delivered the opinion of the Court.
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The question for our decision is whether this provision is itself in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
HH
This litigation began almost 20 years ago in 1963, when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state court *530seeking desegregation of the District’s schools.1 The case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial court issued an opinion finding that the District was substantially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a desegregation plan for immediate use. App. 139.
On the District’s appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution.2 The court explained that under the California Constitution “state school boards . . . bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be *531de facto or de jure in origin.” 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 34. The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of a “reasonably feasible” plan for school desegregation. Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.3
On remand, the trial court rejected the District’s mostly voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a second plan that included substantial mandatory school reassignment and transportation — “busing”—on a racial and ethnic basis.4 The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but after one year’s experience, all parties to the litigation were dissatisfied. See 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 636, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 497 (1981). Although the plan continued in operation, the trial court began considering alternatives in October 1979.
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California ratified Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and *532Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution.5 Proposition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . ”6
*533Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and busing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied the District’s application. The court reasoned that Proposition I was of no effect in this case in light of the court’s 1970 finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reassignment and transportation.7
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1981). The court found that the trial court’s 1970 findings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional segregation.8 Thus, Proposition I *534was applicable to the trial court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan requiring mandatory student reassignment and transportation. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 654, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509. The court found no obligation on the part of the State to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial segregation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. Ibid. The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655,170 Cal. Rptr., at 509.9
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and constitutional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a.10 We granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 892 (1981).
*535II
We agree with the California Court of Appeal m rejecting the contention that once a State chooses to do “more” than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede.11 We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive of a State’s democratic processes and of its ability to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the decisions of this Court.
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Constitution. The state courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The school districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to *536take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they remain free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate desegregation.12
Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is unconstitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I employs an “explicit racial classification” and imposes a “race-specific” burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state-created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to enforce the state-created right to desegregated schools, petitioners contend, Proposition I creates a “dual court system” that discriminates on the basis of race.13 They emphasize that other state-created rights may be vindicated by the state courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue that the “dual court system” created by Proposition I is unconstitutional unless supported by a compelling state interest.
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to further a compelling state interest. “A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid *537and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a racial classification.14 It neither says nor implies that persons are to be treated differently on account of their race. It simply forbids state courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer — neighborhood schooling — is made available regardless of race in the discretion of school boards.15 Indeed, even if Proposition I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the demographic mix of the District it is not .clear which race or races would be affected the most or in what way.16 In addition, this Court previously has held that even when a neutral law has a dis*538proportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.17
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters.18 This distinction is implicit in the Court’s repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board’s mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for desegregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.19 In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 390, n. 5 (1969), we were careful to note that the laws under review did more than “mere[ly] repeal” existing antidiscrimination legislation.20 *539In sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.21
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race-related legislation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the authority of States to deal with the problems of our heterogeneous population. States would be committed irrevocably to legislation that has proved unsuccessful or even harmful in practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that discouraged the States from providing greater protection to racial minorities.22 Nor would the purposes of the Amendment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legislation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities but which has produced just the opposite effects.23 Yet these would be the results of requiring a State *540to maintain legislation that has proved unworkable or harmful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legislation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to require the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction of their State Constitution when that Constitution itself vests final authority in the people.
III
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing considerations by arguing that Proposition I is not a “mere repeal.” Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal a state-created right but fundamentally alters the judicial system so that “those seeking redress from racial isolation in violation of state law must be satisfied -with less than full relief from a state court.”24 We do not view Hunter as controlling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners’ characterization of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal.
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The *541amendment “not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect.” 393 U. S., at 389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would be forced to clear an additional hurdle.25 As such, the charter amendment placed an impermissible, “special burde[n] on racial minorities within the governmental process.” Id., at 391.26
Hunter involved more than a “mere repeal” of the fair housing ordinance; persons seeking antidiscrimination housing laws — presumptively racial minorities — were “singled out for mandatory referendums while no other group . . . face[d] that obstacle.” James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 142 (1971). By contrast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefited from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is less than a “repeal” of the California Equal Protection Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the State Constitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to desegregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor can it be said that Proposition I distorts the political process for racial reasons or that it allocates governmental or judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory principle. “The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the *542same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). Remedies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desirable in another. The remedies available for violation of the antitrust laws, for example, are different than those available for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a “dual court system” — one for the racial majority and one for the racial minority — is not established simply because civil rights remedies are different from those available in other areas.27 Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court to caution that although “in some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan,” in other circumstances “its ‘costs,’ both in financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable.” See n. 3, swpra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the State to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by Proposition I.28
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the Proposition unconstitutional on its face.
*543H-t <1
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless unconstitutional because enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposition were well stated in the Proposition itself.29 Voters may have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. The court found that voters also may have considered that the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, actually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the desegregation problem. See n. 1, supra. It characterized petitioners’ claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions of voters as but “pure speculation.” 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509.
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court considered the constitutionality of another California Proposition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had concluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it gave the State’s approval to private racial discrimination. This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the California court. The Court noted that the California court was “armed . . . with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact” of the Proposition and “familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate.” Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, *544again involving the circumstances of passage and the potential impact of a Proposition adopted at a statewide election, we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state appellate court.30
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In determining whether such a purpose was the motivating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official action provides “an ‘important starting point.’” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977).
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is composed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See nn. 1 and 16, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one ■means of achieving the state-created right to desegregated education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still may order desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.31
*545Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no reason to challenge the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509. In this case the Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of the electorate.32 It received support from members of all races.33 The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the Court of Appeal or impugn the motives of the State’s electorate.
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is
Affirmed.
In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23.7% white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7.7% Asian and other. See 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 501 (1981).
“The findings in this case adequately support the trial court’s conclusion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in nature. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)] that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation 'regardless of its cause.’ ” Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d, at 285, 551 P. 2d, at 30. The court explained that federal cases were not controlling:
“In focusing primarily on. . . federal decisions . . . defendant ignores a significant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively establish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.” Id., at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 33-34.
In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the State Supreme Court discussed the “busing” question: “While critics have sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and time again emphasized that ‘busing’ is not a constitutional end in itself but is simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district’s constitutional obligation in this field. . . . [I]n some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in other instances its ‘costs,’ both in financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable.” Id., at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation process so long as the school board takes “reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation,” id., at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that “a court cannot properly issue a ‘busing’ order so long as a school district continues to meet its constitutional obligations.” Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these children were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the voluntary transfer of some 30,000 students.
Respondent Bustop, Inc., unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (Powell, J., in chambers).
Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const., Art. 18, § 1. The State Senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the State Assembly by a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a majority of the vote in each of the State’s 58 counties and in 79 of the State’s 80 assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, November 6, 1979, Election 3-4, 43-49.
Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to Art. 1, § 7(a), of the California Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in relevant part:
“(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States *533Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
“Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after the effective date of this subdivision as amended.
“In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment.”
The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the revised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 U. S. 1343 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
“When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segregative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the *534findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial imbalance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements.” 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 645-646, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 503.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived minority children of a “vested right” to desegregated education in violation of due process. See id., at 655-656,170 Cal. Rptr., at 509-510. Petitioners no longer advance this claim.
On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reassignment under the Superior Court’s revised plan be terminated on April 20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. According to respondent Board of Education, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent Board of Education 10.
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 1981, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 513 F. Supp. 717. The District Court found that there was *535a “fair chance” that intentional segregation by the District could be demonstrated. Id,., at 720. The District Court’s order was vacated on the following day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (1981). On remand the District Court denied the District’s motion to dismiss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for Respondent Board of Education 10, n. 4.
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary desegregation plan.
Respondent Bustop, Inc., argues that far from doing “more” than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the Amendment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief for Respondent Bustop, Inc., 10-18. We do not reach this contention.
In this respect this case differs from the situation presented in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, ante, p. 457.
In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California Supreme Court stated that “the amendment neither releases school districts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.” McKinny v. Oxnard Union High School District Board of Trustees, 31 Cal. 3d 79, 92-93, 642 P. 2d 460, 467 (1982). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state courts when enforcing the State Constitution. Thus, the Proposition would not bar state-court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for desegregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 244, 627 F. 2d 1221, 1230 (1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to require busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the “effective avenues for desegregation” left open by the legislation).
“[I]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not racial discrimination in the state’s schools, that petitioners challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment in this case.” Brief for Petitioners 48.
In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court invalidated a city charter amendment which placed a special burden on racial minorities in the political process. The Court considered that although the law was neutral on its face, “the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority.” Id., at 391. In light of this reality and the distortion of the political process worked by the charter amendment, the Court considered that the amendment employed a racial classification despite its facial neutrality. In this case the elements underlying the holding in Hunter are missing. See infra.
A neighborhood school policy in itself does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 28 (1971) (“Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes”). Cf. 20 U. S. C. § 1701: “(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that — (1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and (2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignments.”
In the Los Angeles School District, white students are now the racial minority, see n. 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial minorities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the population. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, California, Advance Reports 6 (Mar. 1981).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971).
Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial desegregation. It applies neutrally to “pupil school assignment or pupil transportation” in general. Even so, it is clear that court-ordered busing in excess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of desegregating schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption of Proposition I.
See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S., at 531, n. 5 (“Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I, is not per se a constitutional violation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is unconstitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
In Hunter we noted that “we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing [antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” 393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Proposition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not because it repealed two pieces of antidiscrimination legislation, but because the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: “Here *539we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” 387 U. S., at 380-381.
Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967).
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) (“To hold . . . that every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally ‘locks in’ the public sponsor so that it may not be dropped . . . would plainly discourage the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run”) (Burger, C. J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 (“Opponents of state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable”) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In his dissenting opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with the “delicate and troublesome problems of race relations.” He noted: “The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are difficult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and *540compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as the popular initiative and referendum.” 387 U. S., at 395-396.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. See id., at 7-8 (“The fact that a state may be free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we argue, provide less than full judicial remedy”).
“In the case before us . . . the city of Akron has not attempted to allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest.” 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Hunter Court noted that although “the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner,” id., at 391, a charter amendment making it more difficult to pass antidiscrimination legislation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental process.
Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition is neutral on its face, however, and respondents — as well as the State in its amicus brief — take issue with petitioners’ interpretation of the provision.
Similarly, a “dual constitution” is not established when the State chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some areas but not others. Nor is a “dual executive branch” created when an agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 627 F. 2d 1221 (1980) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or federal courts, from requiring busing).
The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose:
“[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and protecting the environment.”
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 253 (“The extent of deference that one pays to the trial court’s determination of the factual issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts”) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In Brown v. Califano, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a federal statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) from requiring busing “to a school other than the school which is nearest the student’s home,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, was not unconstitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage school districts to desegregate through other means, and the enforcement powers of the Department of Justice were left untouched. The court therefore concluded that the limits on HEW’s ability to order mandatory busing did not have a discriminatory *545effect. And, having done so, it refused to inquire into legislative motivation: “Absent discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into legislative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable.” 201 U. S. App. D. C., at 248, 627 F. 2d, at 1234 (footnote omitted).
Cf. Washington v. Davis, supra, at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is unrealistic ... to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for it”).
Proposition I received support from 73.9% of the voters in Los Angeles County which has a “minority” population — including persons of Spanish origin — of over 50%. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, November 6, 1979, Election 3. See n. 16, supra. By contrast, the Proposition received its smallest percentage of the vote in Humboldt and Marin Counties which are nearly all-white in composition.