Jorge A. Resendiz Jr. v. Mandi Marie Martinez

NUMBER 13-22-00060-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JORGE A. RESENDIZ JR, Appellant,

v.

MANDI MARIE MARTINEZ, Appellee.

On appeal from the 135th District Court
of DeWitt County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Jorge A. Resendiz Jr. challenges the trial court’s final divorce decree

arguing the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) ordering that appellee Mandi Marie

Martinez determine when, where, “and even if” Resendiz can see his children and that

said visitation be supervised; (2) naming Martinez sole managing conservator;

(3) ordering an amount of child support that deviated from the guidelines; and
(4) inequitably dividing the estate of the parties. We affirm in part and reverse and remand

in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Martinez filed for divorce from Resendiz and sought to be named joint managing

conservators of their children A.R. and C.R. 1 After Martinez filed her petition for divorce,

she and Resendiz agreed to temporary orders which were signed by the trial court in

January 2021. In the temporary orders as it relates to conservatorship and possession of

the children, the parties agreed to be joint managing conservators with a modified

standard possession order. Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing held on October

28, 2021, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that appointed Martinez as sole

managing conservator and Resendiz as possessory conservator. At the time the order

was entered, Resendiz was in custody in federal prison. The decree stated that during

his incarceration, Resendiz was not entitled to possession of or access to the children

and that upon his release, any periods of possession or access to the children would be

at “times and locations agreed upon in advance by” Mandi and under her supervision.

The decree further ordered Resendiz to pay $800 per month in child support.

As it related to the division of property, Martinez was awarded the vast majority of

the property, including, but not limited to, the martial home and all of its contents, all lawn

equipment, and two vehicles. Resendiz was awarded: a kayak, fishing gear, a Yeti cooler,

all personal effects in his possession, all sums of cash in his possession, and all life

insurance policies insuring his own life.

1 To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the children by their initials or an alias.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(a).
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 Resendiz filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of law. This

appeal followed. 2

II. CONSERVATORSHIP AND POSSESSION

By his first two issues, Resendiz challenges the trial court’s determinations related

to conservatorship and possession of the children.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court

in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”

In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002).

“[C]onservatorship determinations are ‘intensely fact driven.’” Id. (quoting Lenz v. Lenz,

79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002)). For this reason, “the trial court is in the best position to

‘observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can “feel” the forces,

powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record.’” Id.

(quoting Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)). “A

trial court’s determination of what is in the child’s best interest, specifically the

establishment of terms and conditions of conservatorship, is a discretionary function.” Id.

“The trial court’s judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a

whole that the court has abused its discretion.” Id.

“A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts ‘without reference to any guiding

rules or principles; or in other words, [when it acts] arbitrarily or unreasonably.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per

2 Martinez has not filed a brief to assist this Court in the resolution of this matter.

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curiam)); see also Lee v. Melinda A.S., No. 02-14-00135-CV, 2015 WL 7820584, at *10

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2015, no. pet.) (mem. op.). An abuse of discretion occurs

when “[a] trial court . . . imposes restrictions that exceed those required to protect the

child’s best interest.” In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *30 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.D.C., 474 S.W.3d

758, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). To determine whether a trial

court abused its discretion in modifying a parent’s possession, we look to whether the trial

court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion, and, if so, whether it

acted reasonably in applying its discretion based on the information before it. In re M.M.S.,

256 S.W.3d 470, 476 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Challenges to the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of review but are relevant

factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. “There is no abuse

of discretion so long as some evidence of a substantive and probative character supports

the trial court’s decision.” Id.

The relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. Quilloin v.

Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). A parent’s right to the care and custody of his child is

a fundamental liberty interest more precious than property rights. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d

534, 547–48 (Tex. 2003) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982)). It is

the public policy of the state of Texas to maintain ongoing, healthy relationships between

parents and children where it is shown to be appropriate. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001.

The findings necessary to support the trial court’s conservatorship decisions against the

parent need be supported by only a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and

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convincing evidence. See id. § 105.005; In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007).

Under this standard, “evidence is legally sufficient when it would ‘enable reasonable and

fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review’” and is “factually insufficient ‘only if

it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and

unjust.’” In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 611 (first quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d

802, 827 (Tex. 2005), then quoting Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per

curiam)).

B. Analysis

Resendiz argues that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that

the standard possession order is in the childrens’ best interest and provides the

reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent named as joint managing

conservator. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252. Resendiz contends that there was no

evidence to support the trial court’s deviation from the standard possession order, nor to

support the modification of the parties from joint managing conservators to Martinez as

sole managing conservator and Resendiz as possessory conservator.

1. Possession

At the hearing for final orders, Martinez’s testimony as it related to possession and

visitation was as follows:

[Martinez’s Counsel]: And it will just be upon [Resendiz’s] release. It
will be at your discretion as to days and times
that he might have visits?

[Martinez]: Yes.

[Martinez’s Counsel]: And it will be at your discretion to supervise
those visits or designate somebody to supervise

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 those visits; is that correct?

[Martinez]: Yes, ma’am.

[Martinez’s Counsel]: And do you think that’s in the best interest of the
children?

[Martinez]: Yes.

...

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Okay. And with regards to the children, after you
and Mr. Resendiz separated, was Mr. Resendiz
visiting with the children?

[Martinez]: Yes, he was.

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: How often was he visiting?

[Martinez]: Every other weekend, and then I—we also had
a very good communication when it was just,
you know, [h]ey, the kids miss you. Come pick
them up. And he would go pick them up. So[,] I
wasn’t opposed to that either.

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Okay. Were there any problems with your
children coming back from the visits?

[Martinez]: Besides their attitudes, no.

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Were they otherwise fed and treated properly?

[Martinez]: Yes, of course.

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Okay. But you’re asking that the visits, once he’s
released, be kind of limited at your discretion,
correct?

[Martinez]: Yes.

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Why is it that you are opposed to him resuming
his standard visitation upon his release from
prison?

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 [Martinez]: Just like I had just mentioned, the kids,
whenever me and their father were married,
they listened and endured a lot of verbal abuse.
And so technically whenever they do come
back, I would always see a different version of
them and what their father would allow and
manners of, like, speaking terms, like, how they
spoke to me, the type of aggression that they
had towards me. So[,] it would just make me
consider, like, what was actually being said
whenever he—whenever they were with him.

[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Did you at any point stop the visitation?

[Martinez]: No.

Resendiz argues that on this testimony alone, there was insufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s order deviating from the standard possession order. While a trial

court is given wide latitude in determining issues pertaining to possession and access,

there is a rebuttable presumption that the standard possession order: (1) provides

reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent named as a possessory

conservator or joint managing conservator; and (2) is in the best interest of the child. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252. The trial court may deviate from the standard possession

order if there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. See In re N.P.M., 509 S.W.3d

560, 564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). When deviating from the standard

possession order, the trial court may consider: (1) the age, developmental status,

circumstances, needs, and best interest of the child; (2) the circumstances of the

managing conservator and of the parent named as a possessory conservator; and (3) any

other relevant factor. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.256. We analyze the best interest of the

children using the Holley factors, as relevant here: (1) the children’s desires, (2) the

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children’s present and future emotional and physical needs, (3) emotional and physical

danger posed to the children now and in the future, (4) the parenting abilities of the

individuals seeking custody, (5) programs available to assist the would-be parents, (6) the

individuals’ or agency’s plans for the child, (7) the stability of the proposed homes, (8) any

acts or omissions by the parent that might show an improper parent–child relationship,

and (9) any excuse for such acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–

72 (Tex. 1976).

Section 153.006(c) of the Family Code allows the trial court to issue a
nonspecific order regarding a possessory conservator's possession and
access when “good cause” exists, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 153.006(c),
while section 153.193 places an outer limit on the permissible scope of
restrictions on a parent possessory conservator’s rights: such “restrictions
or limitations on a parent’s right to possession of or access to a child may
not exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the child,”
id. § 153.193. Thus, in rare cases, a severe restriction or limitation is
permissible if it is in the best interest of the child. See In re Walters, 39
S.W.3d 280, 286 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).

In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 220 (Tex. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. R.S. C. v. Tex.

Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 212 L. Ed. 2d 24, 142 S. Ct. 1139 (2022).

The evidence before the trial court is Martinez’s testimony that she did not like the

“manners” of the children after they visited with Resendiz. Martinez also stated the

children witnessed and endured “verbal abuse” during her marriage with Resendiz,

however Martinez did not elaborate, and that was the extent of her testimony regarding

the children witnessesing and enduring “verbal abuse.” To the contrary, Martinez further

testified that during his periods of possession, Resendiz cared for the children and treated

them properly. Additionally, she explained that the children would inform her that they

missed Resendiz and she would communicate that to Resendiz and he would take the

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children for a visit. Martinez’s testimony sets forth that the children desired to see

Resendiz, that their needs were met, and that Resendiz cared for them properly during

his periods of possession. This evidence, when viewed in light of the Holley factors, does

not rebut the presumption that a standard possession order was proper. 3

Additionally, the order put into place by the trial court allows Martinez to determine

when, where, and how often Resendiz is allowed to see his children and effectively denies

Resendiz’s access to his children. Many of our sister courts have held that such an order,

which could allow the other parent to deny access to the children completely, absent

sufficient evidence, is an abuse of discretion. See In re A.P.S., 54 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding) (finding that the trial court’s order allowing

father “complete discretion” over mother’s possession of children was an abuse of

discretion); In re Lemons, 47 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, orig.

proceeding) (explaining that the trial court’s order giving father “complete discretion to

determine when, where, and if” mother may have possession or access to child

constituted an abuse of discretion); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 451-52 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (providing that the trial court’s order

requiring mother’s approval for father’s visitation, which was not enforceable by contempt,

was erroneous); Wright v. Wentzel, 749 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1988, no writ) (holding that the trial court’s order making mother’s visitation

3 The trial court also heard testimony from Martinez that Resendiz was incarcerated in federal

prison. The record does not provide Resendiz’s release date or the terms of his incarceration. The parties
agreed, and Resendiz does not dispute on appeal, that the terms of the possession order would not be in
effect until his release from federal prison. The parties agreed that the children would not see Resendiz
during his period of incarceration.
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contingent on father’s consent was error); Hill v. Hill, 404 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, no writ) (holding that the trial court’s order making father’s

visitation contingent on mother’s prior written consent denied father the ability to enforce

the judgment by contempt and was an abuse of discretion). An order providing Martinez

sole discretion to determine when, where, and if Resendiz would have visitation is not

inherently an abuse of discretion; however, such a secerely restrictive order constitutes

an abuse of discretion absent sufficient evidence that it was in the best interests of the

children. See Interest of J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 221.

The trial court is required to fashion an order that specifically articulates the times

and conditions of Resendiz’s access to the children upon his release from incarceration.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.006. Because the order in the present case severely

restricts and limits Resendiz’s access to the children, because these restrictions and

limitations were not shown to be in the children’s best interests, and because good cause

as to why specific orders were inappropriate was not shown, we find that the trial court

abused its discretion. See Interest of J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 221.

Resendiz’s first point of error is sustained.

2. Conservatorship

Both Martinez’s testimony and her pleadings requested that she and Resendiz be

named joint managing conservators of the children. Resendiz contends that the trial court

erred in appointing Martinez as sole managing conservator and Resendiz as possessory

conservator absent sufficient evidence to determine such an appointment was in the best

interests of the children.

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 It is presumed that the appointment of both parents of a child as joint managing

conservators is in the best interest of the child unless the court finds the appointment

would not be in the best interest of the child because it would significantly impair the

child’s physical health or mental development. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a).

“When determining fitness of a parent, the material time to consider is the present.” In re

K.R.B., No. 02-10-00021-CV, 2010 WL 3928727, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 7,

2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). At the time that the court entered its final decree, it was

undisputed that Resendiz was incarcerated in federal prison. Accordingly, at the present

time, he was unable to care for the children and it was not an abuse of discretion to

designate Resendiz as a possessory conservator.

We overrule Resendiz’s second issue. 4

III. CHILD SUPPORT

By his third issue, Resendiz challenges the trial court’s order setting child support

in the amount of $800 per month. Resendiz argues that the amount awarded was not

supported by the evidence and testimony presented and accordingly was unreasonable

in light of the guidelines in the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.121.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

Most of the appealable issues in a family-law case, including issues related to child

support, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reddick v. Reddick, 450 S.W.3d 182,

187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Thus, we will not disturb a trial court’s

4 We note that upon his release from federal prison, Resendiz has the option of seeking a
modification of the order establishing conservatorship or possession and access. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 156.101. We pass no judgment on the merits of any such claim, should Resendiz choose to pursue a
modification.
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modification of a child support obligation absent a clear abuse of discretion. See In re

K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.); In re H.J.W., 302 S.W.3d

511, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706. A trial court

abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without any reference to

guiding rules and principles. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). In

making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment. In re K.M.B.,

606 S.W.3d at 894; Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706.

Challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent

grounds of review but are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused

its discretion. In re M.M.S., 256 S.W.3d at 476. “There is no abuse of discretion so long

as some evidence of a substantive and probative character supports the trial court’s

decision.” Id.

The Texas Family Code establishes guidelines for setting monthly child support

obligations in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. See Grotewold v. Meyer, 457

S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The first step in

determining a monthly child support obligation is to calculate, if feasible, the gross annual

resources of the obligor parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.061(a) (requiring, when

feasible, calculation of gross income on annual basis); Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 538

S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Grotewold, 457 S.W.3d at 534; see

also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.062(b) (listing income to be included in calculation of

parent’s resources). Resources include several types of income, including “all other

12
income actually being received.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.062(a), (b); see also In re

P.C.S., 320 S.W.3d 525, 537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (noting that the

language of Texas Family Code § 154.062(b) indicates the Legislature intended “all

receipts of money that are not specifically excluded by the statute . . . whether

nonrecurring or periodic, whether derived from the obligor[ ][parent’s] capital or labor or

from that of others, must be included in the definition of ‘resources’”).

Pursuant to Texas Family Code § 154.068:

(a) In the absence of evidence of a party’s resources, as defined by
Section 154.062(b), the court shall presume that the party has
income equal to the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour week to
which the support guidelines may be applied.

(b) The presumption required by Subsection (a) does not apply if the
court finds that the party is subject to an order of confinement that
exceeds 90 days and is incarcerated in a local, state, or federal jail
or prison at the time the court makes the determination regarding the
party’s income.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.068.

In this case, the trial court made no findings of fact, and Resendiz requested none.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 297. “Therefore, we assume the trial court found all facts to

support the judgment, and we will affirm the judgment if there is any legal theory

supported by the record to justify it.” See In re M.M., 980 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

B. Analysis

Resendiz contends that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to calculate his

net resources, because no evidence established his income or capability for earning

income. He maintains that, in the absence of such evidence, the trial court was required

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to “presume that [he] has wages or salary equal to the federal minimum wage for a 40–

hour week.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.068.

We agree that the record reveals no evidence concerning Resendiz’s employment,

wages, salary, or income. No documents were submitted into evidence demonstrating

Resendiz’s monthly salary. Martinez testified that prior to Resendiz’s incarceration, “he

had a very good income” but went on to state that she “didn’t really understand or know

about” Resendiz’s occupation or source of income. While Martinez made an assertion

that she believed Resendiz had “about $200,000” in cash savings somewhere, there was

no calculation regarding Resendiz’s net resources. Because the record contains no

evidence of Resendiz’s salary, wages, or earning income, we conclude there was

insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that Resendiz pay $800 per month

in child support. See Miles v. Peacock, 229 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“There must be some evidence of a substantive and probative

character of net resources” in order for the trial court to discharge its duty to calculate

monthly net resources).

We sustain Resendiz’s third issue.

IV. DIVISION OF PROPERTY

In his fourth and final issue, Resendiz argues that the trial court erred in awarding

a “grossly disproportionate share of the parties’ community estate” to Martinez.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s division of marital property in a divorce proceeding for an

abuse of discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). A trial court enjoys

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wide latitude in dividing the marital estate, and we presume that the trial court properly

exercised its discretion in reaching its decision. Id. at 698–700. Accordingly, we will not

overturn that decision unless the complaining party demonstrates that it was so unjust

and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 698, 700; Mann v. Mann, 607

S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980).

A trial court is required to divide the marital estate in a manner that it deems “just

and right.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. Although a trial court does not have to divide the

marital estate equally, it must do so equitably. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699; O’Carolan v.

Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). If a trial court chooses to

divide the marital estate unequally, there must be some reasonable basis for doing so.

O’Carolan, 71 S.W.3d at 532. In deciding whether a reasonable basis exists for an

unequal division of the marital estate, a trial court may consider many factors, including:

(1) the spouses’ capacities and abilities; (2) benefits that the party not at fault would have

derived from the continuation of the marriage; (3) business opportunities; (4) relative

physical conditions; (5) relative financial conditions; (6) disparity of ages; (7) size of

separate estates; (8) the nature of the property; and (9) disparity of income or earning

capacity. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699.

To evaluate the trial court’s “just and fair” division, the analysis typically begins with

the values of the various marital assets. See Wells v. Wells, 251 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). “The party complaining of the division of the community

estate has the burden of showing from the evidence in the record that the trial court’s

division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of

15
discretion.” See In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 384 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2013, no pet.).

B. Analysis

The trial court awarded to Martinez the marital home and all “furniture, furnishings,

fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances, and equipment” therein, her Dodge

Charger, Resendiz’s truck, a smoker pit, lawn equipment, garage equipment, the pool

and accessories, a trailer, and all possessions subject to her sole control. Martinez also

took on the remaining debt on the portion of the estate awarded to her. Resendiz was

awarded a kayak, his fishing gear, a Yeti cooler, and the possessions subject to his sole

control such as his cash, clothing, and jewelry. Resendiz was also ordered to pay

Martinez $6,500 on the day of divorce “to equalize the division.”

“It is difficult—if not impossible—to determine whether the trial court abused its

discretion by dividing the marital estate when we do not know what percentage of the

marital assets either party received.” Wells v, 251 S.W.3d at 841. Here, however, the

record does not include the value of any of the parties’ respective or marital assets. Nor

is there any evidence in the record about the parties’ debt, though there was testimony

from Martinez that there was at least one vehicle loan and a mortgage on the home. It

was Resendiz’s burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s division of the community

estate was so unjust and unfair, such that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re

Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d at 384 Absent these valuations, Resendiz

cannot demonstrate from the record that the trial court erred in its division of the marital

estate. See id. Without such evidence we cannot say the division of the marital estate

16
was disproportionate, much less an abuse of discretion. See id.

We overrule Resendiz’s fourth issue.

V. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order as it relates to possession and remand the cause

for the trial court to to fashion an order that specifically articulates the times and conditions

of Resendiz’s access to the children upon his release from incarceration. We further

reverse the trial court’s order setting forth Resendiz’s child support obligations and

remand for further proceedings to determine Resendiz’s net resources. In all other

respects, we affirm the order of the trial court.

NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
27th day of July, 2023.

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