In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00101-CR
No. 02-22-00102-CR
No. 02-22-00103-CR
No. 02-22-00104-CR
No. 02-22-00105-CR
No. 02-22-00106-CR
___________________________
CHRISTOPHER STEPHENSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 462nd District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. F20-1623-462, F20-1624-462, F20-1625-462, F20-1626-462,
F20-1627-462, F20-1628-462
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
OPINION
Appellant Christopher Stephenson sexually abused four of his wife’s children. A
jury convicted him of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a young child under
the age of 14, three counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of 17, and one
count of indecency with a child under the age of 17. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 21.02(b), 21.11(a), 22.011(a)(2). Stephenson appeals his convictions and raises a slew
of issues, which we construe as six: two Sixth Amendment challenges, one sufficiency
challenge, one evidentiary challenge, and two Double Jeopardy challenges. Although
one of his Double Jeopardy challenges presents an issue of first impression, none of his
arguments unearth error, much less reversible error. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I. Background
Christopher Stephenson married a woman—B.S. (Brittney)1—who had nine
children. The family had already been through a lot when Stephenson entered the
picture.
A. Before Stephenson
Brittney’s nine children had four different fathers. In 2009, one of those fathers
shot and killed Brittney’s oldest child. After the death, the Department of Family and
Protective Services—commonly referred to as Child Protective Services (CPS)—
1
Pseudonyms are used for the minor victims and their mother. Cf. Tex. R. App.
P. 9.10(a)(3).
2
removed Brittney’s remaining children 2 from her home for about six months. The
children were initially placed in foster homes before CPS transferred them to their
uncle’s care, but that transfer was not an improvement; one of Brittney’s daughters—
C.W. (Courtney)—later reported that the uncle had anally raped her. 3 Needless to say,
even after the children were ultimately reunited with their mother, they were “all scared
because of [the experience].”
Stephenson began a relationship with Brittney a few years later, 4 and he was
aware of this CPS history.
B. Stephenson’s Sexual Abuse
Brittney and Stephenson married in January 2014. For the majority of the six
years that followed, Brittney worked long hours and had a lengthy commute, while
Stephenson was unemployed. Left at home with the children, Stephenson sexually
abused four of them: Courtney, S.R. (Simon), R.R. (Rebecca), and T.R. (Tina).
Brittney’s two youngest children had not yet been born at the time of the
2
murder.
3
The sexual assault case against the uncle was “no-bill[ed]” by the grand jury.
4
The couple began dating in mid-2013.
3
1. Courtney
Courtney was Brittney’s oldest surviving daughter. Born in 2002, she was 11
years old when Stephenson married her mother. Within about six months, Stephenson
started abusing her.
At first Stephenson grabbed Courtney’s breasts, butt, and inner thigh, claiming
it was “on accident.” Then he began “repetive[ly]” slipping his hand under her blanket
during family movie nights and touching and rubbing her vaginal area. Stephenson also
came into Courtney’s bedroom when she was alone and digitally penetrated her, asking
her if she liked it. And on one occasion, he anally raped her, leaving her with blood
and semen running down her legs.
Brittney later recalled how, around this time, Stephenson began referring to
Courtney as “[h]is girlfriend,” despite her being 11 or 12 years old. Brittney told him
that it “was highly inappropriate” and that “it needed to stop,” but Stephenson insisted
“it was a joke.”
Stephenson continued to digitally penetrate Courtney and ask her if she liked it,
and then when she was 12 years old, he progressed to vaginally raping her, increasing
in frequency until he was raping her “three, four times a week.” The “very regular
vaginal raping” continued through her 14th birthday in March 2016.
Even after she turned 14, it did not stop; the rapes were, in Courtney’s words,
“very repetitive, very constant.”
4
The next year, on her 15th birthday, Courtney tried to run away with her
boyfriend.5 When she returned home, Stephenson insisted on inspecting her
underwear, he accused her of “whor[ing] around,” and then he raped her again. At that
point, the rapes increased to “almost every day.”6
In October 2018, when Courtney was 16 years old, she, her mother, and
Stephenson attended a concert, and Stephenson told Courtney that she “owed him for
that” by not only having sex with him but also “acting like [she] enjoyed” it and
performing oral sex.7 Courtney’s birth control had lapsed at the time, and she soon
realized she was pregnant.
Stephenson took Courtney to get an abortion, but she was too far along in the
pregnancy by then, so, in an attempt to force a miscarriage, he “started hitting [her] in
the stomach, punching [her], kicking [her], [and] shoving [her] down” on an almost daily
5
Stephenson had been incarcerated for a different crime in 2016, so he was not
in Courtney’s home for several months leading up to her 15th birthday in March 2017.
6
Courtney recalled that when her mother was at work, Stephenson would send
the other children to play outside, and he would rape her.
7
Courtney described how Stephenson often urged her to “be more engaged,”
telling her to “grab up on him.” If she resisted, he would “yell[ and] curs[e]” in
frustration.
5
basis. 8 Meanwhile, he continued to rape and inappropriately touch her “[a]lmost every
day.”
When Courtney was about seven months pregnant, she began bleeding
profusely, and she was taken to the hospital where she gave birth to a stillborn baby
girl. Courtney later explained that she “didn’t want to get beat more by telling the truth”
about the father’s identity, so she lied and claimed the father was a boy at school.
Soon after the birth, Stephenson resumed raping Courtney.9 He had grown
increasingly physically abusive as well; 10 when Courtney “said no, [she] would get kicked
into a dresser or hit in the back or screamed at.”
8
On one occasion, Stephenson “punched [Courtney] extremely hard, where
[she] . . . could not move for multiple hours . . . because it just hurt so incredibly bad.”
Not long after the birth, Stephenson moved out of the house for two months
9
(for reasons explained below), so he directed Courtney to meet him “once or twice a
week” so he could rape her.
Multiple other children testified to Stephenson’s physical abuse. Simon and
10
Tina both referenced Stephenson’s general “rule [that] if [they] hit, he would hit
back”—and often “hit [back] harder.” Tina described how Stephenson would get a
belt, a wood paddle, or a whip, and “just starting hitting.” She remembered having
marks or bruises on her back and legs from the abuse. And the victims’ oldest brother
recalled one time when he was 17 and saw Stephenson touching Courtney
inappropriately. The brother told Stephenson not to touch his sister, but Stephenson
responded that he “w[ould] do what [he] want[ed],” then he “swung [the brother]
around on the floor and got on top of [him] and started to strangle [him].”
Courtney recalled not only the physical abuse but also the threats of abuse. She
later told a nurse how Stephenson threatened to “beat [her] and put [her] in the
hospital” if she “played him.”
6
Courtney graduated from high school in mid-2020, and Stephenson urged her to
move into his friends’ home so he and she could “get married and start [their] own lives
together.” Instead, Courtney—feeling so trapped that she penned a suicide note—
finally told her mother about the sexual abuse.
2. Simon
Simon was also a victim of Stephenson’s abuse. Simon was born in 2003 and
was 10 years old when Stephenson married his mother. He testified that Stephenson
grabbed his penis “about three times” over the years that followed.
The first incident occurred when Simon was 13. He was playing a video game
on his bed, and Stephenson came in, started joking around, then grabbed Simon’s penis
and tugged. When asked if Stephenson said anything at the time, Simon remembered
that he “just laugh[ed].”
The second incident was similar. When Simon was 15, Stephenson came into
Simon’s room and again grabbed his penis while he was playing a video game on his
bed. But this time, Stephenson asked him, “Do you like that?” When Simon responded
negatively and pushed Stephenson away, Stephenson got angry and “started yelling at
[Simon] for hitting him,” stating that he would fight Simon “like a man, one-on-one.”
Stephenson also “threaten[ed Simon] with CPS,” which—due to the family’s prior CPS
experience—Simon feared would “split the family apart.” At that time, Stephenson
told Simon “that he [wa]sn’t gay and that he only like[d] women and that all of it was a
joke.” Simon, though, testified that he did not think it was a joke.
7
In the third touching incident, Simon was riding in the front seat of Stephenson’s
truck, and Stephenson reached for Simon’s penis, but Simon managed to push his hand
away.11
Simon told the jury that, on multiple occasions, Stephenson verbalized his
concern that Brittney would look at him (Stephenson) differently if Simon told her
about the touching. And Simon reiterated how Stephenson used CPS-related threats
to keep him quiet. Stephenson repeatedly warned Simon that, if he told, CPS would
take Simon from his mother and siblings just as it had in the past. So although Simon
was “sometimes . . . tempted” to tell, he “was always scared because [he] didn’t like
CPS.”
Despite this fear, in 2020, Simon disclosed his abuse while being forensically
interviewed as a witness to Stephenson’s sexual abuse of Courtney.
In addition to the touching, Simon recounted an incident when Stephenson
11
“burst out of the shower and he was unclothed, and he ran at [Simon] full speed.”
Stephenson was smiling while he ran, saying “I’m going to get you.” Simon hid under
a bed to avoid him.
8
3. Rebecca
In addition to Courtney and Simon, Stephenson sexually abused Rebecca.
Rebecca was born in 2005, so she was eight when Stephenson married her mother.
Although the family did not know it at the time, Rebecca is autistic. 12
She testified that, when she was in sixth grade, Stephenson “made [her] use [her]
mouth on his man private part.” She remembered him repeating this type of sexual
abuse between three and five times over the two years that followed.
He committed other acts of sexual abuse during this same time period as well,
“[b]asically, all throughout [Rebecca’s time in] middle school.” On one occasion, he
made her touch “his private part.” On another, he lay down beside her on her bed and
digitally penetrated her. Rebecca remembered how, when he penetrated her,
Stephenson “asked [her] if [she] liked it.”
She also recalled his saying multiple times that if she told anyone, “CPS w[ould]
get involved.” She explained that she “was afraid of that because [she] didn’t want to
lose [her] mom or [her] siblings.” Rebecca told her father about Stephenson’s abuse in
June 2019, just a few weeks after her 14th birthday.
12
Rebecca’s father testified that she had been diagnosed with autism and that the
condition limited her ability to articulate information. While Tina told him about
specific instances of abuse, Rebecca described the abuse more generally.
9
4. Tina
Stephenson also abused Tina. Tina—born in 2006—was seven when
Stephenson married her mother.
Stephenson first inappropriately touched Tina about three years later, when she
was around the age of 10. On that occasion, Stephenson took her four-wheeling.
During that excursion, he drove them off the main trail, made her touch “his front
private area,” and then “touched [her] front private area” in turn. Stephenson told Tina
that such touching was “how people show love,” and he told her not to tell anyone. He
continued to touch her during subsequent four-wheeler rides, “maybe twice a month.”
Later, when Tina was 11 or 12 years old, Stephenson began coming into her
room at night and “touching [her] in [her] front private area” underneath her clothes.
Tina testified that this occurred about “three times a week” until she was 13, and that
each time, he would ask her if she enjoyed it.
She also described how, during family movie nights, Stephenson would tell her
to lie down beside him, he would put a blanket on top of them, and he would digitally
penetrate her vaginally or grab her butt. 13 And when she was alone with him in his
truck, he did the same thing, inappropriately touching her on approximately ten separate
truck rides.
13
Tina testified that when Stephenson began asking one of her younger sisters to
lie next to him under the blanket, she would distract her sister or “sacrifice [her]self so
it would never happen to the youngest.”
10
Like her siblings, Tina remembered Stephenson using threats of CPS to scare her
into secrecy. But in mid-2019—before Tina turned 14—she was spending a weekend
with her father’s family, and she told her cousin14 that Stephenson had sexually abused
her.15 The news made its way to Tina’s father—who was also Simon’s and Rebecca’s
father. He asked Rebecca and Tina about the abuse, and both girls confirmed what
Stephenson had done to them. The father contacted law enforcement and was soon
put in touch with CPS.
C. Outcries and Mounting Evidence
Both a criminal investigation and a CPS investigation followed. Rebecca and
Tina submitted to forensic interviews and sexual assault nurse examinations (SANEs),
and both girls repeatedly and consistently recounted Stephenson’s acts of abuse.
Nonetheless, after about two months, CPS’s case was closed as “inconclusive.” As for
the police investigation, it was “paused” for several months, then when “the world shut
down for COVID,” it was not pursued. 16 Although Brittney had agreed to make
14
The cousin, who testified, explained that she and Tina were not technically
cousins because of a divorce in the family and because they were not related by blood.
15
Prior to Tina telling her cousin in June 2019, Tina had overhead Rebecca
confiding in a younger sister about her abuse, and Tina had revealed to Rebecca that
she was a victim as well. Then, in May 2019, Tina and Rebecca told their mother about
Stephenson’s abuse. Brittney confronted Stephenson, but Stephenson denied it, so
nothing happened.
16
Investigator Michelle Haiduk of the Denton County Sheriff’s Office explained
that, in early 2020—after Rebecca and Tina gave consistent statements in another round
11
Stephenson leave the home during CPS’s investigation, when that investigation closed
in August 2019, he moved back in.
Finally, in mid-2020, Courtney outcried. While the family was on a vacation
without Stephenson, Courtney told her mother about Stephenson’s abuse. Brittney
immediately moved out with the children, and she contacted Investigator Haiduk to
report Courtney’s outcry.
Courtney submitted to a forensic interview and SANE, and all of her siblings
were interviewed or re-interviewed as potential witnesses. During Simon’s witness
interview, he revealed that Stephenson had sexually abused him as well.
Meanwhile, Investigator Haiduk sent Courtney’s SANE samples for testing,
along with a gown that had been worn by her stillborn baby. The vaginal swabs from
Courtney’s SANE tested positive for semen, and Stephenson “could not be excluded”
as a DNA contributor, meaning that the markers from Stephenson’s DNA appeared to
match those on the swab. A DNA test of the stillborn baby’s gown was even more
incriminating—it revealed that Stephenson was almost certainly the father of
Courtney’s baby; “99.9999999999 percent of the population, would be . . . expected to
be excluded” as the father, but Stephenson could not be excluded.17
of forensic interviews—she was preparing the case for the grand jury, but then the
COVID shutdown caused the case to stall.
17
The DNA analyst explained that DNA results are reported based on likelihood
ratios, which is the ratio between two numbers: the likelihood that the person is the
father and the likelihood that he is not. Using this calculation, it was “280 trillion times
12
D. Trial Court Proceedings
Stephenson was indicted for
• continuous sexual abuse of Courtney from 2014 to 2016 when she under
age 14, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b);
• continuous sexual abuse of Rebecca and Tina from 2017 to 2019 when
they were under age 14, see id.;
• one count of sexual assault of Courtney in 2017 when she was under age
17, see id. § 22.011(a)(2);
• a second count of sexual assault of Courtney in 2018 when she was under
age 17, see id.;
• a third count of sexual assault of Courtney later in 2018 when she was
under age 17, see id.; and
• indecency with Simon by contact in 2015 when he was under age 17, see
id. § 21.11(a)(1).18
All six cases were tried together.
The evidence at trial was plentiful and egregious. Each of the victims testified,19
as did Brittney, two of the victims’ siblings, Investigator Haiduk, the person who had
more likely . . . that Christopher Stephenson [wa]s the true biological father of the
[stillborn baby] than if the father [was a different] . . . random man from the Caucasian
population.”
Stephenson was indicted for indecently touching Simon in June 2015, but
18
Simon was 11 years old in June 2015, and the evidence showed that Stephenson first
grabbed his penis when he was 13 years old.
19
At the time of trial, Courtney was 20, Simon was 18, Rebecca was 16, and Tina
was 15.
13
performed the relevant DNA tests, and numerous other witnesses. The jury also
received copies of the various SANE reports, copies of the DNA lab results, copies of
Stephenson’s inappropriate Facebook messages to and about Courtney, medical
records related to Courtney’s pregnancy, and birth and death records for her stillborn
baby. Stephenson did not present any witnesses or exhibits in his own defense.
Three trial developments are relevant to this appeal.
1. Concession of Guilt
First, Stephenson’s trial counsel conceded—on multiple occasions—that
Stephenson had impregnated Courtney when she was 16. His opening statement
acknowledged that Stephenson and Courtney had sex when she was 16, that “she was
impregnated, [that] she had a stillborn baby,” and that Stephenson was “guilty of a
second-degree felony of sexual assault against [Courtney] for that.” His cross-
examinations were also peppered with references to this admitted impregnation.
Through leading questions, Stephenson’s counsel effectively told Brittney (and the jury)
that “we know for sure that [the baby] was [Stephenson’s] child,” and that “we know
for sure that when [the baby] was conceived, Stephenson would have had to have had
sexual intercourse with [Courtney] when she was 16.” He then repeated the concession
in his closing, acknowledging “[t]hat child [i.e., Courtney’s stillborn baby] was Chris’s,”
and “[h]e is guilty of sexual assault on that [cause number].” Counsel used this
concession to argue, though, that “just because [Stephenson] did one bad thing doesn’t
14
mean [he] did every bad thing,” and he claimed that “every other charge ha[d] no
evidence” and required the jury to “just believe somebody when they sa[id] it.”
2. Exclusion of Testimony Regarding Sexual Allegations
In the second relevant trial development, Stephenson attempted to cross-
examine Investigator Haiduk regarding “other sexual activity happening in that house
with these kids.” When the State objected to the evidence as irrelevant hearsay, the trial
court sustained the objections, and it excused the jury to allow Stephenson to “make an
offer of proof on [that] line of question[ing].”
Outside the jury’s presence, the investigator explained that Stephenson and his
mother had told her that Simon might have had sex with Rebecca and Tina in “2018ish,
2020ish.” Investigator Haiduk noted, though, that she never found any evidence to
corroborate these allegations. Stephenson argued that Investigator Haiduk should be
permitted to testify about the allegations because they went “towards the credibility of
S[imon] and R[ebecca]” and “should be relevant.” He claimed that Rebecca’s
descriptions of Stephenson’s abuse had changed over time, and he argued that her
“graphic” trial testimony was “essentially describing what she did with S[imon] and not
with [Stephenson].”20 The State responded by repeating its arguments that the evidence
20
Stephenson’s counsel told the trial court that he did not intend to ask
Investigator Haiduk about the allegations that Simon was having sex with Tina because
Tina “was much more descriptive” regarding the abuse while Rebecca “was
extraordinarily vague.”
15
was irrelevant and that it was hearsay, and it added an objection under Rule 412. See
Tex. R. Evid. 412(a). Prior to excluding the testimony, the trial court offered
Stephenson an opportunity to respond to the State’s amended objections, but he
declined to do so, saying he had “[n]othing else” to add.
3. Punishment Testimony
Third, Stephenson was not called to testify during the punishment phase.
Although a record was made documenting his decision not to testify at the guilt–
innocence phase, no comparable record was made of his decision not to testify at
punishment. Rather, moments after the State rested its punishment case, Stephenson’s
counsel rested, and the trial court proceeded to read the punishment charges to the jury.
Stephenson did not vocalize any objection to this trial progression, nor did he vocalize
any desire to testify.
4. Conviction and Punishment
The jury convicted Stephenson of all six counts, and it returned the maximum
punishment for each. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a), .33(a). The trial court
sentenced Stephenson, and judgment was entered accordingly.
16
II. Discussion
Stephenson’s briefs raise what we construe as six issues: (1) two Sixth
Amendment challenges, (2) a sufficiency challenge, (3) an evidentiary challenge, and
(4) two Double Jeopardy challenges.21
A. Sixth Amendment Challenges
Stephenson’s two Sixth Amendment challenges allege violations of his right to
make critical decisions in his case. He claims that this right was violated by (1) his trial
counsel conceding guilt to his impregnation of Courtney and (2) his trial counsel failing
to call him as a punishment witness. The record is insufficient to sustain either claim.
1. Decision to Concede Guilt
First, Stephenson argues that his trial counsel disregarded his decision to
maintain his innocence and—in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to make that
critical decision—conceded that Stephenson had impregnated Courtney when she was
16. 22
Although Stephenson’s cases were tried together, he treats this as three separate
21
appeals and has filed three separate briefs—one for the crimes against Courtney (cause
numbers 02-22-00101-CR, 02-22-00103-CR, 02-22-00105-CR, and 02-22-00106-CR);
one for the crime against Rebecca and Tina (cause number 02-22-00104-CR); and one
for the crime against Simon (cause number 02-22-00102-CR). His briefs list a total of
nine issues, many of which overlap. We read his briefs together and consolidate his
overlapping issues for simplicity and organization.
Stephenson indicates that this appellate issue is intended to challenge his
22
conviction in cause number 02-22-00101-CR for continuous sexual abuse of Courtney
because his counsel “conceded guilty to a lesser[-]included offense” of continuous
sexual abuse. But Stephenson was convicted in a separate cause number—cause
17
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right “to decide [whether] the
objective of the defense is to assert innocence.” McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500,
1505, 1508 (2018). This is distinct from the defendant’s right to decide his plea; the
defendant is entitled “to decide on the objective of his defense[—]to admit guilt in the
hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it
to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1505. A defendant’s
contention that his right to make this decision has been violated is often referred to as
a McCoy complaint based on the landmark Supreme Court case on the topic. See id. at
1505–12.
But in McCoy, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s “vociferous,”
“express statements of [his] will to maintain innocence” distinguished his situation from
prior case law in which the defendant failed to protest his counsel’s strategy and no
Sixth Amendment violation was apparent. Id. at 1505, 1507–10 (distinguishing Florida
v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 178–92, 125 S. Ct. 551, 555–63 (2004)); see Ex parte Barbee, 616
S.W.3d 836, 844–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (explaining that McCoy was “a logical
extension of Nixon” and “merely required factually what Nixon explicitly lacked: a
defendant’s express objections to a concession of guilt disregarded by counsel and court
number 02-22-00106-CR—for the conceded conduct, i.e., for sexually assaulting
Courtney and impregnating her when she was 16. And because that particular sexual
assault occurred when Courtney was 16, it could not have been a predicate offense for
continuous sexual abuse. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b)(2)(A) (limiting offense
to acts committed against a child under 14).
18
and aired before a jury during trial”). “[A] defendant cannot simply remain silent before
and during trial and raise a McCoy complaint for the first time after trial”; he must
“present[] ‘express statements of [his] will to maintain innocence.’” Turner v. State, 570
S.W.3d 250, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509); see Barbee,
616 S.W.3d at 845; Martinez v. State, No. 13-18-00621-CR, 2020 WL 4381997, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 30, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (“Texas does not require a trial court to address a claim of McCoy error
until it is brought to its attention.”).
Stephenson made no such express statements here. His trial counsel’s
concession—that Stephenson had impregnated Courtney—was repeated numerous
times and at different stages throughout trial, and Stephenson did not object in any of
those instances. Nor is there anything in the record showing that he asked the trial
court to appoint new counsel on this basis. He even testified outside the presence of
the jury at one point, giving him a prime opportunity to notify the trial court of the
complaints he now raises on appeal. 23 But he did not mention anything about the
concession. Although Stephenson pleaded not guilty, he did not object to his counsel’s
statements, inform the trial court of his disagreement with his counsel’s trial strategy,
or otherwise express dissatisfaction with the concession of guilt. See Barbee, 616 S.W.3d
While Stephenson’s testimony outside the jury’s presence focused on
23
documenting his decision not to testify, it nonetheless provided him with a jury-free
environment in which he could have notified the trial court of his concerns.
19
at 845 (holding that evidence defendant told his attorneys he was innocent and would
not plead guilty did not satisfy McCoy because it did not “demonstrate that he told [his
attorneys] that his defensive objective was to maintain his innocence at trial”). Even
after the trial ended and his appellate counsel was appointed, Stephenson’s motion for
new trial did not mention his alleged dissatisfaction with his trial counsel’s
performance.24
We cannot presume a McCoy error based on a silent record. Because there were
no express statements of Stephenson’s desire to maintain his innocence, he has not
presented a sufficient record to sustain his McCoy complaint. See Barbee, 616 S.W.3d at
845–46. We overrule this issue.
2. Decision to Testify
The record is similarly insufficient to support Stephenson’s argument that he was
denied the right to decide whether to testify at punishment. A defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to make this decision, McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508, but we cannot
presume that the right was violated on the face of a silent record.
We held as much in Thompson v. State. Nos. 02-18-00230-CR, 02-18-00231-CR,
02-18-00232-CR, 2019 WL 1065925, at *4–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 7, 2019,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). There, the defendant argued that
24
Stephenson filed a motion for new trial to challenge his conviction for
impregnating Courtney, but he did not file a motion for new trial to challenge his
conviction for continuous sexual abuse of Courtney.
20
his Sixth Amendment right to testify had been violated by his trial counsel’s failure to
call him as a witness. Id. at *3. He claimed—as Stephenson does here—that our review
of the alleged error should follow the framework set forth in McCoy. Id. at *3, *5. But
we noted that Texas courts generally analyze “a defendant’s complaint that his right to
testify was denied by his counsel . . . under [the] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
framework” established in Strickland v. Washington. Id. at *4; see Johnson v. State, 169
S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding in pre-McCoy case that because
“defense counsel shoulders the primary responsibility to inform the defendant of his
right to testify, . . . Strickland provides the appropriate framework for addressing an
allegation that the defendant’s right to testify was denied by defense counsel”). See
generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
Nevertheless, under either framework, the defendant’s claim required a sufficient
record to “establish the fact that [was] essential to [his] claim—that he wished to testify
on his own behalf and was prevented from doing so.” Thompson, 2019 WL 1065925, at
*6. Although the defendant had told the trial court that he wanted to testify, there was
“a follow-up discussion that reflect[ed] that [he] and his counsel were still discussing
the issue,” and “after that, the record [wa]s silent.” Id. Such silence “ma[d]e[] it
impossible to resolve [his Sixth Amendment] claim on direct appeal, no matter the
standard.” Id. It undermined the defendant’s ability to establish that his expressed
desire to testify had been frustrated—as was required to show error under McCoy—and
it undermined his ability to establish his counsel’s deficient performance—as was
21
required to show error under Strickland. See id. (further noting that “[t]he failure to call
a defendant or any witness to testify during a punishment trial is not on its face so
outrageous that it represents deficient performance” on a silent record).
The same is true here. Whether we review Stephenson’s complaint under McCoy
or Strickland, Stephenson cannot prevail without a record that supports the crux of his
claim: that his counsel deficiently disregarded his expressed desire to exercise his right
to testify.25 As Stephenson candidly acknowledges, the record is silent on this issue.
Faced with such a silent record, we cannot infer error. Turner, 570 S.W.3d at 276 (“[A]
defendant cannot simply remain silent before and during trial and raise a McCoy
complaint for the first time after trial.”); Thompson, 2019 WL 1065925, at *4 (noting that
we “may not infer ineffective assistance simply from an unclear record or a record that
does not show why counsel failed to do something”).
Because the silent record is insufficient to establish a deprivation of Stephenson’s
Sixth Amendment right to testify—whether such deprivation is analyzed under McCoy
or Strickland—we overrule this issue.
25
The appellant in Thompson also alleged that his trial counsel had talked him out
of testifying. See 2019 WL 1065925, at *6. Stephenson makes no such claim.
22
B. Sufficiency Challenge
Stephenson next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction for indecency with a child by contact.26 He argues that there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that he acted with sexual intent, i.e., that when he
touched Simon, he acted with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an essential element
of a crime, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to
determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the challenged essential
element beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655–56 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2021); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The
crime at issue here is indecency with a child by contact, which a person commits by
“engag[ing] in sexual contact with the child or caus[ing] the child to engage in sexual
contact.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” is defined to include a
list of acts when those acts are “committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person”—the element at issue here. Id. § 21.11(c); see McKenzie v. State,
617 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (“An essential element of the offense of
Stephenson raises his sufficiency challenge as his first issue in cause number
26
02-22-00102-CR (his indecency conviction). He raised a similar argument through a
motion for directed verdict after the State rested its case.
23
indecency with a child is . . . the specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person.”).
“[T]he requisite specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person
can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, his remarks[,] and all surrounding
circumstances.” McKenzie, 617 S.W.2d at 216; see Weaver v. State, No. 02-21-00081-CR,
2022 WL 2978730, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 28, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication). Such circumstantial evidence is just as probative as
direct evidence, and the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the circumstantial
evidence. See Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(distinguishing between inferences and speculation); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (describing an inference as “a conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them” and describing
speculation as “mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts”). The
defendant need not vocalize or admit his sexual intent for the jury to infer that such
intent was present. See Weaver, 2022 WL 2978730, at *8.
Stephenson appears to claim that the jury could not infer sexual intent because
Simon described Stephenson as laughing or joking when he grabbed Simon’s penis. But
what the evidence actually showed was that Stephenson told Simon he was joking.
Simon testified that he did not believe it was a joke, and the jury was not required to
believe that it was either. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655 (reciting rule that “a juror may
choose to believe or disbelieve all, some, or none of the evidence presented”); Queeman,
24
520 S.W.3d at 622 (“The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimonies.”).
There was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have
logically inferred that, rather than joking, Stephenson was acting with sexual intent. The
indecent conduct alone—Stephenson’s repeatedly grabbing Simon’s genitals—was
indicative of such intent. See Weaver, 2022 WL 2978730, at *9 (holding defendant’s
“conduct alone [wa]s sufficient to infer intent” when defendant repeatedly touched
child’s breasts but claimed he was massaging her); Corporon v. State, 586 S.W.3d 550, 562
(Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (holding that jury could have inferred sexual intent
from the manner in which the defendant touched child’s genitals).
And Stephenson implicitly recognized the sexual overtone of his conduct when,
after grabbing Simon, he told him “that he [wa]sn’t gay and that he only like[d] women.”
See Weaver, 2022 WL 2978730, at *8 (noting that “intent can be inferred from the
appellant’s conduct after the incident” (quoting Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 891
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.))). Such a disclaimer reflected Stephenson’s
awareness that grabbing Simon’s penis was a sexual act that could be understood to
reflect a same-sex attraction.
Such awareness was further reflected by Stephenson’s comment that if Brittney
found out what he had done, she would look at him differently. There was no reason
to believe that Brittney would look at her husband differently if, as Stephenson insisted,
he was merely joking. But there was certainly a reason to believe that she would look
25
at her husband differently if he had been acting with the intent to arouse or gratify his
sexual desire through his conduct with her son. Thus, the instruction by Stephenson
not to tell Brittney because she would look at him differently provided circumstantial
evidence that Stephenson acknowledged sexual intent with regard to his conduct.
Stephenson’s other statements during and after the grabbing incidents also
supported the jury’s conclusion that his conduct was not intended as a joke. Simon
testified that when Stephenson grabbed his penis he asked, “Do you like that?” This
question placed the grabbing incidents within Stephenson’s larger pattern of sexual
abuse; Courtney, Rebecca, and Tina testified that Stephenson similarly inquired whether
they liked his sexual conduct when he inappropriately touched them. Cf. Corporon, 586
S.W.3d at 562 (holding evidence sufficient to infer sexual intent and noting that, when
defendant indecently touched child, he asked her how it felt); Tyler v. State, 950 S.W.2d
787, 789 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (holding evidence of sexual intent
sufficient when defendant touched both victim and second child under similar
circumstances). And there is no evidence that his sexual abuse of the girls was done as
a joke.
Plus, after grabbing Simon, Stephenson warned him that if he told anyone, CPS
would get involved and tear the family apart. This, too, indicates that Stephenson
viewed his conduct as more than a simple joke. And, again, this warning fit Stephenson’s
pattern of making similar threats to at least two of Simon’s victimized sisters after he
sexually abused them.
26
But even more telling than the content of the threats was the fact that
Stephenson made them. Stephenson’s insistence on secrecy is inconsistent with his
claim that he was joking; insistence on secret-keeping “shows a consciousness of guilt
which leads to an inference that . . . [he] had the specific intent to arouse and gratify his
own sexual desire.” Bousquet v. State, No. 01-02-01209-CR, 2003 WL 22254683, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 2, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding evidence sufficient to show sexual intent when defendant
threatened “that he would hurt complainant and his mother if complainant ever told”);
see Johnson v. State, No. 02-13-00482-CR, 2015 WL 1792971, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Apr. 16, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding
evidence sufficient to show sexual intent and noting that the defendant “was trying to
hide his actions”); Dease v. State, No. 01-02-00096-CR, 2003 WL 124817, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 16, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding jury could have inferred sexual intent when, after defendant
touched victim, “he told her not to tell anyone about it”); Branson v. State, 825 S.W.2d
162, 168 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.) (holding evidence of sexual intent sufficient
and stating rule that “[e]vidence that the accused told the victim not to tell or that he
would hurt her will support an inference that the accused knew what he was doing was
wrong and punishable”).
Based on Stephenson’s repeatedly grabbing Simon’s genitals, his inquiry during
one of the grabbing incidents, his threats and statements after the incidents, and
27
Simon’s testimony that he did not see Stephenson’s behavior as a joke, there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Stephenson acted “with the intent to arouse
or gratify [his] sexual desire.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(c). We overrule this issue.
C. Evidentiary Challenge
Next, Stephenson asserts that the trial court erred by applying Rule 412 to
exclude Investigator Haiduk’s testimony about Simon’s alleged sexual relationships with
Rebecca and Tina.27 Rule 412 applies to prosecutions for certain sexual offenses and
renders inadmissible “reputation or opinion evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior”
and “specific instances of a victim’s past sexual behavior.” Tex. R. Evid. 412(a). There
are exceptions,28 though, and Stephenson claims that Investigator Haiduk’s testimony
was admissible under two of those exceptions: as evidence of “the victim’s motive or
bias,” and as evidence “constitutionally required to be admitted” by the Due Process 29
Stephenson raises his evidentiary challenge as his second issue in cause number
27
02-22-00102-CR (his indecency conviction), and as his first issue in cause number 02-
22-00104-CR (his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of Rebecca and Tina).
28
The Rule 412 exceptions apply to “[e]vidence of specific instances of a victim’s
past sexual behavior”—not “reputation or opinion evidence of a victim’s past sexual
behavior.” Tex. R. Evid. 412(a), (b). When the State objected to the relevant portion
of Detective Haiduk’s testimony at trial, it objected under Rule 412 generally without
specifying whether the testimony was “reputation or opinion evidence” or “specific
instances of a victim’s past sexual behavior.” Neither party discusses the distinction on
appeal.
29
Specifically, Stephenson asserts that Rule 412 “does not extend so far” as to
invade his constitutional right to present a complete defense and that (1) the alleged
sexual relationship with Simon was “a possible motivation [for Rebecca and Tina] to
fabricate [their] outcr[ies]”; and (2) Simon was an alternate suspect for Rebecca’s and
28
and Confrontation Clauses. See Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(C), (E). But as the State points
out, these alleged grounds for admission were not raised below.
If a proponent of evidence wishes to complain on appeal regarding the exclusion
of that evidence, “it is not enough to [have] t[old] the judge that [the] evidence [wa]s
admissible”; the proponent “must have told the judge why the evidence was
admissible.” Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). If the proponent did not tell the trial court why the evidence was
admissible, or if the ground for admission that he gave the trial court does not comport
with his argument on appeal, then “he has preserved nothing for review.” Ibarra v. State,
11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177–80; McDonald
v. State, No. 02-13-00483-CR, 2015 WL 2353307, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May
14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Stephenson told the trial court that Investigator Haiduk’s testimony regarding
the victims’ alleged sexual relationships was admissible to prove Rebecca’s and Simon’s
“credibility” because Rebecca’s descriptions of Stephenson’s sexual abuse had changed
over time. Stephenson did not mention either of the Rule 412 exceptions he raises on
Tina’s sexual abuse. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727,
1731 (2006) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (1986))).
29
appeal—he did not mention anything about the victims’ motive or bias, nor did he
mention anything about the evidence being constitutionally required. Cf. Reyna, 168
S.W.3d at 175–79 (holding that defendant did not preserve Confrontation Clause
challenge to exclusion of evidence by telling the trial court that evidence went to a
“[c]redibility issue” without “[‘]clearly articulat[ing]’ that the Confrontation Clause
demanded admission of the evidence” (quoting Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 694 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994))). He thus failed to preserve his complaint for appeal. See Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1(a); Barker v. State, No. 01-19-01009-CR, 2021 WL 4733789, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 12, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding defendant forfeited complaint that evidence excluded under Rule
412 was “constitutionally required” under Rule 412(b)(2)(E) when he argued at trial that
it was admissible to prove “motive or bias” under Rule 412(b)(2)(C)); McDonald, 2015
WL 2353307, at *3 (holding defendant failed to preserve complaint that evidence
excluded under Rule 412 was “scientific or medical evidence” under Rule 412(b)(2)(A)
when he argued at trial that evidence went to motive or bias under Rule 412(b)(2)(C)).
We overrule this issue. 30
30
Even if Stephenson had preserved his Rule 412 complaint, we would still affirm
the trial court’s ruling because he has not addressed the State’s hearsay objection, which
was an alternative basis for the ruling. See Petty v. State, No. 02-21-00130-CR, 2022 WL
4545532, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“When an appellant fails to challenge all independent
grounds supporting the trial court’s ruling on appeal, we must affirm the trial court’s
ruling on the unchallenged ground.”).
30
D. Double Jeopardy Challenges
Finally, Stephenson raises two Double Jeopardy challenges arguing that he was—
or hypothetically could have been—punished twice for the same conduct.
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person
shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. This guarantees several protections, including protection from
receiving multiple punishments for the same offense. Nawaz v. State, 663 S.W.3d 739,
743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Rachal v. State, Nos. 02-18-00500-CR, 02-18-00501-CR,
2019 WL 5996985, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 14, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication). In the multiple-punishments context, two offenses
may be the same if one is a lesser-included offense of the other or if the two offenses
are defined under distinct statutory provisions but the legislature made it clear that only
one punishment was intended. Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273, 275–76 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) (noting further that “[s]ameness in this context is a matter of legislative
intent”).
When, as here,31 a defendant fails to preserve his Double Jeopardy challenges, he
may raise them for the first time on appeal if enforcing the usual rules of procedural
Stephenson notes that he raised Double Jeopardy challenges in his motions for
31
new trial, but the State argues that he was required to raise these challenges at or before
trial to preserve them. See Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(holding that, generally, a defendant has “the burden to preserve, in some fashion, a
31
default would serve no legitimate state interest and the undisputed facts show that the
violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record.32 Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680,
687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Gonzalez, 8 S.W.3d at 642–43; Tufts, 2020 WL 5242431, at
*25.
Stephenson argues that the face of the record shows two Double Jeopardy
violations: (1) that the flexible “on or about” dates in his indictments and jury charge
allowed the jury to punish him for both sexually assaulting and continuously sexually
abusing Courtney based on the same incidents of abuse; and (2) that his two counts of
continuous sexual abuse punished him twice for the same pattern of abuse and were
required to be combined into a single charge.
The first challenge is resolved by established case law, but the second is an issue
of first impression.
[D]ouble [J]eopardy objection at or before the time the charge [was] submitted to the
jury” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Either way, Stephenson’s motions for new trial did not preserve the challenges
he raises on appeal. Although he filed new-trial motions in four of his six cases, and
although those motions raised Double Jeopardy challenges, they did not raise the same
challenges that he presents on appeal.
32
A Double Jeopardy claim is apparent on the face of the trial record “if
resolution of the claim does not require further proceedings for the purpose of
introducing additional evidence in support of the . . . claim.” Ex Parte Denton, 399
S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Tufts v. State, No. 02-19-00143-CR, 2020
WL 5242431, at *25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 3, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
32
1. Potential Overlap of Continuous Sexual Abuse and Sexual Assaults
Stephenson argues that because he was convicted of not only sexually assaulting
Courtney in 2017 and 2018 but also continuously sexually abusing her between 2014
and 2016,33 and because the State was not bound to the “on or about” dates alleged in
the indictments and recited in the charges, 34 the jury could have strayed from the dates
alleged for his 2017 and 2018 sexual assaults and duplicatively punished him for
predicate acts that occurred between 2014 and 2016, i.e., during the period of his
continuous sexual abuse.35
But as the State points out, this possibility was entirely hypothetical.36 The
evidence at trial showed that the offenses did not overlap, and that is what matters. See
Allen v. State, 620 S.W.3d 915, 919–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
33
The time period for which Stephenson was convicted of continuously sexually
abusing Courtney ended the day before her 14th birthday.
34
Stephenson notes that jury charge informed the jury that the State was not
bound to the “on or about” dates alleged in the indictments, and some portions of his
brief appear to frame this Double Jeopardy issue as a matter of charge error. Either
way, the gist of his argument is the same: he does not claim that the charge misstated
the law but rather that the law itself—the rule that the State was not bound to the dates
alleged in the indictments and recited in the jury charges—resulted in Double Jeopardy
violations.
35
Stephenson raises this as his third, fourth, and fifth issues—one for each of the
counts of sexual assault—in cause numbers 02-22-00101-CR, 02-22-00103-CR, 02-22-
00105-CR, and 02-22-00106-CR.
36
Stephenson, too, indirectly acknowledges that the dates of his alleged offenses
do not in fact overlap.
33
It is well established that “trial upon an indictment does not bar every offense
that could be prosecuted under its language; instead, trial upon the indictment bars
prosecution [and punishment] only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial.”
Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (reciting rule when
appellant challenged prosecution after mid-trial dismissal and noting further that, even
if proof of an offense is offered at trial, “the State or the trial court can exclude an
instance of conduct from the jeopardy bar through an election”). The Court of
Criminal Appeals recently reiterated as much in the continuous sexual abuse context.
See Allen, 620 S.W.3d at 919–22.
In Allen v. State, the defendant was indicted for numerous offenses including
indecency with a child in September 2009 and continuous sexual abuse of the same
child between October 2009 and August 2012. Id. at 917, 919, 921–22. But at trial, the
State offered evidence that the indecency offense had occurred in December 2011. Id.
at 919, 922 & n.10. On appeal, the defendant argued that his indecency conviction
could not stand because the 2011 indecency offense was within the time period alleged
in his indictment for his continuous sexual abuse of the same victim. Id. at 919.
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the continuous sexual abuse statute
prohibits a defendant’s additional conviction for a predicate offense only if that offense
“occurred [in]side the period in which the [continuous sexual abuse offense] was
committed.” Id.; see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(e)(2). The statutory prohibition
turns on what dates the evidence shows the offenses actually “occurred” or were
34
“committed” rather than what dates are “alleged.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(e); see
Allen, 620 S.W.3d at 919–20. The court thus held that “in determining whether a
defendant may be convicted for a continuous abuse offense and an offense listed [as a
predicate offense] in § 21.02(c) in the same criminal action and against the same victim,
the proper consideration is whether the evidence shows that the [predicate] offense
occurred outside of the period that the continuous abuse offense was committed”; the
determination “does not consider whether the [predicate] offense occurred outside the
time period alleged in the indictment for the continuous abuse offense.”37 Allen, 620
S.W.3d at 921.
Although the issue in Allen was not identical to the one Stephenson raises here,
Allen’s holding undermines the core of Stephenson’s position: his reliance on the
indictments’ flexible “on or about” dates rather than on the evidence. He is correct
that the “on or about” dates alleged in the indictments were not binding on the State,
see id. at 920, but the question is not what flexibility the indictments allowed but on what
dates the evidence showed the offenses “occurred” or “w[ere] committed.” Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.02(e)(2).
The Allen court ultimately held that the evidence showed continuous sexual
37
abuse from “the middle of the 2008–2009 school year through December 2011,” and
because the parties agreed that the evidence showed the indecency offense had been
committed in December 2011, it was within the time period of the continuous sexual
abuse offense and was barred by Double Jeopardy. Allen, 620 S.W.3d at 921–22 & n.10.
35
The evidence showed—and the judgments reflect—that Stephenson
continuously sexually abused Courtney from approximately March 2014 to March 2016
and that he sexually assaulted her in March 2017, June 2018, and October 2018. The
latter three offenses were not only committed outside the time period of the continuous
sexual abuse offense, but because Courtney was over the age of 14 when the sexual
assaults occurred, they could not have been included as predicate acts for the
continuous sexual abuse charge even if the State had wanted to include them. See id.
§ 21.02(b)(2)(A).
Because “the proper consideration is whether the evidence shows that the
[predicate] offense occurred outside of the period that the continuous abuse offense
was committed,” Allen, 620 S.W.3d at 921, and because the evidence showed that
Stephenson’s sexual assaults of Courtney occurred outside the period of his continuous
sexual abuse of her, no violation of Stephenson’s Double Jeopardy rights is apparent
on the face of the record. See Langs, 183 S.W.3d at 687. We overrule this issue.
2. Multiple Counts of Continuous Sexual Abuse
Stephenson’s second Double Jeopardy issue is not quite as simple. He argues
that his two counts of continuous sexual abuse should have been combined into a single
count because even though they involved different victims, they reflected a single unit
36
of prosecution.38 He claims that the gravamen of continuous sexual abuse is the nature
of the conduct—the pattern of sexual abuse—and because the Penal Code authorizes
a single count of continuous sexual abuse to encompass multiple victims, the separate
victims were not separate units of prosecution. He thus reasons that his two
convictions for continuous sexual abuse were part of the same unit of prosecution—
the same pattern of abuse—and the trial court punished him twice for the same offense.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has yet to weigh in on the allowable unit of
prosecution for continuous sexual abuse, and the question is an issue of first impression
for this court. See Cisneros v. State, 622 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2021, no pet.) (op. on remand) (noting lack of authority on the issue).
a. Governing Law
The Legislature has the authority to define crimes, including the allowable unit
of prosecution, i.e., what constitutes a distinct, discrete violation of the statute. Harris
v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Consequently, determining
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments under the same
statute requires an examination of what “the state legislature prescribed with respect to
how many times an offender may be punished[.]” 39 Nawaz, 663 S.W.3d at 743.
Stephenson raises this as his second issue in cause number 02-22-00104-CR
38
(his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of Rebecca and Tina).
39
Although Double Jeopardy challenges are often analyzed under the test
established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 300–05, 52 S. Ct. 180, 180–82
(1932), that test does not apply when the defendant is challenging two prosecutions
37
Generally, absent an express statutory statement dictating that “the allowable unit of
prosecution shall be such-and-such,” the best indicator of the allowable unit of
prosecution is the gravamen or focus of the offense. Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630; Jones v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Although this inquiry resolves the
[D]ouble [J]eopardy analysis, it is purely one of statutory construction.” Jones, 323
S.W.3d at 888; see Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 629.
In construing a statute, we “seek to effectuate the ‘collective’ intent or purpose
of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014) (first quoting Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); and then quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
The definitive evidence of that collective intent—“the only thing actually adopted by
the legislators . . . and submitted to the Governor for [his] signature”—is the “literal
text.” Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. We “attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning
of that text at the time of its enactment” using established canons of construction,
reading words and phrases in context, and construing the text according to the rules of
grammar and common usage. Lang v. State, 561 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(quoting Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785).
brought under the same statute, as Stephenson is here. See Ex parte Goodman, 152
S.W.3d 67, 70 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
38
When the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, “the Legislature
must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add
or subtract from such a statute.” Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 (quoting Coit v. State, 808
S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see Price, 434 S.W.3d at 605 (noting that, when
statutory language is unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning absent absurd
consequences).
b. Plain Language
We therefore begin with the plain language of the continuous sexual abuse
statute.
That statute—Article 21.02 of the Penal Code—penalizes a person if, “during a
period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of
sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one
or more victims,” as long as when each act is committed, “the victim is . . . a child
younger than 14 years of age.” 40 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b). The jury need not
“agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the
defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed” as long as it “agree[s]
unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration,
As an alternative to proving that the victim of continuous sexual abuse is under
40
the age of 14, the State can establish that the victim is a disabled individual. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.02(b)(2). But there was neither allegation nor evidence that Courtney
was disabled.
39
committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.” Id. § 21.02(d). Clearly, given that the
legislature did not prioritize unanimity on the specific predicate acts, “[t]he gravamen
of a Section 21.02 [continuous sexual abuse] offense is not a particular instance of one
of the [predicate] offenses listed in Section 21.02(c).” Ramos v. State, 636 S.W.3d 646,
655–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (distinguishing the societal interest that makes conduct
punishable as continuous sexual abuse from that which makes it punishable as
prohibited sexual conduct).
But in contrast to the legislature’s de-emphasizing the specific predicate acts—
and to prevent problems that might arise because of it—the legislature expressly
identified other parameters of the offense that bar dual convictions. See Soliz v. State,
353 S.W.3d 850, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that the prohibitions in
“Subsections (e) and (f) appear to be designed to prevent problems that might arise
from the legislature’s relaxation of the unanimity requirement”). And those parameters
are victim-specific.
The first relates to duplicative punishments for predicate offenses. The
continuous sexual abuse statute prohibits duplicative convictions for predicate offenses
committed within the time period of the continuous sexual abuse, but only if those
predicate offenses are committed against “the same victim”:
A defendant may not be convicted in the same criminal action of [a
predicate offense] the victim of which is the same victim as a victim of the
offense alleged under Subsection (b) [i.e., continuous sexual abuse] unless
the [predicate offense] . . . occurred outside the period in which the
40
offense alleged [for continuous sexual abuse] under Subsection (b) was
committed. 41
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(e)(2). The focus of this prohibition is not on the
defendant’s overarching, victim-indifferent pattern of abusing children but on the
defendant’s pattern of abusing a specific child or specific children. See id.
Even more telling are the parameters of the statutory prohibition on partitioning
continuous sexual abuse offenses into multiple counts. See id. § 21.02(f). The legislature
prohibited the State from charging a defendant “with more than one count [of
continuous sexual abuse] if all of the specific acts of sexual abuse that are alleged to
have been committed are alleged to have been committed against a single victim.” Id.
In other words, if all of the pleaded predicate acts were “committed against a single
victim,” then those acts form a single allowable unit of prosecution. See id. This stops
short of expressly stating that “the allowable unit of prosecution shall be such-and-
such,” see Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630, but just barely. It is “a strong indication” that the
legislature intended the allowable unit of prosecution to be victim-specific. See Ellison
v. State, 425 S.W.3d 637, 645–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)
(holding similarly in construction of continuous family violence statute).
41
If the predicate offense occurred within the relevant time period, it may be
charged in the alternative or considered by the trier of fact as a lesser-included offense.
Id. § 21.02(e)(1), (3).
41
Meanwhile, Stephenson’s proposed interpretation of the continuous sexual
abuse statute would render the statutory anti-partitioning provision meaningless. If, as
he proposes, we were to construe the statute to prohibit more than one count per
overarching, victim-indifferent pattern of abusing children, then we would nullify the
last half of the anti-partitioning provision—the portion that confines the prohibition to
instances in which “all of the specific acts of sexual abuse that are alleged to have been
committed are alleged to have been committed against a single victim.” Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.02(f). An interpretation that renders portions of a statute ineffectual is
contrary to the canons of construction as well as common sense. Both dictate the
“presum[ption] that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose” and both
require us to give effect to “each word, phrase, clause, and sentence . . . if reasonably
possible.’” Lang, 561 S.W.3d at 180 (quoting State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997)); see Allen, 620 S.W.3d at 919–20 (similar).
42
If the legislature had intended Stephenson’s proposed meaning—if it had
“intended to prohibit multiple [continuous sexual abuse] prosecutions in cases with
multiple victims, or if it [had] intended to prohibit multiple [continuous sexual abuse]
prosecutions relating to the same time period irrespective of the number of victims[—]it
could have easily done so, but it did not.” Cisneros, 622 S.W.3d at 520–21. Rather, the
statutory text unambiguously demonstrates the legislature’s intent for the unit of
prosecution to turn on whether the “two or more acts of sexual abuse” (committed
over a period of 30 days or more) were “committed . . . against a single victim.”42 Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b), (f).
42
The Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that the continuous sexual abuse
statute was enacted as a “legislative response to Judge Cochran’s concurring opinion in
Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring),”
in which she called for a new Penal Code provision that focused on “the existence of a
sexually abusive relationship with a young child . . . marked by continuous and
numerous acts of sexual abuse of the same or different varieties.” Ramos, 636 S.W.3d
at 655 (quoting Price, 434 S.W.3d at 607–08). Our interpretation of the statutory text is
consistent with this legislative history; both reflect a legislative focus on the defendant’s
“sexually abusive relationship” with a specific victim. See Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 737
(Cochran, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, because the statute is unambiguous on the question before us, the
legislative history does not sway our textual analysis. See Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785–86
(recognizing that “[i]f the plain language of a statute would lead to absurd results, or if
the language is not plain but rather ambiguous, then and only then, out of absolute
necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a court to consider . . . extratextual
factors”); cf. Price, 434 S.W.3d at 605–07 (“resort[ing]” to extratextual factors after
finding statute ambiguous on question at issue).
43
c. Guidance from Case Law
Our sister court has interpreted the continuous sexual abuse statute similarly.
When faced with the same issue of first impression that confronts us here, the
Thirteenth Court of Appeals identified the allowable unit of prosecution for continuous
sexual abuse based, in large part, on the text of the anti-partitioning provision. See
Cisneros, 622 S.W.3d at 520–21.
In Cisneros, the defendant (Cisneros) was convicted of two counts of continuous
sexual abuse, one for each of his two stepdaughters.43 Id. at 515–16, 520. On appeal,
he raised a Double Jeopardy challenge similar to the one Stephenson raises here.
Because the Penal Code’s definition of continuous sexual abuse encompasses multiple
predicate acts “regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one
or more victims,” see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b)(1), Cisneros claimed that he had
been convicted of the same offense—committing sexual acts against “one or more
victims”—twice. Cisneros, 622 S.W.3d at 520. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals rejected
this argument.
Focusing on the language of the continuous sexual abuse statute, the court
observed that the anti-partitioning provision prohibited “more than one count [only] if
all of the specific acts of sexual abuse . . . are alleged to have been committed against a
The defendant was convicted of other sexual offenses as well, all of which were
43
committed against his stepdaughters. Cisneros, 622 S.W.3d at 515–16.
44
single victim,” and it reasoned that the corollary to this “is that a defendant may be
charged with more than one count of continuous sexual abuse if multiple acts of sexual
abuse are alleged to have been committed against each of multiple victims.” Id.
(agreeing with the State’s argument).
The Cisneros court also noted that the Court of Criminal Appeals had indirectly
commented on the unit of prosecution in Price v. State. See id. at 520–21. See generally
Price, 434 S.W.3d at 605–11. There, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed “whether
the statute defining the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child permits a
defendant to be convicted both of that offense and of a criminal attempt to commit a
predicate offense under that statute.” Price, 434 S.W.3d at 603. Ultimately, it held that
allowing such dual convictions would defeat the legislative intent and violate a
defendant’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 609–11. A key stepping
stone to that holding, though, was the court’s analysis of the legislative intent behind
the continuous sexual abuse statute.44 See id. at 605–11; see also Nawaz, 663 S.W.3d at
746 (noting that, in determining unit of prosecution, “the Court will look to see what it
has said when construing that statute for other purposes” because “‘[w]hether statutory
construction occurs in the [D]ouble [J]eopardy context,’ or in some other context . . . ,
44
Because the court concluded that the statutory language was ambiguous
regarding whether a defendant could be convicted of both continuous sexual abuse and
attempt to commit a predicate offense, the court examined extratextual indicators of
legislative intent. Price, 434 S.W.3d at 606–11.
45
‘the issue is the same: the meaning of the statute’” (quoting Jones, 323 S.W.3d at 889)).
On that question, the Court of Criminal Appeals repeatedly concluded that “the
Legislature intended to permit one conviction for continuous sexual abuse for conduct
committed against a single complainant during a specified time period.” Price, 434
S.W.3d at 609; see id. at 605–06, 611 (similar).
The Cisneros court emphasized Price’s summary of the legislative intent, and it
ultimately held—consistent with both Price and the anti-partitioning provision—that
the unit of prosecution for continuous sexual abuse was “a series of acts of sexual abuse
‘that occur over an extended period of time against a single complainant.’” Cisneros, 622
S.W.3d at 521 (quoting Price, 434 S.W.3d at 605–06).
d. Interpretation of Similar Statutes
This construction of the allowable unit of prosecution also aligns with Texas
courts’ interpretations of similarly worded Penal Code provisions.
The structure of the continuous sexual abuse statute is similar to that of the
statute criminalizing continuous family violence. Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 21.02, with id. § 25.11; see also Ellison, 425 S.W.3d at 646 (noting similarly). Both
statutes criminalize “two or more” predicate offenses within a specified time period;
both authorize the inclusion of multiple victims (or, for continuous family violence,
multiple households) in a single count; both prohibit a defendant from being separately
convicted for a predicate offense; and both prohibit the State from partitioning the
defendant’s charge into more than one count if all of the alleged predicate acts involve
46
a single victim (or, for continuous family violence, single household). Compare Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 21.02 (criminalizing continuous sexual abuse), with id. § 25.11
(criminalizing continuous family violence). Just as we have noted the significance of
the last limitation—the anti-partitioning limitation—in our unit-of-prosecution analysis
for continuous sexual abuse, our sister court recognized the anti-partitioning limitation
as “a strong indication” of the allowable unit of prosecution for continuous family
violence. Ellison, 425 S.W.3d at 645–48 (rejecting argument that State could punish
defendant twice based on overlapping predicate offenses and holding that allowable
unit of prosecution was “a series of at least two bodily-injury assaults committed within
a certain 12-months-or-less period against a single victim in a dating relationship with
appellant”).45
The same rationale was employed by another court of appeals to interpret
another parallel statute: the statute for repeated violations of certain court orders. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.072; State v. Maldonado, 523 S.W.3d 769, 774–77 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.). That statute, too, criminalizes “two or
more” predicate offenses within a specified time period, authorizes the inclusion of
In Rachal v. State, we adopted a related portion of Ellison’s unit-of-prosecution
45
reasoning as our own. 2019 WL 5996985, at *6. But there, we focused on the portion
of the continuous family violence statute that prohibits separate convictions for
predicate offenses, and we held that the defendant’s Double Jeopardy rights had been
violated because the predicate acts for his continuous family violence conviction had
been used to separately convict him of other variations of assault. Id.
47
multiple court orders in a single count, prohibits a defendant from being separately
convicted for a predicate offense, and prohibits the State from partitioning the
defendant’s charge into more than one count if all of the predicate acts are alleged to
violate a single court order. Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02 (criminalizing
continuous sexual abuse), with id. § 25.072 (criminalizing repeated violations of court
orders), and id. § 25.11 (criminalizing continuous family violence). Once again, our sister
court focused on the anti-partitioning provision, noting that it was “a strong indication”
of the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature. See Maldonado, 523 S.W.3d at
774–76 (discussing Ellison’s reasoning and holding that allowable unit of prosecution
was “two or more [predicate offenses] in a period of twelve months or less which violate
the same court order or setting of bond”).
e. Holding
The plain language of the continuous sexual abuse statute, the persuasive case
law interpreting it, and the interpretations of similarly worded statutes all support the
same conclusion: the legislature intended “to permit one conviction for continuous
sexual abuse based on the repeated acts of sexual abuse that occur over an extended
period of time [30 or more days in duration] against a single complainant.” Cisneros, 622
S.W.3d at 520 (emphasis removed) (quoting Price, 434 S.W.3d at 605–06); see Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.02(b), (f). It is undisputed that Stephenson’s two continuous sexual
abuse convictions involved different victims and occurred over different periods of
time. Therefore, his convictions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
48
We overrule this issue.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled all of Stephenson’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s six
judgments of conviction. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice
Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b), 47.4(a)
Delivered: July 20, 2023
49