State v. Banks

#29875-a-PJD
2023 S.D. 39

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND CHARLES BANKS, Defendant and Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE ROBIN J. HOUWMAN
Judge

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KRISTI JONES
Sioux Falls, South Dakota

MANUEL J. DE CASTRO JR.
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

PAUL S. SWEDLUND
Solicitor General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.

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ARGUED
MARCH 23, 2023
OPINION FILED 07/26/23
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DEVANEY, Justice

[¶1.] Raymond Banks pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter. Prior to his

sentencing hearing, Banks sought to introduce evidence of a polygraph examination

regarding his role in the crime. The circuit court precluded the admission of the

polygraph evidence and sentenced Banks to eighty years in the penitentiary with

twenty years suspended. Banks appeals, raising the single issue of whether the

circuit court erred in excluding the polygraph evidence in its sentencing

consideration. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

[¶2.] Casey Bonhorst was killed by a single gunshot wound to his neck on

the evening of February 26, 2020, after delivering a pizza to a home in Sioux Falls.

The investigation of this incident led law enforcement to suspect Banks and

Jahennessy Bryant as the perpetrators of the shooting. Bryant was arrested first,

but on August 12, 2020, Banks and Bryant were charged as co-defendants in a five-

count superseding indictment that included two counts of first-degree murder, one

count of second-degree murder, one count of first-degree manslaughter, and one

count of attempted first-degree robbery.

[¶3.] Throughout the entirety of the proceedings, Banks and Bryant have

maintained differing accounts of the events that transpired leading to Bonhorst’s

death. Both agreed that while walking from Banks’s girlfriend’s apartment to the

duplex where Banks’s aunt resided, they noticed a Domino’s delivery vehicle parked

outside the duplex. According to Bryant, Banks suggested that they rob the

delivery man, but Banks claimed it was Bryant’s idea.

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[¶4.] As to the subsequent events, Bryant testified at a pretrial hearing that

Banks approached Bonhorst, pulled a gun on him, and told him, “Don’t move or

anything, try anything stupid.” Bryant explained that he started moving toward

Banks to help him by holding Bonhorst from behind, but then he heard gunshots.

After the shooting, both he and Banks took off running in different directions.

[¶5.] The roles were essentially reversed in Banks’s version of the events,

with Bryant being the shooter and Banks serving as the lookout. Banks claimed

that he stayed back behind the house as a lookout while Bryant walked up to

Bonhorst and put the gun in his face. According to Banks, Bonhorst threw some

change at Bryant and lunged at him. Bryant reacted by pulling the trigger, after

which they both fled the scene.

[¶6.] In November 2020, both defendants moved to sever their cases and the

circuit court granted their motions. Bryant subsequently entered into a plea

agreement with the State, pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter in exchange

for a cap on his sentence of twenty-five years in prison with twenty-five additional

years suspended. As part of his plea agreement, Bryant was required to testify

against Banks.

[¶7.] Later, Banks also pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter. His

agreement capped the prison time he would have to serve at sixty years with the

possibility of more time suspended. At Banks’s change of plea hearing, the State

described the factual basis for the plea in accord with Bryant’s version of the events,

with Banks being the shooter. Banks contested this factual basis and alleged that

while the underlying facts provided by the State were true, the roles were reversed.

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Banks claimed Bryant was the shooter but acknowledged to the court that he knew

a robbery was going to occur and that he stood by as a lookout. In response to

further questions from the court about his actions, Banks admitted that he was

aiding and abetting the situation. The court then accepted Banks’s guilty plea.

[¶8.] Two days before his sentencing hearing, Banks notified the court and

counsel that he was planning to offer the testimony of Mike Webb, a polygraph

examiner, regarding the results of a polygraph examination Banks had recently

taken at the jail, which supported his version of the shooting. The polygraph report

states that in the examiner’s opinion, Banks showed “no significant reaction

indicating deception” when he answered “no” to questions regarding whether he had

shot Bonhorst on the date in question.

[¶9.] Prior to the hearing, the State objected to the admission of any

testimony regarding the polygraph examination. The State argued that polygraph

evidence is not admissible at sentencing absent an agreement by the parties, citing

State v. Stevenson, 2002 S.D. 120, 652 N.W.2d 735. The circuit court agreed with

the State and noted that because of the questionable reliability of polygraph

examination results, this Court has consistently held that such evidence is not

admissible in any proceeding and has only affirmed the admission of such evidence

where there was a stipulation or agreement between the parties. The court

therefore ruled that the evidence of Banks’s polygraph examination would not be

admitted at his sentencing hearing.

[¶10.] Banks and Bryant were sentenced at a joint sentencing hearing at

which the circuit court considered evidence of the crime committed relating to both

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defendants, as well as information regarding each defendant’s history and

background. The State asked for sentences consistent with the respective agreed-

upon caps in each defendant’s plea agreement. Banks, however, maintained that he

was not the shooter and urged the circuit court to impose the same sentence for

both defendants.

[¶11.] The circuit court began its remarks by explaining what must be

considered when imposing a sentence, including the gravity of the offense in

comparison to the harshness of the penalty, the character and history of the

defendant, the defendant’s rehabilitation prospects, any expressed remorse, an

appropriate punishment, and deterrence. The court then acknowledged that the

facts were not clear about what had happened in this case. Because there was no

trial, the court noted its reliance on other sources of information, such as police

reports, prior testimony, forensic evidence reports, and the additional information

contained in the presentence investigation reports.

[¶12.] In describing the offense itself, the circuit court acknowledged the

divergent stories of the two defendants. The court related the evidence implicating

both Banks and Bryant and also commented on the evidence in the record which did

or did not support each defendant’s version of the events. Importantly, the court

noted that regardless of the two versions, both men had pled guilty to manslaughter

in the first degree—a killing of another human being with a dangerous weapon. See

SDCL 22-16-15(3). The court further noted that “one who aids and abets this crime

is equally culpable under the law of the State of South Dakota” and that “legally it

does not matter who pulled the trigger.”

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[¶13.] In considering Banks’s history, the court commented on his childhood

during which he resided with his mother and moved frequently. The court noted

Banks’s early use of substances which included smoking marijuana every day since

the age of fourteen and drinking alcohol several times a week. The court also noted

that Banks had been suspended from school on a few occasions, but nevertheless

obtained his GED.

[¶14.] Regarding rehabilitation, the court observed that Banks was only

eighteen years old at the time of the crime but then noted his extensive juvenile

history, which included intensive probation and placements with the Department of

Corrections. The court further observed that previous rehabilitation efforts had not

been effective given that Banks continued to commit crimes very similar to the one

for which he was being sentenced. His criminal history, as noted by the court,

included drug-related charges, curfew violations, intentional damage to property,

theft, second-degree robbery, riot, and assault, and some of these crimes were

committed while Banks was on probation. The court also noted that following the

shooting of Bonhorst, Banks was charged with simple assault for violent acts

against two different women, and according to testimony from Bryant, he and

Banks committed another robbery immediately after their attempted robbery and

shooting of Bonhorst. Additionally, the court mentioned that Banks had been the

subject of many informal disciplinary reports as well as two major violations for

fighting while in jail, and at the time of sentencing, Banks had pending federal

charges involving the theft of firearms.

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[¶15.] As for remorse, the court considered that Banks had pled guilty to the

crime and expressed in court that he was remorseful, but just three days prior,

Banks had joked while talking with his girlfriend by phone at the jail that instead

of getting a tear drop tattoo in prison indicating that he had killed an individual, he

should instead get a tattoo of a slice of pizza. The court concluded its remarks by

noting the devastating impact this crime had on Bonhorst’s family members and the

fact that Bonhorst’s shooting had impacted the entire community’s ability to feel

safe and secure.

[¶16.] Ultimately, the court sentenced Banks, consistent with his plea

agreement, to eighty years in prison, with twenty years suspended. 1 Banks

appeals, raising the single issue of whether the circuit court erred by excluding his

polygraph results from the sentencing hearing.

Analysis

[¶17.] In this appeal, Banks is not directly challenging his sentence per se.

Instead, he challenges the circuit court’s refusal to consider a particular type of

evidence when determining his sentence. “[A] circuit court’s ruling on the

admissibility of evidence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” State

v. Loeschke, 2022 S.D. 56, ¶ 17, 980 N.W.2d 266, 272. “An abuse of discretion is a

fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices.”

State v. Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d 326, 332 (quoting State v. Rice,

2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d 75, 83). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the

1. The court sentenced Bryant, in accord with his plea agreement, to fifty years
in prison with twenty-five years suspended.

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circuit court exercises its discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly

against reason and evidence.” State v. Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 967 N.W.2d 144,

147 (quoting State v. Berget, 2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d 45, 52). “This Court . . .

will not overturn the circuit court’s abuse of discretion unless that ‘error is

demonstrated and shown to be prejudicial error.’” Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963

N.W.2d at 332 (quoting State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26, 958 N.W.2d 734, 740).

[¶18.] As the evidentiary ruling at issue here pertains to a sentencing

hearing, we note that “[c]ircuit courts have broad discretion in sentencing” and

when making a sentencing decision, “[c]ourts should consider the traditional

sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence—both individual and general—

rehabilitation, and incapacitation.” Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 28, 958 N.W.2d at

741. “[C]ircuit courts must look at both the person before them and the nature and

impact of the offense.” Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 29, 963 N.W.2d at 333. Regarding

the latter, “courts must consider sentencing evidence tending to mitigate or

aggravate the severity of a defendant’s conduct and its impact on others.

Sentencing courts are often required, in this regard, to accurately assess the ‘true

nature of the offense.’” Id. ¶ 30, 963 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Klinetobe, 2021 S.D.

24, ¶ 36, 958 N.W.2d at 742).

[¶19.] With regard to the information presented to a sentencing court, we

have noted that “the range of evidence that may be considered at sentencing is

extremely broad.” State v. Arabie, 2003 S.D. 57, ¶ 21, 663 N.W.2d 250, 257. This

broad range of information may include evidence that would be inadmissible at

trial, as the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings. Stevenson, 2002

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S.D. 120, ¶ 15, 652 N.W.2d at 740; see also SDCL 19-19-1101(4) (listing sentencing

as one of the situations where the rules of evidence do not apply).

[¶20.] Banks argues that because his polygraph results supported his claim

that he was not the shooter, the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to

admit this mitigating evidence. At oral argument, counsel for Banks urged this

Court to adopt a categorical rule that all evidence that is conceivably mitigating in

nature must be admitted at sentencing. Banks’s argument centers on this Court’s

statements in Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 30, 963 N.W.2d at 333, directing that

mitigating evidence must be considered at sentencing, and the fact that the rules of

evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings. While it is true that circuit courts

have wide latitude in determining what type of evidence may be considered at

sentencing, Banks’s reliance on Mitchell to support his suggestion that any and all

possible mitigating evidence must be admitted without limitation is misplaced.

[¶21.] In Mitchell, the evidence the sentencing court failed to consider

involved the very essence of the crime to which the defendant had pled guilty. Id.

¶ 38, 963 N.W.2d at 335. In pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter under

SDCL 22-16-15(4), the defendant admitted that he had unnecessarily killed another

person while resisting that person’s attempt to commit a crime. Id. ¶ 33, 963

N.W.2d at 334. Thus, the crime for which Mitchell was being sentenced

contemplates criminal conduct by the victim and the exercise of an “imperfect” self-

defense by the defendant. Id. ¶ 36, 963 N.W.2d at 334–35. Because the circuit

court failed to take the victim’s criminal conduct into account when evaluating the

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defendant’s culpability and determining his sentence, we vacated the sentence and

remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 40, 963 N.W.2d at 335–36.

[¶22.] Here, unlike in Mitchell, the circuit court did not fail to consider

evidence relating to an essential element of the first-degree manslaughter offense to

which Banks had pled guilty. Although Banks maintains that a determination of

which defendant was the shooter was critical to the court’s sentencing

determination, here, the circuit court noted that under the circumstances

surrounding Bonhorst’s shooting, “legally it does not matter who pulled the trigger.”

See SDCL 22-3-3 (“Any person who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the

commission of a crime, aids, abets, or advises another person in planning or

committing the crime, is legally accountable, as a principal to the crime.”). While

the role each defendant played may, in some cases, have a mitigating or

aggravating effect on the court’s sentencing determination, the court has broad

discretion to determine what constitutes a mitigating or aggravating circumstance

given the unique facts of each case. 2

[¶23.] As for the other premise on which Banks relies to support his claim

that the polygraph evidence should have been admitted, the fact that the rules of

evidence do not apply at a sentencing hearing does not mean that any and all

2. Notably, in cases involving a shooting and charges against multiple
defendants, a court may find the individual who actually fired the gun to be
less culpable than a co-defendant who instigated the offense or provided the
weapon. See, e.g., Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶¶ 24–25, 877 N.W.2d at 83–84
(rejecting a defendant’s claim that because he was not directly involved with
the shooting, the sentence he received for first-degree manslaughter was
disproportionate to the sentences his co-defendants received for the same
offense).

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evidence proffered by the parties must be considered. Though much less restrictive

than the limitations posed by the rules of evidence, this Court has still placed guard

rails on what can be introduced at a sentencing hearing.

[¶24.] In State v. Berget, in the context of the sentence selection phase of a

capital murder case, the Court acknowledged that while the rules of evidence do not

apply to sentencing, “[t]his does not mean, however, that the sentence-selection

determination is a free-for-all at which any information can be presented to the

sentencing authority, regardless of its reliability.” 2013 S.D. 1, ¶ 65, 826 N.W.2d at

21. In considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence, Berget held that “due

process requires that some minimal indicia of reliability accompany a hearsay

statement.” Id. ¶ 65, 826 N.W.2d at 22. This rule requiring a base level of

reliability before hearsay evidence can be considered at sentencing is generally

applicable to other types of evidence as well. 3

[¶25.] Given the reliability concerns surrounding polygraph evidence, this

Court has established a per se rule prohibiting the admission of polygraph evidence

in criminal and civil cases. State v. Bertram, 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 14, 906 N.W.2d 418,

423–24. We have explained the basis for this per se rule, citing three rules of

evidence, as follows:

3. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly required a base level of
reliability for evidence introduced at sentencing. In rejecting the use of
polygraph evidence at a sentencing hearing in Ortega v. United States, the
Eighth Circuit stated that “although at sentencing a district court may
consider information that would be inadmissible at trial, the information
must have ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’”
270 F.3d 540, 548 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)).

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The rationale advanced for not admitting evidence of polygraph
results, in civil or criminal cases, is that such evidence is
irrelevant because of dubious scientific value [(Rule 402)], it has
no “general scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate
means of ascertaining truth or deception,” it is not reliable
[(Rule 702)], it has no probative value, and it is likely to be given
significant, if not conclusive weight by the jury, so that “the
jurors’ traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the
facts and adjudge guilt or innocence is thereby preempted”
[(Rule 403)].

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sabag v. Cont’l S.D., 374 N.W.2d 349, 353 (S.D.

1985)). Banks notes, however, that Bertram and the cases cited therein pertain to

polygraph evidence offered at trial and the inherent concerns regarding how such

evidence would be considered by a jury. 4 He asserts that because the rules of

evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings, the concerns identified in Bertram

should not preclude a sentencing court from considering polygraph evidence.

[¶26.] This Court has, thus far, only analyzed the use of polygraph evidence

at sentencing hearings in a scenario where such evidence was offered for a

particular purpose relating to a condition in a plea agreement. In State v.

Stevenson, the defendant was required under the terms of her plea agreement to

take a polygraph examination regarding her role in forest fires, the failure of which

would result in a revocation of the agreement. 2002 S.D. 120, ¶ 2, 652 N.W.2d at

737. At the sentencing hearing, the State offered testimony from a polygraph

4. The discussion in Bertram regarding the per se rule prohibiting the
admission of polygraph evidence also noted other decisions by this Court
affirming the exclusion of such evidence. See State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18
(S.D. 1985) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit
polygraph evidence offered by the defendant as impeachment evidence and to
implicate a third-party perpetrator); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588
(S.D. 1985) (affirming the exclusion of polygraph evidence to impeach a
State’s witness).

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examiner to establish that the defendant had failed a polygraph examination

regarding her involvement in a previous fire. Id. ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d at 738. This

evidence was offered in conjunction with the State’s request for leave of the court to

depart from its agreed-upon sentencing recommendation and argue for a more

severe sentence. Id. The circuit court admitted the evidence for this limited

purpose and determined that the defendant had breached the plea agreement by

failing the polygraph examination. The court then granted the State’s request for

leave to argue for a sentence outside the bounds of the plea agreement. Id.

[¶27.] On appeal, the defendant asserted that the circuit court erred in

finding a breach of the plea agreement and allowing the State to seek a greater

sentence, arguing, in part, that the court’s ruling was contrary to this Court’s cases

rejecting the admission of polygraph evidence. Id. ¶ 16, 652 N.W.2d at 741. After

analyzing the prior cases that have addressed such evidence, the Court determined

that the circuit court did not err in allowing the admission of the polygraph

evidence given the circumstances presented, i.e., “where passage of a polygraph was

made a significant part of the [parties’] bargain and where proof of any breach

would necessitate introduction of polygraph evidence.” 5 Id. ¶ 19, 652 N.W.2d at

742.

5. In affirming the admission of the polygraph evidence in Stevenson, the Court
referred to a special writing in Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 771 (S.D.
1990) (Henderson, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part), and the
related opinion this Court issued in State v. Satter, 1996 S.D. 9, 543 N.W.2d
249 after the case was remanded and once again appealed. 2002 S.D. 120,
¶ 18, 652 N.W.2d at 741. The Court observed that the Satter cases “yield a
conclusion that polygraph results may be admitted in legal proceedings . . .
according to the agreement or stipulation of the parties.” Id. ¶ 19, 652
(continued . . .)
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[¶28.] Here, unlike the Stevenson case, there was no agreement or stipulation

between the parties as to the use of polygraph evidence. But even if there had been

such an agreement, Banks seeks to use the results of a polygraph examination, not

to establish whether he passed or failed, but as substantive proof of an underlying

fact in dispute. The Court’s affirmation of the admission of the results of a

polygraph examination in Stevenson for the distinct purpose of showing

noncompliance with a plea agreement does not resolve the reliability concerns

associated with the accuracy of polygraph examinations in determining the truth or

falsity of a disputed fact. Such concerns are present regardless of whether the

polygraph results are being offered at a trial or at a sentencing hearing.

[¶29.] As the United States Supreme Court stated in rejecting a claim that a

rule precluding the admissibility of polygraph evidence is contrary to a defendant’s

constitutional right to present a defense, “there is simply no consensus that

polygraph evidence is reliable.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309, 118 S.

Ct. 1261, 1265, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998). The Court in Scheffer also observed that

“there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph

examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague

even the best polygraph exams.” Id., 523 U.S. at 312, 118 S. Ct. at 1266.

________________________
(. . . continued)
N.W.2d at 742. Notably, however, the statements quoted from these Satter
cases are, at best, dicta, given that the admissibility of polygraph evidence
was not the issue in either case. Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling in
Stevenson supports the general principle that the circuit court has the
discretion to admit polygraph evidence under certain circumstances. But this
does not mean, as Banks suggests, that a sentencing court is required to
admit such evidence simply because the rules of evidence do not apply at
sentencing.

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[¶30.] Further, in contrast to the scenario in Stevenson, the polygraph here

was commissioned by Banks alone and the State did not find out about it until after

it had been administered. As we noted in Bertram, a “privately commissioned

polygraph test, which [is] unknown to the government until after its completion, is

of extremely dubious probative value[.]” 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 18, 906 N.W.2d at 425

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1094

(8th Cir. 2011)).

[¶31.] Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings with polygraph evidence, this

Court has acknowledged the possibility of the admissibility of such evidence in the

future, stating:

We do not foreclose the possibility of reconsidering this per se
rule in the future if presented with an appropriate case.
However, abandoning the per se rule against admitting
polygraph-test results would require, at a minimum, strong
evidence that the technology of polygraphs has advanced to such
a degree that they are generally accepted as reliable in the
scientific community.

Bertram, 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 15 n.6, 906 N.W.2d at 424 n.6. When making his proffer to

the circuit court, Banks did not provide evidence as to any scientific advancement in

polygraph administration or a shift in the consensus among the scientific

community indicating greater confidence in the reliability of the examination

results to support the admission of his polygraph results. 6

6. Banks relies heavily on this Court’s decision in State v. Huettl to support his
claim that evidence otherwise inadmissible at trial because of reliability
concerns may nevertheless be considered at sentencing despite such concerns.
In Huettl, the circuit court relied on the results of a preliminary breath test
(PBT) as a factor in determining its sentence even though the PBT results
had been excluded from trial. 379 N.W.2d 298, 304 (S.D. 1985). Notably,
(continued . . .)
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[¶32.] The circuit court, in refusing to admit Banks’s polygraph evidence

because of reliability concerns, cited extensive research showing that most state and

federal appellate courts considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence at

sentencing have upheld refusals to admit this evidence. See, e.g., Ortega, 270 F.3d

at 548 (citing numerous cases from other appellate courts). While Banks attempts

to distinguish a few of the cases the circuit court cited, he has not refuted the

central point that the weight of the authority is contrary to his position. Moreover,

given this Court’s clearly expressed concerns regarding the reliability of polygraph

evidence, Banks has failed to show how the circuit court’s ruling would be “clearly

against reason and evidence,” Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 967 N.W.2d at 147

(quoting Berget, 2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d at 52), or “outside the range of

permissible choices.” Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d at 332 (quoting Rice,

2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83). We therefore conclude that the circuit court

did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered polygraph evidence.

[¶33.] Affirmed.

[¶34.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices,

concur.

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(. . . continued)
however, the defendant’s primary argument on appeal did not relate to the
unreliability of PBT results. Instead, the defendant asserted a lack of
foundation for the admission of this evidence at sentencing because the
witness through whom the evidence was offered was not the person who
administered the PBT. Id. It was in this context (an asserted lack of
foundation) that this Court referred to the rules of evidence not applying at
sentencing hearings and determined that the sentencing court did not err in
admitting the PBT results. Id. These statements in Huettl do not support
Banks’s broad assertion that circuit courts lack the discretion to refuse to
admit evidence with questionable reliability at sentencing hearings.

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