Isse v. Whitman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SADE ABDULKADIR ISSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 22-3114 (BAH)

MARGARET WHITMAN, et al., Judge Beryl A. Howell

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Sade Abdulkadir Isse, a citizen of Somalia currently residing in Kenya, seeks to

compel defendants, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya and the Secretary of State, in their official

capacities, to adjudicate his visa application. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s wife,

Bello Abdule Hirsi, filed an I-130 application on plaintiff’s behalf in January 2017. Id. ¶ 1. By

December 2022, plaintiff had not yet received a final decision, prompting his filing of this suit,

alleging that defendants have unreasonably delayed his visa application under the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 and 701, et seq., and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 1361, et seq. See Compl. ¶ 31. Defendants now move to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, for failure to

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 6. For the

reasons explained below, defendants’ motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A review of the statutory and regulatory background underlying the claims is below,

followed by a summary of the factual and procedural history of this case.

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

1
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., allows for the

issuance of immigrant visas, including for relatives of U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1154; 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.1(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1), (b). A U.S. citizen seeking permanent resident status for a

spouse or other family member may fill out a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, with U.S.

Customs and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining a

spouse as an “immediate relative” of a citizen for the purposes of Form I-130 petitioners); 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition, the case is forwarded to the National Visa Center

(“NVC”) for processing. Id. § 204.2(a)(3). The NVC serves as the visa application processing

center for the U.S. Department of State (“State Department”). Id.

Following approval of the petition, the foreign spouse must submit paperwork and

processing fees to the NVC. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.67 (outlining application fees and additional

documentation that an applicant must submit to the NVC to complete their application, including

an oath and a signature on Forms DS-230 and DS-260, a “[f]orm of attestation for certain repeat

applications due to COVID-19,” registration requirements, and fingerprints). NVC then schedules

a consular interview for the applicant at the embassy with jurisdiction over the applicant’s

residence. Id. § 42.62. The consular officer must either issue or refuse the visa following the

interview. Id. § 42.81(a).

B. Factual Background

In January 2017, Hirsi filed an I-130 visa petition with USCIS on behalf of her husband

and paid the fees associated with the visa application process. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9, 22. Hirsi aimed to

secure lawful permanent resident status for her husband, a refugee living in Kenya, to allow him

to join her in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10. USCIS received the petition in good order. Id. ¶ 9

(showing petition receipt number); Case Status Online, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,

2
https://perma.cc/GX4B-QVNC (showing plaintiff’s case status, based on USCIS receipt number,

as “My Case was Received”). USCIS approved plaintiff’s visa petition in May 2017, and he was

granted a consular interview at the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in April 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11; see

also 22 C.F.R. § 42.62 (requiring every U.S. immigrant visa applicant to submit to an interview by

a consular official for “execution of the application”). Following his interview at the Embassy,

plaintiff was informed that his visa application was being placed in “administrative processing.”

Compl. ¶ 12. Despite numerous inquiries, plaintiff received no further updates on his visa

application for nearly four years following the interview. Id. ¶ 13. As of June 2023, plaintiff’s

application for an immigrant visa to the United States appears to have been refused, see id. ¶ 9

(identifying plaintiff’s State Department visa application number (NRB2017693019)); Visa Status

Check, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/T225-GHH7 (showing plaintiff’s case status, based

on the provided application number, as “REFUSED,”), though the same page on the State

Department’s website suggests that his application remains subject to additional administrative

processing before a final decision is rendered, see id. (“If you were informed by the consular officer

that your case was refused for administrative processing, your case will remain refused while

undergoing such processing. You will receive another adjudication once such processing is

complete.”).

In March 2020, the State Department suspended visa processing services at every U.S.

Embassy due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Suspension of Routine Visa Services, U.S. DEP’T OF

STATE, https://perma.cc/9EUT-5UTX (July 22, 2020). 1 As the global effects of the pandemic

lessened, the State Department allowed embassies gradually to resume visa processing activities,

granting each embassy discretion in the process based on its individual capacity and safety

1
Judicial notice is appropriately taken of information posted on government agencies’ official public websites.
Cannon v. Dist. Of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 205 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

3
considerations. Visa Services Operating Status Update, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

https://perma.cc/RW3C-4KYL (Nov. 19, 2021). The goal of this policy was to allow each embassy

to use on-the-ground information to assess the current COVID-19 situation of the country where

the embassy is located. Id. As a result of these safety procedures, the State Department and U.S.

embassies still face a significant backlog of visa applications. See National Visa Center (NVC)

Immigrant Visa Backlog Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/HD67-HPYW. As of May

2023, nearly 400,000 immigrant visa applications are “documentarily” complete but still await

final adjudication. Id. This backlog has created substantial delays in processing and wait times

for visa applicants, including at the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. See U.S. Visa Services, U.S. EMBASSY

IN KENYA, https://ke.usembassy.gov/visas/ (last visited May 26, 2023). Even with the delays, the

Embassy maintains that it is “working diligently to reduce wait times in all visa categories as

quickly and safely as possible.” Id.

Meanwhile, plaintiff’s delay in receiving a final decision on his visa petition has had a

“profound and negative impact” on his life. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff’s separation from his wife and

young children has created “significant personal, financial, and emotional hardship” on his entire

family. Id. ¶ 1. Aside from phone calls made more burdensome by an eight-hour time difference,

plaintiff has been unable to interact with his young children during a formative time in their lives.

Id. The stress of the separation from his spouse and children has caused plaintiff significant health

issues, including hypertension, anxiety, depression, and stress. Id. The separation has also caused

economic hardship on plaintiff and his wife: Plaintiff’s wife must support the entire family

financially, working and caring for the couple’s children without assistance, and she has also spent

nearly $15,000 in travel costs to visit plaintiff three times during their separation. Id. To make

4
matters worse, plaintiff enjoys no legal status or family support in Kenya, as he is only in that

country to facilitate the processing of his visa application. Id.

C. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint on October 13, 2022, to “compel Defendants to take

action on and adjudicate his properly-filed visa application.” Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff maintains that

defendants retain jurisdiction over plaintiff’s visa application and that defendants have

“unreasonably and improperly withheld action” to process that application, causing harm to

plaintiff. Id. While plaintiff argues that defendants “owe a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate

[his] immigration case,” plaintiff does not seek review of any final decision by defendants on the

application; instead, he seeks only adjudication of his visa application under the APA, id. ¶¶ 2, 9-

25, and the Mandamus Act, id. ¶¶ 26-31. In his Prayer for Relief, plaintiff requests final

adjudication of his visa application within fifteen calendar days and attorney’s fees and costs under

the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504, et seq., and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, et seq. Compl. ¶ 3.

On January 23, 2023, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defs.’ Mot. at 1. With briefing complete, see Pl.’s

Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 7; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’

Reply”), ECF No. 9, defendants’ motion is ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256

(2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)), and “have

only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by

Congress pursuant thereto,” Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C.

5
Cir. 2017) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). To survive

a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff thus “bears the

burden of invoking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

When a jurisdictional argument “present[s] a dispute over the factual basis of the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, . . . the court must go beyond the pleadings and resolve” any dispute

necessary to the disposition of the motion to dismiss. Feldman v. FDIC, 879 F.3d 347, 351 (D.C.

Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Phoenix Consulting v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36,

40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The court must accept as true “material factual allegations in the complaint

and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be

derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In addition, however, the “court

may properly consider . . . evidentiary material in the record,” again affording the plaintiff “the

benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Feldman, 879 F.3d at 351.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Wood v.

Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757–58 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A

facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability”

but that allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

556 (2007)); see also Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In deciding a motion

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must consider the whole complaint, accepting all factual allegations

6
as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Courts do not, however, “assume

the truth of legal conclusions … nor … accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out

in the complaint.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19 (internal citation omitted). “In determining whether a

complaint fails to state a claim,” a court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any

documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [courts] may

take judicial notice.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting EEOC v. St.

Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants advance two main arguments to dismiss the complaint, contending, first,

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking to adjudicate this dispute under the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability, Defs.’ Mot. at 5, 11; and, second, that, even if not barred for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, plaintiff’s claims still fail to state viable claims for relief for unreasonable delay

under the Mandamus Act and the APA, id. at 3, 9. While the doctrine of consular nonreviewability

does not preclude judicial review of plaintiff’s claims because he seeks only procedural, not

substantive, relief, his complaint nonetheless fails on the merits because the delay in resolving

plaintiff’s visa application, given the backlog resulting from the pandemic, is not unreasonable as

a matter of law. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

A. The Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability Does Not Bar Review of Plaintiff’s Visa
Application Because a Consular Officer Has Not Rendered a Final Decision.

Defendants first allege that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes judicial

review of plaintiff’s case. Defs.’ Mot. at 5. Specifically, defendants assert that “the consular

official has decided not to issue a visa in response to the visa application[,] [making] [t]hat decision

[ ] immune from review in this court” under the doctrine. Defs.’ Mot. at 8. Yet, the procedural

posture of plaintiff’s visa application, though marked “refused,” is that the application is still

7
undergoing additional administrative processing. Thus, no final decision has apparently been

made, with the result that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar judicial review of

plaintiff’s claims. See Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C.

2022); accord Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-35 (BAH), 2020 WL 3082018, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Jun.

10, 2020).

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., gives consular

officers “exclusive authority” to review and adjudicate visa applications. Saavedra Bruno v.

Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1201(a)). Given the

“political nature of visa determinations and the lack of any statute expressly authorizing judicial

review of consular officers’ actions,” “courts are without authority to displace the consular function

in the issuance of visas.” Id. at 1159, 1164 (quoting City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 512

(D.C. Cir. 1989)). The limitation on courts’ ability substantively to review a consular officer’s

final decision on a visa application is known as the “doctrine of consular nonreviewability.” Id. at

1159; see also Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 428 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (observing

that “a consular officer could make . . . a decision [to deny a visa] without fear of reversal since

visa decisions are nonreviewable”).

The consular nonreviewability doctrine “shields a consular official’s decision to issue

or withhold a visa from judicial review.” Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020,

1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not, however, “insulate a

delay in reaching” final decisions on visa applications “from judicial review.” Vulupala v. Barr,

438 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2020); see also Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931–32 (9th Cir.

1997) (“Normally a consular official’s discretionary decision to grant or deny a visa petition is not

subject to judicial review. However, when the suit challenges the authority of the consul to take

8
or fail to take an action as opposed to a decision taken within the consul’s discretion, jurisdiction

exists.”). An assessment of whether the government has delayed action on a particular visa

application is not the type of political consideration that the consular nonreviewability doctrine

aims to avoid, and that assessment is not “an area ‘in which legislative action [and] traditional

practice indicate that courts are unqualified or that issues are inappropriate for judicial

determination.’” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the

government cannot elevate “form over substance” when it comes to rendering a final decision on

a visa application, and thus the focus in a consular nonreviewability case must be “on what is

actually happening.” Vulupala, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 98.

Resultantly, “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not triggered” when “a consular

officer” has not rendered a final decision and the visa application remains under consideration.

Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat Because of their Faithful Serv. to the U.S. v. Kerry, 168 F.

Supp. 3d 268, 290 (D.D.C. 2016). Here, plaintiff does not request review of a final State

Department adjudication on his visa, but only to compel agency action on his application. Pl.’s

Opp’n at 11–12. Since plaintiff seeks only procedural, and not substantive, review of his visa

process, the consular nonreviewability doctrine does not apply, and jurisdiction exists to adjudicate

plaintiff’s claim. See Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 92 (D.D.C 2020) (explaining that,

while the consular nonreviewability doctrine would bar review of a “consular officer’s decision

. . . to refuse [the applicant’s] visa application,” it does not bar “review of the government’s failure

to adjudicate [plaintiff’s] waiver eligibility . . . the failure to make a decision”) (emphasis in

original).

Al-Gharawy v. United States Department of Homeland Security is instructive and

persuasive here. In that case, the plaintiffs’ visa applications had been similarly “refused,” but the

9
court rejected the defendants’ argument to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for relief under the

Mandamus Act and the APA under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. 617 F. Supp. 3d at

16. The court explained that “the factual allegations in the complaint . . . indicate that no final

decision has been made with respect to [the] [p]laintiffs’ visa applications” because the plaintiffs

were told that their applications needed “further administrative processing,” and they had made

several requests “regarding the status of their visa applications, only to be told that their ‘[v]isa

application[s] [were] refused . . . for administrative processing.’” Id. at 16 (alterations in original).

The court reasoned that, although the “consular nonreviewability doctrine applies to a consular

officer’s substantive decisions to approve or deny a visa application, that same reasoning does not

extend to the procedural considerations at issue.” Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). Given that the

plaintiffs were not requesting the court “to second guess the Executive in exercising [] the

sovereign powers to exclude aliens,” but were merely requesting the agency be compelled to take

a final action on their visa applications, id. at 13, the mere fact that the plaintiffs’ visa applications

were refused did not preclude judicial review under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, id.

at 16–17.

Just like the plaintiffs in Al-Gharawy, plaintiff’s “refused” application here is not a final

decision on his application because, as plaintiff’s Complaint makes clear, he was informed that his

visa application is still undergoing “administrative processing.” Compl. ¶ 12. Moreover,

plaintiff’s case status on the State Department’s website expressly provides that if plaintiff was

informed “by the consular officer that [his] case was refused for administrative processing, [his]

case will remain refused while undergoing such processing,” and he “will receive another

adjudication once such processing is complete.” Visa Status Check, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

https://perma.cc/T225-GHH7 (emphasis added). Given that plaintiff is awaiting a final decision

10
on his visa application, and he has received “no meaningful response” regarding the status of the

application despite inquiring about its status “on numerous occasions,” Compl. ¶¶ 8, 13, the

consular nonreviewability doctrine does not bar review since the “refusal” plaintiff received “was

merely provisional, with a final decision yet to come.” Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 16.

Defendants make no effort to distinguish the facts in Al-Gharawy, and instead argue that

Al-Gharawy was incorrectly decided, reasoning that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability

“shields a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from judicial review,” Baan Rao,

985 F.3d at 1024 (emphasis added), so the consular officer’s decision “not to issue a visa in

response to the visa application . . . is immune from review[.]” Def.’s Mot. at 6–8. Defendants’

reliance on the “withhold” language in Baan Rao, however, is a misfire. As the court observed in

Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 15, Baan Rao does not stand for the proposition advanced by

defendants because that case concerned a final consular decision to deny visa applications on

substantive grounds, see 985 F.3d at 1023 (“[T]he Embassy denied [plaintiffs’] applications,

concluding both did not meet all of the requirements of an E-2 essential employee as specified in

[the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual].”) (second alteration in original) (quotation

marks omitted)—which is a formal, substantive decision in contrast to a temporary hold status that

is marked as “refusal” by a consular officer, see Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (making this

observation). The D.C. Circuit in Baan Rao was thus not opining on whether the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability precluded judicial review of “refused” visa applications that remains

subject to additional administrative processing, but rather whether a final decision on the merits of

a visa application precluded judicial review.

11
 Accordingly, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not preclude judicial review

of plaintiff’s visa application. 2

B. The Alleged Delay in Decision on Plaintiff’s Visa Application is Not Unreasonable, So
Plaintiff’s Claim Must Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim

Alternatively, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim because “any delay

[on his visa application] here is not unreasonable as a matter of law.” Defs.’ Mot. at 9. As

defendants point out, a writ of mandamus to compel agency action “starts from the premise that

issuance of the writ is an extraordinary remedy, reserved only for the most transparent violations

of a clear duty to act. In the case of agency inaction, we not only must satisfy ourselves that there

indeed exists such a duty, but that the agency has ‘unreasonably delayed’ the contemplated action.”

In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)).

The D.C. Circuit has enumerated six factors to consider when determining whether a delay

in agency action is unreasonable, known as the “TRAC Factors”:

(1) [T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by
a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or
other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to
proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply
content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable
in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human

2
Defendants also claim that dismissal is warranted because the defendants named are officials who cannot
provide the requested relief, Def.’s Mot. at 3–5, but this argument is not persuasive. At the outset, defendants make
the puzzling argument that officials from the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice either
“have no role in adjudicating the request [sic] visa or they completed their role in the process,” Defs.’ Mot. at 3, yet
no such officials from those two agencies are named; rather, plaintiff names only the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya and
the Secretary of State. Compl. at 1. Defendants further contend that the Secretary of State cannot provide plaintiff
any relief because the INA “grants consular officers ‘exclusive authority to review applications for visas, precluding
even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations.’” Def.’s Mot. at 4 (quotation marks and emphasis
omitted) (quoting Baan Rao, 985 F.3d at 1024). Baan Rao, however, does not support defendants’ argument because
“[c]ontrol over a consular officer's visa determinations—that is, her decisions to ‘grant[ ], deny[,] [or] revok[e] . . .
immigrant and non-immigrant visas,’—is not the same as control over the timing by which the consular officer
considers the applications presented to her.” Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (quoting Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d
at 1156) (emphasis in original). Defendants have identified no authority to suggest that the Secretary of State cannot
direct consular officers within the State Department to issue a final decision more quickly on plaintiff’s visa
application, so this argument is rejected.

12
 health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the
effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher
or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the
nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the
court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude
in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations and

internal formatting omitted).

Plaintiff argues that, due to the fact-intensive nature of the TRAC inquiry, evaluation of the

factors is not appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. Pl.’s Opp’n at. 15. The D.C. Circuit has

similarly warned that “[r]esolution of a claim of unreasonable delay is ordinarily a complicated

and nuanced task requiring consideration of the particular facts and circumstances before the

court.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(“Mashpee”). Nevertheless, courts in this circuit have employed the TRAC factors at the motion

to dismiss stage to determine “whether a [plaintiff’s] complaint has alleged facts sufficient to state

a plausible claim for unreasonable administrative delay.” Ghadami v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., No. 19-cv-00397 (ABJ), 2020 WL 1308376, at *7 n.6; see also Bagherian, 442 F. Supp. 3d

at 94–95 (employing the TRAC factor analysis during the motion to dismiss stage); Sarlak, 2020

WL 3082018, at *5 (same); Didban v. Pompeo, 435 F. Supp. 3d 168, 175-76 (D.D.C. 2017)

(same). 3 As in those cases, the record here provides enough factual background to evaluate the

TRAC factors and find that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim that action on his visa has

been unreasonably delayed.

1. TRAC Factors 1 & 2

3
When limited factual information is available in the record, some courts have determined that the TRAC
factor analysis is premature at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Moghaddam v. Pompeo, 424 F. Supp. 3d 104,
117 (D.D.C. 2020); Thomas v. Pompeo, 438 F. Supp. 3d 35, 44 (D.D.C. 2020). Here, however, the record provides
sufficient factual information to apply the TRAC factor analysis.

13
 The first and second TRAC factors weigh in defendants’ favor because the delay in

adjudicating plaintiff’s visa application—around forty months—is not unreasonable. 4 These two

factors are typically considered in conjunction, with the first factor being considered the most

important. In re Core Commc’ns Inc., 531 F.3d 850, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Milligan v.

Pompeo, 502 F. Supp. 3d 302, 317 (D.D.C. 2020).

Congress tends to give agencies “wide” discretion in their visa processing timelines.

Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153-54 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that a two-year delay in

processing a visa application is not unreasonable). In fact, “no statutory or regulatory timeframe

[exists] within which the State Department or a consular officer must re-adjudicate visa

applications.” Id. “Absent a congressionally supplied yardstick, courts typically turn to case law

as a guide.” Sarlak, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6. Even though courts have drawn no bright lines to

determine reasonableness, “[d]istrict courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess

of five, six, seven years are unreasonable.” Yavari v. Pompeo, No. 19-cv-02524 (SVW), 2019 WL

6720996, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2019) (citing Siwen Zhang v. Cissna, No. 18-cv-9696 (MWF),

2019 WL 3241187, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019)). Reasonableness in this context also “cannot

be decided in the abstract, by reference to some number of months or years beyond which agency

action is presumed to be unlawful, but will depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the

4
Plaintiff alleges a six-year delay in the adjudication of his visa application because he filed his application
six years ago. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The proper method for calculating delay, however, is the length of time between the
last action the government took on a visa application and the filing of plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g.
Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 68 n.7 (D.D.C. 2022) (determining that the delay was thirty months by calculating
the time difference between “[t]he last government action on this matter” and the date the complaint was filed);
Rahimian v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-785 (BAH), 2023 WL 143644, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2023) (evaluating unreasonable
delay of a visa application based on the time between the last action on the application—when USCIS approved
plaintiff’s visa petition—and when plaintiff’s complaint was filed). The last action taken on plaintiff’s visa application
was his consular interview in Kenya in April 2019, so the time between that action and the date plaintiff filed this suit
(October 2022) is approximately forty months.

14
task at hand, the significance (and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the

agency.” Mashpee, 336 F.3d at 1102.

Not only does the delay in plaintiff’s visa adjudication fall at least twenty months short of

the five-, six-, and seven-year delay found to be potentially unreasonable in Yavari, but that case

was decided prior to the global pandemic. Consideration of agency resources and the context of

an agency action is critical to the determination of reasonableness. Id.; see also Tate v. Pompeo,

513 F. Supp. 3d 132, 150–51 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding that the government’s determination of “how

to allocate scarce resources in a global pandemic outweigh[s] [visa applicants’] interests in

immediate adjudication of their visas”). Less than a year after plaintiff’s consular interview, U.S.

consulates and embassies shut down across the globe due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The

ensuing backlog of visa applications and the ongoing importance of public health considerations

in consular operations continue to affect the processing of immigration procedure today. The visa

backlog due to the COVID-19 pandemic might even further stretch the time window outlined in

Yavari, given the strain on agency resources following the health crisis. These circumstances

further weigh in defendants’ favor. See Murway v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-1618 (RJL), 2022 WL

493082, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2022) (finding that “operational delays due to the COVID-19

pandemic favor the government on the first two [TRAC] factors”); Rahimian, 2023 WL 143644, at

*7 (same); Zaman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-3592 (ABJ), 2021 WL 5356284, at

*6 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2021) (same); Khan v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-1683 (JEB), 2021 WL 5356267, at

*3 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2021) (same).

2. TRAC Factors 3 & 5

The third and fifth TRAC factors are related and together examine “the nature and extent

of the interests prejudiced by the delay,” including whether “human health and welfare” might be

15
implicated. 750 F.2d at 80. Plaintiff has faced serious personal hardship from the delay of his visa

adjudication and so, contrary to defendants’ assertion, see Defs.’ Mot. at 15, these factors weigh in

his favor.

Prolonged separation from a spouse, fiancé, or other immediate family member may be

considered a risk to human health and welfare. See Didban, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 177 (finding the

third and fifth TRAC factors to weigh in favor of plaintiff given the continued separation of

spouses); see also Bagherian, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (conceding that plaintiff’s long separation

from her family threatened her health and welfare). Plaintiff and his family have suffered serious

financial and emotional consequences because of their long-term separation; in addition, the

separation has caused plaintiff to suffer ongoing physical health issues and stress. Compl. ¶ 1.

Defendants do not contest that plaintiff’s own wellness has been negatively affected by the

long separation from his family. Nonetheless, they maintain that the third and fifth factors weigh

in its favor because expediting review in plaintiff’s case may cause harm to the health and welfare

of those visa applicants whose applications would be further delayed by expediting plaintiff’s

application. Defs.’ Mot. at 15. Defendants contend that, in the aggregate, delaying those other

applications in favor of plaintiff’s would “direct resources away from the adjudications that the

State Department has identified as more urgent.” Id.

Even if defendants’ point about resource allocation may be true, courts frequently examine

the individual health or welfare of a specific plaintiff when evaluating TRAC factors three and five.

See, e.g., Rahimian, 2023 WL 143644, at *8; Sarlak, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (similar). Thus,

considering the harm done to this particular plaintiff if his visa application is delayed is appropriate

in evaluating TRAC factors 3 & 5.

3. TRAC Factor 4

16
 The fourth TRAC factor considers whether “expediting delayed action” will have a harmful

effect on “agency activities of a higher or completing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Defendants

correctly point out that this factor carries “significant weight” in the TRAC analysis. Defs.’ Reply

at 10; see Mashpee, 336 F.3d at 1100. This factor weighs heavily in defendants’ favor, particularly

in context of the ongoing recovery efforts from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Granting expedited agency action is considered inappropriate when that relief “would

simply ‘reorder’ a queue of applicants seeking adjudication” and when no concomitant “‘net gain’

in adjudications is achieved.” Tate, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (quoting In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930

F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). In particular, “where resource allocation is the source of the delay,

courts have declined to expedite action because of the impact on competing priorities.” Liberty

Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 117 (D.D.C. 2005).

Plaintiff claims that he is “not asking to be put ahead in line of other. Rather, he is merely

asking that the Government engage in normal processing of his visa.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 19. Post-

pandemic, such normal processing means accommodating the backlogs of the hundreds of

thousands of visa applications still awaiting adjudication due to staffing and resource shortages

arising during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Expediting review in plaintiff’s case “would

merely pull government resources” away from other visa adjudications and agency business.

Bagherian, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 95; see also Didban, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 176 (holding that reordering

agency business “would impermissibly interfere with the agency’s ‘unique’ and ‘authoritative [ ]

position to view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects for each, and allocate its resources

in the optimal way’” (quoting In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d at 76)); see NVC Immigrant Visa

Backlog Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/HD67-HPYW (providing data and

information about the backlog in visa applications still faced by the Department of State post-

17
pandemic). In addition, plaintiff advances no explanation for why other visa applications should

be further delayed to expedite his own. Since the D.C. Circuit recognizes “no basis for reordering

agency priorities,” In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d at 76, this factor weighs in favor of defendants.

4. TRAC Factor 6

The sixth and final TRAC factor is neutral. This factor states that “the court need not ‘find

any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably

delayed.’” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 (quoting Pub. Citizen Rsch. Grp. v. Comm’r, Food & Drug

Admin., 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). While plaintiff alleges that the State Department could

and should have been more forthcoming with information about his visa application timeline, he

does not go so far as to allege any bad faith on the part of the agency or its staff. See Pl.’s Opp’n

at 23-24. While plaintiff is understandably frustrated with the visa application process given his

long separation from his family and wife, the delay alone does not demonstrate any agency

misconduct.

5. TRAC Factors Considered in Totality

Taking all six TRAC factors as a whole, plaintiff has not stated a claim under the Mandamus

Act or the APA for unreasonable delay. See Rahimian, 2023 WL 143644, at *9 (reaching the same

conclusion); Logan, 2022 WL 3715798, at *7 (same); Arab, 600 F. Supp. 3d. at 72 (same); Zaman,

2021 WL 5356284, at *6–8 (same); Sarlak, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (same). The reasoning found

in prior caselaw, the context of agency resource backlogs stemming from the COVID-19

pandemic, and the fact that granting plaintiff relief would merely reorder his application in the

queue, all support the conclusion that the delay in adjudication of plaintiff’s visa is not

unreasonable. While TRAC factors three and five do weigh somewhat in plaintiff’s favor, a holistic

review of the factors does not allow these two to eclipse the rest. In this situation, “the

18
government’s interests in balancing its own priorities” outweighs the individual harm done to

plaintiff and his family as they await a final decision. Milligan, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 320 (quoting

Bagherian, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 95–96). This Court has deep sympathy for plaintiff and his family

during their separation, but must also recognize that countless other families are facing similarly

difficult circumstances as they await immigration decisions. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812

F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (collecting cases “reject[ing] mandamus claims that would have

had the effect of allowing the plaintiffs to jump the line, functionally solving their delay problem

at the expense of other similarly situated applicants”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. An Order consistent with

this Memorandum Opinion will be filed contemporaneously.

Date: June 26, 2023

__________________________
BERYL A. HOWELL
U.S. District Court Judge

19