dissenting.
The Court today addresses two state ballot measures, a constitutional amendment and a statutory initiative, each of which is admittedly designed to substantially curtail, if not eliminate, the use of mandatory student assignment or transportation as a remedy for de facto segregation. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, ante, p. 457 (Seattle), the Court concludes that Washington’s Initiative 350, which effectively prevents school boards from ordering mandatory school assignment in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unconstitutional because “it uses the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking *548structure, and thus imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.” Seattle, ante, at 470. Inexplicably, the Court simultaneously concludes that California’s Proposition I, which effectively prevents a state court from ordering the same mandatory remedies in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation, is constitutional because “having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout the United States.” Ante, at 542. Because I fail to see how a fundamental redefinition of the governmental decisionmaking structure with respect to the same racial issue can be unconstitutional when the State seeks to remove the authority from local school boards, yet constitutional when the State attempts to achieve the same result by limiting the power of its courts, I must dissent from the Court’s decision to uphold Proposition I.
I
In order to understand fully the implications of the Court s action today, it is necessary to place the facts concerning the adoption of Proposition I in their proper context. Nearly two decades ago, a unanimous California Supreme Court declared that “[t]he segregation of school children into separate schools because of their race, even though the physical facilities and the methods and quality of instruction in the several schools may be equal, deprives the children of the minority group of equal opportunities for education and denies them equal protection and due process of the law.” Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 880, 382 P. 2d 878, 880-881 (1963). Recognizing that the “right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation” do not differ according to the cause of racial isolation, the California Supreme Court declined to adopt the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation en-grafted by this Court on the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., *549at 881, 382 P. 2d, at 881-882. Instead, the court clearly held that “school boards [must] take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regardless of its cause.” Id., at 881, 382 P. 2d, at 882.
As the California Supreme Court subsequently explained, the duty established in Jackson does not require that “each school in a district . . . reflect the racial composition of the district as a whole.” Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 302, 551 P. 2d 28, 42 (1976) (Crawford I). Rather, it is sufficient that school authorities “take reasonable and feasible steps to eliminate segregated schools, i. e., schools in which the minority student enrollment is so disproportionate as realistically to isolate minority students from other students and thus deprive minority students of an integrated educational experience.” Id., at 303, 551 P. 2d, at 43 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the California courts have made clear that the primary responsibility for implementing this state constitutional duty lies with local school boards. “[S]o long as a local school board initiates and implements reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation in its district, and so long as such steps produce meaningful progress in the alleviation of such segregation, and its harmful consequences, . . . the judiciary should [not] intervene in the desegregation process.” Id., at 305-306, 551 P. 2d, at 45. If, however, a school board neglects or refuses to implement meaningful programs designed to bring about an end to racial isolation in the public schools, “the court is left with no alternative but to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of minority children.” Id., at 307, 551 P. 2d, at 45. When judicial intervention is necessary, the court “may exercise broad equitable powers in formulating and supervising a plan which the court finds will insure meaningful progress to alleviate the harmful consequences of school segregation in the district.” Id., at 307, 551 P. 2d, at 46. Moreover, “once a school board defaults in its constitutional task, the court, in *550devising a remedial order, is not precluded from requiring the busing of children as part of a reasonably feasible desegregation plan.” Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
Like so many other decisions protecting the rights of minorities, California’s decision to eradicate the evils of segregation regardless of cause has not been a popular one. In the nearly two decades since the State Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson, there have been repeated attempts to restrain school boards and courts from enforcing this constitutional guarantee by means of mandatory student transfers or assignments. In 1970, shortly after the San Francisco Unified School District voluntarily adopted a desegregation plan involving mandatory student assignment, the California Legislature enacted Education Code § 1009.5, Cal. Educ. Code Ann. §1009.5, currently codified at Cal. Educ. Code Ann. §35350 (West 1978), which provides that “[n]o governing board of a school district shall require any student or pupil to be transported for any purpose or for any reason without the written permission of the parent or guardian.” In San Francisco Unified School District v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P. 2d 669 (1971), the California Supreme Court interpreted this provision only to bar a school district from compelling students, without parental consent, to use means of transportation furnished by the district. Construing the statute to prohibit nonconsensual assignment of students for the purpose of eradicating dejure or defacto segregation, the court concluded, would clearly violate both the State and the Federal Constitutions by “exorcising a method that in many circumstances is the sole and exclusive means of eliminating racial segregation in the schools.” Id., at 943, 479 P. 2d, at 671.
The very next year, opponents of mandatory student assignment for the purpose of achieving racial balance again attempted to eviscerate the state constitutional guarantee recognized in Jackson. Proposition 21, which was enacted by referendum in November 1972, stated that “[n]o public school *551student shall, because of his race, creed, or color, be assigned to or be required to attend a particular school.” Predictably, the California Supreme Court struck down Proposition 21 “for the same reasons set forth by us in Johnson.” Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 324, 530 P. 2d 605, 613 (1975).
Finally, in 1979, the people of California enacted Proposition I. That Proposition, like all of the previous initiatives, effectively deprived California courts of the ability to enforce the state constitutional guarantee that minority children will not attend racially isolated schools by use of what may be “the sole and exclusive means of eliminating racial segregation in the schools,” San Francisco Unified School District v. Johnson, supra, at 943, 479 P. 2d, at 671, mandatory student assignment and transfer. Unlike the earlier attempts to accomplish this objective, however, Proposition I does not purport to prevent mandatory assignments and transfers when such measures are predicated on a violation of the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the only question presented by this case is whether the fact that mandatory transfers may still be made to vindicate federal constitutional rights saves this initiative from the constitutional infirmity presented in the previous attempts to accomplish this same objective. In my view, the recitation of the obvious — that a state constitutional amendment does not override federal constitutional guarantees — cannot work to deprive minority children in California of their federally protected right to the equal protection of the laws.
II
A
In Seattle, the Court exhaustively set out the relevant principles that control the present inquiry. We there found that a series of precedents, exemplified by Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (three-judge court), summarily aff’d, 402 U. S. 935 (1971), establish that the Fourteenth Amendment *552prohibits a State from allocating “governmental power non-neutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process.” Seattle, ante, at 470 (emphasis in original). We concluded that “state action of this kind . . . ‘places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process’ . . . thereby ‘making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities [than for other members of the community] to achieve legislation that is in their interest.’” Ibid, (emphasis in original), quoting Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 391, 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
It is therefore necessary to determine whether Proposition I works a “nonneutral” reallocation of governmental power on the basis of the racial nature of the decision. This determination is also informed by our decision in Seattle. In that case we were presented with a statewide initiative which effectively precluded local school boards from ordering mandatory student assignment or transfer except where required to remedy a constitutional violation. We concluded that the initiative violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it reallocated decisionmaking authority over racial issues from the local school board to a “new and remote level of government.” Seattle, ante, at 483. In reaching this conclusion, we specifically affirmed three principles that are particularly relevant to the present inquiry.
First, we rejected the State’s argument that a statewide initiative prohibiting mandatory student assignment has no “racial overtones” simply because it does not mention the words “race” or “integration.” Seattle, ante, at 471. We noted that “[njeither the initiative’s sponsors, nor the District Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350.” Ibid. In light of its language and the history surrounding its adoption, we found it “beyond reasonable dispute . . . that the initiative was enacted “‘because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon’ busing for inte*553gration. ” Ibid., quoting Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979). Moreover, we rejected the Solicitor General’s remarkable contention, a contention also pressed here, that “busing for integration . . . is not a peculiarly ‘racial’ issue at all.” Seattle, ante, at 471-472. While not discounting the value of an integrated education to nonminority students, we concluded that Lee v. Nyquist, supra, definitively established that “desegregation of the public schools ... at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed for that purpose,” thereby bringing it within the Hunter doctrine. Seattle, ante, at 472.
Second, the Seattle Court determined that Initiative 350 unconstitutionally reallocated power from local school boards to the state legislature or the statewide electorate. After the enactment of Initiative 350, local school boards continued to exercise considerable discretion over virtually all educational matters, including student assignment. Those seeking to eradicate de facto segregation, however, were forced to “surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable legislative action,” Seattle, ante, at 474, for instead of seeking relief from the local school board, those pursuing this racial issue were forced to appeal to a different and more remote level of government. Just as in Hunter v. Erickson, supra, where those interested in enacting fair housing ordinances were compelled to gain the support of a majority of the electorate, we held that this reallocation of governmental power along racial lines offends the Equal Protection Clause. Our holding was not altered by the fact that those seeking to combat de facto segregation could still pursue their cause by petitioning local boards to enact voluntary measures or by seeking action from the state legislature. Nor were we persuaded by the argument that no transfer of power had occurred because the State was ultimately responsible for the educational policy of local school boards. We found it sufficient that Initiative 350 had deprived those seek*554ing to redress a racial harm of the right to seek a particularly effective form of redress from the level of government ordinarily empowered to grant the remedy.
Finally, the Court’s decision in Seattle implicitly rejected the argument that state action that reallocates governmental power along racial lines can be immunized by the fact that it specifically leaves intact rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that mandatory pupil reassignment was still available as a remedy for de jure segregation did not alter the conclusion that an unconstitutional reallocation of power had occurred with respect to those seeking to combat de facto racial isolation in the public schools.
B
In my view, these principles inexorably lead to the conclusion that California’s Proposition I works an unconstitutional reallocation of state power by depriving California courts of the ability to grant meaningful relief to those seeking to vindicate the State’s guarantee against de facto segregation in the public schools. Despite Proposition I’s apparent neutrality, it is “beyond reasonable dispute,” Seattle, ante, at 471, and the majority today concedes, that “court-ordered busing in excess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . prompted the initiation and probably the adoption of Proposition I.” Ante, at 538, n. 18 (emphasis in original).1 Because “minorities may consider busing for integration to be ‘legislation that is in their interest,”’ Seattle, ante, at 474, quoting *555Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring), Proposition I is sufficiently “racial” to invoke the Hunter doctrine.2
Nor can there be any doubt that Proposition I works a substantial reallocation of state power. Prior to the enactment of Proposition I, those seeking to vindicate the rights enumerated by the California Supreme Court in Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963), just as those interested in attaining any other educational objective, followed a two-stage procedure. First, California’s minority community could attempt to convince the local school board voluntarily to comply with its constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to eliminate racial isolation in the public schools. If the board was either unwilling or unable to carry out its constitutional duty, those seeking redress could petition the California state courts to require school officials to live up to their obligations. Busing could be required as part of a judicial remedial order. Crawford I, 17 Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
Whereas Initiative 350 attempted to deny minority children the first step of this procedure, Proposition I eliminates by fiat the second stage: the ability of California courts to order meaningful compliance with the requirements of the State Constitution. After the adoption of Proposition I, the only method of enforcing against a recalcitrant school board the state constitutional duty to eliminate racial isolation is to petition either the state legislature or the electorate as a whole. Clearly, the rules of the game have been signifi*556cantly changed for those attempting to vindicate this state constitutional right.3
The majority seeks to conceal the unmistakable effects of Proposition I by calling it a “mere repeal” of the State’s earlier commitment to do “ ‘more’ than the Fourteenth Amendment requires.” Ante, at 535. Although it is true that we have never held that the “mere repeal of an existing [antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment,” Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 5, it is equally clear that the reallocation of governmental power created by Proposition I is not a “mere repeal” within the meaning of any of our prior decisions.
In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977), the new members of the Dayton Board of Education repudiated a resolution drafted by their predecessors admitting the Board’s role in the establishment of a segregated school system and calling for various remedial actions. In *557concluding that the Board was constitutionally permitted to withdraw its own prior mea culpa, this Court was careful to note that “[t]he Board had not acted to undo operative regulations affecting the assignment of pupils or other aspects of the management of school affairs.” Id., at 413 (emphasis added). Therefore, the only time that this Court has squarely held that a “mere repeal” did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, it was presented with a situation where a governmental entity rescinded its own prior statement of policy without affecting any existing educational policy. It is no surprise that such conduct passed constitutional muster.
By contrast, in Seattle, Hunter, and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967),4 the three times that this Court has explicitly rejected the argument that a proposed change constituted a “mere repeal” of an existing policy, the alleged rescission was accomplished by a governmental entity other than the entity that had taken the initial action, and resulted in a drastic alteration of the substantive effect of existing policy. This case falls squarely within this latter category. To be sure, the right to be free from racial isolation in the public schools remains unaffected by Proposition I. See ante, at 535-536; see McKinny v. Oxnard Union High School District Board of Trustees, 31 Cal. 3d 79, 92-93, 642 P. 2d 460, 467 (1982). But Proposition I does repeal the power of the state court to enforce this existing constitutional guarantee through the use of mandatory pupil assignment and transfer.
The majority asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment does not “require the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction of their State Constitution when that Constitution itself vests final authority in the people.” Ante, at 540. A state court’s authority to order appropriate remedies for *558state constitutional violations, however, is no more based on the “final authority” of the people than the power of the local Seattle School Board to make decisions regarding pupil assignment is premised on the State’s ultimate control of the educational process. Rather, the authority of California courts to order mandatory student assignments in this context springs from the same source as the authority underlying other remedial measures adopted by state and federal courts in the absence of statutory authorization: the “courts power to provide equitable relief” to remedy a constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 30 (1971); Crawford I, 17 Cal. 3d, at 307, 551 P. 2d, at 46 (“a trial court may exercise broad equitable powers in formulating and supervising a plan which the court finds will insure meaningful progress to alleviate . . . school segregation”). Even assuming that the source of a court’s power to remedy a constitutional violation can be traced back to “the people,” the majority’s conclusion that “the people” can therefore confer that remedial power on a discriminatory basis is plainly inconsistent with our prior decisions. In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S., at 392, we struck down the referendum at issue even though the people of Akron, Ohio, undoubtedly retained “final authority” for all legislation. Similarly, in Seattle we concluded that the reallocation of power away from local school boards offended the Equal Protection Clause even though the State of Washington “is ultimately responsible for providing education within its borders.” Ante, at 477. The fact that this change was enacted through popular referendum, therefore, cannot immunize it from constitutional review. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 736-737 (1964).
As in Seattle, Hunter, and Reitman, Proposition I’s repeal of the state court’s enforcement powers was the work of an independent governmental entity, and not of the state courts themselves. That this repeal drastically alters the substan*559tive rights granted by existing policy is patently obvious from the facts of this litigation.5 By prohibiting California courts from ordering mandatory student assignment when necessary to eliminate racially isolated schools, Proposition I has placed an enormous barrier between minority children and the effective enjoyment of their constitutional rights, a barrier that is not placed in the path of those who seek to vindicate other rights granted by state law. This Court’s precedents demonstrate that, absent a compelling state interest, which respondents have hardly demonstrated, such a discriminatory barrier cannot stand.6
*560The fact that California attempts to cloak its discrimination in the mantle of the Fourteenth Amendment does not alter this result. Although it might seem “paradoxical” to some Members of this Court that a referendum that adopts the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment might violate it, the paradox is specious. Because of the Supremacy Clause, Proposition I would have precisely the same legal effect if it contained no reference to the Fourteenth Amendment. The lesson of Seattle is that a State, in prohibiting conduct that is not required by the Fourteenth Amendment, may nonetheless create a discriminatory reallocation of governmental power that does violate equal protection. The fact that some less effective avenues remain open to those interested in mandatory student assignment to eliminate racial isolation, like the fact that the voters in Hunter conceivably might have enacted fair housing legislation, or that those interested in busing to eliminate racial isolation in Seattle conceivably might use the State’s referendum process, does not justify the discriminatory reallocation of governmental decision-making.
In this case, the reallocation of power occurs in the judicial process — the major arena minorities have used to ensure the protection of rights “in their interest.” Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). Certainly, Hunter and Seattle cannot be distinguished on the ground that they concerned the reallocation of legislative power, whereas Proposition I redistributes the inherent power of a court to tailor the remedy to the violation. As we have long recognized, courts too often have been “the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 430 (1963). See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S., at 377 (invalidating state constitutional amendment because “[t]he right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State’s basic charter, immune from legislative, ex*561ecutive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government”) (emphasis added). It is no wonder, as the present case amply illustrates, that whatever progress has been made towards the elimination of de facto segregation has come from the California courts. Indeed, Proposition I, by denying full access to the only branch of government that has been willing to address this issue meaningfully, is far worse for those seeking to vindicate the plainly unpopular cause of racial integration in the public schools than a simple reallocation of an often unavailable and unresponsive legislative process. To paraphrase, “[i]t surely is an excessively formal exercise ... to argue that the procedural revisions at issue in Hunter [and Seattle] imposed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of decisionmaking authority worked by [Proposition I] does not erect comparable political obstacles.” Seattle, ante, at 475, n. 17.
Ill
Even if the effects of Proposition I somehow can be distinguished from the enactments at issue in Hunter and Seattle, the result reached by the majority today is still plainly inconsistent with our precedents. Because it found that the segregation of the California public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the state trial court never considered whether Proposition I was itself unconstitutional because it was the product of discriminatory intent. Despite the absence of any factual record on this issue, the Court of Appeal rejected petitioners’ argument that the law was motivated by a discriminatory intent on the ground that the recitation of several potentially legitimate purposes in the legislation’s preamble rendered any claim that it had been enacted for an invidious purpose “pure speculation.” 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 655, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 509 (1981).
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977), we declared that “[determining *562whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Petitioners assert that the disproportionate impact of Proposition I, combined with the circumstances surrounding its adoption and the history of opposition to integration cited supra, at 548-551, clearly indicates the presence of discriminatory intent. See Brief for Petitioners 64-96. Yet despite the fact that no inquiry has been conducted into these allegations by either the trial or the appellate court, this Court, in its haste to uphold the banner of “neighborhood schools,” affirms a factual determination that was never made. Such blind allegiance to the conclusory statements of a lower court is plainly forbidden by our prior decisions.7
IV
Proposition I is in some sense “better” than the Washington initiative struck down in Seattle.8 In their generosity, California voters have allowed those seeking racial balance to petition the very school officials who have steadfastly maintained the color line at the schoolhouse door to comply voluntarily with their continuing state constitutional duty to desegregate. At the same time, the voters have deprived minorities of the only method of redress that has proved effective — the full remedial powers of the state judiciary. In the name of the State’s “ability to experiment,” ante, at 535, the Court today allows this placement of yet another burden *563in the path of those seeking to counter the effects of nearly three centuries of racial prejudice. Because this decision is neither justified by our prior decisions nor consistent with our duty to guarantee all citizens the equal protection of the laws, I must dissent.
Just as in Seattle, the fact that other types of student transfers conceivably might be prohibited does not alter this conclusion: “Neither the initiative’s sponsors, nor the District Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by” Proposition I. Seattle, ante, at 471. Indeed in their response to the petition for certiorari, respondents characterized Proposition I as addressing but “one narrow area: the power of a state court to order mandatory student assignment or transportation as a desegregation remedy. ” Brief in Opposition 9.
It is therefore irrelevant whether the “benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially neutral,” as the majority asserts. Ante, at 544; see ante, at 537. In Seattle, ante, at 472, we specifically rejected the argument that because some minorities as well as whites supported the initiative, it could not be considered a racial classification.
There can be no question that the practical effect of Proposition I will be to deprive state courts of “the sole and exclusive means of eliminating racial segregation in the schools.” San Francisco Unified School District v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 943, 479 P. 2d 669, 671 (1971). As we have often noted, “bus transportation has long been an integral part of all public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a truly effective remedy could be devised without continued reliance upon it.” North Carolina Board of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). Moreover, Proposition I prevents a state court from ordering school officials to take any action respecting pupil school assignment, as well as pupil transportation. Presumably, state courts could not design a remedy involving the “pairing” or “clustering” of schools, even if such a remedy did not involve any “busing.” In the present case, the state trial court found that the voluntary programs proposed by the Los Angeles School Board were “constitutionally suspect” because they “place[d] the burden of relieving the racial isolation of the minority student upon the minority student.” App. 160. Consequently, since “a voluntary program would not serve to integrate the community’s schools,” Seattle, ante, at 473, n. 16, Proposition I, like the measures at issue in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (three-judge court), summarily aff’d, 402 U. S. 935 (1971), and Seattle, precludes the effective enjoyment by California’s minority children of their right to eliminate racially isolated schools.
In Reitman v. Mulkey, this Court struck down another California ballot measure, granting every resident the absolute constitutional right to sell or rent his property to whomever he or she chooses. We held that the provision amounted to an unconstitutional authorization of private discrimination.
Indeed Proposition I by its express terms allows for the modification of existing plans upon the application of any interested person. Art. 1, § 7(a).
As the majority notes, Proposition I states that the “people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests,” including, inter alia, “making the most efficient use of . . . limited financial resources,” protecting the “health and safety” of all students, preserving “harmony and tranquility,” and “protecting the environment.” Ante, at 533, n. 6. These purported justifications, while undoubtedly meritorious, are clearly insufficient to sustain the racial classification established by Proposition I. As we have often noted, racial classifications may only be upheld where “necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.” McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964). It goes without saying that a self-serving conclusory statement of necessity will not suffice to fulfill this burden. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 28, 29-31 (1971) (rejecting a similar list of justifications for establishing a racial classification). “In any event, [respondents] have failed to show that the purpose[s] they impute to the [Proposition] could not be accomplished by alternative methods, not involving racial distinctions.” Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 720.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the allegedly compelling interest in establishing “neighborhood schools” so often referred to by the majority appears nowhere in the official list of justifications. The absence of any mention of this supposed justification is not surprising in light of the fact that the Proposition’s ban on student “assignment” effectively prevents desegregation remedies that would not require a student to leave his “neighborhood.” See n. 3, supra.
The majority’s reliance on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), is therefore misplaced. How can any deference be given to the state court’s “knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact” of Proposition I, id., at 378, when no such findings were ever made.
Initiative 350, however, at least did “not hinder [the] State from enforcing [the State] Constitution.” Seattle, ante, at 490, n. 3 (POWELL, J., dissenting).