with whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Marshall concur, dissenting.
This phase of this protracted litigation involves quite a different problem than the one presented in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657. Pennington involved the question whether § 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738, and § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, under the complaint there made exempted the United Mine Workers from liability under the antitrust laws. That was recognized as the single issue. Id., at 661-666. The Court said, “[W]e think a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.” Id., at 665.
The question in this case involves not the scope of the exemption but whether the Sherman Act has been violated. As we said in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 512, “[Activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act.”
A union-employer agreement to force other employers out of business causes the union to lose its exemption. But the fact that a union may be sued under the Sherman Act does not mean that it is necessarily liable. The question in the present case is, indeed, only one phase of the alleged Sherman Act violation. It solely concerns the kind of proof needed.
*315This phase of the litigation turns on the meaning of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U. S. C. § 106, which provides:
“No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.”
The Court says that: “On its face § 6 is not addressed to the quantum of evidence required to prove the occurrence of the alleged ‘unlawful acts/ ” I respectfully disagree.
Unions usually act through officers, members, or agents, not as a body. Their liability is therefore vicarious; and Congress was anxious to safeguard, curtail, and limit it. The “clear proof” required was not restricted to “clear proof” of authority to act or “clear proof” of agency or “clear proof” of other “authorization.” The “clear proof” was “clear proof” of authority to commit “the unlawful acts.” The “clear proof” required was “clear proof” of “actual participation” in the “unlawful acts.” The “clear proof” required was “clear proof” of the “ratification” of the “unlawful acts.”
Authorization to perform those “unlawful acts” like ratification of them or participation in them must, if § 6 is to .be given full vitality, be based on “clear proof” that the union had full complicity in the scheme.1 It is in *316my view a drastic rewriting of § 6 to conclude as does the Court that: “The straightforward answer was § 6, with its requirement that when illegal acts of any individual are charged against one of the major antagonists in a labor dispute — whether employer or union — the evidence must clearly prove that the individual’s acts were authorized or ratified.”
United Mine Workers and BCOA (Bituminous Coal Operators Association) entered into an industry-wide wage agreement in 1958 which provided wage scales for employees of all “signatory operators” of coal lands or leases.
It is argued that this agreement constituted an agreement by United Mine Workers to impose the wage scale on all nonsignatory coal operators in order to force some (including petitioners) out of business. If that was the agreement then, as I said in Pennington (381 U. S., at 674), the union would have lost its exemption. But there is not a word in the agreement, as I read it, that covers nonsignatory operators.
*317It is, however, contended that even though there is no express commitment to drive marginal operators out of business, there was a conspiracy between BCOA and United Mine Workers to impose a wage scale upon the total industry which had the purpose and effect of driving the small, marginal operators out of business.
On this issue of the case, Judge Wilson of the District Court ruled:
“Were this case being tried upon the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable to civil cases, the Court would conclude that the U. M. W. did so impliedly agree. However, the standard of proof where a labor union is involved is ‘clear proof,’ as required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a standard different from the ordinary civil burden of persuasion. United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395 . . . ; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 .... The Court is of the opinion that the evidence upon the record in this case does not establish such clear and unequivocal proof as to warrant the Court in finding that the U. M. W. pursued its policy of uniformity of wage and labor standards by agreement with one or more employers, as distinguished from pursuing such policy upon its own. The only direct evidence in the record is to the effect that the Union pursued such policy upon its own, and not in agreement with any employer.” 265 F. Supp. 388, 412.
The action of United Mine Workers officials in agreeing to the wage clause was the action of fully authorized agents. If that is all that the “clear proof” of § 6 requires, the case would be easy. For then it would be immaterial whether “clear proof” of an illegal purpose *318or “preponderance of the evidence” were the test, for whichever were required, there would be no difference. If therefore “clear proof” is to set labor-antitrust cases apart from the rest — as it clearly was designed to do — it must embrace a union program to impose a wage scale on the entire industry with the purpose and effect of driving the small, marginal operators out of business.
Judge Wilson of the District Court and eight members of the Court of Appeals have reviewed the evidence in detail. While they agree that a case against the union has been made out if “preponderance of the evidence” is the test, none has suggested that the “clear proof” test has been satisfied if it is to mean more than “clear proof” of an agency relation.
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 739, we spoke of the effect of § 6 in a case where the union is charged with the damages flowing from violence:
“What is required is proof, either that the union approved the violence which occurred, or that it participated actively or by knowing tolerance in further acts which were in themselves actionable under state law or intentionally drew upon the previous violence for their force.”
If in Gibbs union officials were authorized to talk with employers and to protest certain issues that threatened the union’s interests, would the union be liable if the protest became so heated that it erupted into violence? Certainly not. Authorization to use dynamite in the protest would be “clear proof”; authorization to carry dynamite for a lawful purpose would certainly not be “clear proof” of the authorization to use the dynamite to destroy an employer’s business.
In the present case, authorization of union officials to use their best efforts to get an industry-wide wage scale *319does not necessarily include authorization to drive some employers out of business. As Mr. Justice Goldberg pointed out in Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U. S. 676, 697 et seq., there is obviously nothing illegal per se about industry-wide collective bargaining.2 A particular agreement becomes vulnerable under the antitrust laws only if there is “clear proof” that the purpose of the union 3 *320was not to advance the coal miners’ interests but to do in one or more operators.
By the same reasoning we should ask here: Was there “clear proof” that the union approved a plan to drive small, marginal operators out of business?
Since on this record no one has suggested that there is such “clear proof,” the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
That was our construction of § 6 in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 410-411. That construction provoked Mr. Justice Frankfurter to say in dissent: “Practically *316speaking, the interpretation given by the Court to § 6 serves to immunize unions, especially the more alert and powerful, as well as corporations involved in labor disputes, from Sherman Law liability. To insist that such is not the result intended by the Court is to deny the practical consequences of the Court’s ruling.” Id., at 422.
Yet, as S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 19, said respecting § 6: “Opposition to this section has been voiced on the ground that it seeks to establish a ‘new law of agency.’ In the first place, this section is concerned especially with establishing a rule of evidence. There is no provision made relieving an individual from responsibility for his acts, but provision is made that a person shall not be held responsible for an 'unlawful act’ except upon ‘clear proof’ of participation or authorization or ratification.” And see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 793, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 6; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 821, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 6.
Mr. Justice Goldberg said: “This history also shows that labor contracts establishing more or less standardized wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment in a given industry or market area are often secured either through bargaining with multi-employer associations or through bargaining with market leaders that sets a 'pattern’ for agreements on labor standards with other employers. These are two similar systems used to achieve the identical result of fostering labor peace through the negotiation of uniform labor standards in an industry.” 381 U. S., at 722.
In the prior Congress a measure like § 6 was introduced. It is described in S. Rep. No. 1060, pt. 2, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19: “[W]hy should an officer of a labor union, who has specifically advised members that violence must be avoided, become responsible for the hot-headed action of some member in perhaps assaulting a strike breaker? Again, the relationship between officers and members of labor unions and other members is not that of employer and employee. The officers chosen by a union are not employers of the membership. They have no control over their associates based upon the power of determining whether or not they will employ them. It may be accepted that if a group associated in common activities becomes controlled by a lawless majority, it may be necessary for law-abiding men to dissolve their association with lawbreakers; but the doctrine that a few lawless men can change the character of an organization whose members and officers are very largely law-abiding is one which has been developed peculiarly as judge-made law in labor disputes, and it is high time that, by legislative action, the courts should be required to uphold the long established law that guilt is personal and that men can only be held responsible for the unlawful acts of associates because of participation in, authorization or ratification of such acts. As a rule of evidence, clear proof should be required, so that criminal guilt and criminal responsibility should not be imputed but proven beyond reasonable doubt in order to impose liability.”