Christian Cruz v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2021-1767
____________

CHRISTIAN CRUZ,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

July 6, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Christian Cruz appeals his sentence of death, which was

imposed by the trial court for the second time following this Court’s

reversal of his original death sentence “and remand for the limited

purpose of requiring the trial court to perform a new sentencing

evaluation and provide a new sentencing order.” See Cruz v. State,

320 So. 3d 695, 731-32 (Fla. 2021). We have jurisdiction. See art.

V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons we explain, we affirm

Cruz’s sentence of death.
 I. BACKGROUND

In 2019, Cruz was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary,

robbery, and kidnapping and was sentenced to death for the

murder. Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 710, 716. This Court summarized the

relevant facts as follows:

In 2013, Christian Cruz and codefendant Justen
Charles were indicted for the first-degree murder of
Christopher Jemery, as well as burglary while armed,
robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping. Cruz and
Charles were tried separately but before the same trial
court. Charles’ trial occurred after Cruz’s trial but before
Cruz’s sentencing. The evidence presented at Cruz’s trial
showed that on April 26, 2013, Jemery was attacked in
his Deltona apartment. The evening before the attack,
both Cruz and Charles were together in an apartment in
the vicinity of Jemery’s apartment. Cruz and Charles
were aware that the former resident of the apartment
where Jemery was living sold drugs out of the apartment,
and Cruz and Charles discussed Jemery’s apartment the
day before the murder.
The evidence showed that both Cruz and Charles
forcefully entered Jemery’s apartment. The physical
evidence obtained from the apartment showed that there
was an assault and attack on Jemery. Blood throughout
the apartment demonstrated that Jemery was beaten
while inside the apartment. Bloody footprints matching
the shoes of Cruz and Charles were found inside the
apartment. One of the bedrooms appeared ransacked
and had additional blood, the kitchen cabinets had been
opened, and a television was taken from the apartment.
Cruz and Charles then placed Jemery in the trunk
of Jemery’s rental car, drove him to a remote location,
and shot him in the head. Jemery was found near the
Sanford airport in Seminole County, Florida. Workers at

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 an industrial area saw what they thought was the body of
a person lying on the ground in a field adjacent to their
warehouse. Because the body lacked identification, the
person was given the name of John Doe. John Doe was
later identified as Christopher Jemery.
Upon first arrival at the field, emergency personnel
made a notation that Jemery was bound with wire and
duct tape on his arms and mouth, was alive but
nonresponsive, and his breathing was very shallow.
Medical examiner testimony would later reveal that
Jemery was shot in the head and also sustained a
number of injuries to his head, face, hands, and torso,
including cuts, bruises, lacerations, and defensive
wounds. His wrists showed what appeared to be tape
residue from being bound with duct tape. Jemery
initially survived the attack but succumbed to his
injuries in a hospital within a day.
Evidence showed that the duct tape recovered from
the area where Jemery was found matched the leftover
roll of duct tape found in Jemery’s apartment. A live .22
bullet was found on the floor of Jemery’s apartment,
which was the same caliber and manufacturer as the .22
shell casing found near Jemery’s body. Cruz’s fingerprint
was found on a piece of duct tape recovered from
Jemery’s body. Cruz’s DNA was found on a swab of
blood taken from the front right kick panel and the right
front door of Jemery’s rental car. Cruz’s fingerprint was
also found on the Air Jordan shoe box found at Jemery’s
apartment and on Jemery’s cell phone, which was
recovered from his rental car. Jemery’s rental car was
not at his apartment and was later found backed into
some bushes near a grocery store in Deltona. The
evidence also showed that the same night Jemery was
taken from his apartment, Cruz was seen on a bank’s
ATM surveillance camera using Jemery’s bank card and
personal identification number (PIN) to withdraw $440
cash from Jemery’s account.

Id. at 705-06.

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 During the guilt phase of Cruz’s trial, the State
presented the testimony of 17 witnesses. The State did
not, however, present at Cruz’s trial 2 items of evidence
that it did introduce at the trial of Charles: first, the
testimony of Charles’ girlfriend that she had seen Cruz
with a .22 caliber firearm, and second, a stipulation
between the State and Charles’ trial counsel that Cruz
was the shooter.

Id. at 708.

To establish the prior violent felony aggravator, the State

presented evidence of a robbery of a Hungry Howie’s committed by

Cruz and Charles days after the murder in this case. At the

conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously

recommended that Cruz be sentenced to death. Id. at 710.

[T]he trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and
sentenced Cruz to death. The trial court found 5
aggravating factors: (1) Cruz was previously convicted of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another
person for the Hungry Howie’s robbery committed shortly
after murdering Jemery (great weight); (2) the first-degree
murder was committed while Cruz was engaged in a
robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, merged with the first-
degree murder was committed for financial gain (great
weight); (3) the first-degree murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding arrest (great weight); (4) the first-
degree murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
(great weight); and (5) the first-degree murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner (great weight). The trial court considered and
found as proven all 37 of Cruz’s proffered mitigators,

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 assigning slight weight to 24, moderate weight to 11,
great weight to 1, and extraordinarily great weight to 1.

In its sentencing order, the trial court conducted an
Enmund[n.4]-Tison[n.5] analysis, finding as follows:

The jury found Mr. Cruz to be the
individual who shot and killed Mr. Jemery. In
Mr. Charles’s case, the State abandoned any
efforts to establish Mr. Charles as the shooter.
The jury in Mr. Charles’ case did not have to
make a determination as to who the shooter
was because of the State’s concession.
However, the jury in Mr. Charles’ case did find
him guilty of both, premeditated murder AND
felony murder.

Therefore, this court finds that Mr. Cruz
in fact killed Mr. Jemery and no further
analysis is needed.

[N.4] Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

[N.5] Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).

In the sentencing order, the trial court explained
that he heard and considered evidence of the case in
Cruz’s and codefendant Charles’ trials.

Id. at 710-11 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, we agreed with Cruz’s argument that he was

improperly sentenced to death based on extrarecord facts:

In sentencing Cruz to death, the trial court relied on
evidence from Charles’ trial, specifically the testimony of
Charles’ girlfriend regarding seeing Cruz with a .22
caliber firearm, as well as the stipulation in Charles’ trial
that Cruz was the shooter. However, there is no
competent, substantial evidence presented in Cruz’s trial

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 to support the jury’s finding that Cruz was the shooter.
We cannot determine what weight the trial judge gave to
the finding that Cruz was the shooter or what part the
nonrecord evidence from codefendant Charles’ trial
played in Cruz’s sentence. Here, this was error that
cannot be considered harmless.

Id. at 725. We thus overturned the death sentence “and remand[ed]

for the limited purpose of resentencing by the trial court and a new

sentencing order.” Id. at 723. At that time, we declined to address

Cruz’s argument that his sentence was “disproportionate in

comparison to other death sentences and Charles’ life sentence.”

Id. We explained that there was no need to address comparative

proportionality in light of our decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 So.

3d 544 (Fla. 2020), in which we receded from the judge-made

requirement to review the comparative proportionality of death

sentences as contrary to the conformity clause of article I, section

17 of the Florida Constitution. Because of the need for

resentencing caused by the error of reliance on facts not in

evidence, we also did not reach the issue of relative culpability in

light of Charles’s life sentence. Id.

On remand in 2020, aside from a slight change in weight to

one aggravator and one mitigator—both of which were favorable to

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Cruz—the trial court found and assigned the same weight to each

aggravator and mitigator and again sentenced Cruz to death. The

trial court decreased the weight it assigned to the cold, calculated,

and premeditated aggravator from great to moderate and increased

the weight it assigned to the “minor participation” mitigator from

slight to moderate. This appeal follows.

II. ANALYSIS

Cruz’s sole challenge to his death sentence is that this Court’s

relative culpability review requires that the sentence be reduced to

life imprisonment because his equally culpable codefendant,

Charles, who was convicted of the same offenses and to whom the

same aggravating factors were proven applicable, was sentenced to

life imprisonment by the same judge. The State takes the position

that when this Court in Lawrence receded from its obligation to

conduct a comparative proportionality review, it also receded from

its obligation to conduct a relative culpability analysis, and

therefore Charles’s sentence is irrelevant to Cruz’s sentence. This

dispute thus presents the threshold question, Does relative

culpability review survive Lawrence?

This Court’s formerly mandatory comparative proportionality

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review that was eliminated in Lawrence involved consideration of

circumstances present in a capital case and a qualitative

comparison to other similar capital cases in order to determine

whether the case being reviewed fell under the category of most

aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders, see, e.g.,

Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 668 (Fla. 2008); Porter v. State, 564

So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990), “thereby assuring uniformity in the

application of the sentence,” Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 408

(Fla. 2003). And in capital cases involving multiple defendants, this

Court has performed an additional analysis—which has been

described as an “aspect” of its comparative proportionality review—

of a defendant’s culpability relative to his codefendant(s). See, e.g.,

Shere v. Moore, 830 So. 2d 56, 60-62 (Fla. 2002). Underlying this

relative culpability review has been “the principle that equally

culpable co-defendants should be treated alike in capital sentencing

and receive equal punishment.” Id. at 60.

In Lawrence, we held “that the conformity clause of article I,

section 17 of the Florida Constitution 1 forbids this Court from

1. The conformity clause of article I, section 17 provides that
“[t]he prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the

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analyzing death sentences for comparative proportionality in the

absence of a statute establishing that review.” Lawrence, 308 So.

3d at 545. Lawrence thus receded from precedent that required

death sentences to be reviewed “for comparative proportionality.”

Id. at 552. And Lawrence “eliminate[d] comparative proportionality

review from the scope of [this Court’s] appellate review set forth in

[Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure] 9.142(a)(5).” Id.

Cruz presents several points of argument in favor of his

position. He asserts that our relative culpability review survived

Lawrence because Lawrence dealt exclusively with the imposition of

comparative proportionality review and did not address relative

culpability review. But nearly every time this Court has addressed

relative culpability review, it has either described it as a part of its

formerly mandatory comparative proportionality review or

addressed it as such. E.g., Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1186

(Fla. 2022) (describing, post-Lawrence, a relative culpability claim

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be
construed in conformity with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.

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as a “proportionality claim” and “claim of relative proportionality”);

Bargo v. State, 331 So. 3d 653, 665 (Fla. 2021) (discussing

proportionality and relative culpability under the joint heading

“Proportionality – Relative Culpability”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 193

(2022); Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 509-11 (Fla. 2017)

(discussing the relative culpability analysis as related to a

“proportionality claim” and under the heading “Proportionality”);

Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 959 (Fla. 2017) (addressing

relative culpability as part of this Court’s then-mandatory

comparative proportionality review despite the fact that defendant

did not raise a relative culpability or comparative proportionality

claim); Jeffries v. State, 222 So. 3d 538, 547 (Fla. 2017) (conducting

a relative culpability analysis under the heading “Proportionality”

and stating that this Court “may also consider relative culpability

as part of our mandatory proportionality review”); McCloud v. State,

208 So. 3d 668, 688 (Fla. 2016) (describing “a full proportionality

review” as “including a relative culpability analysis”); Cannon v.

State, 180 So. 3d 1023, 1041 (Fla. 2015) (analyzing a relative

culpability claim under the heading “Proportionality,” addressing it

as a claim that defendant’s sentence is “disproportionate,” and

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referring to it in terms of “comparing the case to other capital cases

with similar mitigating and aggravating circumstances”); Fletcher v.

State, 168 So. 3d 186, 221 (Fla. 2015) (conducting a relative

culpability analysis under the heading of “Proportionality” and in

conjunction with a traditional comparative proportionality analysis);

Brooks v. State, 175 So. 3d 204, 235 (Fla. 2015) (addressing a

relative culpability claim under the heading “Proportionality”); Carr

v. State, 156 So. 3d 1052, 1070 n.13 (Fla. 2015) (noting under the

heading “Proportionality” that defendant also raised a relative

culpability claim); Martin v. State, 151 So. 3d 1184, 1198 (Fla.

2014) (addressing relative culpability as part of traditional

comparative proportionality review); Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277,

305 (Fla. 2009) (“[P]roportionality review requires us to consider the

codefendant’s sentence.”); Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 671

(Fla. 2009) (addressing relative culpability claim under the

“Proportionality” heading); Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 210

(Fla. 2005) (same); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 47 (Fla. 2003)

(stating that an analysis of comparative proportionality, “of

necessity, includes the relative culpability of each codefendant”);

Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 117-19 (Fla. 2003) (addressing relative

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culpability claim under the “Proportionality” heading and as part of

traditional comparative proportionality review); Shere, 830 So. 2d at

62 (noting that “relative culpability” is an “aspect of

proportionality”); Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 629, 652 (Fla. 2001)

(addressing relative culpability under the “Proportionality” heading);

Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 282 (Fla. 1998) (same); Henyard v.

State, 689 So. 2d 239, 254 (Fla. 1996) (“[T]hus, an equally or more

culpable codefendant’s sentence is relevant to a proportionality

analysis.” (citing Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994))); see

also McCloud, 208 So. 3d at 693 n.6 (Canady J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) (describing relative culpability as “an aspect

of [this Court’s] comparative proportionality review”); Shere, 830 So.

2d at 64 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(“As a corollary to this analysis of comparing the circumstances of a

case in which death had been imposed to others with a similar

sentence, the Court also performs an additional analysis of relative

culpability in cases where more than one defendant was involved in

the commission of the killing.”). But see Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d

857, 867, 879 (Fla. 2010) (considering defendant’s relative

culpability claim prior to and separate from traditional, comparative

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proportionality); Cole v. State, 36 So. 3d 597, 610 (Fla. 2010)

(same); Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 662-63 (Fla. 2003)

(same).

Cruz cites Palmes v. Wainwright, 460 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla.

1984), for the proposition that this Court views comparative

proportionality review and relative culpability review as entirely

separate matters, relying on the following statement in the opinion:

“Proportionality review compares the sentence of death with other

cases in which a sentence of death was approved or disapproved.

Disparate treatment of accomplices which may be a ground of

mitigation is an entirely separate matter.” But when read in

context, it is clear that this statement cannot be interpreted literally

to mean that relative culpability review does not fall under the

umbrella of proportionality review.

In his habeas petition, Palmes asserted that this Court failed

to conduct a proportionality review in his direct appeal affirming his

death sentence. 460 So. 2d at 364. Palmes “argue[d] that the

state’s chief witness against him was equally as guilty of the murder

as he was and that her immunization from prosecution constituted

such a disparity of treatment of equally guilty accomplices as to

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violate the principle of proportionality.” Id. This Court rejected

Palmes’s argument on the ground that it was procedurally barred,

having been raised in his direct appeal and previous postconviction

motion, and noted that “the original affirmance of the sentence of

death implicitly found the sentence appropriate to the crime under

proportionality principles.” Id. Only then did the Court make the

statement that “[d]isparate treatment of accomplices which may be

a ground of mitigation is an entirely separate matter.” When taken

in context, this statement cannot support Cruz’s position, because

before the statement was made, the Court had already confirmed

that Palmes’s claim of disparate sentencing based on relative

culpability was previously resolved, implicitly and “under

proportionality principles.” It would be illogical to conclude that

relative culpability is an entirely separate matter from

proportionality yet able to be implicitly resolved by a determination

that a death sentence is proportional.

This Court’s lengthy history of overwhelmingly referring to and

treating relative culpability as a part of, “a corollary of,” or

intertwined with its traditional comparative proportionality review

as well as its explicit identification of a relative culpability analysis

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as a necessary component of comparative proportionality in multi-

defendant capital cases, e.g., McCloud, 208 So. 3d at 688;

Kormondy, 845 So. 2d at 47, makes it clear that relative culpability

review was indeed a part of its comparative proportionality review.

Consequently, this Court’s elimination of comparative

proportionality review in Lawrence also resulted in the elimination

of its relative culpability review. Here, that means that Charles’s

life sentence is irrelevant to and has no bearing on Cruz’s death

sentence.

Cruz argues that the conformity clause in article I, section 17

does not prohibit this Court from conducting a relative culpability

review because Lawrence was exclusively premised on Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), which held that comparative

proportionality review is not constitutionally required but did not

address relative culpability, and there is no direct United States

Supreme Court opinion prohibiting relative culpability review under

the Eighth Amendment. This argument fails for the same reason as

the previous argument: our relative culpability review is a corollary

of our obsolete comparative proportionality review. Under Pulley, as

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a component of comparative proportionality review, a relative

culpability review is not constitutionally required.

Cruz also argues that his death sentence violates his right to

equal protection under the United States and Florida Constitutions,

in light of Charles’s life sentence. But “co-defendants have no

enforceable right to have sentences that are precisely congruent

with one another.” United States v. Haehle, 227 F.3d 857, 860 (7th

Cir. 2000). And it has been recognized that “[a] criminal sentence

violates the Equal Protection Clause only if it reflects disparate

treatment of similarly situated defendants lacking any rational

basis.” Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832, 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

(quoting United States v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2005)).

One potential “rational basis” for imposing different sentences

on codefendants who appear to share equal culpability is the

mitigation, or the lack thereof, applicable to each codefendant.

Mitigation is “a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of

inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428

U.S. 280, 304 (1976). “[T]he sentencer in capital cases must be

permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor,” Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982), “may not refuse to consider

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any mitigating evidence,” Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 831 (Fla.

2003), and “must expressly evaluate each statutory and

nonstatutory mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant,”

Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186 (Fla. 2010). Because a capital

sentencing court is required to give due consideration to each

mitigating circumstance that exists relative to each individual

defendant, there can be no constitutional requirement that capital

codefendants who appear equally culpable on the facts of a case

receive the same sentence. This individualized consideration of

mitigation has been described as “[t]he core substantive ingredient”

of a capital defendant’s right to individualized sentencing. Puiatti v.

McNeil, 626 F.3d 1283, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The core substantive

ingredient in the constitutional right to an ‘individualized

sentencing’ is mitigation evidence relevant to the capital defendant

as an individual or unique person . . . .”).

Like mitigation, aggravation may provide a “rational basis” for

imposing different sentences on codefendants who appear to be

equally culpable on the facts of a murder. But this Court’s relative

culpability review never required consideration of the aggravating

factors or mitigating circumstances applicable to each codefendant.

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Even where codefendants had equal roles in a murder, it would be a

farce to consider them equally culpable if, for example, only a single

aggravator were applicable to one codefendant but numerous

aggravators were proven as to the other. Yet this Court has almost

exclusively declined to consider any fact in its relative culpability

analyses aside from a defendant’s degree of participation in the

murder.

The fact that this Court’s relative culpability review failed to

require consideration of “constitutionally indispensable” mitigation

or aggravation—also a “constitutionally indispensable” part of

capital sentencing, see, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S.

101, 111 (2003)—further supports our conclusion that relative

culpability review is neither constitutionally required nor consistent

with ensuring that a constitutional capital sentence was rendered.

Cruz also attempts to invoke the Due Process Clause, arguing

that “the unequal treatment of equally culpable defendants in a

capital case violates due process,” Initial Brief of Appellant at 69,

“because the entire purpose of the Due Process Clause is to prevent

arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property,” id. at 70. But this

argument makes no sense if disparate sentences are imposed based

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on incongruent mitigation or aggravation or both. The imposition of

a lesser sentence upon a defendant with more mitigation or less

aggravation than his codefendant(s) certainly cannot be considered

“arbitrary.” And there is no merit to Cruz’s assertion that the

conformity clause in article I, section 17 does not prevent this Court

from continuing to conduct its relative culpability review because

there is no corresponding conformity clause for due process in the

Florida Constitution.

It is no more tenable to skirt the conformity clause
by proclaiming that comparative proportionality review is
required by the due process clause rather than by the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Under
the federal Constitution, “the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause [is] made applicable to
the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53
(2010)]. The prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments thus is a particular aspect of due process.
And the conformity clause expressly limits the authority
of this Court with respect to that aspect of due process.
To conclude otherwise is to treat the conformity clause as
meaningless for all practical purposes.

Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539, 562 (Fla. 2014) (Canady, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (first alteration in

original).

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 Cruz’s other arguments—e.g., that relative culpability review is

part of this Court’s obligatory sufficiency of the evidence review in

capital cases, and that the State’s argument that relative culpability

had been abandoned was not properly preserved for review—are

without merit and do not warrant further discussion.

III. CONCLUSION

This Court’s relative culpability review was a corollary of its

comparative proportionality review, which was determined in

Lawrence to be violative of the Florida Constitution. As an

integrated part of comparative proportionality review, relative

culpability review was rendered obsolete by the Lawrence decision,

and it cannot now provide a basis for vacating Cruz’s death

sentence, which we hereby affirm.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
SASSO, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

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LABARGA, J., dissenting.

In 2020, during a series of significant changes by this Court to

Florida’s death penalty jurisprudence, I strenuously dissented to

the elimination of comparative proportionality review—which I

described as “the most consequential step yet in dismantling the

reasonable safeguards contained within Florida’s death penalty

jurisprudence.” Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 552-53 (Fla.

2020) (Labarga, J., dissenting).

Today, I reiterate my dissent as the majority expressly

eliminates relative proportionality review as “a corollary of our

obsolete comparative proportionality review.” Majority op. at 15. I

fundamentally disagree with the majority’s view that the conformity

clause prohibits this Court from conducting proportionality review

as a part of its review of death penalty cases. Indeed, I view

proportionality review as being consistent with the Eighth

Amendment prohibition of arbitrary death sentences.

Surely, in a state that leads the nation with thirty

exonerations of individuals from death row, every reasonable

safeguard should be retained in this Court’s toolkit when reviewing

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death sentences to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the

most aggravated and least mitigated of murders. 2

I respectfully dissent.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,
Raul A. Zambrano, Judge – 642013CF102943XXXADL

J. Rafael Rodriguez of Law Offices of J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami,
Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick
Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellee

2. See Death Penalty Information Center,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-
state/florida (last visited June 14, 2023).

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