dissenting.
Had the cases just decided been, according .to my view, regularly within the cognizance of the District.and Circuit Courts, and therefore properly before this tribunal, upon the appeals taken, I could have no objection to the disposition made of' those cases. The evidence appears to place the delinquency, or the wrong done, where this court has pronounced it to be; and it can scarcely be doubted, that the rules which have been prescribed for the government of vessels, propelled either, by sail's or by steam, when crossing each other’s tracks, will conduce to the preservation of both life and property. My dissent from the decision in these cases results, from considera-' tions much highenthan any that connect themselves with the mere adjustment of private controversies.- It is a deduction from my understanding of the constitutional power of this court, and of the courts whose decisions we have under review, to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, in the exercise of that species of jurisdiction which has been, as to these cases, asserted and sanctioned. That jurisdiction I feel constrained to.deny. I know that my opinions, relatively to the sources and- the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, have not accorded with those of the majority of this, court; but on these, as on all other subjects involving, the integrity of the'Constitution (the only true foundation of every *608power in the federal, government), I hold myself bound, with respect to differences of opinion, not to yield an acquiescence which, in matters of minor importance, would be cheerfully conceded. My own opinions relative to the admiralty jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in the courts of the United States have been heretofore too fully declared to render their repetition here in detail either proper Or necessary. I content myself with a reference to them as expressed in the case of The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. The Merchant’s Bank, 6 Howard, 395, and in my concurrence with the opinion of Justice [Woodbury in the case of Waring v. Clarke, 5 Howard, 4&7, and with reasserting the positions there maintained ; viz. that the civil jurisdiction in admiralty of the courts of the United States, in tort or in contract, (with the anomalous exceptions of seamen’s wages arid hypothecations,) is limited to transactions occurring on the high seas, and embraces no transaction occurring either on the land, or within the bays, rivers, havens, ports, harbors, or other places within the body or jurisdiction of any county, and that cases of seizure under the revenue laws do not spring from any regular class or head of admiralty powers. My conclusions, thus stated, are fortified by the strong desire to preserve in fullest vigor that admirable institution of our Anglo:Saxon ancestors, — whose elevating influence on the character eyen of the humblest man is perceived in his consciousness that he forms a part, an important, nay, an indispensable part, in the administration of the laws, — the venerable trial by jury; and, in the next place, by my conviction of the duty incumbent on all to maintain, with directness and in good faith, those distinctions and distributions with respect to the judicial power which the Constitution and laws of the United States have ordained, — distributions which the power now claimed and exerted appears to confound and overthrow. Thus, in the second section of the third article of the Constitution, in a definition of the judicial power of the govern: ment, in which definition the admiralty jurisdiction is explicitly comprised, it is declared that the judicial power shall extend “to controversies between citizens of different States.” This distribution of judicial power by the Constitution, Congress have carried into execution by the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act, and this court in a series of decisions has maintained. • Can it, then, comport with a just interpretation, either of the Constitution or of the act of Congress, or with the decisions of this court made in conformity with both, that they should all be' annulled by a seeming evasion ? Can it possibly be right thus summarily to abrogate the jurisdiction of the State courts over their own territory and their own citizens ?' If these things can *609be done, it follows, of course,-that the trial by jury, and the requisite as to. citizenship of parties, drdained both by the Qonatitution and laws, may be abolished by the mere will ofpersons interested, or by the fiat of a tribunal by which neither citizenship nor trial by jury is held in regard. It would be difficult to adduce a more striking example of the irregularities here pointed , out, than , is furnished by one of the cases now ■before us, — that of Newton v. Stebbins. This is a case which the evidence shows to have occurred between citizens of the same .State, upon the narrow waters, and far within the interior of the State; and' necessarily, therefore, within the body of a county of ..the State. It presents within that locality an instance of simple tort, the proper subject of trespass or case at comrpon law % yet this case, without regard to locality or citizenship, is wrested from the, tribunals of the State and the common law. modes of trial, and transferred to a tribunal whose peculiar and appropriate jurisdiction, we are told by the English authorities, attaches only where there is no vicinage from which the pais can be summoned. I am compelled, therefore, to, deny to the admiralty the constitutional authority to take cognizance, of these cases.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard oil the transcript of the record from' the Circuit Court of .the United States for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is ordered and decreed by this court, that the decreee of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.