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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11648
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ERIC WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RANDY AZAEL,
Correction Deputy #13263,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-62236-AMC
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11648
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Eric Watkins, a former detainee at the Broward
County Main Jail, brought this pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against defendant Randy Azael, a deputy at the jail.
Watkins’s complaint alleged that on January 9, 2016 Azael several
times verbally threatened to rape him, in violation of Watkins’s
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
(1) granted defendant Azael’s motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity, and (2) denied Watkins’s motion for leave
to amend his complaint to add new state law claims.
After review, we conclude that Azael is entitled to qualified
immunity on Watkins’s § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim
because Watkins points to no clearly established law that a
corrections officer’s verbal threats of rape rise to the level of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. Further, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Watkins’s motion to amend his
complaint given that it was filed six months after the deadline set
in the district court’s scheduling order and while Azael’s summary
judgment motion was already pending.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
At summary judgment, defendant Azael’s Statement of
Facts was drawn from Watkins’s verified amended complaint. In
other words, for summary judgment purposes, defendant Azael did
not dispute Watkins’s version of events, which we recount below.
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A. Azael Verbally Harasses Watkins in December 2015
In early December 2015, Watkins arrived as a pretrial
detainee at the Broward County Main Jail, where defendant Azael
worked as a correctional deputy. Shortly thereafter, Azael appeared
at Watkins’s cell “a couple of times” and made “homosexual
gestures and comments” to Watkins. Sometimes Watkins ignored
Azael, but other times Watkins responded by cursing at Azael,
which led to a “verbal confrontation” between the two men.
On December 26, 2015, defendant Azael opened the door to
Watkins’s cell while Watkins was sleeping. When Watkins awoke,
Azael told Watkins he was a handsome man and made
“homosexual gestures” at Watkins. Watkins became angry, cursed
at Azael, and told Azael “to get his faggot ass from in front of [his]
cell.” Azael became angry, told Watkins that he was becoming
aggressive, and put Watkins in “lock down” for the whole day as
punishment.
The next day, plaintiff Watkins filed an administrative
complaint regarding the incident, but no investigation was
conducted. Watkins began to worry that Azael’s verbal harassment
might become physical sexual harassment.
B. January 9, 2016: Azael Repeatedly Threatens to Rape
Watkins
On January 9, 2016, Watkins was sitting in the jail’s day room
when Azael, who was conducting cell checks, entered and ordered
Watkins to go to his cell. As Watkins complied and began walking
up the stairs to his cell, Azael “grab[bed] [Watkins’s] forearm.”
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Watkins pulled his arm away and continued up the stairs and into
his cell.
By this time, Azael was “in a rage of anger.” Azael reached
for his mace (but apparently did not use it) and slammed Watkins’s
cell door shut. Azael also repeatedly threatened to rape Watkins,
“while showing [Watkins] gestures of how he intend[ed] to rape
[him].” Azael stormed off, still threatening that he intended to rape
Watkins.
Extremely frightened by Azael’s threats, Watkins began
repeatedly kicking his cell door and loudly requesting to speak to
the shift sergeant. Before the shift sergeant arrived, Azael
continued to walk by Watkins’s cell during cell checks and to
threaten to rape Watkins.
When the shift sergeant finally arrived at the end of the day
on January 9, he was accompanied by Azael. Watkins told the shift
sergeant that Azael had repeatedly threatened to rape him. The
shift sergeant responded that he did not believe Watkins and asked
Watkins to shake Azael’s hand. When Watkins refused, the shift
sergeant and Azael left without doing anything to protect Watkins
from Azael.
From January 9 until Watkins’s release on January 26, there
is no evidence (or even an allegation) that Azael continued to
threaten Watkins or ever acted on his past threats. Nonetheless,
Watkins avers that after January 9, he was “in a state of fright,
terror, nervousness, anxiousness and paranoia” because of Azael’s
earlier threats. Watkins lost his appetite, had sleepless nights, was
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afraid to shower or exercise, and was constantly alert to the guards’
movements for fear that Azael would carry out his threat to rape
him.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Motion for Leave to File Complaint Asserting an Eighth
Amendment Claim Against Azael
As background, in 2019, the district court deemed Watkins
a vexatious litigant and entered a sanctions order enjoining
Watkins from initiating any new action in the Southern District of
Florida without prior court approval. This Court affirmed the
district court’s sanctions order given that under the pre-approval
filing injunction, the district court screens out frivolous and
malicious claims and allows arguable claims to go forward. Watkins
v. Dubreuil, 820 F. App’x 940, 948 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly,
Watkins first had to file, and did file, on December 26, 2019, a pro
se motion for leave to file a § 1983 complaint asserting an Eighth
Amendment claim against Azael.
On January 2, 2020, the district court denied leave,
explaining that the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted
prisoners and not to pretrial detainees like Watkins and that
Watkins’s lawsuit was malicious. Watkins did not appeal this
ruling.
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B. Motion for Leave to File Complaint Asserting a Fourteenth
Amendment Claim Against Azael
On January 6, 2020, Watkins filed a pro se motion for leave
to file a § 1983 complaint asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim
against Azael based on his sexual harassment of, and threats to
rape, Watkins. The district court denied Watkins’s motion for
leave. The district court recognized that Watkins was now
asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim but concluded that “the
other reasons for the denial stated in the Court’s January 2, 2020
Order . . . remain valid grounds to deny the request.”
On appeal, this Court vacated the district court’s denial of
Watkins’s motion for leave and remanded with instructions to
docket his proposed complaint. In re Eric Watkins Litig., 829 F.
App’x 428, 430 (11th Cir. 2020). In so doing, this Court observed
that “Azael’s alleged conduct of directing demeaning homosexual
comments and gestures at Watkins, though unacceptable and
unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective, is the type of
verbal harassment or taunting that is not actionable under the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 431.
This Court acknowledged, however, that “Watkins’s
allegation that Azael angrily and repeatedly threatened to rape
him” was “conduct objectively more serious than mere vulgar
words or gestures” and that Watkins had alleged “severe mental
distress.” Id. This Court noted that other circuits had suggested
“that verbal threats, under certain circumstances, may be sufficient
to state a constitutional claim.” Id. We concluded “that Watkins
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ha[d] presented an ‘arguable’ constitutional claim” that “he should
have been permitted to file in federal court.” Id.
C. Amended Federal Complaint and Notice of State Court
Action
On remand, the district court docketed Watkins’s proposed
§ 1983 complaint. Shortly thereafter, the district court granted
Watkins’s motion to file an amended § 1983 complaint. Watkins’s
amended § 1983 complaint, filed February 26, 2021, was
substantially similar to his original January 6, 2020 complaint.
In a pre-answer notice, defendant Azael advised the district
court that on January 6, 2020, Watkins filed a civil suit against Azael
in Florida state court. Azael attached copies of Watkins’s original
and amended state court complaints. In his amended state court
complaint, Watkins alleged Florida law claims of assault and
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the same facts
and circumstances alleged in Watkins’s federal complaint. In his
federal court response to Azael’s notice, Watkins acknowledged
that his federal and state cases were “factually . . . identical” but
argued they were not duplicative because they raised different
causes of action.
On April 5, 2021, Azael also filed a pre-answer motion to
dismiss Watkins’s action with prejudice, arguing, inter alia, that
Watkins had improperly split duplicative claims against Azael in his
federal and state court actions.
Shortly thereafter, on May 3, 2021, Azael withdrew his
motion to dismiss. Azael’s pleading: (1) acknowledged that
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Watkins’s federal action was filed first; (2) advised that attempts to
reach a resolution by consolidating both actions in the federal case
had been unsuccessful; and (3) proposed that Watkins voluntarily
dismiss his state court action without prejudice and file an
unopposed motion to amend his federal complaint to incorporate
his state law claims. Watkins, however, continued to pursue his
two-action strategy.
D. Scheduling Order and Motion for Summary Judgment
The district court entered a scheduling order that required
the parties: (1) to amend their pleadings by June 4, 2021; (2) to
complete discovery by December 30, 2021; and (3) to file any
summary judgment motion by January 25, 2022.
On November 19, 2021, Azael filed a motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Azael argued Watkins
could not demonstrate that a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from repeated threats of rape was
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Watkins
opposed the motion on numerous grounds.
E. Untimely Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
On December 28, 2021, before the district court could rule
on the summary judgment motion, Watkins filed a motion for
leave to amend his pleadings. Watkins’s motion was well outside
the June 4, 2021 deadline for amendments. Yet, Watkins sought to
add the state law claims of assault and intentional infliction of
emotional distress previously raised in his state court action.
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Watkins averred that the state court had dismissed that action on
grounds of duplicative claims splitting.
The district court denied Watkins’s motion to amend his
complaint, concluding Watkins had not shown good cause under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). The district court stressed
that: (1) the case was over two years old; (2) Watkins was put on
notice of his duplicative-claims defect by Azael’s pleadings but
“chose to proceed in different courts until receiving an unfavorable
ruling in state court”; (3) Watkins did not move to amend his
complaint until six months after the scheduling order’s June 4, 2021
deadline; and (4) Azael’s motion for summary judgment was now
fully briefed.
F. District Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment
On April 5, 2022, the district court granted summary
judgment to Azael based on qualified immunity. The district court
found that at the time of the alleged rape threats, Azael was
performing a job-related function and acting within his
discretionary authority.
Turning to the alleged constitutional violation, the district
court construed Watkins’s allegations as tantamount to an
excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
expressing skepticism that Azael’s verbal threats constituted
excessive force, the district court concluded Watkins had not
shown Azael’s conduct: (1) violated a “clearly established” right
through binding case law with materially indistinguishable facts; or
(2) was so egregious that it violated a constitutional right of
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“obvious clarity” even in the absence of case law. Watkins timely
appealed.
III. MOTION TO AMEND
On appeal, Watkins pro se argues the district court abused
its discretion by refusing to allow him to amend his complaint to
add his state law claims against Azael.
Under Rule 15(a), a plaintiff may amend his complaint once
as a matter of course within 21 days of serving it or within 21 days
after the defendant’s service of either the answer or a motion under
Rule 12(b), whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Thereafter,
a plaintiff may amend his complaint “only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Rule 15(a)(2) instructs courts to “freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Id. Nevertheless, the district court may deny leave to
amend on numerous grounds, including undue delay. Maynard v.
Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
Once the district court enters a scheduling order limiting the
time to amend pleadings, that schedule may be modified only for
“good cause” and with the district court’s consent. Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4). Thus, a plaintiff seeking leave to amend his complaint
after the scheduling-order deadline must show “good cause” under
Rule 16(b). S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241
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(11th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff’s lack of diligence in pursuing a claim
precludes a finding of good cause. Id. at 1241 & n.3. 1
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying as untimely Watkins’s motion for leave to amend his
complaint. Watkins amended his complaint once as a matter of
right. After Azael filed his answer, Watkins needed either Azael’s
consent or the district court’s leave to amend again. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2). And because Watkins’s motion was filed over six
months after the scheduling order’s June 4, 2021 deadline for
amendments, Watkins was required to show good cause for his
delay under Rule 16(b).
The district court concluded, and we agree, that Watkins
failed to demonstrate good cause for missing the scheduling order’s
deadline. The record shows Watkins’s lack of diligence. First,
Watkins knew of the information supporting his proposed state
law claims long before the scheduling order’s deadline, as
evidenced by the fact that he had already asserted those same state
law claims in his state court action. See S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc.,
575 F.3d at 1241 n.3; Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1419. Indeed, Watkins filed
his state court action asserting the state law claims on January 6,
2020, the same day he filed his motion for leave to file his original
1We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for
leave to amend a complaint. Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of
Marietta, 654 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). Likewise, we review for abuse
of discretion a district court’s enforcement of its scheduling order. Sosa v.
Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998).
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complaint in this federal action. Yet, Watkins did not file his
motion to amend until December 28, 2021, almost two years later.
Second, Watkins was put on notice of the potential pitfalls
of proceeding in parallel actions by Azael’s pleadings discussing
duplicative claim splitting. Azael’s pleadings even recounted how
his counsel had unsuccessfully proposed to Watkins that he dismiss
his state action without prejudice and file in his federal action an
unopposed motion to amend his complaint to add the state law
claims. Yet, Watkins took no steps to do so before the June 4, 2021
deadline expired. 2 Instead, Watkins waited another six months and
only after Azael’s motion for summary judgment was fully briefed.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the
district court abused its discretion.
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Watkins next argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on his Fourteenth Amendment claim against
Azael on qualified immunity grounds.3
2 There is no merit to Watkins’s contention that he could not amend his
federal complaint until after the state court dismissed his state court action as
impermissibly duplicative. As Azael’s counsel proposed, Watkins was free to
voluntarily dismiss his state court action and move to amend his federal
complaint to add the state law claims.
3 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir.
2017). At the summary judgment stage, we construe all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff as the non-moving party and use
that version of the facts to determine whether the defendant is entitled to
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Qualified immunity protects a government official sued in
his individual capacity from civil damages so long as his “conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Spencer
v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks
omitted). To seek qualified immunity, the government official
must show that he was “acting within the scope of his
‘discretionary authority’ when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred.” Id. If the government official does so, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the official’s conduct (1) violated federal
law (2) that was clearly established at the relevant time.” Id.
A. Scope of Azael’s Discretionary Authority
As to Azael’s discretionary authority, Watkins contends that
jail guards are not allowed to threaten to rape a detainee under any
circumstances and such an act is not related to any legitimate state
objective.
To demonstrate that he acted within the scope of his
discretionary authority, Azael “was required to show that he acted:
‘(1) . . . pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) within
the scope of his authority.’” Benison, 5 F.4th at 1230 (ellipsis in
original) (quoting Est. of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940
(11th Cir. 2018)). “Put differently, [Azael] was required to show that
he was (a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is,
qualified immunity. Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2013); Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 948-49 (11th Cir. 2010).
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pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within
his power to utilize.” Id. at 1230-31 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, when Azael allegedly made the rape threats, he was
on duty as a correctional officer at the jail and was conducting a cell
check, a legitimate job-related function. During the cell check,
Azael directed Watkins to return to his cell, escorted Watkins from
the day room to his cell, secured Watkins in the cell, and then
continued with the cell check, all means that were within Azael’s
power to utilize to carry out the cell check.
Watkins’s argument—that Azael was not authorized to
make rape threats as part of those job duties—misunderstands the
nature of the discretionary authority inquiry. “The inquiry is not
whether it was within the defendant’s [discretionary] authority to
commit the allegedly illegal act. Framed that way, the inquiry is no
more than an ‘untenable’ tautology.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157
F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998).
Rather, “[i]n applying each prong of the [discretionary
authority] test, we look to the general nature of the defendant’s
action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been
committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional
manner, to an unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally
inappropriate circumstances.” Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252,
1266 (11th Cir. 2004). In other words, we “consider a government
official’s actions at the minimum level of generality necessary to
remove the constitutional taint.” Id.; Benison, 5 F.4th at 1231
(explaining that a proper “framing of the inquiry” must “strip out
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the allegedly illegal conduct”). When we do so here, it is readily
apparent from the record that Azael was acting within his
discretionary authority as a corrections officer at the jail when he
threatened Watkins during the cell check.
B. Clearly Established Right
Watkins next contends that he met his burden to show that
Azael violated his clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right
as an inmate to be free from a corrections officer’s threats of rape.
Once the defense of qualified immunity has been properly raised,
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing: (1) that the defendant
violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009). We have
discretion to affirm a grant of qualified immunity on either prong
or both. Id. at 236, 129 S. Ct. at 818; see also Crocker v. Beatty, 995
F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021).
Even assuming arguendo that Watkins has shown that Azael’s
rape threats violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Azael is still
entitled to qualified immunity because Watkins failed to
demonstrate the constitutional violation was clearly established at
the time Azael made the threats in 2016. A right is clearly
established if “at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand
that what he [was] doing [was] unlawful.” District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quotation marks
omitted). To meet this “demanding standard,” “existing law must
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have placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct ‘beyond
debate.’” Id.
A plaintiff can show that a constitutional right was clearly
established in three ways: (1) “he can point us to a materially similar
case that has already been decided”; (2) “he can point us to a
broader, clearly established principle that should control the novel
facts of the situation; or (3) he can show that the conduct involved
“so obviously violate[d] the Constitution that prior case law is
unnecessary.” Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). “We look only to binding precedent at the time of
the challenged conduct—that is, the decisions of the Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state” to
see if the right was clearly established. Id. (quotation marks
omitted).
We now turn to Watkins’s particular constitutional claim.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Claims involving the mistreatment of pretrial detainees, like
Watkins, are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to convicted prisoners.
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996). Although the
source of the right differs, pretrial detainees, like prisoners, have a
right to be free from excessive uses of force by guards. See Piazza
v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2019). Because the
district court’s order and the parties’ appellate briefs analyzed
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Watkins’s Fourteenth Amendment claim within the excessive force
framework, we do as well.
Nonetheless, in Watkins’s prior appeal, this Court
concluded that Azael’s alleged demeaning homosexual comments
and gestures were the type of verbal harassment or taunting that is
not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment (or even the
Eighth Amendment). See In re Eric Watkins Litig., 829 F. App’x at
431. Thus, we focus our analysis on Azael’s alleged angry and
repeated threats to rape Watkins, which are “objectively more
serious than mere vulgar words or gestures,” and allegedly caused
Watkins severe mental distress. See id.
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court in a published
opinion has determined whether a correctional officer’s verbal
threats to physically harm an inmate alone violate the Eighth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. In dicta, this Court
has said that “verbal taunts. . . . [h]owever distressing” cannot
establish a claim that guards violated the Eighth Amendment.
Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989)
(alterations in original). In an unpublished decision, this Court has
gone further and concluded that prison officers’ threats that were
never carried out were insufficient to state a constitutional
violation. Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th
Cir. 2008).
More recently (and after Azael’s 2016 conduct alleged here),
this Court has held that prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right
to be free from sexual assault by corrections officers and have
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defined sexual assault to include various types of physical contact
of a sexual nature. See DeJesus v. Lewis, 14 F.4th 1182, 1195-98 (11th
Cir. 2021). Yet, in doing so, we have left open “whether non-
physical contact can constitute ‘sexual assault’ for purposes of
establishing an excessive-force claim under the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. at 1197 n.14.
Elsewhere, at least three other courts have concluded that
threats, in at least some situations, may be sufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441,
448-50 (8th Cir. 2008) (involving correctional officer’s ongoing
threats to kill a prisoner and to have him killed or beaten by other
prisoners coupled with the officer’s unsuccessful efforts to pay
other prisoners to assault him and to arm one of them with a razor
blade); Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 145 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (involving correctional officer’s threats to have inmate
killed); Hudspeth v. Fiins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1978)
(involving correctional officer’s threat to pay another officer to
shoot an inmate and make it look like an accident accompanied by
a gesture toward the officer’s holstered gun).
But these courts do not bind the Eleventh Circuit. Nor did
they address facts like those alleged here. And we are not aware of
any court, much less this Court or the Supreme Court, that has
previously concluded that threats of rape that occurred on a single
day and not followed by additional threats or other action, stated a
violation of a prisoner’s right to be free from excessive force. Even
if the facts alleged here do state a Fourteenth Amendment due
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process violation—a question we do not decide—we cannot say
that any such violation was “clearly established” in 2016, at the time
of Azael’s alleged conduct.
As we have mentioned, in 2016, no binding precedent from
this Court or the Supreme Court established “beyond doubt,”
either through materially similar facts or a broad statement of
principle, that a corrections officer’s verbal threats to sexually
assault a pretrial detainee, without more, rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at
589. And, in dicta in a published decision and in an unpublished
decision, this Court had indicated that mere verbal threats were not
cognizable constitutional violations. See Edwards, 867 F.2d at 1273
n.1; Hernandez, 281 F. App’x at 866. Given the state of our
decisional law in 2016, we cannot say Azael had “fair notice” that
his threats constituted a due process violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Watkins cites Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 113 S. Ct. 2475
(1993), for the general principle “[t]hat the Eighth Amendment
protects against future harm to inmates” and “requires that
inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is
4 Watkins argues the district court mischaracterized his claim as onefor verbal
sexual harassment when his claim is for “sexual assault by way of rape threats.”
While the district court referred to Watkins’s claim as one involving “sexual
harassment,” it also acknowledged that Azael’s alleged conduct was
objectively more serious than vulgar words or gestures, properly focused its
qualified immunity analysis on Azael’s alleged rape threats, and treated
Watkins’s claim as an excessive force claim.
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‘reasonable safety.’” See 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S. Ct. at 2480-81
(involving a claim that officials were deliberately indifferent to an
inmate’s serious medical problems caused by exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke). But this principle defines the right
at too high of a level of generality to put a reasonable corrections
officer on notice that threats like the ones Azael allegedly made to
Watkins amounted to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.5
Finally, Azael’s alleged threats to rape Watkins were
undoubtedly unprofessional and highly inappropriate. Like sexual
assault itself, threats to commit sexual assault by correctional
officers serve no legitimate penological purpose and have no place
in correctional facilities, and they should be dealt with swiftly and
definitively. See DeJesus, 14 F.4th at 1195. However, given the
binding precedents concerning verbal statements (in a single
incident) without accompanying actions, we cannot say that such
verbal threats present one of the exceptionally rare cases in which
the conduct so obviously violates the Fourteenth Amendment that
no prior case law was necessary to give a reasonable corrections
officer fair notice. See Echols, 913 F.3d at 1324.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order denying Watkins’s
untimely motion to amend his § 1983 complaint to add state law
5 Watkins’s reliance on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Burton v. Livingston, 791
F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986), is misplaced, as only decisions from the Supreme
Court, this Court, or the highest court of the state can “clearly establish” a
constitutional right. See Echols, 913 F.3d at 1324.
USCA11 Case: 22-11648 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2023 Page: 21 of 21
22-11648 Opinion of the Court 21
claims. We also agree with the district court that because Azael
acted within the scope of his discretionary authority and did not
violate a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right, he is
entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, we affirm the district court’s
entry of summary judgment in Azael’s favor on Watkins’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983.
AFFIRMED.