicion exists when a police officer “has a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The basis of reasonable suspicion must be

particularized and objective, but “the likelihood of criminal activity need not

rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of

satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)).

Here, Det. Dover received a reliable report that drugs were found at

Knight’s Mechanical. Det. Dover determined the substance was heroin. Upon

reviewing the surveillance video and speaking with employees, Det. Dover

suspected Gasaway had possessed the heroin. Det. Dover was aware of

Gasaway’s criminal history involving controlled substances. It was also

reasonable for Det. Dover to suspect that Gasaway’s truck contained

contraband given the totality of the circumstances including Gasaway’s parole

status. Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly denied Gasaway’s

48
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his

truck.

IV. EVIDENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA WAS
INADMISSIBLE UNDER KRE 404(B).

For his second contention of error, Gasaway argues the trial court erred

by admitting the methamphetamine and marijuana evidence into evidence.32

Gasaway asserts it is fundamentally unfair to allow the use of the

methamphetamine evidence of which Gasaway was acquitted in the first trial.

Gasaway further argues the marijuana evidence should have been excluded as

improper character evidence under KRE 404(b). We hold there is no per se rule

prohibiting the Commonwealth from introducing, in a subsequent proceeding,

evidence of a crime for which the defendant was acquitted. Nevertheless, we

hold the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the admission of this evidence

under KRE 404(b).

A. EVIDENCE OF ACQUITTED CRIMES NOT PER SE INADMISSIBLE

Gasaway asks this Court to join our sister states in barring the

admission of evidence relating to crimes for which the defendant has been

acquitted. Contrary to the implication of Gasaway’s argument, we are not

starting from a clean slate on this issue.

In Hampton v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Ky. 2004), this

Court held an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the

32 Any questions regarding the admissibility of the Whizzinator are not properly

before us.

49
Commonwealth from relitigating an issue in a subsequent proceeding that is

governed by a lower standard of proof, such as KRE 404(b). This decision

represented a change in Kentucky law, which had previously held “the

Commonwealth is precluded from introducing evidence of issues that must

have been decided against the Commonwealth at the previous trial.” Id. at 441

(citing Commonwealth v. Hillebrand, 536 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1976)) (quotations

omitted). The basis of the new rule was this Court’s application of the

reasoning of the Supreme Court in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342

(1990). Id. at 442.

In Dowling, the Supreme Court held that neither the prohibition against

double jeopardy nor considerations of fundamental fairness under the due

process clause preclude the admission, in a subsequent proceeding, of

evidence from a prior proceeding that resulted in acquittal, when the evidence

is offered under a lower burden of proof. Id. at 354. The reason for the rule is

that an acquittal does not necessarily prove a defendant is innocent: an

acquittal merely proves the existence of reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s

guilt. Id. at 349. Therefore, the admission of such evidence in a subsequent

proceeding is simply a question of the applicable rules of evidence. Id. at 352.

Indeed, the Supreme Court held that non-constitutional sources such as a trial

court’s discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence under FRE 403

constitute an adequate safeguard against the introduction of fundamentally

unfair evidence. Id.

50
 We are convinced our decision in Hampton was sound and adhere to the

reasoning of Dowling. The facts in Hampton demonstrate the prudence of

avoiding a per se rule prohibiting this type of evidence if offered under a lesser

standard in a subsequent proceeding. In Hampton, the defendant was charged

with murder, animal cruelty, and tampering with physical evidence. At her

first trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and tampering, but the trial

court granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the animal cruelty charge. Id.

at 441. This Court reversed the murder and tampering convictions on direct

appeal. Id. at 440. The defendant was again convicted of murder and

tampering after retrial. Id.

On direct appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing

the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that she shot the family cat, which

was the basis of the original animal cruelty charge. Id. at 441. This error was

unpreserved, and the defendant did not request a limiting instruction. Id. We

reviewed for palpable error and held the evidence was admissible under KRE

404(b) because it was offered to prove the defendant killed the cat “in an

attempt to confuse the crime scene and turn suspicion [for the murder] away

from herself.” Id. at 442. The evidence was admissible “as it related to [the

defendant’s] commission of the other offenses” and “was not error, palpable or

otherwise.” Id. However, the Court indicated “a limiting instruction or

admonition would have been proper if requested.” Id. An appropriate limiting

instruction in this context emphasizes the limited purpose of the evidence and

51
the fact that the defendant had been acquitted of the prior act.33 Dowling, 493

U.S. at 346, 353.

Gasaway relies upon several decisions of other state courts that do not

follow the rule as expressed in Dowling. However, these decisions predate our

decision in Hampton. State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1977); State v.

Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979); McMichael v. State, 577 P.2d

398 (Nev. 1978); State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787, 789 (N.C. 1992), and Kerbyson

v. State, 711 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. App. 1986). This Court was aware of the

state of the law in 2004 at the time it adopted the reasoning of the Dowling

majority. Therefore, we do not find these pre-Hampton decisions persuasive.

Additional post-Hampton authority is similarly unpersuasive. Gasaway

cites State v. Mundon, 292 P.3d 205, 226-27 (Ha. 2012). In Mundon, the

Supreme Court of Hawaii declined to follow Dowling in reliance on the double

jeopardy clause of the Hawaii Constitution, which it interprets more broadly

than the federal constitution. Id. By contrast, we have interpreted the double

jeopardy clause of the Kentucky Constitution as co-extensive with the federal

constitution. Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996).

Therefore, the reasoning of Mundon is not persuasive.

33 We note the parties agreed a limiting instruction was necessary. At the close

of the Commonwealth’s case, the trial court provided an oral admonition, but did not
reference Gasaway’s acquittal. However, Gasaway did not challenge the sufficiency of
the admonition until his motion for a new trial. A challenge to the adequacy of an
admonition may not be raised for the first time on a motion for new trial. Webster v.
Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1974).

52
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts declined to follow

Dowling in reliance on the right to a fair trial under Article 12 of Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights, which the Court interprets more expansively than the

due process provisions of the federal constitution. Commonwealth v. Dorazio,

37 N.E.3d 566, 576 (Mass. 2015). The right to a fair trial is grounded in due

process considerations. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). This

Court has consistently construed due process under Section 11 of the

Kentucky as co-extensive with the due process provisions under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution. Brashars v.

Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58, 61-62 (Ky. 2000). Therefore, we do not find the

Dorazio decision persuasive.

We adhere to our decision in Hampton. Although we determined there is

no per se rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence for which a defendant

has been acquitted, such evidence must be otherwise admissible under the

rules of evidence.

B. METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA INADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE OF INTENT UNDER KRE 404(B)

The trial court admitted the evidence of methamphetamine and

marijuana as relevant to intent under KRE 404(b). This was in error.

Under KRE 404(a), the general rule is that evidence of other crimes is not

admissible to show that a defendant is a person of criminal disposition. We

have explained the rule as follows:

The reasons for the rule are salutary. Ordinarily, such evidence
does not tend to establish the commission of the crime. It tends

53
 instead to influence the jury, and the resulting prejudice often
outweighs its probative value. Ultimate fairness mandates that an
accused be tried only for the particular crime for which he is
charged. An accused is entitled to be tried for one offense at a
time, and evidence must be confined to that offense. The rule is
based on the fundamental demands of justice and fair play

O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1982). KRE 404(b)

provides an exception to this salutary rule and provides:

Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible:

(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident; or

(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
party.

While KRE 404(b) is couched as an exception to the general rule prohibiting

improper propensity evidence, it is still “exclusionary in nature.” Bell v.

Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994). This Court has long

recognized “the application of exceptions to the general rule that evidence of

prior bad acts is inadmissible should be closely watched and strictly enforced

because of the dangerous quality and prejudicial consequences of this kind of

evidence.” O’Bryan, 634 S.W.2d at 156. The admissibility of evidence under

KRE 404(b) is evaluated under a three-part test: (1) relevance; (2)

probativeness; and (3) prejudicial effect. Conley v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d

54
756, 772 (Ky. 2019). The appellate standard of review is for abuse of

discretion. Id.

This Court has “found error in the admission of KRE 404(b) evidence for

an issue not in genuine dispute.” Minch v. Commonwealth, 630 S.W.3d 660,

667 (Ky. 2021). “Especially in drug cases like this one, other-act evidence is

too often admitted almost automatically, without consideration of the

‘legitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be used and the need for

it.’” United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United

States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012)). The Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals has explained it is “not enough for the proponent of the other-act

evidence simply to point to a purpose in the ‘permitted’ list and assert that the

other-act evidence is relevant to it.” Id. at 856. “Rule 404(b) excludes the

evidence if its relevance to ‘another purpose’ is established only through the

forbidden propensity inference.” Id. Trial courts are required to conduct the

full KRE 404(b) analysis.

Here, the trial court found the methamphetamine and marijuana

evidence was relevant to the issue of Gasaway’s intent to possess heroin.

Professor Lawson has warned, “there is a very fine line between the use of other

crimes evidence to prove intent and the use of such evidence to prove general

propensity to commit crime, and as a result there is a greater than normal

potential in this ‘other purpose’ category for abuse of the ‘other crimes’ law.”

Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.30[4][b] (2022).

“Special precautions are critical, to minimize the naked propensity logic.” Id.

55
(quoting 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 827 (3d. 2007)). These

precautions include an assurance that “intent was genuinely in dispute, and

the uncharged crime was relevant to prove intent to commit the charged

crime.” Id. Indeed, the use of other crimes evidence to prove the defendant’s

knowledge or intent “should await the conclusion of the defendant’s case and

should be aimed at a specifically identified issue.” Id. at § 2.30[2][b][ii].

In his opening statement, Gasaway denied possessing the heroin and did

not offer any proof in this case. By offering the methamphetamine and

marijuana evidence during its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth was offering

such evidence as direct proof of his intent to possess heroin. However, intent

was not in genuine dispute because Gasaway denied possessing the heroin.

See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 216, 224 (Ky. App. 2011).

Although intent may be an element of the crime of possession, “intent is

not placed in issue by a defense that the defendant did not do the charged act

at all.” See United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 904 (2nd Cir. 1988). “When a

defendant unequivocally relies on such a defense, evidence of other acts is not

admissible for the purpose of proving intent.” Id. In this context, intent with

regard to simple possession is distinct from a trafficking offense which requires

proof of possession and a specific intent to sell. See Walker v. Commonwealth,

52 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Ky. 2001). The situation where a defendant denies

possession is also distinct from situations where a defendant admits or does

not otherwise dispute the fact of possession, but asserts some innocent mental

state such as mere presence, accident, mistake, or lack of knowledge. See 2

56
Wigmore, Evidence § 302 (3d ed. 1940) (“The argument here is purely from the

point of view of the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that

logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying

instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot

explain them all.”).

Because Gasaway’s intent to possess heroin was not genuinely in

dispute, we conclude the trial court erred by admitting the methamphetamine

and marijuana as evidence of such intent. Even if the methamphetamine and

marijuana could be viewed as relevant under the circumstances of this case,

there was insufficient similarity to justify the admission of the evidence as

direct proof of guilt of possession of heroin. Unlike possession cases where

different drugs were found contemporaneously in the same location, Gasaway

was found guilty of possession of heroin based in part upon evidence of

different drugs that were found in a different location on a different occasion.

This is precisely the type of propensity logic that our evidentiary rules are

designed to prevent.

C. METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA NOT INEXTRICABLY
INTERTWINED WITH POSSESSION OF HEROIN CHARGE

The trial court alternatively determined the evidence of

methamphetamine and marijuana was admissible under KRE 404(b)(2)

because the evidence was inextricably intertwined with the possession of

heroin charge. This was also in error.

As cited above, KRE 404(b)(2) provides a separate exception to the

prohibition on improper character evidence when evidence of other crimes is
57
“so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that

separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse

effect on the offering party.” “Two types of ‘other act’ evidence fit the

description: (1) evidence of part of the transaction on which the criminal charge

is based and (2) evidence required “to permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent

and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime.” Leslie W.

Abramson, 9 Kentucky Practice Series, Criminal Practice & Procedure § 27:168

(6th ed.).

Again, Professor Lawson warns of “the need for extraordinary caution” in

this use of this exception because the “expanded idea of contextual relevance

often paves the way to prove acts that are anything but inseparable from the

charged crime, and this label can become a catchall for admitting acts that are

far more prejudicial to the defendant than useful in determining guilt of the

charged offense.” Robert A. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook §

2.30 [3][c] (quoting 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 809 (3d. ed.

2007)). “[T]he key to understanding this exception is the word ‘inextricably.’”

Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Funk v.

Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1992)). “The exception relates only

to evidence that must come in because it ‘is so interwoven with evidence of the

crime charged that its introduction is unavoidable.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Evidence is inextricably intertwined where “two or more crimes are so linked

together in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown

without proving the other.” Id. (quoting Fleming v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky.

58
209, 144 S.W.2d 220, 221 (1940)). In other words, the test is whether by

excluding evidence of the prior offense, it would be necessary to suppress facts

and circumstances relevant to the commission of the charged offense. Id.

(citation omitted).

The evidence of the methamphetamine and marijuana was simply not

inextricably intertwined with the charge of possession of heroin. See United

States v. Lightly, 616 F.3d 321, 354 (4th Cir. 2010) (“the events occurred at

different times, at different places, and involved completely different motives, so

there were no gaps in the government’s case without the evidence”). The

methamphetamine and marijuana are different substances than heroin, and

these other drugs were found in a different location on a different occasion.

Therefore, this other-crimes evidence was neither part of the same criminal

transaction nor essential to allowing the Commonwealth to offer a complete

and comprehensible account of the charged crime.

Further, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the

methamphetamine and marijuana evidence was necessary to explain

Gasaway’s post-arrest statements to Det. Dover, “I’m not worried about the

weed or ecstasy and you damn sure didn’t find no three grams of heroin. And

in Louisville, that’s just a citation.” As in Metcalf, “it would have been a simple

matter” for Det. Dover to truthfully testify concerning Gasaway’s statements

about the heroin without mentioning the portion of the statement relating to

uncharged crimes. 158 S.W.3d at 744. The exclusion of Gasaway’s statements

regarding the methamphetamine and marijuana would not have required the

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suppression of any facts bearing on whether Gasaway possessed heroin the

day before. Therefore, the evidence of methamphetamine and marijuana was

not inextricably intertwined with the heroin charge. The admission of this

evidence was in error.

We further conclude the improper admission of the methamphetamine

and marijuana evidence was highly prejudicial to Gasaway’s defense and

constitutes reversible error. The evidence of methamphetamine and marijuana

was referenced on multiple occasions throughout the guilt phase of the trial.

The direct evidence of heroin possession was not overwhelming. Moreover, the

impact of the methamphetamine and marijuana evidence clearly influenced the

jury’s verdict given its request, during deliberation, for the trial court to provide

a copy of the prior oral admonition in writing. Further, any question

concerning the adequacy of the trial court’s admonition is irrelevant because

the evidence of methamphetamine and marijuana was inadmissible for any

purpose. See KRE 105(a) (“When evidence which is admissible as to one (1)

party of for one (1) purpose but not admissible as to another party or for

another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the

evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly.”). Nor does

this case implicate the situation where an adequate admonition is given after a

defense objection to inadmissible evidence has been sustained. See Soto v.

Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 861-62 (Ky. 2004). We cannot consider this

error harmless. Therefore, reversal for retrial is necessary.

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 V. INTERPRETATION OF VIDEO EVIDENCE WAS ERROR

For his third and final contention of error, Gasaway argues the trial court

improperly permitted three witnesses to interpret the contents of the

surveillance video. Although we have already determined reversible error

occurred, we will nevertheless address this issue because it is likely to recur

upon re-trial. We conclude that Knight was improperly permitted to interpret

the video and decline to review the other claimed errors because they were not

properly preserved for review.

The rule in Kentucky is that a witness may not interpret the contents of

a recording. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ky. 1995).

Specifically, a witness is not permitted to testify concerning events the witness

did not perceive in real-time. Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126, 131-

132 (Ky. 2014). In Morgan v. Commonwealth, 421 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ky. 2014),

we explained:

[A] lay witness “may not interpret audio or video evidence, as such
testimony invades the province of the jury, whose job is to make
determinations of fact based upon the evidence.” “It is for the jury
to determine as best it can what is revealed in the tape recording
without embellishment or interpretation by a witness.”

(Internal citations omitted). This rule is based on KRE 701, which limits

opinion testimony to matters “rationally based on the perception of the

witness.” Id. Additionally, witnesses must testify based on personal

knowledge under KRE 602. Id. However, the identification of a person in a

video recording does not run afoul of the prohibition on interpreting a

recording because such matter is rationally within a witness’s perception. Id.

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 Gasway first argues the trial court erred by allowing Jeremy Knight to

interpret the video. This error was properly preserved by objection.34 The

Court of Appeals held it was proper for Knight to identify Gasaway on the

video because he was familiar with Gasaway’s appearance. However, the

record reflects Knight’s testimony concerning the video went well beyond

identification. While the video clip of Gasaway was playing before the jury, the

following questioning occurred:

Com.: Now you said you viewed the video and saw him [Gasaway]
pull a phone out?

Knight: Correct.

Com.: And where was the item you were talking about falling out?

Knight: So, the white,

Com.: Go ahead.

Knight: Item there.

Com.: Is that that on the floor there?

Knight: Yes sir.

Com.: Now, that is eventually what you found, correct?

Knight: Yes.

Com.: You started with what?

Knight: I started with Austin when he found it.

Com.: Now is that video as well?

34Gasaway made a “prophylactic” objection to the line of questioning
concerning Knight’s interpretation of the video. At that time, he did not mention or
otherwise preemptively object to the testimony of any other witnesses.

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 (Video clip of Austin and Daniel plays).

Knight: Yes. So Austin and Daniel had just got off break and
walked in and he picked it up and was like, “huh what’s that?”.

After the video stopped playing, Knight continued to testify about what he

observed on the video. Knight was clearly interpreting the contents of the video

clip rather than testifying from personal knowledge, perception, or recollection.

Therefore, it was improper to allow this line of questioning over Gasaway’s

objection.

Gasaway also argues the lower courts erred by allowing Brian Tharpe to

interpret the video. However, we have not been cited to any specific objection

in the record concerning this allegedly improper testimony. Our review of the

record indicates that, following the questioning of Tharpe by the parties, the

jury raised a question concerning whether the video had been viewed in its

entirety from the time Gasaway dropped an item and the time the heroin was

found. The jury also posed a question concerning sequencing of the video

clips.

Gasaway objected to the question about how much of the video had been

viewed because it had already been testified to by Knight. Regarding the

sequencing of the video clips, the parties agreed the trial court could ask

Tharpe which parts of the video he had personally viewed. While Tharpe

continued testifying regarding his opinions of what occurred on the video, there

was no further objection. Gasaway did not request palpable error review of this

issue and we decline to address it further.

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 Gasaway finally argues Det. Dover was improperly permitted to interpret

the video. The Court of Appeals concluded Det. Dover’s testimony was

improper, but determined the error was harmless under Boyd, 439 S.W.3d at

132. Gasaway points to three instances where the trial court erred by allowing

Det. Dover to interpret the video. However, we are cited to only one instance

where Gasaway made an objection. And then, the objection was sustained and

Gasaway requested no additional relief.

Regarding the first instance of Det. Dover’s allegedly improper testimony,

Gasaway did not object. He has not requested palpable error and we decline to

review this issue further.

Regarding the second instance of allegedly improper testimony, the

Commonwealth approached the bench during its questioning of Det. Dover.

The Commonwealth apologized because the still photographs from the

surveillance video that it was intending to introduce had been altered and were

not ready for introduction into evidence. The Commonwealth asked for a brief

recess to obtain clean copies of the photographs. Gasaway agreed to allow Det.

Dover to reference the altered photographs during his testimony, and then

allow the Commonwealth to introduce the clean copies when they arrived. No

further objection was made. Gasaway has not requested palpable error review

and we decline to address this issue further.

Regarding the third and final instance of allegedly improper testimony,

the Commonwealth asked Det. Dover, “Do have any question at all that was

dropped by Mr. Gasaway was what was tested positive for heroin at the lab?”

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Gasaway then objected to the question on the basis that it called for a legal

conclusion. Notably, Gasaway stated, “He can say what he saw on the video.”

The trial court then proposed an alternative wording of the question to which

both parties agreed. The Commonwealth then asked Det. Dover, “Do you have

any question whether the substance found on the floor by Austin McClanahan

at Knight’s Mechanical was the same substance tested at the Kentucky State

Police Lab?” Det. Dover answered, “There’s no question.” Gasaway did not

make any further objection or request additional relief. There was no request

for palpable error review and we decline to address the issue further.

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we overrule our decision in Bratcher and reaffirm the

reasoning of the Samson decision as stated above. We hold, albeit for different

reasons than the courts below, the trial court properly denied Gasaway’s

motion to suppress. However, the trial court erred by admitting evidence of

methamphetamine and marijuana under KRE 404(b) because intent was not at

issue and the evidence was not inextricably intertwined with the heroin charge.

Additionally, the trial court improperly allowed a witness to interpret the

contents of a video recording.

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and

reversed in part. We remand to the Hardin Circuit Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

All sitting. Conley, Lambert, and Thompson, JJ., concur. VanMeter,

C.J.; Bisig and Keller, JJ., concur in result only.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Christopher Henry
Assistant Attorney General

66