#29875-a-PJD
2023 S.D. 39
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RAYMOND CHARLES BANKS, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE ROBIN J. HOUWMAN
Judge
****
KRISTI JONES
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
MANUEL J. DE CASTRO JR.
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
PAUL S. SWEDLUND
Solicitor General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
****
ARGUED
MARCH 23, 2023
OPINION FILED 07/26/23
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DEVANEY, Justice
[¶1.] Raymond Banks pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter. Prior to his
sentencing hearing, Banks sought to introduce evidence of a polygraph examination
regarding his role in the crime. The circuit court precluded the admission of the
polygraph evidence and sentenced Banks to eighty years in the penitentiary with
twenty years suspended. Banks appeals, raising the single issue of whether the
circuit court erred in excluding the polygraph evidence in its sentencing
consideration. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
[¶2.] Casey Bonhorst was killed by a single gunshot wound to his neck on
the evening of February 26, 2020, after delivering a pizza to a home in Sioux Falls.
The investigation of this incident led law enforcement to suspect Banks and
Jahennessy Bryant as the perpetrators of the shooting. Bryant was arrested first,
but on August 12, 2020, Banks and Bryant were charged as co-defendants in a five-
count superseding indictment that included two counts of first-degree murder, one
count of second-degree murder, one count of first-degree manslaughter, and one
count of attempted first-degree robbery.
[¶3.] Throughout the entirety of the proceedings, Banks and Bryant have
maintained differing accounts of the events that transpired leading to Bonhorst’s
death. Both agreed that while walking from Banks’s girlfriend’s apartment to the
duplex where Banks’s aunt resided, they noticed a Domino’s delivery vehicle parked
outside the duplex. According to Bryant, Banks suggested that they rob the
delivery man, but Banks claimed it was Bryant’s idea.
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[¶4.] As to the subsequent events, Bryant testified at a pretrial hearing that
Banks approached Bonhorst, pulled a gun on him, and told him, “Don’t move or
anything, try anything stupid.” Bryant explained that he started moving toward
Banks to help him by holding Bonhorst from behind, but then he heard gunshots.
After the shooting, both he and Banks took off running in different directions.
[¶5.] The roles were essentially reversed in Banks’s version of the events,
with Bryant being the shooter and Banks serving as the lookout. Banks claimed
that he stayed back behind the house as a lookout while Bryant walked up to
Bonhorst and put the gun in his face. According to Banks, Bonhorst threw some
change at Bryant and lunged at him. Bryant reacted by pulling the trigger, after
which they both fled the scene.
[¶6.] In November 2020, both defendants moved to sever their cases and the
circuit court granted their motions. Bryant subsequently entered into a plea
agreement with the State, pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter in exchange
for a cap on his sentence of twenty-five years in prison with twenty-five additional
years suspended. As part of his plea agreement, Bryant was required to testify
against Banks.
[¶7.] Later, Banks also pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter. His
agreement capped the prison time he would have to serve at sixty years with the
possibility of more time suspended. At Banks’s change of plea hearing, the State
described the factual basis for the plea in accord with Bryant’s version of the events,
with Banks being the shooter. Banks contested this factual basis and alleged that
while the underlying facts provided by the State were true, the roles were reversed.
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Banks claimed Bryant was the shooter but acknowledged to the court that he knew
a robbery was going to occur and that he stood by as a lookout. In response to
further questions from the court about his actions, Banks admitted that he was
aiding and abetting the situation. The court then accepted Banks’s guilty plea.
[¶8.] Two days before his sentencing hearing, Banks notified the court and
counsel that he was planning to offer the testimony of Mike Webb, a polygraph
examiner, regarding the results of a polygraph examination Banks had recently
taken at the jail, which supported his version of the shooting. The polygraph report
states that in the examiner’s opinion, Banks showed “no significant reaction
indicating deception” when he answered “no” to questions regarding whether he had
shot Bonhorst on the date in question.
[¶9.] Prior to the hearing, the State objected to the admission of any
testimony regarding the polygraph examination. The State argued that polygraph
evidence is not admissible at sentencing absent an agreement by the parties, citing
State v. Stevenson, 2002 S.D. 120, 652 N.W.2d 735. The circuit court agreed with
the State and noted that because of the questionable reliability of polygraph
examination results, this Court has consistently held that such evidence is not
admissible in any proceeding and has only affirmed the admission of such evidence
where there was a stipulation or agreement between the parties. The court
therefore ruled that the evidence of Banks’s polygraph examination would not be
admitted at his sentencing hearing.
[¶10.] Banks and Bryant were sentenced at a joint sentencing hearing at
which the circuit court considered evidence of the crime committed relating to both
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defendants, as well as information regarding each defendant’s history and
background. The State asked for sentences consistent with the respective agreed-
upon caps in each defendant’s plea agreement. Banks, however, maintained that he
was not the shooter and urged the circuit court to impose the same sentence for
both defendants.
[¶11.] The circuit court began its remarks by explaining what must be
considered when imposing a sentence, including the gravity of the offense in
comparison to the harshness of the penalty, the character and history of the
defendant, the defendant’s rehabilitation prospects, any expressed remorse, an
appropriate punishment, and deterrence. The court then acknowledged that the
facts were not clear about what had happened in this case. Because there was no
trial, the court noted its reliance on other sources of information, such as police
reports, prior testimony, forensic evidence reports, and the additional information
contained in the presentence investigation reports.
[¶12.] In describing the offense itself, the circuit court acknowledged the
divergent stories of the two defendants. The court related the evidence implicating
both Banks and Bryant and also commented on the evidence in the record which did
or did not support each defendant’s version of the events. Importantly, the court
noted that regardless of the two versions, both men had pled guilty to manslaughter
in the first degree—a killing of another human being with a dangerous weapon. See
SDCL 22-16-15(3). The court further noted that “one who aids and abets this crime
is equally culpable under the law of the State of South Dakota” and that “legally it
does not matter who pulled the trigger.”
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[¶13.] In considering Banks’s history, the court commented on his childhood
during which he resided with his mother and moved frequently. The court noted
Banks’s early use of substances which included smoking marijuana every day since
the age of fourteen and drinking alcohol several times a week. The court also noted
that Banks had been suspended from school on a few occasions, but nevertheless
obtained his GED.
[¶14.] Regarding rehabilitation, the court observed that Banks was only
eighteen years old at the time of the crime but then noted his extensive juvenile
history, which included intensive probation and placements with the Department of
Corrections. The court further observed that previous rehabilitation efforts had not
been effective given that Banks continued to commit crimes very similar to the one
for which he was being sentenced. His criminal history, as noted by the court,
included drug-related charges, curfew violations, intentional damage to property,
theft, second-degree robbery, riot, and assault, and some of these crimes were
committed while Banks was on probation. The court also noted that following the
shooting of Bonhorst, Banks was charged with simple assault for violent acts
against two different women, and according to testimony from Bryant, he and
Banks committed another robbery immediately after their attempted robbery and
shooting of Bonhorst. Additionally, the court mentioned that Banks had been the
subject of many informal disciplinary reports as well as two major violations for
fighting while in jail, and at the time of sentencing, Banks had pending federal
charges involving the theft of firearms.
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[¶15.] As for remorse, the court considered that Banks had pled guilty to the
crime and expressed in court that he was remorseful, but just three days prior,
Banks had joked while talking with his girlfriend by phone at the jail that instead
of getting a tear drop tattoo in prison indicating that he had killed an individual, he
should instead get a tattoo of a slice of pizza. The court concluded its remarks by
noting the devastating impact this crime had on Bonhorst’s family members and the
fact that Bonhorst’s shooting had impacted the entire community’s ability to feel
safe and secure.
[¶16.] Ultimately, the court sentenced Banks, consistent with his plea
agreement, to eighty years in prison, with twenty years suspended. 1 Banks
appeals, raising the single issue of whether the circuit court erred by excluding his
polygraph results from the sentencing hearing.
Analysis
[¶17.] In this appeal, Banks is not directly challenging his sentence per se.
Instead, he challenges the circuit court’s refusal to consider a particular type of
evidence when determining his sentence. “[A] circuit court’s ruling on the
admissibility of evidence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” State
v. Loeschke, 2022 S.D. 56, ¶ 17, 980 N.W.2d 266, 272. “An abuse of discretion is a
fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices.”
State v. Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d 326, 332 (quoting State v. Rice,
2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d 75, 83). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
1. The court sentenced Bryant, in accord with his plea agreement, to fifty years
in prison with twenty-five years suspended.
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circuit court exercises its discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly
against reason and evidence.” State v. Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 967 N.W.2d 144,
147 (quoting State v. Berget, 2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d 45, 52). “This Court . . .
will not overturn the circuit court’s abuse of discretion unless that ‘error is
demonstrated and shown to be prejudicial error.’” Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963
N.W.2d at 332 (quoting State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26, 958 N.W.2d 734, 740).
[¶18.] As the evidentiary ruling at issue here pertains to a sentencing
hearing, we note that “[c]ircuit courts have broad discretion in sentencing” and
when making a sentencing decision, “[c]ourts should consider the traditional
sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence—both individual and general—
rehabilitation, and incapacitation.” Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 28, 958 N.W.2d at
741. “[C]ircuit courts must look at both the person before them and the nature and
impact of the offense.” Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 29, 963 N.W.2d at 333. Regarding
the latter, “courts must consider sentencing evidence tending to mitigate or
aggravate the severity of a defendant’s conduct and its impact on others.
Sentencing courts are often required, in this regard, to accurately assess the ‘true
nature of the offense.’” Id. ¶ 30, 963 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Klinetobe, 2021 S.D.
24, ¶ 36, 958 N.W.2d at 742).
[¶19.] With regard to the information presented to a sentencing court, we
have noted that “the range of evidence that may be considered at sentencing is
extremely broad.” State v. Arabie, 2003 S.D. 57, ¶ 21, 663 N.W.2d 250, 257. This
broad range of information may include evidence that would be inadmissible at
trial, as the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings. Stevenson, 2002
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S.D. 120, ¶ 15, 652 N.W.2d at 740; see also SDCL 19-19-1101(4) (listing sentencing
as one of the situations where the rules of evidence do not apply).
[¶20.] Banks argues that because his polygraph results supported his claim
that he was not the shooter, the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to
admit this mitigating evidence. At oral argument, counsel for Banks urged this
Court to adopt a categorical rule that all evidence that is conceivably mitigating in
nature must be admitted at sentencing. Banks’s argument centers on this Court’s
statements in Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 30, 963 N.W.2d at 333, directing that
mitigating evidence must be considered at sentencing, and the fact that the rules of
evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings. While it is true that circuit courts
have wide latitude in determining what type of evidence may be considered at
sentencing, Banks’s reliance on Mitchell to support his suggestion that any and all
possible mitigating evidence must be admitted without limitation is misplaced.
[¶21.] In Mitchell, the evidence the sentencing court failed to consider
involved the very essence of the crime to which the defendant had pled guilty. Id.
¶ 38, 963 N.W.2d at 335. In pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter under
SDCL 22-16-15(4), the defendant admitted that he had unnecessarily killed another
person while resisting that person’s attempt to commit a crime. Id. ¶ 33, 963
N.W.2d at 334. Thus, the crime for which Mitchell was being sentenced
contemplates criminal conduct by the victim and the exercise of an “imperfect” self-
defense by the defendant. Id. ¶ 36, 963 N.W.2d at 334–35. Because the circuit
court failed to take the victim’s criminal conduct into account when evaluating the
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defendant’s culpability and determining his sentence, we vacated the sentence and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 40, 963 N.W.2d at 335–36.
[¶22.] Here, unlike in Mitchell, the circuit court did not fail to consider
evidence relating to an essential element of the first-degree manslaughter offense to
which Banks had pled guilty. Although Banks maintains that a determination of
which defendant was the shooter was critical to the court’s sentencing
determination, here, the circuit court noted that under the circumstances
surrounding Bonhorst’s shooting, “legally it does not matter who pulled the trigger.”
See SDCL 22-3-3 (“Any person who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of a crime, aids, abets, or advises another person in planning or
committing the crime, is legally accountable, as a principal to the crime.”). While
the role each defendant played may, in some cases, have a mitigating or
aggravating effect on the court’s sentencing determination, the court has broad
discretion to determine what constitutes a mitigating or aggravating circumstance
given the unique facts of each case. 2
[¶23.] As for the other premise on which Banks relies to support his claim
that the polygraph evidence should have been admitted, the fact that the rules of
evidence do not apply at a sentencing hearing does not mean that any and all
2. Notably, in cases involving a shooting and charges against multiple
defendants, a court may find the individual who actually fired the gun to be
less culpable than a co-defendant who instigated the offense or provided the
weapon. See, e.g., Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶¶ 24–25, 877 N.W.2d at 83–84
(rejecting a defendant’s claim that because he was not directly involved with
the shooting, the sentence he received for first-degree manslaughter was
disproportionate to the sentences his co-defendants received for the same
offense).
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evidence proffered by the parties must be considered. Though much less restrictive
than the limitations posed by the rules of evidence, this Court has still placed guard
rails on what can be introduced at a sentencing hearing.
[¶24.] In State v. Berget, in the context of the sentence selection phase of a
capital murder case, the Court acknowledged that while the rules of evidence do not
apply to sentencing, “[t]his does not mean, however, that the sentence-selection
determination is a free-for-all at which any information can be presented to the
sentencing authority, regardless of its reliability.” 2013 S.D. 1, ¶ 65, 826 N.W.2d at
21. In considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence, Berget held that “due
process requires that some minimal indicia of reliability accompany a hearsay
statement.” Id. ¶ 65, 826 N.W.2d at 22. This rule requiring a base level of
reliability before hearsay evidence can be considered at sentencing is generally
applicable to other types of evidence as well. 3
[¶25.] Given the reliability concerns surrounding polygraph evidence, this
Court has established a per se rule prohibiting the admission of polygraph evidence
in criminal and civil cases. State v. Bertram, 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 14, 906 N.W.2d 418,
423–24. We have explained the basis for this per se rule, citing three rules of
evidence, as follows:
3. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly required a base level of
reliability for evidence introduced at sentencing. In rejecting the use of
polygraph evidence at a sentencing hearing in Ortega v. United States, the
Eighth Circuit stated that “although at sentencing a district court may
consider information that would be inadmissible at trial, the information
must have ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’”
270 F.3d 540, 548 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)).
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The rationale advanced for not admitting evidence of polygraph
results, in civil or criminal cases, is that such evidence is
irrelevant because of dubious scientific value [(Rule 402)], it has
no “general scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate
means of ascertaining truth or deception,” it is not reliable
[(Rule 702)], it has no probative value, and it is likely to be given
significant, if not conclusive weight by the jury, so that “the
jurors’ traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the
facts and adjudge guilt or innocence is thereby preempted”
[(Rule 403)].
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sabag v. Cont’l S.D., 374 N.W.2d 349, 353 (S.D.
1985)). Banks notes, however, that Bertram and the cases cited therein pertain to
polygraph evidence offered at trial and the inherent concerns regarding how such
evidence would be considered by a jury. 4 He asserts that because the rules of
evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings, the concerns identified in Bertram
should not preclude a sentencing court from considering polygraph evidence.
[¶26.] This Court has, thus far, only analyzed the use of polygraph evidence
at sentencing hearings in a scenario where such evidence was offered for a
particular purpose relating to a condition in a plea agreement. In State v.
Stevenson, the defendant was required under the terms of her plea agreement to
take a polygraph examination regarding her role in forest fires, the failure of which
would result in a revocation of the agreement. 2002 S.D. 120, ¶ 2, 652 N.W.2d at
737. At the sentencing hearing, the State offered testimony from a polygraph
4. The discussion in Bertram regarding the per se rule prohibiting the
admission of polygraph evidence also noted other decisions by this Court
affirming the exclusion of such evidence. See State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18
(S.D. 1985) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit
polygraph evidence offered by the defendant as impeachment evidence and to
implicate a third-party perpetrator); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588
(S.D. 1985) (affirming the exclusion of polygraph evidence to impeach a
State’s witness).
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examiner to establish that the defendant had failed a polygraph examination
regarding her involvement in a previous fire. Id. ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d at 738. This
evidence was offered in conjunction with the State’s request for leave of the court to
depart from its agreed-upon sentencing recommendation and argue for a more
severe sentence. Id. The circuit court admitted the evidence for this limited
purpose and determined that the defendant had breached the plea agreement by
failing the polygraph examination. The court then granted the State’s request for
leave to argue for a sentence outside the bounds of the plea agreement. Id.
[¶27.] On appeal, the defendant asserted that the circuit court erred in
finding a breach of the plea agreement and allowing the State to seek a greater
sentence, arguing, in part, that the court’s ruling was contrary to this Court’s cases
rejecting the admission of polygraph evidence. Id. ¶ 16, 652 N.W.2d at 741. After
analyzing the prior cases that have addressed such evidence, the Court determined
that the circuit court did not err in allowing the admission of the polygraph
evidence given the circumstances presented, i.e., “where passage of a polygraph was
made a significant part of the [parties’] bargain and where proof of any breach
would necessitate introduction of polygraph evidence.” 5 Id. ¶ 19, 652 N.W.2d at
742.
5. In affirming the admission of the polygraph evidence in Stevenson, the Court
referred to a special writing in Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 771 (S.D.
1990) (Henderson, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part), and the
related opinion this Court issued in State v. Satter, 1996 S.D. 9, 543 N.W.2d
249 after the case was remanded and once again appealed. 2002 S.D. 120,
¶ 18, 652 N.W.2d at 741. The Court observed that the Satter cases “yield a
conclusion that polygraph results may be admitted in legal proceedings . . .
according to the agreement or stipulation of the parties.” Id. ¶ 19, 652
(continued . . .)
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[¶28.] Here, unlike the Stevenson case, there was no agreement or stipulation
between the parties as to the use of polygraph evidence. But even if there had been
such an agreement, Banks seeks to use the results of a polygraph examination, not
to establish whether he passed or failed, but as substantive proof of an underlying
fact in dispute. The Court’s affirmation of the admission of the results of a
polygraph examination in Stevenson for the distinct purpose of showing
noncompliance with a plea agreement does not resolve the reliability concerns
associated with the accuracy of polygraph examinations in determining the truth or
falsity of a disputed fact. Such concerns are present regardless of whether the
polygraph results are being offered at a trial or at a sentencing hearing.
[¶29.] As the United States Supreme Court stated in rejecting a claim that a
rule precluding the admissibility of polygraph evidence is contrary to a defendant’s
constitutional right to present a defense, “there is simply no consensus that
polygraph evidence is reliable.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309, 118 S.
Ct. 1261, 1265, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998). The Court in Scheffer also observed that
“there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph
examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague
even the best polygraph exams.” Id., 523 U.S. at 312, 118 S. Ct. at 1266.
________________________
(. . . continued)
N.W.2d at 742. Notably, however, the statements quoted from these Satter
cases are, at best, dicta, given that the admissibility of polygraph evidence
was not the issue in either case. Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling in
Stevenson supports the general principle that the circuit court has the
discretion to admit polygraph evidence under certain circumstances. But this
does not mean, as Banks suggests, that a sentencing court is required to
admit such evidence simply because the rules of evidence do not apply at
sentencing.
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[¶30.] Further, in contrast to the scenario in Stevenson, the polygraph here
was commissioned by Banks alone and the State did not find out about it until after
it had been administered. As we noted in Bertram, a “privately commissioned
polygraph test, which [is] unknown to the government until after its completion, is
of extremely dubious probative value[.]” 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 18, 906 N.W.2d at 425
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1094
(8th Cir. 2011)).
[¶31.] Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings with polygraph evidence, this
Court has acknowledged the possibility of the admissibility of such evidence in the
future, stating:
We do not foreclose the possibility of reconsidering this per se
rule in the future if presented with an appropriate case.
However, abandoning the per se rule against admitting
polygraph-test results would require, at a minimum, strong
evidence that the technology of polygraphs has advanced to such
a degree that they are generally accepted as reliable in the
scientific community.
Bertram, 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 15 n.6, 906 N.W.2d at 424 n.6. When making his proffer to
the circuit court, Banks did not provide evidence as to any scientific advancement in
polygraph administration or a shift in the consensus among the scientific
community indicating greater confidence in the reliability of the examination
results to support the admission of his polygraph results. 6
6. Banks relies heavily on this Court’s decision in State v. Huettl to support his
claim that evidence otherwise inadmissible at trial because of reliability
concerns may nevertheless be considered at sentencing despite such concerns.
In Huettl, the circuit court relied on the results of a preliminary breath test
(PBT) as a factor in determining its sentence even though the PBT results
had been excluded from trial. 379 N.W.2d 298, 304 (S.D. 1985). Notably,
(continued . . .)
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[¶32.] The circuit court, in refusing to admit Banks’s polygraph evidence
because of reliability concerns, cited extensive research showing that most state and
federal appellate courts considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence at
sentencing have upheld refusals to admit this evidence. See, e.g., Ortega, 270 F.3d
at 548 (citing numerous cases from other appellate courts). While Banks attempts
to distinguish a few of the cases the circuit court cited, he has not refuted the
central point that the weight of the authority is contrary to his position. Moreover,
given this Court’s clearly expressed concerns regarding the reliability of polygraph
evidence, Banks has failed to show how the circuit court’s ruling would be “clearly
against reason and evidence,” Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 967 N.W.2d at 147
(quoting Berget, 2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d at 52), or “outside the range of
permissible choices.” Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d at 332 (quoting Rice,
2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83). We therefore conclude that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered polygraph evidence.
[¶33.] Affirmed.
[¶34.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices,
concur.
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(. . . continued)
however, the defendant’s primary argument on appeal did not relate to the
unreliability of PBT results. Instead, the defendant asserted a lack of
foundation for the admission of this evidence at sentencing because the
witness through whom the evidence was offered was not the person who
administered the PBT. Id. It was in this context (an asserted lack of
foundation) that this Court referred to the rules of evidence not applying at
sentencing hearings and determined that the sentencing court did not err in
admitting the PBT results. Id. These statements in Huettl do not support
Banks’s broad assertion that circuit courts lack the discretion to refuse to
admit evidence with questionable reliability at sentencing hearings.
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