NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-1164
__________
LINDA ANN WRIGHT,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF TEXAS;
THE U.S. ATTORNEYS OFFICE PENNSYLVANIA; ALEX KOZINSKI; NEAL
KATYAL; BARBARA BOXER; BONNIE S. GRAHAM; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS; SYLVIA MATTHEWS BURWELL; ARNOLD RUSSO; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; PATRICK ORY; ANDREW
SAUL; KILOLO KIJAKAZI; TOM WHEELER; ROBERT GATES; DANIEL
DEWSNUP; ERIC SHINSEKI; KATHLEEN SEBELIUS; DAVID SPIVEY; RICHARD
P. GEIB; ERIC HOLDER; KARLA KERLIKOWSKE; JOSEPH P. RUSSONIELLO;
SAN FRANCISCO VA MEDICAL CENTER; COLEEN L. WELCH; KENNETH
SWASEY; TELLA WILLIAMS; ULRIKE WILLIMON; MARIA RAINWATER;
JENNIFER VANDERMOLEN; DONALD E. KOENIG; PA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE; CARRIE E. WILSON; SAINT CLAIR HOSPITAL, ET AL; THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL CA; JEFFREY R, VINCENT;
XAVIER BECERRA; EDMUND BROWN, JR.; KAMALA HARRIS; BETTY T. YEE;
CA BOARD OF EQUALIZATION; MARTINEZ VA HOSPITAL; ELIZABETH
MARTINEZ MAHAN; MAE FRANCINE HOLMES; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF INSURANCE; MEDICAID OF CALIFORNIA; MEDICAL BOARD OF
CALIFORNIA; KAREN L. SMITH; KRISTINA D. LAWSON; OAKLAND VA
REGIONAL OFFICE; SUPERIOR COURT OF COURT HUMBOLDT; JOHN L.
BURRIS; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; KEN PIMLOTT;
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF VEHICLES; JEAN SHIOMOTO; MEDTRONIC
SPRINT FIDELIS; LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NUEN; DAVID S. WEILAND; EAST
BAY CARDIOLOGY;PROTRANSPORT1; KINDRED MEDICAL HILL
REHABILITATION; KINDRED REHABILITATION SAN LEANDRO; HARNETT
CHOPRA;MAE FRANCINE HOLMES; VALE REHABILITATION; SHEILA
CULLEN; DOCTORS HOSPITAL; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CORONER;
WILLIAM WALKER; RONALD M. SATO; OTIS ROUNDS; WILLIAM W. CHEN;
ALTA BATES SUMMIT MEDICAL CENTER; CASA ADOBE SENIOR
APARTMENTS; MARIA FUENTES; UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY; U.S. POST
OFFICE-EUREKA; U.S. POST OFFICE-SAN PABLO; TEXAS ATTORNEY
GENERA OFFICE; SCOT M. GRAYDON; KEN PAXTON; GREG ABBOTT; RICK
PERRY; ERIN NEALY COX; TALETA TOWNSEND; ALLEGIANCE BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH; CITY OF AMARILLO; CITY OF AMARILLO; AMARILLO POLICE
DEPARTMENT; AMARILLO BUILDING DEPARTMENT; BRYAN SCOTT
MCWILLIAMS; GWEN GONZALES; KIRKLAND COURT REHABILITATION;
JOYCE COURSE; JACQUELINE S. COOPER; JOHN DZIK; KEVIN WRIGHT;
GORDON K. WRIGHT; YOLANDA CALDWELL; TIMOTHY M. DORTCH;
KIRKLAND COURT NURSING STAFF 2013-PRESENT; MICHAEL KAITCER;
NORTHWEST TEXAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM; MITZI S. MAYFIELD; KEVIN
WRIGHT; BSA REHABILITATION; THOMAS E. CREEK MEDICAL CENTER;
RODNEY GONZALEZ; CHAD LOGAN; LEONARD & LYDE; REDWOOD FAMILY
PRACTICE; MARIA WINTERS; AMERICAN MODERN HOME INSURANCE;
JOSEPH J. MINIOZA; SAMANTHA POWERS; ANDREW P. SCLAR; NATHANIEL
LUCEY; ERIKSEN ARBUTHNOT; AMERICAN EXPRESS CORPORATION; THE
MOORE GROUP; HARVEY MOORE; RAMIN MAHAVI; BOIES SCHILLER &
FLEXNOR; EDMOND GARABEDIAN; SONYA DEVORAH PASKIL; PALMER
LOMBARDI & DONOHUE; ROBERT L. BACHMAN; CHETNA VORA; BRETT
DAVID WATSON; DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS; THE ARBORS
REHABILITATION; JOSEPH MARK PARSONS; NANCY K. DELANEY; KEVIN
WRIGHT; MOBILITY SOLUTIONS AMARILLO; J. SELMAN; JEFF GEARHART;
NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; WELLS FARGO USA; STEVEN L. HOARD;
KEVIN WRIGHT; TYRONE WRIGHT; MARGARET MARIE SCHNECK; LARRY
"DOE"; JOHNATHAN HINDERS HINDERS; WELLS FARGO BANK-AMARILLO;
EQUIFAX CORPORATION; RICHARD SMITH, CEO; MEPCO FINANCIAL; JAIME
PAUL DREHER; KELLY LUIS POPE; AT&T CORPORATION; JOHN STANKEY;
RANDALL STEPHENSON; AT&T EUREKA-CA; COAST CENTRAL CREDIT
UNION; LARRY DERIDDER; AMELIA FAIRBANKS BURROUGHS; NANCY
CRAIG; BRIAN OGDEN CRAIG; KIM S. ERIVN; THE EUREKA VETERANS
CLINIC; PATRICIA FITZGERALD; PETRA KUHFAHL; MICHAEL MORRISON;
THOMAS J. RYDZ; KUSUM STOKES; JANSSEN MALLOY; NEEDHAM
MORRISON; CROWLEY & GRIEGO REINHOLTSEN; MITCHELL BRISSO
DELANEY & VRIEZE; NANCY K. DELANEY; JOHN VRIEZE; CLERK OF BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS; HUMBOLDT COUNTY ASSESSOR; HUMBOLDT COUNTY
BUILDING PERMITS; HUMBOLDT COUNTY SHERIFFS; JOHN
BARTHOMOLEW; SAINT JOSEPH HOSPITAL; SAINT JOSEPH
REHABILITATION; THE ARBORS REHABILITATION-TEXAS; HUMBOLDT
COUNTY WASTE MANAGEMENT; JILL DUFFY; MECHANICS BANK; PACIFIC
GAS & ELECTRIC CORPORATION; WILLIAM D, JOHNSON CEO; JP MORGAN
CHASE; ALTICE COMMUNICATIONS; DEXTER GOEI, CEO; SUDDENLINK
COMMUNICATIONS-EUREKA CA; S. LEE MERRITT; RAY SCHNIBBEN;
GIORGIO HERRERA; SUTTER DELTA HEALTHCARE; IRINA KOLOMEY; LONE
TREE CONVALESCENT, ET AL; ALLSTATE INSURANCE CORPORATION;
THOMAS WILSON, CEO; TIM STOREY-EUREKA CA; THE ARBORS
2
REHABILITATION; JOSEPH MARK PARSONS; CHARLES EDWARD MOSS; NW
TEXAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, MITZI S. MAYFIELD; MICHAEL H. LOFTIN;
KEVIN WRIGHT; THOMAS E. CREEK VA MEDICAL CENTER; RODNEY
GONZALEZ; CHAD LOGAN; MOBILITY SOLUTIONS AMARILLO; DUSTY J.
STOCKARD; J. SELMAN; SHARON B. DRAGER; IRINA KOLOMEY; ST. CLAIR
HOSPITAL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-01152)
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 7, 2022
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 14, 2023)
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OPINION *
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Linda Ann Wright appeals from the District Court’s order
dismissing her lawsuit with prejudice after screening it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Wright filed this action in August 2021 against the United States, the States of
California and Texas, certain federal agencies and officials, and a multitude of other
public officials and private individuals, seeking tens of millions of dollars in damages and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
3
other relief. Wright’s complaint and amended complaints catalogued a vast inventory of
grievances, many unrelated to each other, from events during her and her deceased
parents’ lives. Much of her case echoed prior litigation she pursued against many of the
same defendants in California and Texas. 1 She claimed jurisdiction in the Western
District of Pennsylvania under diversity of citizenship and federal question jurisdiction
for alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution; 18 U.S.C. §§ 153, 241, 242, 371, 1503, 1951; and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2),(3).
See ECF Dkt. No. 17 at 3.
In December 2021, the District Court granted her motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Before defendants were served with her most recent amended complaint, the
District Court screened the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires
dismissal of an in forma pauperis action that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune,” or is frivolous. Id.
The District Court considered Wright’s latest complaint in the case under those criteria
and concluded that “dismissal with prejudice [was] appropriate, as Ms. Wright’s claims
suffer[ed] from a range of fatal deficiencies,” the most obvious being that the complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. D. Ct. Mem. Ord. at 2. The
1
See Wright v. United States, No. 3:14-cv-3008, 2015 WL 3902798, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Jun. 24, 2015); Wright v. United States, No. 2:15-cv-0214, 2016 WL 1070838, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2016). She recently sought, unsuccessfully, to reopen those cases.
She has also filed Supreme Court actions which, she admits, concern some of the same
grievances. In 2021, Wright filed another lawsuit in the Western District of
Pennsylvania, but it was essentially identical to this one and she agreed to close it. See
No. 2:21-cv-713.
4
District Court identified other obstacles, including that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Veterans Affairs (VA) benefit claims, that she could not bring civil
claims to enforce the criminal code, and that res judicata and the applicable statute of
limitations barred her claims. Id. at 2-4. Wright filed this timely appeal. 2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e). See Dooley
v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). In order to avoid dismissal, a complaint
must meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned
up). 3 We review a court’s dismissal with prejudice for an abuse of discretion. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
We discern no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Wright’s complaint. First,
we agree that, despite Wright’s many efforts, the second amended complaint (ECF Dkt.
No. 17 plus attachments, and what are essentially duplicate filings at Nos. 23 and 24)
does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, even affording it the most
2
To the extent that Wright includes new allegations in her appellate filings, we will not
address them here because they are not properly before us. See Simko v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021).
3
Under Rule 8, an allegation must plain enough “to give the adverse party fair notice of
the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial,” and it cannot place
“an unjustified burden on the court and the part[ies] who must respond to it because they
are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Salahuddin v.
Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
5
generous construction, see Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374. As the District Court noted, the
second amended complaint lacks factual allegations with respect to many named
defendants. D. Ct. Mem. Ord. at 2. The balance of defendants has been left to guess the
specific factual nature and the legal basis of her claims against them, such that they are
unable to properly answer or prepare for trial. See Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42.
Generally, Wright alleges that she has been the victim of botched medical treatments
going back decades, that she and her deceased parents were denied medical and
appropriate respite care, that the Department of Veterans Affairs denied benefits owed to
her, and that various entities wrongfully took possession of her property. See ECF Dkt.
Nos. 17 at 4, 17-3 at 1-12. But to proceed, her complaint must do more than broadly
describe interactions with a disparate group of entities over a twenty-plus year period
without identifying actions by specific defendants that support a facially plausible claim
for legal relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a minimum, she has
not alleged facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004), for the proposition
that the complaint must provide more than facts that “merely create[] a suspicion of a
legally cognizable right of action”).
We further note that Wright’s named causes of action are largely not viable as
presented in her complaint. Wright’s attempts to raise civil claims to enforce sections
153, 241, 242, 371, 1503, and 1951 of the Federal Criminal Code fail because the statutes
she cited do not create a private cause of action. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83,
6
85-86 (1981) (explaining that a private party has no right to compel the enforcement of
criminal laws). Wright’s claims seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and alleging
tortious action must comply with the applicable state statute of limitations for personal
injury claims; the claims alleged in Pennsylvania before August 30, 2018, are barred
under the two-year statute for personal injury claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524;
Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1989); Schmidt v. Skolas, 770
F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim
on statute of limitations grounds when that defense is apparent on the face of the
complaint). 4
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Wright’s
action with prejudice because we agree that it would be futile to allow her to file yet
another amended complaint. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that a district court must offer amendment
when dismissing for failure to state a claim “unless doing so would be inequitable or
futile”). Wright has been afforded ample opportunities to make her case. After at least
4
As the District Court decided, Wright’s lawsuit faced a variety of other problems, too.
For example, a substantial part of Wright’s allegations is barred under res judicata
principles in light of her prior litigation in federal courts in California and Texas, see D.
Ct. Mem. Ord. at 2. On appeal, she tacitly conceded this point because she did not deny
repeating those claims in this lawsuit but instead argued that the prior cases were not
litigated before fair tribunals. See Notice of Appeal at 10; Appellant’s Informal Brief
(C.A. Dkt. No. 15) at 9. Also, insofar as her action concerned disputes over VA benefits,
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, see ECF Dkt. No. 17-3 at 6-7. See
38 U.S.C. § 511. Of course, Wright also cannot overcome the substantial bar to her
claims that the sovereign immunity doctrine presents in light of the many federal and
state defendants named in her action. See D.J.S.-W by Stewart v. United States, 962 F.3d
745, 749 (3d Cir. 2020); Kimmel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000).
7
three attempts, her complaint still suffers from multiple flaws which are fatal to her
lawsuit.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Wright’s
outstanding motions are denied.
8