dissenting.
I
I would dismiss the writ in this case as improvidently granted. The question presented to the courts below concerns the constitutional validity of a 1964 Tennessee conviction. The New York courts had relied on that conviction to sentence respondent as a multiple offender, after his conviction in 1966 for a New York offense. It was conceded at oral argument, however, that New York has no present interest whatever in *217that Tennessee conviction. For, after the United States Court of Appeals held that it was constitutionally defective, New York substituted for the Tennessee conviction an earlier Texas conviction, and reinstated precisely the same enhanced sentence it had previously imposed.1
In determining that this case is nevertheless appropriate for adjudication here, the Court seems to rely on two separate factors. First, it reasons that the event that seems to moot the case — the resentencing — was merely the State A obedience to the adverse judgment below, and for that reason cannot moot the controversy. And, second, it reasons that the resentencing may prove to be defective as a matter of law, that New York may in the future wish to rely on the Tennessee conviction again, if the Texas conviction should prove to have defects of its own.
The first proposition falls wide of the mark in this case. It is well established that an unsuccessful litigant does not moot his case by complying with an unfavorable judgment pending the disposition of his appeal. Thus, a debtor does not moot his case by paying the judgment against him pendente lite. Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U. S. 222 (1885). And if a union is enjoined from boycotting or striking at a particular store, the union does not moot the case by lifting the boycott or strike pendente lite. Bakery Drivers v. Wag-*218shal, 333 U. S. 437 (1948). But that principle does not protect the unsuccessful litigant who goes beyond what is required of him, and obtains relief in some way not prohibited by the judgment against him. Thus, the debtor does moot his case by entering into a compromise in settlement of the debt. Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U. S., at 224-227. And the union might well moot its case if all the striking employees left the store and obtained other employment elsewhere.
This case would come within the principle of Dakota County and Bakery Drivers, if New York had simply abandoned, temporarily, its attempt to impose an enhanced recidivist sentence, pending review of the judgment below. But New York did more than merely submit to the decision below; it found a complete substitute for the result it had sought in the Court of Appeals, and the result it continues to seek here.2 By reversing the judgment below, this Court gives New York no relief it has not already obtained.
The Court offers a second reason to disregard the re-sentencing in this case, however, and that reason is perhaps independent of the first. The Court argues that the Texas conviction, and the resentencing based on it, may be found invalid in other proceedings, in which case New York may wish to revive its interest in the Tennessee conviction. Thus, the argument rests on the Court’s estimate that the controversy that gave *219rise to this litigation has a substantial probability of recurring. That analysis might in my view carry considerable weight, if it were applied uniformly in all cases. But this Court has regularly refused to adjudicate the claims of litigants who argue that illegal action will probably harm them in the future. E. g., Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 (1972); SEC v. Medical Committee, 404 U. S. 403 (1972).3 Moreover, in this case the Court can find that the controversy will probably recur only by presuming that the Texas conviction is probably invalid. Such a presumption flies in the face of the principle that state convictions are ordinarily presumed valid.'4 The Court betrays a surprising lack of confidence in the criminal processes of our States, for which there is no warrant in this record.
In these circumstances, the possibility that this controversy will be revived is too remote and speculative to keep the case alive under established precedents. It is certainly too remote and speculative to warrant invoking the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
II
Because the Court reaches out to decide the merits of this case, I think it appropriate to state my views on that subject as well.
*220Respondent was convicted of murder in Tennessee after a trial in which the principal prosecution witness, one Alex Holm, did not appear. Instead, Holm’s testimony was introduced through a transcript of a previous trial on the same charge. The State made absolutely no effort to secure Holm’s presence at the second trial, relying wholly on the claim that Holm was unavailable because he had become a resident of Sweden. The Court today concludes that the State did not thereby deny Stubbs his right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. To reach that result, the Court necessarily distinguishes our holding in Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968), on untenable grounds, and utterly ignores its rationale.
In Barber v. Page, the petitioner had been convicted on the basis of testimony introduced through a transcript of a preliminary hearing. The witness in question was incarcerated in a federal prison. We held that the State could not, consistent with constitutional requirements, use that transcript in lieu of the witness himself unless two conditions were met: (1) the witness was shown to be actually unavailable to testify at trial, and (2) the witness had been adequately confronted and cross-examined at the prior hearing. In Barber we concluded that neither condition had been met; the State had failed to make a good-faith effort to secure the presence of the witness at trial, and hence it could not be said that the witness was unavailable; moreover, the preliminary hearing did not afford an adequate pretrial opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination.
The Court purports to apply the two-part test of Barber to the facts of this case. It devotes considerable space to the second part of the test, analyzing the opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of Holm at the first trial of Stubbs, and concluding that the *221opportunity there was significantly greater than at the preliminary hearing in Barber. The Court’s distinction for this purpose between a preliminary hearing and a prior trial is tenable, in my view, although on the peculiar facts of this case the Court’s conclusion is somewhat troublesome. But the Court fails totally to explain how the first part of the Barber test is satisfied here. On that question, the Court has only this to say: “the predicate of unavailability was sufficiently stronger here than in Barber that a federal habeas court was not warranted in upsetting the determination of the state trial court as to Holm’s unavailability.”
The difficulty with that position, is that there never has been any factual inquiry resulting in a determination as to Holm’s unavailability. Rather, the courts have consistently presumed his unavailability from the bare fact that he lives in Sweden. The Tennessee Supreme Court thought it was enough that Holm was out of the jurisdiction of the United States, beyond the reach of compulsory process, Stubbs v. State, 216 Tenn. 567, 574-575, 393 S. W. 2d 150, 153-154 (1965), as did the dissenting judge in the United States Court of Appeals, 442 F. 2d 561, 565 (1971). Apparently this Court takes the same view. But in Barber v. Page we squarely rejected any such presumption of unavailability. In that case, the claim was made that the court had no pow'er to compel the absent witness to appear. We held that nevertheless the State was obliged to make a good-faith effort to secure his appearance, for “ ‘the possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff.’ ” 390 U. S., at 724, quoting the decision below, 381 F. 2d 479, 481 (CA10 1966) (Aldrich, J., dissenting). As we said in Barber:
“In short, a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authori*222ties have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” 390 U. S., at 724-725.
The Court seeks to distinguish Barber on the ground that in that case the absent witness was a federal prisoner, and while the State had no power to compel his appearance, it could at least have sought the cooperation of the federal prison authorities who did have such power. Here, on the other hand, the absent witness was a resident of a foreign nation, and. hence it is argued that even federal authorities would have no power to help. In support of that analysis, the Court seems to place substantial reliance on the fact that at the time of Stubbs’ trial, the federal courts had statutory power to subpoena American citizens living abroad, but that power was apparently available only to compel their appearance before federal courts. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 949, 28 U. S. C. § 1783 (1958 ed.). If the Court’s decision today does in fact rest on the lack of federal power to compel the appearance of Holm at a state trial, then the holding in this case is of very limited significance. For less than three months after the trial of Stubbs, Congress amended § 1783 to provide:
“A court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena requiring the appearance as a witness before it, or before a person or body designated by it, of a national or resident of the United States who is in a foreign country . . . .” Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 10 (a), 78 Stat. 997 (emphasis added).
Since October 3, 1964, then, it appears that the federal courts have had the power to assist state courts in securing the presence of witnesses like Alex Holm, and hence for trials occurring since that date, Barber would seem to control.
*223I cannot agree, however, that if neither state nor federal authorities had the power to compel Holm’s appearance, that fact relieved the State of its obligation to make a good-faith effort to secure his presence. It simply reduced the likelihood that any effort would succeed. The State’s obligation would hardly be framed in terms of “good-faith effort” if that effort were required only in circumstances where success was guaranteed. If, as the Court contends, it is more difficult to produce at trial a resident of Sweden than a federal prisoner, that fact might justify a failure to produce the witness; it cannot justify a failure even to try. At a minimum, the State could have notified Mr. Holm that the trial was scheduled, and invited him to come at his own expense. Beyond that, it could have offered to pay his expenses. Finally, it could have sought federal assistance in invoking the cooperation of Swedish authorities, as a matter of international comity.
As in Barber, “so far as this record reveals, the sole reason why [the witness] was not present to testify in person was because the State did not attempt to seek his presence. The right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly.” 390 U. S., at 725.
I respectfully dissent.
Mr. Justice Douglas joins in Part II of this opinion.Under the then-applicable New York sentencing statute, former N. Y. Penal Law § 1941, one prior conviction was sufficient to trigger the recidivist sentencing provisions, and Stubbs received the maximum authorized recidivist sentence. New York has subsequently amended its law to increase the maximum recidivist sentence, and to provide that two prior convictions are necessary to trigger the recidivist statute, N. Y. Penal Law § 70.10. The new provisions do not, however, apply to this case, because the underlying New York conviction here was obtained before the effective date of the new statute. N. Y. Penal Law § 5.05.
The Court seeks to distinguish SEC v. Medical Committee, 404 U. S. 403 (1972), on the ground that in that case the action relied on to moot the case was taken by a third party rather than by a litigant. I can see no relevant difference, however, between the action of a third party, and the action of a litigant which goes beyond mere pendente lite compliance with the court order, so long as that action gives the litigant the relief he seeks. If burning down a building will moot a case, surely that is so whether the fire is set by a litigant or a lightning bolt, though the litigant may, of course, be subject to sanctions quite apart from the case he has rendered moot.
Indeed, the claim we rejected in SEC is closely analogous to the claim here. In each case, events subsequent to the decision below removed the occasion for present conflict between the parties, but it was alleged that within a short time the conflict could be expected to recur. In SEC, the Court found that allegation too speculative to keep the controversy alive.
Even when an appeal is pending, see, e. g., Bloch v. United States, 226 F. 2d 185, 188 (CA9 1955), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 948 (1956); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F. 2d 16, 20 (CA7), cert. denied, 337 U. S. 959 (1949); Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts § 609 (e) (1972), and Advisory Committee’s Note.