Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs, dissenting.

These cases require us to consider whether radio and television broadcast licensees may, with the approval of the Federal Communications Commission,1 refuse absolutely to sell any part of their advertising time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance. In practical effect, the broadcaster policy here under attack permits airing of only those paid presentations which advertise products or deal with “noncontroversial” matters, while relegating the discussion of controversial public issues to formats such as documentaries, the news, or panel shows, which are tightly controlled and edited by the broadcaster. The Court holds today that this policy — including the absolute ban on the sale of air time for the discussion of controversial issues — is consistent with the “public interest” requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. §§ 307 (d), 309 (a).2 The Court also holds that the *171challenged policy does not violate the First Amendment. It is noteworthy that, in reaching this result, the Court does not hold that there is insufficient “governmental involvement” in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged ban to activate the commands of the First Amendment. On the contrary, only The Chibe Justice, and my Brothers Stewart and Rehnquist express the view that the First Amendment is inapplicable to this case. My Brothers White, Blackmun, and Powell quite properly do not decide that question, for they find that the broadcaster policy here under attack does not violate the “substance” of the First Amendment. Similarly, there is no majority for the holding that the challenged ban does not violate the “substance” of the First Amendment. For, although The Chief Justice, and my Brother Rehnquist purport to “decide” that question, their disposition of the “governmental involvement” issue necessarily renders their subsequent discussion of the “substantive” question mere dictum.

*172In my view, the principle at stake here is one of fundamental importance, for it concerns the people’s right to engage in and to hear vigorous public debate on the broadcast media. And balancing what I perceive to be the competing interests of broadcasters, the listening and viewing public, and individuals seeking to express their views over the electronic media, I can only conclude that the exclusionary policy upheld today can serve only to inhibit, rather than to further, our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). I would therefore affirm the determination of the Court of Appeals that the challenged broadcaster policy is violative of the First Amendment.

I

The command of the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” is, on its face, directed at governmental rather than private action. Nevertheless, our prior decisions make clear that “[cjonduct that is formally 'private’ may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon [governmental] action.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296, 299 (1966). Thus, the reach of the First Amendment depends not upon any formalistic “private-public" dichotomy but, rather, upon more functional considerations concerning the extent of governmental involvement in, and public character of, a particular “private” enterprise. “Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the [Government] in private conduct be attributed its true significance.” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 722 (1961); see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. *173Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 172 (1972). And because of the inherent complexity of this case-by-case inquiry, “[t]his Court has never attempted the 'impossible task’ of formulating an infallible test” for determining in all instances whether particular conduct must be deemed private or governmental. Beitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 378 (1967); see Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552, 556 (1947).

This does not mean, of course, that our prior experience in this area offers no guidance for the purposes of our present inquiry. On the contrary, our previous decisions have focused on myriad indicia of “governmental action,” many of which are directly applicable to the operations of the broadcast industry.3 As the Court of Appeals recognized, “the general characteristics of the broadcast industry reveal an extraordinary relationship between the broadcasters and the federal government— a relationship which puts that industry in a class with few others.” 146 U. S. App. D. C. 181, 190, 450 F. 2d 642, 651. More specifically, the public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally created preferred status of broadcast licensees, the pervasive federal regulation of broadcast programming, and the Commission’s specific approval of the challenged broadcaster policy combine in this case to bring the promulgation and enforcement of that policy within the orbit of constitutional imperatives.

At the outset, it should be noted that both radio and television broadcasting utilize a natural resource — the electromagnetic spectrum4 — that is part of the public *174domain. And, although broadcasters are granted the temporary use of this valuable resource for terminable three-year periods, “ownership” and ultimate control remain vested in the people of the United States. Thus, § 301 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 301, specifically provides:

“It is the purpose of this [Act] ... to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. . . .”

Such public “ownership” of an essential element in the operations of a private enterprise is, of course, an important and established indicium of “governmental involvement.” In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, for example, we emphasized the fact of “public ownership” in holding the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to a privately owned restaurant leasing space in a building owned by the State.5 *175In reaching that result, we explained that, in part because of the “public ownership” of the building, the State “has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the” actions of the privately owned restaurant. 365 U. S., at 725. And, viewing the relationship in its entirety, we concluded that “[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . .” Ibid.; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 172-173, 175; Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 (1962); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (SDNY 1967); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (SDNY 1964).

A second indicium of “governmental involvement” derives from the direct dependence of broadcasters upon the Federal Government for their “right” to operate broadcast frequencies. There can be no doubt that, for the industry as a whole, governmental regulation alone makes “radio communication possible by . . . limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 389 (1969).6 Moreover, with respect to individual licensees, it is equally clear that “existing broadcasters have often attained their present position,” not as a result of free market pressures7 but, rather, “because of their initial government selection. . . .” Id., at 400. Indeed, the “quasi-monopolistic” advantages enjoyed by broadcast licensees “are the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government.” Ibid. *176Thus, as Mr. Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger has himself recognized, “[a] broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.” Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 337, 359 F. 2d 994, 1003 (1966). And, along these same lines, we have consistently held that “when authority derives in part from Government’s thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 401 (1950) ; see, e. g., Public Utilities Comm’n v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451, 462 n. 8 (1952).

A further indicium of “governmental involvement” in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged broadcaster policy may be seen in the extensive governmental control over the broadcast industry. It is true, of course, that this “Court has never held” that actions of an otherwise private entity necessarily constitute governmental action if that entity “is subject to . . . regulation in any degree whatever.” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 173. Here, however, we are confronted, not with some minimal degree of regulation, but, rather, with an elaborate statutory scheme governing virtually all aspects of the broadcast industry.8 Indeed, federal *177agency review and guidance of broadcaster conduct is automatic, continuing, and pervasive.9 Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted, “[a]lmost no other private business — almost no other regulated private business— is so intimately bound to government . . . 146 U. S. App. D. C., at 191, 450 F. 2d, at 652.

Even more important than this general regulatory scheme, however, is the specific governmental involvement in the broadcaster policy presently under consideration. There is, for example, an obvious nexus between the Commission's Fairness Doctrine and the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell any part of their air time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance. Indeed, in defense of this policy, the broadcaster-petitioners argue vigorously that this exclusionary policy is authorized and even compelled by the Fairness Doctrine. And the Court itself recognizes repeatedly that the Fairness Doctrine and other Communications Act policies are *178inextricably linked to the challenged ban. Thus, at one point, the Court suggests that “[i]f the Fairness Doctrine were applied to editorial advertising, there is . . . the substantial danger that the effective operation of that doctrine would be jeopardized.” Ante, at 124. Similarly, the Court maintains that, in light of the Fairness Doctrine, there simply is no reason to allow individuals to purchase advertising time for the expression of their own views on public issues. See ante, at 130-131.10 Although I do not in any sense agree with the substance of these propositions, they serve at least to illustrate the extent to which the Commission's Fairness Doctrine has influenced the development of the policy here under review.

Moreover, the Commission’s involvement in the challenged policy is not limited solely to the indirect effects of its Fairness Doctrine. On the contrary, in a decision which must inevitably provide guidance for future broadcaster action, the Commission has specifically considered and specifically authorized the flat ban. See Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d 242 (1970); Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d 216 (1970). In so doing, the Commission— and through it the Federal Government — has unequivocally given its imprimatur to the absolute ban on editorial advertising. And, of course, it is now well settled that specific governmental approval of or acquiescence in challenged action by a private entity indicates “governmental action.”

Thus, in McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 TJ. S. 151 (1914), for example, the Court dealt with a statute which, as construed by the Court, simply *179authorized rail carriers to provide certain types of cars for white passengers without offering equal facilities to blacks. Although dismissal of the complaint on procedural grounds was affirmed, we made clear that such a statute, even though purely permissive in nature, was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because a carrier refusing equal service to blacks would be “acting in the matter under the authority of a state law.” Id., at 162. And, some 50 years later, we explained this finding of “governmental action” in McCabe as “nothing less than considering a permissive state statute as an authorization to discriminate and as sufficient state action to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S., at 379. Thus, “[o]ur prior decisions leave no doubt” that any action of the Government, through any of its agencies, approving, authorizing, encouraging, or otherwise supporting conduct which, if performed by the Government, would violate the Constitution, “constitutes illegal [governmental] involvement in those pertinent private acts . . . that subsequently occur.” Adickes v. Kress & Co,, 398 U. S. 144, 202 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.); see, e. g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra; Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U. S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra.

Finally, and perhaps most important, in a case virtually identical to those now before us, we held that a policy promulgated by a privately owned bus company, franchised by the Federal Government and regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, must be subjected to the constraints of the First Amendment. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Poliak, 343 *180U. S. 451 (1952). In reaching that result, we placed primary emphasis on the specific regulatory acquiescence in the challenged action of the bus company. Thus, after noting that the bus company “operates its service under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress,” we explained that our finding of “governmental action” was predicated specifically

“upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the [challenged policy], ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby.” Id., at 462.

See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 175-176, n. 3.

Although The Chief Justice, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, strains valiantly to distinguish Poliak, he offers nothing more than the proverbial “distinctions without a difference.” Here, as in Poliak, the broadcast licensees operate “under the regulatory supervision of ... an agency authorized by Congress.” 343 U. S., at 462. And, again as in Poliak, that agency received “protests” against the challenged policy and, after formal consideration, “dismissed” the complaints on the ground that the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” were not “impaired” by that policy. Indeed, the argument for finding “governmental action” here is even stronger than in Poliak, for this case concerns, not an incidental activity of a bus company, but, rather, the primary activity of the regulated entities — communication.

Thus, given the confluence of these various indicia of “governmental action” — including the public nature *181of the airwaves,11 the governmentally created preferred status of broadcasters, the extensive Government regulation of broadcast programming, and the specific governmental approval of the challenged policy — I can only conclude that the Government “has so far insinuated itself into a position” of participation in this policy that the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell air time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance must be subjected to the restraints of the First Amendment.12

*182II

Radio and television have long been recognized as forms of communication “affected by a First Amendment interest” and, indeed, it can hardly be doubted that broadcast licensees are themselves protected by that Amendment. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 386. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 545-546 (1941). Recognition of this fact does not end our inquiry, however, for it is equally clear that the protection of the First Amendment in this context is not limited solely to broadcasters. On the contrary, at least one set of competing claims to the *183protection of that Amendment derives from the fact that, because of the limited number of broadcast frequencies available and the potentially pervasive impact of the electronic media, "the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390.

Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes sounded what has since become a dominant theme in applying the First Amendment to the changing problems of our Nation. "[T]he ultimate good,” he declared, “is better reached by free trade in ideas,” and “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375-376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672-673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, the First Amendment itself testifies to our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” 13 and the Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . . .” Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). For “it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326-327 (1987).

*184With considerations such as these in mind, we have specifically declared that, in the context of radio and television broadcasting, the First Amendment protects “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supm, at 390.14 And, because “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee,” “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Ibid.

Thus, we have explicitly recognized that, in light of the unique nature of the electronic media, the public have strong First Amendment interests in the reception of a full spectrum of views — presented in a vigorous and uninhibited manner' — on controversial issues of public importance. And, as we have seen, it has traditionally been thought that the most effective way to insure this “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate is by fostering a “free trade in ideas” by making our forums of communication readily available to all persons wishing to express their views. Although apparently conceding the legitimacy of these principles, the Court nevertheless upholds the absolute ban on editorial advertising because, in its view, the Commission’s Fairness Doctrine, in and of itself, is sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment interests of the public. I cannot agree.

*185The Fairness Doctrine originated early in the history of broadcast regulation and, rather than being set forth in any specific statutory provision,15 developed gradually in a long series of Commission rulings in particular cases.16 In essence, the doctrine imposes a twofold duty upon broadcast licensees: (1) coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate,17 and (2) such coverage must fairly reflect opposing viewpoints.18 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 377. In fulfilling their obligations under the Fairness Doctrine, *186however, broadcast licensees have virtually complete discretion, subject only to the Commission’s general requirement that licensees act “reasonably and in good faith,” 19 “to determine what issues should be covered, how much time should be allocated, which spokesmen should appear, and in what format.” 20 Thus, the Fairness Doctrine does not in any sense require broadcasters to allow" “non-broadcaster” speakers to use the airwaves to express their own views on controversial issues of public importance.21 On the contrary, broadcasters may meet *187their fairness responsibilities through presentation of carefully edited news programs, panel discussions, interviews, and documentaries. As a result, broadcasters retain almost exclusive control over the selection of issues and viewpoints to be covered, the manner of presentation, and, perhaps most important, who shall speak. Given this doctrinal framework, I can only conclude that the Fairness Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient — in theory as well as in practice — to provide the kind of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” exchange of views to which the public is constitutionally entitled.

As a practical matter, the Court’s reliance on the Fairness Doctrine as an “adequate” alternative to editorial advertising seriously overestimates the ability — or willingness — of broadcasters to expose the public to the “widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.” 22 As Professor Jaffe has noted, “there is considerable possibility the broadcaster will exercise a large amount of self-censorship and try to avoid as much controversy as he safely can.” 23 Indeed, in light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audience, and therefore their profits, it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and controversiality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints. Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and, in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply “bad business” to espouse— or even to allow others to espouse — the heterodox or the controversial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only estab*188lished — or at least moderated — views to enter the broadcast world’s “marketplace of ideas.” 24

Moreover, the Court’s reliance on the Fairness Doctrine as the sole means of informing the public seriously misconceives and underestimates the public’s *189interest in receiving ideas and information directly from the advocates of those ideas without the interposition of journalistic middlemen. Under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters decide what issues are “important,” how “fully” to cover them, and what format, time, and style of coverage are “appropriate.” The retention of such absolute control in the hands of a few Government licensees is inimical to the First Amendment, for vigorous, free debate can be attained only when members of the public have at least some opportunity to take the initiative and editorial control into their own hands.

Our legal system reflects a belief that truth is best illuminated by a collision of genuine advocates. Under the Fairness Doctrine, however, accompanied by an absolute ban on editorial advertising, the public is compelled to rely exclusively on the “journalistic discretion” of broadcasters, who serve in theory as surrogate spokesmen for all sides of all issues. This separation of the advocate from the expression of his views can serve only to diminish the effectiveness of that expression. Indeed, we emphasized this fact in Red Lion:25

“Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them.”

Thus, if the public is to be honestly and forthrightly apprised of opposing views on controversial issues, it is imperative that citizens be permitted at least some *190opportunity to speak directly for themselves as genuine advocates on issues that concern them.

Moreover, to the extent that broadcasters actually permit citizens to appear on “their” airwaves under the Fairness Doctrine, such appearances are subject to extensive editorial control. Yet it is clear that the effectiveness of an individual's expression of his views is as dependent on the style and format of presentation as it is on the content itself. And the relegation of an individual’s views to such tightly controlled formats as the news, documentaries, edited interviews, or panel discussions may tend to minimize, rather than maximize the effectiveness of speech. Under a limited scheme of editorial advertising, however, the crucial editorial controls are in the speaker’s own hands.

Nor are these cases concerned solely with the adequacy of coverage of those views and issues which generally are recognized as “newsworthy.” For also at stake is the right of the public to receive suitable access to new and generally unperceived ideas and opinions. Under the Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster is required to present only “representative community views and voices on controversial issues” of public importance.26 Thus, by definition, the Fairness Doctrine tends to perpetuate coverage of those “views and voices” that are already established, while failing to provide for exposure of the public to those “views and voices” that are novel, unorthodox, or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion.27

*191Finally, it should be noted that the Fairness Doctrine permits, indeed requires, broadcasters to determine for themselves which views and issues are sufficiently “important” to warrant discussion. The briefs of the broadcaster-petitioners in this case illustrate the type of “journalistic discretion” licensees now exercise in this regard. Thus, ABC suggests that it would refuse to air those views which it considers “scandalous” or “crackpot,”28 while CBS would exclude those issues or opinions that are “insignificant”29 or “trivial.”30 Similarly, NBC would bar speech that strays “beyond the bounds of normally accepted taste,” 31 and WTOP would protect the public from subjects that are “slight, parochial or inappropriate.” 32

The genius of the First Amendment, however, is that it has always defined what the public ought to hear by permitting speakers to say what they wish. As the Court of Appeals recognized, “[i]t has traditionally been thought that the best judge of the importance of a particular viewpoint or issue is the individual or group holding the viewpoint and wishing to communicate it to others.” 146 U. S. App. D. C., at 195, 450 F. 2d, at 656. Indeed, “supervised and ordained discussion” is directly contrary to the underlying purposes of the First Amendment,33 for that Amendment “presupposes that right *192conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” 34 Thus, in a related context, we have explicitly recognized that editorial advertisements constitute “an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to [media] facilities,” and the unavailability of such editorial advertising can serve only “to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’ ” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 TI. S., at 266.

The Fairness Doctrine’s requirement of full and fair coverage of controversial issues is, beyond doubt, a commendable and, indeed, essential tool for effective regulation of the broadcast industry. But, standing alone, it simply cannot eliminate the need for a further, complementary airing of controversial views through the limited availability of editorial advertising. Indeed, the availability of at least some opportunity for editorial advertising is imperative if we are ever to attain the “ 'free and general discussion of public matters [that] seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.’ ” Gr os jean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936).

Ill

Moreover, a proper balancing of the competing First Amendment interests at stake in this controversy must consider, not only the interests of broadcasters and of the listening and viewing public, but also the independent First Amendment interest of groups and individuals in effective self-expression. See, e. g., T. Emerson, Toward *193a General Theory of the First Amendment 4-7 (1966); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1941). “[SJpeech concerning public affairs ... is the essence of self-government,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964), and the First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the right of the public to hear debate, but also the right of individuals to participate in that debate and to attempt to persuade others to their points of view. See, e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 537 (1945); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429-430 (1963). And, in a time of apparently growing anonymity of the individual in our society, it is imperative that we take special care to preserve the vital First Amendment interest in assuring “self-fulfillment [of expression] for each individual.” Police Dept, of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). For our citizens may now find greater than ever the need to express their own views directly to the public, rather than through a governmentally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they can achieve at least some measure of control over their own destinies.

In light of these considerations, the Court would concede, I assume, that our citizens have at least an abstract right to express their views on controversial issues of public importance. But freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum — whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have consistently held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for the expression of his views. *194See, e. g., Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 559 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939).

Here, of course, there can be no doubt that the broadcast frequencies allotted to the various radio and television licensees constitute appropriate “forums” for the discussion of controversial issues of public importance.35 *195Indeed, unlike the streets, parks, public libraries, and other “forums” that we have held to be appropriate for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the broadcast media are dedicated specifically to communication. And, since the expression of ideas — whether political, commercial, musical, or otherwise — is the exclusive purpose of the broadcast spectrum, it seems clear that the adoption of a limited scheme of editorial advertising would in no sense divert that spectrum from its intended use. Cf. Lloyd Gorp., Ltd. v. Tanner, supra, at 563; Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, supra, at 320.

Moreover, it is equally clear that, with the assistance of the Federal Government, the broadcast industry has become what is potentially the most efficient and effective “marketplace of ideas” ever devised.36 Indeed, the electronic media are today “the public’s prime source of information,” 37 and we have ourselves recognized that broadcast “technology . . . supplants atomized, relatively *196informal communication with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news . . . Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 386 n. 15. Thus, although “full and free discussion” of ideas may have been a reality in the heyday of political pamphleteering, modern technological developments in the field of communications have made the soapbox orator and the leafleteer virtually obsolete. And, in light of the current dominance of the electronic media as the most effective means of reaching the public, any policy that absolutely denies citizens access to the airwaves necessarily renders even the concept of “full and free discussion” practically meaningless.

Regrettably, it is precisely such a policy that the Court upholds today. And, since effectuation of the individual’s right to speak through a limited scheme of editorial advertising can serve only to further, rather than to inhibit, the public’s interest in receiving suitable exposure to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on controversial issues, the challenged ban can be upheld only if it is determined that such editorial advertising would unjustifiably impair the broadcaster’s assertedly overriding interest in exercising absolute control over “his” frequency.38 Such an analysis, however, hardly reflects the delicate balancing of interests that this sensitive question demands. Indeed, this “absolutist” approach wholly disregards the competing First Amendment rights of all “non-broadcaster” citizens, ignores the *197teachings of our recent decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, and is not supported by the historical purposes underlying broadcast regulation in this Nation.

Prior to 1927, it must be remembered, it was clearly recognized that the broadcast spectrum was part of the public domain. As a result, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector,39 and groups and individuals therefore had the same right of access to radio facilities as they had, and still have, to the printed press — that is, “anyone who will may transmit.” 40 Under this scheme, however, the number of broadcasters increased so dramatically that by 1927 every frequency was occupied by at least one station, and many were occupied by several. “The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 212 (1943). It soon became “apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 376. Thus, in the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, Congress placed the broadcast spectrum under federal regulation and sought to reconcile competing uses of the airwaves by setting aside a limited number of frequencies for each of the important uses of radio.41 And, since the number of frequencies allocated to public broadcasting was necessarily limited, the *198Government was compelled to grant licenses to some applicants while denying them to others. See generally Bed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 375-377, 388; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 210-214.

Although the overriding need to avoid overcrowding of the airwaves clearly justifies the imposition of a ceiling on the number of individuals who will be permitted to operate broadcast stations42 and, indeed, renders it “idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish,” 43 it does not in any sense dictate that the continuing First Amendment rights of all nonlicensees be brushed aside entirely. Under the existing system, broadcast licensees are granted a preferred status with respect to the airwaves, not because they have competed successfully in the free market but,, rather, “because of their initial government selection . . . .” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 400. And, in return for that “preferred status,” licensees must respect the competing First Amendment *199rights of others. Thus, although the broadcaster has a clear First Amendment right to be free from Government censorship in the expression of his own views44 and, indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable journalistic control over the use of his facilities, “[t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster . . . does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.” Id., at 387 (emphasis added). Indeed, after careful consideration of the nature of broadcast regulation in this country, we have specifically declared that

“as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to . . . monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.” Id., at 389.

Because I believe this view is as sound today as when voiced only four years ago, I can only conclude that there is simply no overriding First Amendment interest of broadcasters that can justify the absolute exclusion of virtually all of our citizens from the most effective “marketplace of ideas” ever devised.

This is not to say, of course, that broadcasters have no First Amendment interest in exercising journalistic supervision over the use of their facilities. On the contrary, such an interest does indeed exist, and it is an interest that must be weighed heavily in any legitimate effort to balance the competing First Amendment interests involved in this case. In striking such a balance, however, it must be emphasized that these cases deal only with the allocation of advertising time — air time that broadcasters regularly relinquish to others without the retention of significant editorial control. Thus, we are concerned here, not with the speech of broadcasters themselves,'*20045 but, rather, with their “right” to decide which other individuals will be given an opportunity to speak in a forum that has already been opened to the public.

Viewed in this context, the absolute ban on editorial advertising seems particularly offensive because, although broadcasters refuse to sell any air time whatever to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance, they make such air time readily available to those “commercial” advertisers who seek to peddle their goods and services to the public. Thus, as the system now operates, any person wishing to market a particular brand of beer, soap, toothpaste, or deodorant has direct, personal, and instantaneous access to the electronic media. He can present his own message, in his own words, in any format he selects, and at a time of his own choosing. Yet a similar individual seeking to discuss war, peace, pollution, or the suffering of the poor is denied this right to speak. Instead, he is compelled to rely on the beneficence of a corporate “trustee” appointed by the Government to argue his case for him.

It has long been recognized, however, that although access to public forums may be subjected to reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulations,46 “[s] elective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone . . . .” Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 96 (emphasis added); see, e. g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969); *201Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). Here, of course, the differential treatment accorded “commercial” and “controversial” speech clearly violates that principle.47 Moreover, and not without some irony, the favored treatment given “commercial” speech under the existing scheme clearly reverses traditional First Amendment priorities. For it has generally been understood that “commercial” speech enjoys less First Amendment protection than speech directed at the discussion of controversial issues of public importance. See, e. g., Breará v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942).

The First Amendment values of individual self-fulfillment through expression and individual participation in public debate are central to our concept of liberty. If these values are to survive in the age of technology, it is essential that individuals be permitted at least some opportunity to express their views on public issues over the electronic media. Balancing those interests against the limited interest of broadcasters in exercising “journalistic supervision” over the mere allocation of advertising time that is already made available to some members of the public, I simply cannot conclude that the interest of broadcasters must prevail.

IV

Finally, the Court raises the specter of administrative apocalypse as justification for its decision today. The Court’s fears derive largely from the assumption, implicit *202in its analysis, that the Court of Appeals mandated an absolute right of access to the airwaves In reality, however, the issue in these cases is not whether there is an absolute right of access but, rather, whether there may be an absolute denial of such access. The difference is, of course, crucial, and the Court's misconception of the issue seriously distorts its evaluation of the administrative difficulties that an invalidation of the absolute ban might conceivably entail.

Specifically, the Court hypothesizes three potential sources of difficulty: (1) the availability of editorial advertising might, in the absence of adjustments in the system, tend to favor the wealthy; (2) application of the Fairness Doctrine to editorial advertising might adversely affect the operation of that doctrine; and (3) regulation of editorial advertising might lead to an enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion. These are, of course, legitimate and, indeed, important concerns. But, at the present time, they are concerns — not realities. We simply have no sure way of knowing whether, and to what extent, if any, these potential difficulties will actually materialize. The Court’s bare assumption that these hypothetical problems are both inevitable and insurmountable indicates an utter lack of confidence in the ability of the Commission and licensees to adjust to the changing conditions of a dynamic medium. This sudden lack of confidence is, of course, strikingly inconsistent with the general propositions underlying all other aspects of the Court’s approach to this case.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that, 28 years ago, the Commission itself declared that

“the operation of any station under the extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the dis*203cussion of controversial public issues ... is inconsistent with the concept of public interest. . . . The Commission recognizes that good program balance may not permit the sale or donation of time to all who may seek it for such purposes and that difficult problems calling for careful judgment on the part of station management may be involved in deciding among applicants for time when all cannot be accommodated. However, competent management should be able to meet such problems in the public interest and with fairness to all concerned. The fact that it places an arduous task on management should not be made a reason for evading the issue by a strict rule against the sale of time for any programs of the type mentioned.” United Broadcasting Go., 10 F. C. C. 515, 518 (1945).

I can see no reason why the Commission and licensees should be deemed any less competent today then they were in 1945. And even if intervening developments have increased the complexities involved in implementing a limited right of access, there is certainly no dearth of proposed solutions to the potential difficulties feared by the Court. See, e. g., Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 723, 754-757 (1972); Malone, Broadcasting, the Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 193, 252-269 (1972) ; Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 Va. L. Rev. 574 (1971); Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 693-699 (1972).

With these considerations in mind, the Court of Appeals confined itself to invalidating the flat ban alone, *204leaving broad latitude48 to the Commission and licensees to develop in the first instance reasonable regulations to govern the availability of editorial advertising. In the context of these cases, this was surely the wisest course to follow, for “if experience with the administration of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing [First Amendment values], there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional implications.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 393.

For the present, however, and until such time, if ever, as these assertedly “overriding” administrative difficulties actually materialize, I must agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that although “it may unsettle some of us to see an antiwar message or a political party message in the accustomed place of a soap or beer commercial ... we must not equate what is habitual with what is right — or what is constitutional. A society already so saturated with commercialism can well afford another outlet for speech on public issues. All that we may lose is some of our apathy.” 49

See Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d 242 (1970); Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d 216 (1970).

I do not specifically address the “statutory” question in this case because, in practical effect, the considerations underlying the “statutory” question are in many respects similar to those relevant to the “substance” of the “constitutional” claim. There is one aspect of the Court’s “statutory” discussion, however, that merits at least brief attention. In upholding the absolute ban on the sale of editorial advertising, the Court relies heavily upon 47 TJ. S. C. § 153 (h), which declares that broadcasters shall not be deemed “common carriers.” In my view, this reliance is misplaced. Even a cursory examination of the legislative history of this provision reveals that it was enacted in recognition of the fact that *171traditional doctrines governing true “common carriers,” such as transportation companies, would not suit the particular problems of radio broadcasting. Specifically, it was feared that such "common carrier” status for broadcasters would mean that they “would have to give all their time to [public issues].” 67 Cong. Rec. 12504 (Sen. Dill) (emphasis added); see also ibid. (Sen. Broussard) ; id., at 12356 (Sen. Fess). Section 153 (h) was intended solely to assure that broadcasters would not be required to surrender all of their air time to willing purchasers; it does not bear upon the question whether they may be required to sell a reasonable and limited amount of air time to members of the public for discussion of controversial issues. See 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 635 n. 75 (1947). Indeed, the Commission itself has rejected the Court’s interpretation of § 153 (h) when it declared, over 25 years ago, that “the operation of any station under the extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the discussion of controversial public issues . .• . is inconsistent with the concept of public interest established by the Communications Act. ...” United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515, 518 (1945).

See generally Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 253-264 (dissenting opinion), wherein Commissioner Johnson identified no less than eight separate indicia of "governmental action” involved in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged broadcaster policy.

For a discussion of the attributes of the electromagnetic spectrum, see generally W. Jones, Regulated Industries 1019 (1967); Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J. Law & Econ. 433 (1968).

It is true, of course, that unlike the State in Burton, the Federal Government here does not receive substantial financial compensation for the use of the "public” property. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 723-724 (1961); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 174-175 (1972). Nevertheless, the absence of such a financial arrangement represents, in practical effect, Government subsidization of broadcasters, thereby enhancing the degree of governmental involvement. Cf. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. Law & Econ. 15, 31 (1967). Moreover, as in Burton, the publicly owned property is “not surplus state property” but, rather, constitutes an "integral and, indeed, indispensable part” of the governmental scheme. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, at 723. See also 47 U. S. C. §303 (g).

For a discussion of the Fairness Doctrine and its relevance to this case, see text and notes, at nn. 15-34, infra.

Indeed, the Communications Act of 1934 makes it a criminal offense to operate a broadcast transmitter without a license. See 47 U. S. C. § 501. Thus, the Federal Government specifically insulates the licensee from any real threat of economic competition.

Thus, the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the Federal Communications Commission to assign frequency bands, 47 U. S. C. § 303 (c); allocate licenses by location, § 303 (d); regulate apparatus, § 303 (e); establish service areas, § 303 (h); regulate chain ownership, §303 (i); require the keeping of detailed records, §303 (j); establish qualifications of licensees, § 303 (1); suspend licenses, § 303 (m) (1); inspect station facilities, § 303 (n); require publication of call letters and other information, § 303 (p); make rules to effect regulation of radio and television, § 303 (r); require that television sets be capable of receiving all signals, § 303 (s); regulate *177the granting of licenses and the terms thereof, §§307, 309; prescribe information to be supplied by applicants for licenses, § 308 (b) ; regulate the transfer of licenses, § 310; impose sanctions on licensees, including revocation of license, §312; require fair coverage of controversial issues, §315; control the operation of transmitting apparatus, § 318; and prohibit the use of offensive language, 18 U. S. C. § 1464.

Pursuant to statutory authority, see n. 8, supra, the Commission has promulgated myriad regulations governing all aspects of licensee conduct. See 47 CFR § 73.17 et seq. These regulations affect such matters as hours of operation, § 73.23; multiple ownership of licenses by a single individual, § 73.35; station location and program origination, §73.30; maintenance of detañed logs of programming, operation, and maintenance, §§73.111-116; baling practices, § 73.124; the personal attack and political editorial fairness requirements, §73.123; relationship of licensees to networks, §§73.131-139; permissible equipment, §§73.39-50. The above-cited regulations relate only to AM radio, but similar regulations exist for FM radio, § 73.201 et seq., and television, § 73.601 et seq.

In addition, the Court contends that, because of the Fairness Doctrine, the challenged broadcaster policy does not discriminate against controversial speech. See ante, at 128-130.

Moreover, the appropriateness of a particular forum, even if privately owned, for effective communication has in some instances been emphasized to establish the relevance of First Amendment protections. See, e. g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946). Here, as the Court of Appeals recognized, “the broadcast media are specifically dedicated to communication. They function as both our foremost forum for public speech and our most important educator of an informed people.” 146 U. S. App. D. C. 181, 192, 450 F. 2d 642, 653. See also text and notes, at nn. 35-37, infra.

In his concurring opinion, my Brother Stewart suggests that a finding of governmental action in this context necessarily means that “private broadcasters are Government.” Ante, at 139 (emphasis in original). In my view, this assertion reflects a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the governmental involvement in these cases. Here, the Government has selected the persons who will be permitted to operate a broadcast station, extensively regulates those broadcasters, and has specifically approved the challenged broadcaster policy. Thus, the commands of the First Amendment come into play, not because “private broadcasters are Government,” but, rather, because the Government “has so far insinuated itself into a position” of participation in the challenged policy as to make the Government itself responsible for its effects. Similarly, I cannot agree with my Brother Stewart’s suggestion that a finding of governmental involvement here “would . . . simply strip broadcasters of their own First Amendment rights.” Ibid. The actions of a purely private individual are, of course, not subject to the constraints of the First Amendment. But where, as here, the *182Government has implicated itself in the actions of an otherwise private individual, that individual must exercise his own rights with due regard for the First Amendment rights of others. In other words, an accommodation of competing rights is required, and “balancing,” not the “absolutist” approach suggested by my Brother Stewart, is the result. Indeed, it is this misunderstanding of the significance of governmental involvement that apparently leads to my Brother Stewart’s disagreement with my Brothers White, Blackmun, and Powell as to the relationship between the “public interest” standard of the Act and First Amendment "values.”

I might also note that, contrary to the suggestion of my Brother Stewart, a finding of governmental involvement in this case does not in any sense command a similar conclusion with respect to newspapers. Indeed, the factors that compel the conclusion that the Government is involved in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged broadcaster policy have simply no relevance to newspapers. The decision as to who shall operate newspapers is made in the free market, not by Government fiat. The newspaper industry is not extensively regulated and, indeed, in light of the differences between the electronic and printed media, such regulation would violate the First Amendment with respect to newspapers. Finally, since such regulation of newspapers would be impossible, it would likewise be impossible for the Government to approve an exclusionary policy of newspapers in the sense that it has approved the challenged policy of the broadcasters.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 573 (1968); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966).

This was not new doctrine, for we have long recognized in a variety of contexts that the First Amendment “necessarily protects the right to receive [information].” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943); see, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 388 (1967) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965).

The Fairness Doctrine was recognized and implicitly approved by Congress in the 1959 amendments to § 315 of the Communications Act. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a). As amended, § 315 (a) recognizes the obligation of broadcasters “to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.”

The Fairness Doctrine was first fully set forth in Report in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949), and was elaborated upon in Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964). The statutory authority of the Commission to promulgate this doctrine and related regulations derives from the mandate to the “Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires,” to promulgate “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions ... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act], . . .” 47 U. S. C. §303 (r).

See John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); see also Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F Radio Reg. 602 (1960); The Evening News Assn., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 283 (1950).

If the broadcaster presents one side of a question, and does not wish to present the other side himself, he can fulfill his fairness obligation by announcing his willingness to broadcast opposing views by volunteers. See Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F. C. C. 620 (1964). If the broadcaster rejects a volunteer spokesman as “inappropriate,” he must seek out others. See Richard G. Ruff, 19 F. C. C. 2d 838 (1969). The broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation of opposing views if sponsorship is unavailable. See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963).

Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, supra, n. 16, at 10424.

Notice of Inquiry: The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F. C. C. 2d 26, 27-28 (1971); see also Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, supra, n. 16, at 10416; Report in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, supra, n. 16.

Thus, the Fairness Doctrine must be sharply distinguished from the “equal time” requirement, which provides that a broadcaster who affords air time to one political candidate must make equal time available to other candidates for the same office. 47 U. S. C. § 315. See also Nicholas Zapple, 23 F. C. C. 2d 707 (1970) (extension of “equal time” rule to cover a candidate’s supporters where spokesmen for other candidates are permitted to purchase air time). Similarly, the Fairness Doctrine must not be confused with the Commission’s “personal attack” and “political editorializing” rules which were upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). The “personal attack” rule provides that “[w]hen, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person,” the licensee must notify the person attacked and offer him an opportunity to respond. 47 CFR § 73.123. The “political editorializing” rule provides that when a licensee endorses a candidate for political office it must give other candidates or their spokesmen an opportunity to respond. See, e. g., 47 CFR § 73.123. Thus, unlike the Fairness Doctrine, the “equal time,” “personal attack,” and “political editorializing” rules grant a particular group or individual a limited “right of access” to the airwaves not subject to the "journalistic supervision” of the broadcaster.

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945).

Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 773 n. 26 (1972).

See generally D. Lacy, Freedom and Communications 69 (1961); Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward the Enforcement of Discretion, 1973 Duke L. J. 89, 94-95, 98-99; Jaffe, supra, n. 23, at 773 n. 26; Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 723, 727 (1972); Malone, Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 193, 205-211, 216 (1972); Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 Va. L. Rev. 574 (1971); Barron, Access to the Press — A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 Va. L. Rev. 636 (1971); Note, A Fair Break for Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532 (1971) ; Note, The Wasteland Revisited: A Modest Attack Upon the FCC’s Category System, 17 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 868, 870-875 (1970); Comment, Freedom of Speech and the Individual’s Right of Access to the Airwaves, 1970 Law & Social Order 424, 428; Note, The Federal Communications Commission’s Fairness Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation oí a Right of Access to the Mass Media, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 294, 296 (1969).

Although admitting that the Fairness Doctrine “has not always brought to the public perfect or, indeed, even consistently high-quality treatment of all public events and issues,” the Court nevertheless suggests that a broadcaster who fails to fulfill his fairness obligations does so “at the risk of losing his license.” Ante, at 130-131. The Court does not cite a single instance, however, in which this sanction has ever been invoked because of a broadcaster’s failure to comply with the Fairness Doctrine. Indeed, this is not surprising, for the Commission has acted with great reluctance in this area, intervening in only the most extreme cases of broadcaster abuse. See Mallamud, supra, at 115-122; Canby, supra, at 725-727; Malone, supra, at 215-216; see also Cox & Johnson, Broadcasting in America and the FCC’s License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F. C. C. 2d 1 (1968).

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 392 n. 18, quoting J. Mill, On Liberty 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947).

Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222 (emphasis added).

Indeed, the failure to provide adequate means for groups and individuals to bring new issues or ideas to the attention of the public explains, at least to some extent, “the development of new media to convey unorthodox, unpopular, and new ideas. Sit-ins and demonstrations testify to . . . the inability to secure access to the conventional means of reaching and changing public opinion. [For by] *191the bizarre and unsettling nature of his technique, the demonstrator hopes to arrest and divert attention long enough to compel the public to ponder his message.” Barron, 80 Harv. L. Rev., at 1647; cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

Brief for American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 52.

Brief for Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 34.

Id., at 40.

Brief for National Broadcasting Company, Inc. 10.

Brief for Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, Inc. 31.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503,512 (1969).

United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (SDNY 1943), aff’d, 326 U. S. 1 (1945). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).

The Court does make the rather novel suggestion, however, that editorial advertising might indeed be “inappropriate” because “listeners and viewers constitute a ‘captive audience.’ ” Ante, at 127. In support of this proposition, the Court cites our decisions in Public Utilities Comm’n v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451 (1952), and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). In Poliak, however, we explicitly rejected, a claim that the broadcasting of radio programs in streetcars violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of passengers who did not wish to listen to those programs. And in Kovacs, although we upheld an ordinance forbidding the use on public streets of sound trucks which emit “loud and raucous noises,” we did so because the ordinance was concerned, not with the content of speech, but, rather, with the offensiveness of the sounds themselves. Here, however, the Court seems perfectly willing to allow broadcasters to continue to invade the “privacy” of the home through commercial advertising and even controversial programming under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus, the Court draws its line solely on the basis of the content of the particular speech involved and, of course, we have consistently held that, where content is at issue, constitutionally protected speech may not be prohibited because of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S., at 509; see, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 117 (1972). The suggestion that constitutionally protected speech may be banned because some per*195sons may find the ideas expressed offensive is, in itself, offensive to the very meaning of the First Amendment.

Indeed, approximately 95% of American homes contain at least one television set, and that set is turned on for an average of more than five and one-half hours per day. See Hearings on H. R. 13721 before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1970) (statement of Dean Burch, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission). As to the potential influence of the electronic media on American thought, see generally A. Krock, The Consent of the Governed 66 (1971); H. Mendelsohn & I. Crespi, Polls, Television, and the New Politics 256, 264 (1970); Malone, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform, at 197.

H. R. Rep. No. 91-257, p. 6 (1969). According to one study, 67% of Americans prefer the electronic media to other sources of information. See G. Wyckoff, The Image Candidates 13-14 (1968). See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules, 22 F. C. C. 2d 339, 344 (1970) (59% of Americans depend on television as their principal source of news).

It should be noted that, although the Fairness Doctrine is at least arguably relevant to the public’s interest in receiving suitable exposure to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on controversial issues, it is not in any sense relevant to the individual’s interest in obtaining access to the airwaves for the purpose of effective self-expression. For the individual’s interest in expressing his own views in a manner of his own choosing is an inherently personal one, and it can never be satisfied by the expression of “similar” views by a surrogate spokesman.

Indeed, pre-1927 regulation of radio gave no discretion to the Federal Government to deny the right to operate a broadcast station. See 1 A. Socolow, The Law of Radio Broadcasting 38 (1939); H. Warner, Radio & Television Law 757 et seq. (1948); see generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 210-214 (1943).

67 Cong. Rec. 5479 (Rep. White).

These include, of course, not only public broadcasting, but also “amateur operation, aircraft, police, defense, and navigation . . . .” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 388.

Although this licensing scheme necessarily restricts the First Amendment rights of those groups or individuals who are denied the “right” to operate a broadcast station, it does not, in and of itself, violate the First Amendment. For it has long been recognized that when “ [conflicting demands on the same [forum] . . . compel the [Government] to make choices among potential users and uses,” neutral rules of allocation to govern that scarce communications resource are not per se unconstitutional. Police Dept, of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 98 (1972); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939). And, in the context of broadcasting, it would be ironic indeed “if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible . . . by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum.” Bed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 389.

Id., at 388.

See, e. g., 47 U. S. C. § 326.

Thus, as the Court of Appeals recognized, “[i]n normal programming time, closely controlled and edited by broadcasters, the constellation of constitutional interests would be substantially different.” 146 U. S. App. D. G, at 193, 450 F. 2d, at 654.

See, e. g., Police Dept, of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, at 98; Groyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S., at 115; Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 554; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 398 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, at 575-576; Schneider v. State, supra, at 160.

Contrary to the Court’s assertion, the existence of the Fairness Doctrine cannot in any sense rationalize this discrimination. Indeed, the Fairness Doctrine is wholly unresponsive to the need for individual access to the airwaves for the purpose of effective self-expression. See also n. 38, supra.

The Court of Appeals did, however, suggest certain possible contours of implementation. For example, the court noted that broadcasters should be permitted “to place an outside limit on the total amount of editorial advertising they will sell,” and “ 'reasonable regulation’ of the placement of advertisements is altogether proper.” 146 U. S. App. D. C., at 202, 450 F. 2d, at 663.

Id., at 204r-205, 450 F. 2d, at 665-666.